in the federal government to promote the general weal, in all the modes permitted to its authority.

After the extinction of the public debt, it is not proba ble that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a considerable surplus in the treasury, beyond what may be required for its current service. As, then, the period approaches when the application of the revenue to pay ment of the debt will cease, the disposition of the sur plus will present a subject for the serious deliberation of Congress; and it may be fortunate for the country that it is yet to be decided. Considered in connection with the difficulties which have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of internal improvement, and with those which this experience tells us will certainly arise, whenever power over such subjects may be exercised by the general government; it is hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some plan which will reconcile the diversified interests of the states, and strengthen the bonds which unite them. Every member of the Union, in peace and in war, will be benefitted by the improvement of inland navigation, and the construction of highways in the several states. Let us then endeavor to attain this benefit in a mode that will be satisfactory to all. That hitherto adopted has, by many of our fellow-citizens, been deprecated as an infraction of the constitution; while by others it has been viewed as inexpedient. All feel that it has been employed at the expense of harmony in the legislative councils.

To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of this surplus revenue, would be its apportionment among the several states, according to their ratio of representation; and should this measure not be found warranted by the constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the states an amendment authorizing it. I regard an appeal to the source of power, in all cases of real doubt, and where its exercise is deemed advisable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of all our obligations. Upon this country, more than any other

If

has, in the Providence of God, been cast the special guardianship of the great principle of adherence to writ ten constitutions. If it fail here, all hope in regard to it will be extinguished. That this was intended to be a government of limited and specific, and not general powers, must be admitted by all; and it is our duty to preserve for it the character intended by its framers. experience points out the necessity for an enlargement of these powers, let us apply for it to those for whose benefit it is to be exercised; and not undermine the whole system by a resort to overstrained constructions. The scheme has worked well. It has exceeded the hopes of those who devised it, and become an object of admiration to the world. We are responsible to our country and to the glorious cause of self-government, for the preservation of so great a good. The great mass of legislation relating to our internal affairs, was intended to be left where the federal convention found it-in the state governments. Nothing is clearer, in my view, than that we are chiefly indebted for the success of the constitution under which we are now acting, to the watchful and auxiliary operation of the state authorities. This is not the reflection of a day, but belongs to the most deeply rooted convictions of my mind. I cannot, therefore, too strongly or too earnestly, for my own sense of its importance, warn you against all encroachment upon the legitimate sphere of state sovereignty. Sustained by its healthful and invigorating influence, the federal system can never fall.

In the collection of the revenue, the long credits authorized on goods imported from beyond the Cape of Good Hope are the chief cause of the losses at present sustained. If these were shortened to six, nine, and twelve months, and warehouses provided by government, sufficient to receive the goods offered in deposite for security and for debenture; and if the right of the United States to a priority of payment out of the estates of its insolvent debtors was more effectually secured, this evil would in a great measure be obviated. An authority to construct such houses is, therefore, with the proposed alteration of the credits, recommended to your attention.

It is worthy of notice, that the laws for the collection and security of the revenue arising from imposts, were chiefly framed when the rates of duties on imported goods presented much less temptation for illicit trade than at present exists. There is reason to believe that these laws are, in some respects, quite insufficient for the proper security of the revenue, and the protection of the interests of those who are disposed to observe them. The injurious and demoralizing tendency of a successful system of smuggling is so obvious as not to require comment, and cannot be too carefully guarded against. I therefore suggest to Congress the propriety of adopting efficient measures to prevent this evil, avoiding, however, as much as possible, every unnecessary infringement of individual liberty, and embarrassment of fair and lawful business.

On an examination of the records of the treasury, I have been forcibly struck with the large amount of public money which appears to be outstanding. Of this sum thus due from individuals to the government, a considerable portion is undoubtedly desperate; and in many instances, has probably been rendered so by remissness in the agents charged with its collection. By proper exertions, a great part, however, may yet be recovered; and whatever may be the portions respectively belonging to these two classes, it behoves the government to ascertain the real state of the fact. This can be done only by the prompt adoption of judicious measures for the collection of such as may be made available. It is believed that a very large amount has been lost through the inadequacy of the means provided for the collection of debts due to the public; and that this inadequacy lies chiefly in the want of legal skill, habitually and constantly employed in the direction of the agents engaged in the service. It must, I think, be admitted, that the supervisory power over suits brought by the public, which is now vested in an accounting officer of the treasury, not selected with a view to his legal knowledge, and encumbered as he is with numerous other duties, operates unfavorably to the public interest.

It is important that this branch of the public service

should be subject to the supervision of such professiona skill as will give it efficacy. The expense attendant upon such a modification of the executive department, would be justified by the soundest principles of economy. I would recommend, therefore, that the duties now assigned to the agent of the treasury, so far as they relate to the superintendence and management of legal proceedings on the part of the United States, to be transferred to the attorney-general; and that this officer be placed on the same footing in all respects, as the heads of the other departments-receiving like compensation, and having such subordinate officers provided for his department, as may be requisite for the discharge of these additional duties. The professional skill of the attorney-general, employed in directing the conduct of marshals and district attorneys, would hasten the collection of debts now in suit, and hereafter save much to the government. It might be further extended to the superintendence of all criminal proceedings for offences against the United States. In making this transfer, great care should be taken, however, that the power necessary to the treasury department be not impaired; one of its greatest securities consisting in a control over all accounts until they are audited or reported for suit.

In connexion with the foregoing views, I would sug gest, also, an inquiry, whether the provisions of the act of Congress, authorizing the discharge of the persons of debtors to the government from imprisonment, may not, consistently with the public interest, be extended to the release of the debt, where the conduct of the debtor is wholly exempt from the imputation of fraud. Some more liberal policy than that which now prevails in reference to this unfortunate class of citizens is certainly due to them, and would prove beneficial to the country. The continuance of the liability after the means to discharge it had been exhausted, can only serve to dispirit the debtor; or where his resources are but partial, the want of power in the government to compromise and release the demand, instigates to fraud, as the only resource for securing a support to his family. He thus sinks into a state of apathy, or becomes a useless drone in society, of

a vicious member of it, if not a feeling witness of the rigor and inhumanity of his country. All experience proves that an oppressive debt is the bane of enterprise; and it should be the care of a republic not to exert a grinding power over misfortune and poverty.

Since the last session of Congress, numerous frauds on the treasury have been discovered, which I thought it my duty to bring under the cognizance of the United States Court, for this district, by a criminal prosecution. It was my opinion, and that of able counsel who were consulted, that the cases came within the penalties of the act of the 17th Congress, approved 3d March, 1823, providing for the punishment of frauds committed on the government of the United States. Either from some defect in the law or in its administration, every effort to bring the accused to trial under its provisions proved ineffectual, and the government was driven to the necessity of resorting to the vague and inadequate provisions of the common law. It is therefore my duty to call your attention to the laws which have been passed for the protection of the treasury. If, indeed, there is no provision by which those who may be unworthily intrusted with its guardianship, can be punished for the most flagrant violation of duty, extending even to the most fraudulent appropriation of the public funds to their own use, it is time to remedy so dangerous an omission. Or, if the law has been perverted from its original purposes, and criminals deserving to be punished under its provisions, have been rescued by legal subtilties, it ought to be made so plain, by amendatory provisions, as to baffle the arts of perversion, and accomplish the ends of its original enactment.

In one of the most flagrant cases, the court decided that the prosecution was barred by the statute which limits prosecutions for fraud to two years. In this case all the

evidences of the fraud, and indeed all knowledge that a fraud had been committed, were in the possession of the party accused, until after the two years had elapsed. Surely the statute ought not to run in favor of any man while he retains all the evidences of his crime in his own possession; add least of all, in favor of a public officer