The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American National PoliticsUniversity of Michigan Press, 10/12/2009 - 304 páginas The Political Economy of Expertise is a carefully argued examination of how legislatures use expert research and testimony. Kevin Esterling demonstrates that interest groups can actually help the legislative process by encouraging Congress to assess research and implement well-informed policies. More than mere touts for the interests of Washington insiders, these groups encourage Congress to enact policies that are likely to succeed while avoiding those that have too great of a risk of failure. The surprising result is greater legislative efficiency. The Political Economy of Expertise illustrates that this system actually favors effective and informed decision making, thereby increasing the likelihood that new policies will benefit the American public. Kevin M. Esterling is Assistant Professor at the University of California, Riverside. |
Índice
| 1 | |
Part I The Politics of Policy Expertise | 19 |
Part II The Case Studies | 99 |
9 Discussion of the Cases | 230 |
10 The Political Economy of Expertise | 242 |
Validity and Reliability Issues | 251 |
References | 259 |
| 277 | |
| 281 | |
Outras edições - Ver tudo
The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American ... Kevin Esterling Pré-visualização limitada - 2004 |
The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American ... Kevin Esterling Pré-visualização limitada - 2009 |
The Political Economy of Expertise: Information and Efficiency in American ... Kevin Esterling Visualização de excertos - 2004 |
Palavras e frases frequentes
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