appellant company through its proper agent recognized the sufficiency of the notice given and waived the furnishing of sworn proof. Appellee had a right to rely upon the agent's assurance that his proof was sufficient. It was held by this court in Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Wright, 22 Ill. 462, that when a representative of an insurance company had no fault to find with the proofs but was satisfied with them, if there existed any informality in the preliminary proofs of loss such informality was expressly waived by the company. The reasoning, also, of this court in Insurance Company of North America v. McDowell & Brown, 50 Ill. 120, would lead to the same conclusion. On this record the appellant cannot raise any question that the notice and proof of loss did not comply with the provisions of the policy.

Counsel for appellant further argue that the court erred in permitting a judgment to be entered against appellant when the proof showed that the policy had been assigned to the Louis Geyler Company by appellee as collateral security for the note given for the new automobile. The point now made on this question is that the wrong party is bringing the suit. No such objection was made in the trial court. It is insisted by counsel for the appellee that the policy had been re-assigned by the Louis Geyler Company, before the trial, to the original beneficiary, appellee herein. We agree with counsel for appellant that there is nothing in the record to indicate such re-assignment back to appellee. The special point, however, as to the wrong party suing, not having been raised in the trial court it is too late to raise it for the first time in a court of review. Counsel for appellant also argue that the trial court erred in its rulings on the admission of evidence. Over the objection of appellant the trial court admitted evidence on behalf of appellee to the effect that he had purchased a new automobile shortly after the theft. They argue that such proof was calculated to mislead the jury into seeking to relieve plaintiff of an undesirable vehicle and require

We

the appellant company to replace it with a new one. do not see any ground upon which the evidence was properly admissible, but under a proper construction of the policy as held above the verdict as directed by the trial court was justified, and we cannot see how the improper admission of this evidence in any way affected the result.

It is also argued by counsel that the court improperly admitted a letter sent from the local office in Chicago to the home office in Maryland in which the Chicago agent stated that the claim of the loss had been reported to the office immediately and had been referred to the adjuster, and that the agent considered that proper proof of loss had been made by appellee and that the writer thought that the loss should be paid; that it would be good business policy for the company to pay the loss rather than contest the claim. The evidence tends to show that the local agent of appellant was a personal friend of appellee and seemed to desire that appellee should recover under the policy, but the main office of the company did not agree with the view of its local agent. Conceding this letter was inadmissible, we do not see, construing the policy as it has been construed and a directed verdict being justified, that appellant was in any way injured by the introduction of this evidence.

Counsel also object to the examination of the local agent during the trial under the provisions of section 33 of the Municipal Court act. (Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 906.) No material error was committed by the trial court as to this examination.

We find no reversible error in the record, and the judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12426.-Reversed and remanded.)

GEORGE W. ALDRICH et al. Appellees, vs. JOHN C. ALDRICH et al.—(HORACE ALDRICH, Appellant.)

Opinion filed February 20, 1919-Rehearing denied April 3, 1919.

1. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-proof of an oral contract to convey must be conclusive. To justify a court in decreeing specific performance of an oral contract for the conveyance of land the proof must be clear and conclusive of its existence and terms.

2. SAME―oral contract to convey need not be proved by direct evidence. An oral contract to convey land in return for services rendered may be proved by other than direct evidence, and where the facts, including the acts of the parties, raise a convincing implication that the contract was actually made and satisfy the court that its terms and provisions are sufficient to justify its enforcement the contract should be upheld.

3. SAME when taking possession and making permanent improvements need not be proved to avoid Statute of Frauds. In establishing an oral contract to convey a farm from father to son in return for services rendered the father until his death, it is not necessary, in order to avoid the Statute of Frauds, to show that the son took exclusive possession and made permanent improvements, where the father lived on the farm with the son, who was not, under the contract, to have full possession until the father's death.

4. SAME when filing claim against estate will not defeat suit for specific performance. As a suit for specific performance of an oral contract to convey land of a decedent to his son in return for services rendered up to the father's death may not be finally decided until the year has expired for filing claims against the estate, the filing of a claim against the estate for such services is a mere legal precaution and not a confession of disbelief in the validity of the alleged contract. (Fletcher v. Osborn, 282 Ill. 143, followed.)

5. SAME-payment of taxes by father after making alleged contract to give land to son is not decisive. The payment of taxes on land by the owner after the making of an alleged contract to give the land to his son for services to be rendered until the father's death is not decisive of question whether such contract was made.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Hancock county; the Hon. HARRY M. Waggoner, Judge, presiding.

O'HARRAS, Wood & Walker, for appellant.

SCOFIELD, HARTZELL & CALIFF, MACK & MACK, and STERLING P. LEMMON, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court:

An original bill was filed by George W. Aldrich in the circuit court of Hancock county for the partition of 240 acres of land among the seven children of George H. Aldrich, deceased. A cross-bill was thereafter filed in said cause by Horace Aldrich, one of the defendants in the original bill, praying for the specific performance of an alleged contract with his father, said George H. Aldrich, for 160 acres of said land, constituting what was known as the "home farm." After the issues were joined the cause was referred to a special master to take the evidence and report his conclusions. The master reported, recommending a decree in favor of Horace Aldrich as prayed for in said cross-bill and that the original bill should be dismissed as to said 160 acres for want of equity. The trial court sustained exceptions to the master's report and entered a decree that the whole 240 acres, including the home farm 160, be partitioned as prayed for in the original bill, and the cross-bill was dismissed for want of equity at the costs of Horace Aldrich, who prayed an appeal from that decree.

George H. Aldrich died in 1913 at the age of eightythree, owning a farm in Fountain Green township, in Hancock county, which he had owned and resided on for many years prior to his death. He left four sons and three daughters, viz., John C., George W., Horace and Stephen D. Aldrich, and Amanda Conkey, Emma Coleman and Mary Booker. All these children were married at the time of his death, and all of them had left the home place before his wife's death, in 1905, except Horace and John. John continued to live there until his marriage, when he moved to the 80-acre tract owned by his father not far from the home farm. Horace continued to assist the father on the home place. At this time, the evidence tends to show,

Horace had been married for years and his family then lived in LaHarpe, in said county, several miles from the home place. The evidence also tends to show that after the mother's death, Horace, with some assistance from his father, carried on the farm and also did the housework, cooking for both himself and his father and doing any other work necessary in order to care for the house, going to La Harpe to visit his family occasionally; that he was doing this from the time of his mother's death until the spring of 1907. Ross Bright, who had been working for some time for them on the farm, testified that during the early part of that year he heard a conversation in the kitchen of the house on the home place between George H. Aldrich and his son Horace, to the effect that the father told Horace that if he would bring his wife and children out there and stay with him and care for him for the rest of his life he could have the farm and what personal property he had; that he wanted them to come out and stay with him and care for him and do his washing and cooking, as he was getting too old to care for himself and did not want to stay there by himself; that Horace in reply stated that he would do so, and that year moved his family and some furniture from LaHarpe out to the farm; that witness continued to work on the farm for several years thereafter. He testified further that Mrs. Horace Aldrich and her family came to the farm and took care of things, and that several times thereafter he heard Horace ask his father whether certain things should be done with reference to the farm, and the father would answer, "It belongs to you; do just as you please about it." Witness Spiker testified that he was a farmer and had known George H. Aldrich for thirty-five years; that he had seen him frequently during the last years of his life, both at LaHarpe and at the home farm; that about eight or nine months prior to Aldrich's death witness called at the home place, and during a conversation the father told him "that Horace