house of prostitution or assignation or building or premises where prostitution, fornication or concubinage was allowed or practiced, it is not material whether plaintiff in error consented to or had knowledge of actual illicit intercourse on the part of Daisy Roberts.

This raises the question as to what, under the laws of this State, constitutes a house of prostitution or assignation or building or premises where prostitution, assignation or concubinage is allowed or practiced. In the case of Bunfill v. People, 154 Ill. 640, prostitution was defined as the act or practice of prostituting or offering the body to indiscriminate intercourse with men or the common lewdness of a female. A house of ill-fame or assignation for the purpose of prostitution is therefore a house where women prostitute themselves by offering their bodies to indiscriminate intercourse with men. (People v. Rice, 277 Ill. 521.) The term "house of ill-fame" is synonymous with bawdy house, having no reference to the reputation of the same. The gist of the offense is the keeping and using of the house for the purpose of prostitution and lewdness, and not its reputation. State v. Smith, 29 Minn. 193; State v. Boardman, 64 Me. 525; Henson v. State, 62 Md. 231; State v. Lee, 80 Iowa, 75; 14 Cyc. 485.

Bishop, in his treatise on criminal law, defines a house of prostitution or assignation as a house kept for the resort of lewd persons for the purpose of prostitution and fornication. (1 Bishop on Crim. Law, sec. 1037.) The statute of this State includes as a house of prostitution or assignation house any building or premises in the State where prostitution, fornication or concubinage is allowed or practiced, and if the house of plaintiff in error comes within any of these designations, and the plaintiff in error, as the keeper thereof, permitted the prosecuting witness, Daisy Roberts, to live, board, room or stop in such house, building or premises, she is then guilty of violation of said act. In order to bring plaintiff in error within the scope of the

statute it is necessary that she be the person in charge of the house in question, and that such house be kept for the purpose of the practices referred to in the statute or that fornication or concubinage be allowed or practiced in such house. That she was in charge of said premises was not denied.

What constitutes the keeping of a house has been defined by Bishop as follows: "To constitute the keeping of a house of prostitution there must be the keeping of a house, though it be but one room. It is not an essential to constitute the keeping of a house of prostitution that the same be done for profit. The gist of the offense is the tendency to corrupt public morals." (1 Bishop on Crim. Law, sec. 1038.) The character of an assignation house may, however, be shown by circumstantial evidence from which the jury might fairly infer the character of such house. (People v. Niehoff, 266 Ill. 103.) In the case last cited the defendant conducted a hotel. Two young men and two young women came to this hotel and registered as man and wife, without baggage. The men stayed until towards morning, and later that day the two girls returned with other men and secured rooms, the men staying a portion of the afternoon. The testimony in that case was held sufficient to sustain a verdict of the jury finding the defendant guilty of being the keeper of a house of assignation. In the case at bar the complaining witness testified that on four different occasions,-in each instance with different men, she had sexual intercourse with said men in the house of plaintiff in error, on one occasion remaining there over night. It is evident from the record that both complaining witness and plaintiff in error indulged in acts of sexual intercourse in said premises, the complaining witness committing such acts with different men. It was a question of fact for the jury to decide, under proper instructions from the court, whether or not the house of the plaintiff in error was a house of prostitution or assignation

or building or premises where prostitution, fornication or concubinage was allowed or practiced, and upon a review of the record we are unable to say that the jury were not justified in their finding.

Complaint is made of the instructions given and refused. We have examined these instructions and find no reversible error. The jury were instructed in the elements of the crime charged and that it would be necessary for them to find that the house in question was a house of prostitution or assignation, and that the plaintiff in error was the keeper thereof, before they could find her guilty. The jury were fully and fairly instructed.

It is also urged that the court erred in refusing to compel the State to admit the truth of the affidavit of plaintiff in error for a continuance or to grant such continuance. The affidavit was by the trial court held sufficient for continuance, and the State was required to elect whether or not the cause should be continued or should admit that if the witnesses were present they would testify as set out in the affidavit. The latter course was chosen by the State. While it lies in the discretion of the trial court to compel the State to admit the truth of an affidavit to avoid continuance, yet where, as in this case, there was no showing that the witnesses could be had at the next term of court, it was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to require only that the State admit that if the witnesses were present they would testify as set out in the affidavit.

On review of the entire record and consideration of all the assignments of error we are of the opinion that the record contains no reversible error. The judgment of the circuit court will therefore be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12295.-Judgment affirmed.)

JOHN J. O'CONNOR, Appellee, vs. THE MARYLAND MOTOR CAR INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed February 20, 1919-Rehearing denied April 2, 1919.

1. INSURANCE—definition of abandonment, in its technical sense. Abandonment, in its technical sense, means the relinquishment of a right or the giving up of one's own property absolutely, without reference to any particular person or purpose, and in maritime insurance law it means relinquishment to the underwriters of all claim.

2. SAME-time is not an essential element of abandonment. Time is not an essential element of abandonment, but the moment the intent to abandon and the relinquishment of possession unite the abandonment is complete.

3. SAME-abandonment is voluntary but cannot be made unless loss is constructively total. Abandonment is not necessary where the loss is actually total but only where the loss is constructively total, and it is never obligatory upon the insured but operates only as a voluntary transfer of title.

4. SAME-construction of automobile insurance policy as to the right of abandonment. Where an automobile is insured against theft, to render the policy of value to the owner there must be some time fixed after which the return of the stolen car will not release the insurer from liability, and where such a policy provides that the insurance shall not be payable until sixty days after proof of loss, a further provision that there can be no abandonment of the property will be construed to prohibit abandonment only before the expiration of the sixty days.

5. SAME―cases of maritime insurance are applicable to automobile insurance only by analogy. Cases of maritime insurance cover a branch of the law having well understood customs and rules, distinct, in some respects, from those relating to other classes of property, and they can be applied only by analogy to a case of automobile insurance.

6. SAME-insured may rely upon agent's assurance that proof of loss is sufficient. Although a policy of insurance requires sworn proof of loss, the insured has a right to rely upon the assurance of the agent of the company that his written notice of the loss was received and was sufficient proof of loss.

7. PRACTICE—what question cannot be raised for first time in court of review. An objection that the wrong party is suing on an insurance policy, which was assigned, after loss, as collateral security, cannot be made in a court of review where the question was not raised in the trial court.

8. EVIDENCE-what evidence is not admissible in suit for automobile insurance. Where an automobile is insured against theft, in a suit on the policy after the car has been stolen, evidence that the insured purchased a new automobile shortly after the theft is not relevant to the issue, but its admission is harmless where a directed verdict is justified under a proper construction of the policy.

APPEAL from the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. SHERIDAN E. Fry, Judge, presiding.

BATES, HICKS & FOLONIE, for appellant.

Adler, LEDERER & BECK, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: Appellee, John J. O'Connor, having had his automobile stolen upon which he had a theft insurance policy in the appellant company, brought suit in the municipal court of Chicago to recover the value of the automobile as fixed by the policy. The trial court directed a verdict in his favor for $1375 and costs, and from the judgment entered thereon an appeal was taken to the Appellate Court, where the judgment was affirmed. The Appellate Court issued a certificate stating that the questions involved were of such importance that they should be passed upon by the Supreme Court, and the case is here by appeal.

Appellee was the owner of a Hudson car and insured it in the appellant company for one year from March 31, 1916, through Roy E. Claypool, an agent of the company. Sunday evening, September 10, 1916, O'Connor left his car at the corner of LaSalle and Randolph streets, in Chicago,