of opinion about doctrines, church polity, &c. But we hear of no discipline on account of this diversity. The probability is, that discipline on these accounts would rend and break up the church. In the face of this diversity they are contented with the adoption and use of the Liturgy, which speaks the same language in the hands of every member, before every congregation, and in the mouth of every clergyman throughout the land. No clergyman disturbs the peace of his congregation because he imagines, or even knows, that some of his parishioners hold opinions different from his own. No bishop arraigns his clergy for diversity of opinion, although they are perfectly open and unreserved in declaring their opinions, even in the face of the diocesan. I have heard it, and been as much surprised as I was delighted at the freedom allowed, and at the perfect good nature and kindness with which such differences are discussed -the bishop himself assuming no more the airs of authority, than if he had none. The bishops also are harmonious among themselves, perfectly so; harmonious in feeling, and unanimous in their economical measures; although it is undoubtedly equally true, that their speculations about doctrine, and their theories relating to church polity and government, are characterized by important shades of difference. I am well certified, that it is getting to be more and more a recognised and practical principle in the Episcopal church, to urge nothing in diocesses or General Convention, which cannot be carried with a tolerable degree of unanimity.

Here, then, is another spectacle of a church rising and improving, maintaining universal harmony of feeling, and concert of action, at the same time that there is in fact a great, and in some instances a wide diversity of opinion on many points of doctrine and practice-a diversity which, if made a subject of disciplinary notice, would be sufficient to destroy the church. Is not this a lesson? Is it not instructive? Does it not prove, that an exact agreement, even in the main points of a common creed-and I may add, in some of the cardinal doctrines of Christianity—is not essential to harmony of feeling, to

Christian fellowship, to general union, to concert of action, to edification, and to efficiency of combined enterprise?

There is no church in the world, that has in fact so great a diversity of opinion in her own bosom, as the Church of England, and not a little of downright infidelity. And yet no one can reasonably doubt, that if she shall continue to let discipline for opinion alone, and if her pious and faithful clergy shall bend all their efforts at a general reformation in heart and life, with dependance on God and the power of his truth-and if the number of faithful clergy shall continue to increase, as they have done that most important branch of Protestantism will ere long be redeemed from her past and present disadvantages, and recover the primitive vitality of Christianity, so as to have it pervading and animating her whole communion. Nor is it less certain, that by attempting discipline for opinion, she would for ever blight all these prospects.

Let it not be supposed, that in acceding to the opinion, that it would be inexpedient to introduce direct and punitive discipline to eradicate and expel corrupt opinions from the English church, in its present peculiar circumstances, I adopt or advocate the principle, that the supervisory authorities of the church have no responsibility in maintaining its purity from such corruptions; or that as a Christian pastor, I should not think it my duty to have regard to this object; or that in any other relation of supervision, which might in any supposable case belong to me, I could deem myself excused from such a care. Purity of doctrine and purity of morals, in the Christian church, are in all cases the prime and high obligation of the ministerial office to maintain by all proper and legitimate means, and in the use of the best discretion. The question here at issue is simply, What treatment is due to a given case, and what in all probability would be best for the interests of religion in such a case? If an adversary should meet me, and deny the right of discretion, I should at once demur to his averment, and between me and him that would be the

end.

The proverb, that circumstances alter cases, might be applied here in all good conscience before God; and ⚫ in no case of the kind could an enlightened conscience disregard circumstances.

Were there no other examples in the world but these two, viz. the Church of England and the Episcopal Church of the United States, showing the comparative advantages of allowing a wide scope and great diversity to speculative religious opinions, yet are these on so large a scale and so important, as to be worthy of great respect and great influence for practical purposes. They are eminent, they are commanding, and they are also positive. Were it convenient, I have no doubt, that others of the same class might be adduced. But these are quite sufficient, if we set over against them all the unhappy results, which lie scattered along the history of the church in all ages, as occasioned by authoritative attempts to enforce uniformity of religious thinking. Nevernever has this been attempted without disaster; certainly, I think, never for good. When will Christianswhen will the church be wise on this subject? When will they learn to trust in God, in the simple energy of his truth, accompanied by the power of his Spirit ?

It remains yet to be seen, how much responsibility lies at the door of the church for multiplying schisms by attempting to enforce opinion. The human mind will never submit to it; it cannot; God never intended it should; it is not desirable. Were man doomed to such a fate, he would be shut out from the pale of a moral universe, and fail to answer the design of his existence. He would no longer respect himself, nor be respected; he would become the resigned, the doomed victim of necessity.

If I may presume to say it, the Christian world wants more philosophy-philosophy of mind and philosophy of observation. It has been cantingly said-We have too much philosophy-that it is philosophy which has done religion so much injury. This is a mistake. We want the philosophy of common sense-inductivefounded upon facts-growing out of observation.

So

long as religion is propounded as a mystery-a thing not to be understood-not to be philosophized upon—so long it will be at war with common sense; and so long, it may be expected, that attempts will be made to enforce its dogmas without allowing the privilege of thinking. In all ages the enforcement of religious dogmas has gone hand in hand with a consciousness, and often with a confession of not being able to explain them. A thing that can be explained need not be enforced; there is no motive for it. But the dogmas of the Koran must be enforced; so also must the superstitious dogmas of papal Rome; and so is it sometimes imprudently attempted in certain sections of the Reformed Church. Some things have got into creeds, which are not quite plain, and which cannot easily be made so; and the way to make them go down is to say and insist-you shall believe them, whether you can or not. And the greater the consciousness of a want of reason in them, the greater the fierceness to impose and enforce them. If they could be defended by clear and reasonable interpretations of the Bible, this anxiety would be wanting. A consciousness of strength on that ground would rely upon it solely. Ordinarily, the fierceness of religious controversy and the zeal and determination to impose religious dogmas may be measured very exactly by a consciousness of weakness in argument. In such cases religion mounts up from the heart to the head, and instead of being a religion of the heart and conscience, it becomes a religion of the head and will-that unconquerable will, which nothing but the power of God can subdue-that will, whose first triumph is the subjugation of the mind of which it is a part; and which then sets out on the fierce crusade of making victims of all unbelievers that may come in its way.

When I suggest, that the claim to impose religious mysteries is not to be respected, I would not be understood as denying, that there are Bible truths, which cannot be comprehended. Doubtless there are many. So are there incomprehensible facts everywhere in the world of nature. We are surrounded by them. Nevertheless we admit them. Reason teaches us to receive and make

the best of them we can. But they are not mysteries in the sense in which I use the term. I mean by mystery a proposition, or dogma, which is at war with settled and known principles and with common sense-which is never the case with truths of revelation, however incomprehensible they may be.

Nor in advocating the use of philosophy in religion do mean anything more, than being guided by inductionby a consideration of facts-and by the use and applica tion of theories founded on facts. Anything that can be proved from the Bible I receive as a fact, or truth, or principle, &c., according to the category, to which it belongs. In a consideration of the philosophy of mind, relating to our subject, I hold for example, what all experience proves, that it is unphilosophical to attempt to enforce opinion; and that the authorities of the church ought to have learned this long ago. Any attempt of this kind shows a censurable neglect of philosophic observation. They should have learned also, that if any who have gone before us have ever been so unphilosophical, as to imagine, that the proper design of a creed is to make all, who agree to come under it, think exactly alike, they adopted an impracticable theory—a theory, which was never yet sustained by the actual state of any two minds. They should have learned, moreover, that Christians can love one another, can have fellowship, can unite, can act together, can do anything that Christ requires of them, even though they entertain diversity of religious opinions; and that the way to make them hate, bite, and devour each other, is to imbue them with the notion, that the first duty of Christians is to bring about a universal harmony of opinion, and to engage in the task with unflinching determination by a direct and positive, and if needs be, compulsory effort. They should have learned, that the only proper and legitimate design of a creed is, that it should be a comprehensive, declarative, suggestive, and devotional manual -not binding on the conscience, as the Bible is-but a help to keep alive in the public mind a knowledge of the Bible, especially of its elementary and practical truths ;