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his duty to be governed by his own judgment of the fitness of the candidates ; finally, although all were inflexibly honest—all accurately informed of the wishes of their constituents-yet, under the present mode of election, a minority may often elect the President; aud when this happens, it may reasonably be expected that efforts will be made on the part of the majority to rectify this injurious operation of their institutions. But although no evil of this character should result from such a perversion of the first principles of our system that the majority is to govern-it must be very certain that a President elected by a minority cannot enjoy the confidence necessary to the successful discharge of his duties.
In this, as in all other matters of public concern, policy requires that as sew impediments as possible should exist to the free operation of the public will. Let us then endeavor to so amend our system, that the office of chief magistrate may not be conferred upon any citizen, but in pursuance of a fair expression of the will of the majority.
I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the constitution as may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each state its present relative weight in the election ; and a failure in the first attempt may be provided for, by confiding the second to a choice between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment, it would seem advisable to limit the service of the chief magistrate to a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying for office, the representatives in Congress on whom such an election may have devolved, would not be proper.
While members of Congress can be constitutionally apppointed to offices of trust and profit, it will be the practice, even under the most conscientious adherence to duty, to select them for such stations as they are believed to be better qualified to fill than other citizens ; but the purity of our government would doubtless be promoted by their exclusion from all appointments in the gift of the President, in whose election they may have been officially concerned. The nature of the judicial office, ara the necessity of securing in the cabinet and diplomatic stations of the highest rank, the best talents and political experience, should, perhaps, except these from the exclusion.
There are perhaps few men who can for any great length of time enjoy office and power, without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavorable to the faithful discharge of their public duties. Their integrity may be proof against improper considerations immedi ately addressed to themselves; but they are apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public interests, and of tolerating conduct from which an unpractised man would revolt. Office is considered as a species of property; and government rather as a means of promoting individual interest, than as an instrument created solely for the service of the people. Corruption in some, and in others a perversion of correct feelings and principles, divert government from its legitimate ends, and make it an engine for the support of the few at the expense of the many. The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience. I submit therefore to
your consideration whether the efficiency of the government would not be promoted, and official industry and integrity better secured by a general extension of the law which limits appointments to four years.
In a country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people, no one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense.
No individual wrong is therefore done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is matter of right. The incumbent became an officer with a view to the public benefits; and when these require his removal, they are not to be sacrificed to pri.vate interests. It is the people, and they alone, who have a right to complain, when a bad officer is substituted for
a good one. He who is removed has the same means of obtaining a living that are enjoyed by the millions who never held office. The proposed limitation would destroy the idea of property, now so generally connected with official station; and although individual distress may be sometimes produced, it would, by promoting that rotation which constitutes a leading principle in the republican creed, give healthful action to the system.
No very considerable change has occurred during the recess of Congress, in the condition of either our agriculture, commerce, or manufactures. The operation of the tariff has not proved so injurious to the two former, or as beneficial to the latter, as was anticipated. Importations of foreign goods have not been sensibly diminished; while domestic competition, under an illusive excitement, has increased the production much beyond the demand for home consumption. The consequences have been, low-prices, temporary embarrassment, and partial loss. That such of our manufacturing establishments as are based upon capital, and are prudently managed, will survive the shock, and be ultimately profitable, there is no good reason to doubt.
To regulate its conduct, so as to promote equally the prosperity of these three cardinal interests, is one of the most difficult tasks of government; and it may be regretted that the complicated restrictions which now embarrass the intercourse of nations, could not by common consent be abolished; and commerce allowed to flow in those channels to which individual enterprise, always its surest guide, might direct it. But we must ever expect selfish legislation in other nations; and are therefore compelled to adapt our own to their regulations, in the manner best calculated to avoid serious injury, and to harmonize the conflicting interests of our agriculture, our commerce, and our manufactures. Under these impressions, I invite your attention to the existing tariff, believing that some of its provisions require modification.
The general rule to be applied in graduating the duties upon the articles of foreign growth or manufacture, is that which will place our own in fair competition with those of other countries : and the inducements to advance