on us, and growing in its importance to the very last word, when this construction can be managed without affectation or unseasonay ble pomp, "If we rise yet higher," says Addison, very beautifully, "and consider the fixed stars as so many oceans of flame, that are each of them attended with a different set of planets; and still discover new firmaments and new lights, that are sunk farther in those unfathomable depths of æther; we are lost in such a labyrinth of suns and worlds, and confounded with the magnificence and immensity of nature." Hence follows clearly, 176. A fifth rule for the strength of sentences; which is, to avoid concluding them with an adverb, a preposition, or any inconsiderable word. Such conclusions are always enfeebling and degrading. Cbs. There are sentences, indeed, where the stress and significancy rest chiefly upon some words of this kind. In this case they are not to be considered as cirsumstances, but as the capital figures; and ought, in propriety, to have the principal place allotted them. No fault, for instance, can be found with this sentence: In their prosperity, my friends shall never hear of me; in their adversity, alwayst," Where never, and always, being emphatical words, were to be so placed, as to make a strong impression. But we speak now of those inferior parts of speech, when introduced as circumstances, or as qualifications of more important words. In such a case they should always be disposed of in the least conspicuous parts of the period; and so classed with other words of greater dignity, as to be kept in their proper and secondary station. "Avarice is Ava 177. Agreeably to this rule, we should always avoid concluding with any of those particles which mark the cases of nouns; as, of, to, from, with, by. Illus. For instance, it is a great deal better to say, a crime of which wise men are often guilty," than to say, rice is a crime which wise men are often guilty of" This last is a phraseology that, with reason, all correct writers shun: for, besides the want of dignity which arises from those monosyllables at the end, the imagination cannot avoid resting, for a little, on the import of the word that closes the sentence; and, as prepositions have no import of their own, but only serve to point out the relations of other words, it is disagreeable for the mind to be left pausing on a word, which does not, by itself, produce any idea, nor form any picture in the fancy. 179. For the same reason, verbs which are used in a compound sense, with some of the prepositions, are not beautiful conclusions of a period. Such verbs as, bring about, lay hold of, come over to, clear up, and many other of this kind, ought to be avoided, if we can employ a simple verb, which will always terminate the sentence with more strength. Obs. Though the pronoun it, has the import of a substantive nou, and indeed often forces itself upon us unavoidably, yet when we want to give dignity to a sentence, this pronoun should, if possible, be avoided in the conclusion; more especially when it is joined with some of the prepositions, as, with it, in it, to it. 179. Besides particles and pronouns, any phrase, which expresses a circumstance only, always brings up the rear of a sentence with a bad grace. Illus. We may judge of this, by the following sentence from Lord Bolingbroke: "Let me therefore conclude by repeating, that division has caused all the mischief we lament; that union alone can retrieve us; and that a great advance towards this union was the coalition of parties, so happily begun, so successfully carried on, and of late so unaccountably neglected; to say no worse." This last phrase, to say no worse, occasions a sad falling off at the end; so much the more unhappy, as the rest of the period is conducted after the manner of a climax, which we expect to find growing to the last. Obs. 1. The proper disposition of such circumstances in a sentence, is often attended with considerable trouble, in order to adjust them so, that they consist equally with the perspicuity and the grace of the period. Though necessary parts, they are, however, like unshapely stones in a building, which, to place them with the least offence, try the skill of an artist. "Let them be inserted wherever the happiest place for them can be found; as, in a structure composed of rough stones, there are always places where the most irregular and unshapely may find some adjacent one to which it can be joined, and some basis on which it may restt." When the 2. The close is always an unsuitable place for them. sense admits their arrangement, the sooner they are dispatched, generally speaking, the better; that the more important and significant words may possess the last place, quite disencumbered. It is a rule too, never to croud too many circumstances together, but rather to intersperse them in different parts of the sentence, joined with the capital words on which they depend; provided that *Letter on the State of Parties at the Accession of King George I. "Jungantur quo congruunt maximè; 'sicut in structurà saxorum rudium, etiam ipsa enormitas invenit cui applicari, et in quo prssit insistere." Quinctilian. care be taken, as was before directed, not to clog those capital words with them. 180. The last rule, which we have to offer, relating to the strength of a sentence, is, that in the members of a sentence where two things are compared or contrasted with each other; where either a resemblance or an opposition is intended to be expressed; some resemblance, in the language and construction, should be preserved. For, when the things themselves correspond to each other, we naturally expect to find the words also corresponding. We are disappointed when it is otherwise; and the comparison, or costrast, appears more imperfect. Illus. The following passage from Pope's Preface to his Homer, fully exemplifies the rule we have now given: "Homer was the greater genius; Virgil the better artist; in the one, we most admire the man; in the other, the work. Homer hurries us with a commanding impetuosity; Virgil leads us with an attractive majesty. Homer scatters with a generous profusion; Virgil bestows with a careful magnificence. Homer, like the Nile, pours out his riches with a sudden overflow; Virgil, like a river in its banks, with a constant stream.And when we look upon their machines, Homer seems like his own Jupiter in his terrors, shaking Olympus, scattering the lightnings, and firing the heavens; Virgil, like the same power in his benenevolence, counselling with the gods, laying plans for empires, and ordering his whole creation." Corol. Periods thus constructed, when introduced with propriety, and not returning too often, have a sensible beauty. But we must beware of carrying our attention to this beauty too far. It ought only to be occasionally studied, when it is naturally demanded by the comparison or apposition of objects. If such a construction as this be aimed at in all our sentences, it leads to a disagreeable uniformity; produces a regularly returning clink in the period, which plainly discovers affectation, and tires the ear like the chime of jingling verse. Scholia. The fundamental rule for the construction of sentences, and into which all other rules might be resolved, undoubtedly is, to communicate, in the clearest and most natural order, the ideas which we mean to transfuse into the minds of our hearers or readers. Every arrangement that does most justice to the sense, and expresses it to most advantage, strikes us as beautiful. To this point have tended all the rules that we have given. And, indeed, did men always think clearly, and were they, at the same time, fully masters of the language in which they write, there would be occasion for few rules. Their sentences would then, of course, acquire all those properties of precision, unity, and strength, which we have recommended. "For we may rest assured," says Dr. Blair,* "that, whenever we express ourselves ill, there is, besides the mismanagement of language, for the most part, some mistake in our manner of conceiving the subject. Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sentences, are generally, if not always, the result of embarrassed, obscure, and feeble thought. Thought and language act and re-act upon each other mutually. Logic and rhetoric have here, as in many other cases, a strict connection; and he that is learning to arrange his sentences with accuracy and order, is learning, at the same time, to think with accuracy and order ;" an observation which alone will justify all the care and attention which we have bestowed on this subject. CHAPTER IV. PERSPICUITY. 181. PERSPICUITY originally and properly sig nifies transparency, such as may be ascribed to air, glass, water, or any other medium, through which material objects are viewed. From this original and proper sense, it hath been metaphorically applied to language, this being, as it were, the medium, through which we perceive the notions and sentiments of any speaker or writer. Illus. 1. Now, in natural things, if the medium through which we look at any object, be perfectly transparent, our whole attention is fixed on the object. If, for instance, we look through the panes of glass in any window, we are scarcely sensible that there is a medium which intervenes, and can hardly be said to perceive the medium. But if there be any flaw in the glass, if we see through it but dimly, if the object be imperfectly represented, or if we know it to be misrepresented, our attention is immediately taken off the ob ject, and turned to the medium. We are then desirous to discover the cause, either of the dim and confused representation, or of the misrepresentation of things which the medium exhibits, or that the defect in vision may be supplied by judgment. 2. The case of language is precisely similar. A discourse, then, excels in perspicuity, when the subject engrosses the attention of the hearer, and the direction is so little minded by him, that he can scarcely be said to be conscious that it is through this medium he sees into the speaker's thoughts, *Lectures on Rhetoric, Lect. XII. 3. On the contrary, the least obscurity, ambiguity, or confusion in the style, instantly removes the attention from the sentiment to the expression, and the hearer endeavours, by the aid of reflection, to correct the imperfections of the speaker's language. Whatever application he must give to the words, is, in fact, so much deducted from what he owes to the sentiments. Besides, the effort which the speaker thus requires his hearer to exert in a very close attention to the language, always weakens the effect, which the thoughts were intended to produce in the mind of the hearer. 4. Perspicuity is, of all qualities of style, the first and most essential. Every speaker does not propose to please the imagination, nor is every subject susceptible of those ornaments, which conduce to this purpose. . Much less is it the aim of every speech, to agitate the passions. There are some occasions, therefore, in which variety, and many in which, animation of style, are not necessary: nay, there are occasions on which the last especially would be improper. But whatever be the ultimate intention of the orator, to inform, to convince, to please, to move, or to persuade, still he must speak so as to be understood, or he speaks to no purpose. If he do not propose to convey certain sentiments into the minds of his hearers, by the aid of signs intelligible to them, he may as well declaim before them in an unknown tongue. This prerogative the intellect hath above all the other faculties, that, whether it be or be not immediately addressed by the speaker, it must be regarded by him either ultimately or subordinately; ultimately, when the direct purpose of the discourse is information, or conviction; subordinately, when the end is pleasure, emotion, or persuasion. 5. Besides, in a discourse wherein either vivacity or animation is requisite, it is not every sentence that requires, or even admits, of either of these qualities; but every sentence ought to be perspicuous. The effect of all other qualities is lost without this. But this being to the understanding, what light is to the eye, ought to be diffused over the whole performance. And since perspicuity is more properly a rhetorical than a grammatical quality, we shall point out the different ways in which a writer may fail to produce a style which shall answer the conditions of the definition we have given of perspicuity. 6. A man may, in respect of grammatical purity, speak unexceptionably, and yet speak obscurely and ambiguously; and though we cannot say, that a man may speak properly, and at the same time speak unintelligibly; yet this last case fails more naturally to be considered as an offence against perspicuity, than as a violation of propriety. (Art. 112. 117. and 124.) For when the meaning is not discovered, the particular impropriety cannot be pointed out. In the three different ways, therefore, just now mentioned, perspicuity may be violated, 182. The obscure, from defect, is the first offence against perspicuity, and may arise from elliptical ex |