What are we to think of this discrepancy? Was Austria trying to deceive England for the purpose of arresting her efforts toward diplomatic intervention, or did she wish to offer to Sir Edward Grey an explanation which might assist the British Government to quiet public opinion and resist being drawn in? In any event, in the light of subsequent events, it would seem to show either an inefficient system of diplomacy and double currents in the Government, or an attempt to steal a march on the other powers and put them face to face with a fait accompli — a policy she had so successfully engineered in the case of the BosniaHerzegovina coup.

On the other hand, refreshingly frank is the statement of the German Secretary of State, Von Jagow, that 'he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18.)

'The general opinion in diplomatic circles at Vienna was undecided what its action would be or was trying to convey a different impression of its action at London than at the other capitals.

On July 11, several days before the Austrian note was presented, the French Consul-General at Budapest sent the following report to his Government:

"Questioned in the Chamber on the state of the Austro-Servian question, M. Tisza explained that before everything else it was necessary to wait for the result of the judicial inquiry, as to which he refused at the moment to make any disclosure whatsoever. And the Chamber has given its full approval to this. He also showed himself equally discreet as to the decisions taken at the meeting of Ministers at Vienna, and did not give any indication whether the project of a démarche at Belgrade, with which all the papers of both hemispheres are full, would be followed up. The Chamber assented without hesitation.

"With regard to this démarche it seems that the word has been given to minimize its significance; the anger of the Hungarians has, as it were, evaporated through the virulent articles of the press, which is now unanimous in advising against this step, which might be dangerous. The semi-official press especially would desire that for the word 'démarche,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be substituted the expression 'pourparlers,' which appears to them more friendly and more courteous. Thus, officially, for the moment all is for peace." (Extract, July 11, F. Y. B. no. 11.)

that the Austro-Hungarian Government were determined on war, and that the Austro-Hungarian note had been so drawn up as to make war inevitable.' (Modified quotation, July 27, B. W. P. nos. 40 and 41.)`

2. Efforts of the powers to secure an extension of the time limit

The powers did not, however, lose much time in futile protests against the terms of the Austrian note, but employed all the means at their disposal toward preventing the actual outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Servia. For they felt, as M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to London, said to Sir Edward Grey, that 'Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia, it would be too late for any mediation.' (Modified quotation, B. W. P. no. 10.)

As soon as the terms of the Austrian ultimatum were known, England, Russia, and France made every effort to secure an extension of the period of forty-eight hours which Austria had imposed as the time limit for the receipt of the Servian answer. While evincing a certain sympathy with Austria's difficulties, the powers besought her to extend the time limit. At St. Petersburg, the British Ambassador expressed to M. Sazonof the opinion 'that the important point was to induce Austria to extend the time limit, and that the first thing to do was to bring influence to bear on Austria with that end in view.' His colleague, the French Ambassador, did not agree with this, saying, 'either Austria had made up her mind to act at once or she was bluffing. Whichever it might be, he considered the only chance of averting war was to adopt a firm and united attitude. There was not, he thought, time to carry out the British Ambassador's suggestion.' (Modified quotation, July 24, B. W. P. no. 6.)

On the same date, probably just after that conversation, M. Sazonof telegraphed the Russian Chargé at Vienna

instructions to present the following vigorous protest: 'The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to Belgrade leaves to the powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have arisen. To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the powers, which may result from the action of the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us above all indispensable that the delay allowed Servia to reply should be extended. Austria-Hungary, in declaring herself disposed to inform the powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations, should at least give them the time to consider them. If after such consideration the powers should be convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to advise the Servian Government accordingly. A refusal to extend the period of the ultimatum would render worthless the step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the powers and would be contrary to the basic principles governing international relations.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 13; July 24, R. O. P. no. 4; cf. A. R. B. no. 21.) In communicating this protest to the powers, Russia expressed the hope that similar instructions might be given their representatives at Vienna.

The Russian note sets forth plainly that such an insufficient interval allowed no time for the powers to consider the reasonableness of the Austrian complaint, and so was nugatory of the very purpose of the explanations offered, and contrary to the basic principles of international relations.

Von Jagow, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, upon receipt, at 10 o'clock in the morning of July 25, of a telegram from the German Ambassador at London, 'immediately instructed the German Ambassador at Vi

enna to "pass on" to the Austrian Government Sir Edward Grey's suggestion to secure an extension of the time limit,' but, due to the unfortunate absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl, 'there would, he thought, be delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 18; R. O. P. no. 14.)

The Russian Chargé at Vienna, 'seeing the impossibility of arriving at Ischl in time, telegraphed the proposal to extend the delay of the ultimatum' (modified quotation, July 25, R. O. P. no. 11) and received from the Austrian Government an answer refusing to do so.1 (July 25, R. O. P. no. 12.)

The Italian Ambassador had been given instructions to support the Russian request, but they arrived too late. (July 27, B. W. P. no. 40.) The French Ambassador received similar instructions, so that both at Vienna and at Berlin every effort of diplomacy was made without avail to secure an extension.

After the failure of this effort, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna thought it was useless to press further for an extension of the time limit.2 (July 26, B. W. P. no. 40.)

1 'Count Berchtold telegraphed Baron von Macchio, the Department Chief of the Austrian Foreign Office, instructions to answer the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in his name that Austria could not agree to an extension of the time limit. Baron von Macchio was further directed to add that Servia could reach a peaceful solution, even after the breaking-off of diplomatic relations, by unreservedly accepting the Austrian demands, but that the Austrian Government would be constrained in such case to demand from Servia indemnification for all the expenses and damages forced upon them through the undertaking of military measures.' (Modified quotation, July 25, A. R. B. no. 20; cf. A. R. B. no. 17.)

↑ An explanation of the attitude of the Austrian Government is found in Count Berchtold's dispatch of July 25 to Count Szapary, Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

"For Your Excellency's information and for the regulation of your remarks.

"The Russian Chargé d'Affaires appeared this morning before the First Department Chief in order to express in the name of his Government the wish that the time limit set in our note to Servia be extended.

"This request was made because it was said that the powers had been surprised by our step and that the Russian Government would consider it a

3. The powers influence Servia to make a conciliatory reply

The powers could hardly have had much hope of the success of their request for an extension of the time limit, and as soon as it was certain that Austria would refuse, another effort was made to prevail upon Austria to delay recourse to hostilities after the expiration of the time limit, and the receipt of Servia's reply. (B. W. P. nos. 10 and 11.) It was evident, however, that Austrian action would depend in great measure upon the nature of the Servian reply. Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, when he handed the ultimatum to the Servian Minister, had 'added verbally that in case the note should not be accepted in its entirety within a delay of forty-eight hours, he had orders to leave Belgrade with the staff of the Legation.' (Modified quotation, July 23, R. O. P. no. 1.)

The Italian Secretary-General thought 'Austria would only be restrained by the unconditional acceptance of her note by the Servian Government.' (Modified quotation, July 25, B. W. P. no. 19.)

The only chance appeared, then, 'to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal, and prevailing upon Servia to reply favorably to as many points as the time limit allowed.' (Modi

natural token of consideration from the Vienna Cabinet toward the other Cabinets if the latter should be given an opportunity to study the grounds of our announcement to the powers and our dossier on the subject.

"The First Department Chief replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would bring his statements immediately to my knowledge, but could tell him even then that there was no hope of the granting of a longer time on our part. As for the reasons stated by the Russian Government for its request, he said that they apparently were based on mistaken assumptions. Our note to the powers was not intended to invite them to make known their objective conception of it, but partook merely of the nature of an announcement which we had considered a duty imposed on us by international courtesy. Moreover, we looked upon our action as a matter concerning only ourselves and Servia, to which we had been forced, in spite of the patience and forbearance evinced by us for years, by the development of the situation which necessitated our defending our most vital interests much against our will." (July 25, A. R. B. no. 21.)