V.

dered it capable of acting with military efficiency in CHAP. concert with other troops, and it may therefore be said that Colonel Shewell (who was senior to Mayow) had under his orders a force of about 70 sabres.

Altogether, these undisabled combatants numbered perhaps about 220 or 230, of which only about 170 were in a state of formation. The two wings (if so we may call disconnected forces) were not visible the one to the other, and no communications passed between them.

In the absence of any general who might come to take in person the direction of these combatants, Lord George Paget, as we saw, was the senior officer on our left; on our right, Colonel Shewell.

From before the 230 English horsemen thus thrust into the very rear of the enemy's position, the bulk of that powerful body of Russian horse which numbered itself by thousands was strangely enough falling back. We now know that the retreat was much more general than our people at the time could perceive, and that, excepting Jeropkine's six squadrons of Lancers, almost the whole of the enemy's cavalry had been not merely beaten but routed.* Apparently,

*Liprandi, in his despatch, admits the retreat of his cavalry, but says that the movement was a ruse of General Ryjoff's to draw the English on. 'The English cavalry,' he says, ' appeared more than 2000 'strong. Its impetuous attack induced Lieutenant-General Ryjoff [the 'commander of the Russian cavalry] to turn back upon the route to Tchorgoun to draw the enemy. General de Todleben, however, discards that way of explaining the retreat, and says frankly that our Light Cavalry utterly overthrew the bulk of the Russian cavalry. Using the word 'Cardigan,' in a sense importing the Light Brigade, he says: 'Cardigan flung himself against the Don Cossack battery which was in

The re

treat of

the Rus

sian cav

alry.

V.

CHAP. also, as indeed might well be, these fugitive squadrons carried panic along with them as they rode ;* for away, on the eastern slopes of Mount Hasfort, where no English could dream of pursuing, battalions of infantry were thrown into hollow squares, as though awaiting from moment to moment a charge of victorious cavalry.

The need

there was of fresh troops in order to clench the victory.

Thus much some brave men were able to do towards wringing an actual victory from even the wildest of blunders.

Thus much; but considering that this singular overthrow of the many by the few was occurring, after all, a mile deep in the enemy's realms, and that, even although partly rolled up, the forces of Jabrokritsky on the north, and of Liprandi on the south, yet lined on both sides, the lower slopes of the valley, it was evident, of course, that the ascendant of little more than two hundred horsemen now driv

ing whole thousands before them would only prove momentary and vain, unless it should be upheld by fresh troops coming down in support, or else by an attack on the Causeway Heights of the kind which Lord Raglan had ordered. Were the red squadrons coming to clench the victory, and by victory to rescue their comrades?

We must turn to the commander of our cavalry,

' advance, sabred the gunners, then charged our cavalry, utterly over'threw it [la culbuta], and advanced far beyond the line of the redoubts ' in pursuit of our cavalry, which retreated towards Tchorgoun.'

* See the plan taken from General de Todleben. To eyes accustomed to such things, it expresses an almost headlong retreat more forcibly than words.

and to the regiments of the Heavy Brigade, with CHAP. which he was present in person.

Amongst all those struggles between the judgment and the feelings by which man is liable to be tortured, hardly any can be more distressing than that which rends the heart of a chivalrously-minded commander who is bringing himself to determine that, in obedience to the hard mandates of Duty, and for the preservation of the troops which still remain in his hands, he will suffer an adventured portion of his force to go on to its fate unsupported; and especially must he be troubled in spirit if the words which drove his people into a desperate path were words from his own lips.

can.

V.

Wild as was the notion of sending a force to run Lord Luthe gauntlet between the Fedioukine Hills and the Causeway Heights, yet, supposing the sacrifice to be irrevocably vowed, Lord Lucan seems to have formed a good conception of the way in which it could best be performed. He saw that in such an undertaking extension of front was an object of vastly less importance than the maintenance of an unfailing connection between the troops employed along the whole line of the advance. In short, he considered that the first line should be followed at intervals by successive lines of support, all forming the links of a chain so connected that, happen what might, the whole British cavalry would be a body of troops acting together under one commander, and constituting a powerful

VOL. IV.

X