quest, before there was any call of a parliament whatever. At length, by the interposition of the hardy barons, that call was obtained, and thenceforth laws were passed in the name of the king, by the lords spiritual and temporal and his faithful commons-subject, however, to his royal assent.

And why has this branch of the royal prerogative been preserved in England? To protect his majesty's rights from the encroachment of the lords and commons. But to preserve the analogy, and to apply the argument to this country, where it is acknowledged on all hands that the sovereignty resides in the people, this veto should be lodged with them, as they represent majesty, and not in the people's agents, to enable them to defeat the will of their masters. The authority to be given to the governor should be supervisory only; the repose of confidence, not the delegation of power. It should be in the nature of a committee of enrolment, to see that the laws are correctly engrossed. Even in England, sir, there is no such thing as a direct and absolute veto. His majesty is too modest to assume that language; he only says, Rex advisare vult-the king will advise upon it.

The notion of a veto was derived from ancient Rome. It came from the tribunes of the people. After a long struggle between the patricians and plebeians, the latter obtained the power of hindering the passage of any law which the patrician senate should have enacted. The tribunes were the organ of their will, and whenever they thought proper to interpose, they pronounced the veto-I forbid it. And what, sir, is derivable from this authority? That the people, not the rulers, may refuse their sanction to a law which shall injure them. There is no analogy, therefore, of which the gentlemen opposed, can avail themselves, unless they resort to the maxim, that it is expedient to "save the people from their worst enemies-to save them from themselves."

It would seem from the remarks of my honourable friend near me, (Mr. Edwards) that it is necessary for the security of the people, that they should put a bridle into the mouths of their representatives to restrain them. And is it really so, that they require snaffles, and reins, and martingales, to keep them within the path of their duty? No, sir, they are members of their own body, subject to, and affected by, the same laws, and possess a common interest with those who elect them.

But it is said, sir, that if the governor does not possess a sufficient power to thwart the will of the people, his authority will dwindle to a mere shadow. In order, then, to decorate the governor with some of the trappings of royalty, you would deprive the people of one third of their power! You would impoverish them of their rights, to enrich the executive with prerogative; and the people are to be stripped of their privileges, to confer high powers upon the public functionaries!

It was complained of yesterday, and almost admitted by the honourable gentleman from Albany, (Mr. Spencer) that party feelings might enter the chamber of the council of revision. And would not the governor strongly feel the influence of party zeal? Or do gentlemen suppose that he will be less influenced by those considerations, when disconnected from the judiciary? Has not experience shewn, that when a majority of the legislature was against him, but few bills could pass that council; but when he possessed the majority, few were denied? There are those, sir, who are willing to cling to a sinking ship: those who, having nothing to lose, would be willing to advise him to desperate measures; men who, when they had lost all hope, can minister to his moroseness, increased by discomfiture and defeat, and who may justly be called evil advisers. Then this council, and that moroseness, may have a most pernicious effect in the prevention of salutary laws.

It was charged upon the king of England in the declaration of independence, that he had "refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good ;" and if the same evil advisers continue to surround the executive chair, when the angry passions have survived his popularity, and give the same advice, we cannot but expect the same unfortunate and pernicious results. In all ages, where free governments have existed, those have been found, who would transfer to the minister or executive, more power than was expedient for the good of the people. This tends to perpetuate the aristocracy that.

exists in the constitution, and instead of being fostered, should receive the firm opposition of those who advocate the cause of the people.)

CHANCELLOR KENT. If it is deemed adviseable to retain this feature in our constitution, it certainly ought to be so constituted as to give it an efficient operation; the check should be such, that it could, when necessary, be executed to some beneficial purpose. If the proposed amendment to the report of the committee should be adopted, the check would be merly nominal, and wholly inoperative. The executive would derive from it no greater power or control over the proceedings of the legislature, than any individual member of the legislature, voting with the majority, at all times possessed, from being authorized to move for a reconsideration of a question the next morning after it has been decided. To talk of such a provision as this being a check, was idle and trifling.

The executive is elective, and his continuance in office is for a very limited period, and it could not be supposed that he would ever exercise this power but on great occasions—on occasions when such interference should be imperiously demanded by a manifestly improper exercise of legislative authority: when the boundaries with which the constitution had been fenced and protected, like other branches of the government, should be invaded; or when the rights or property of individuals should be arbitrarily assailed.

It was a gross error to suppose that the power and authority of the people was delegated to the legislative branches of the government alone. The executive, as also the administrators and expounders of the laws, were equally with them the representatives of the people, who had delegated to them the power and authority which appertained to their respective offices; and it was necessary for the purposes of good government, and for the public peace and welfare, that these agents of the people should be supported and protected in the due exercises of their authority.

It has been determined to abolish the council of revision; this will greatly - narrow the operation of the veto provided on the passage of laws. The council of revision was not only vested with the power, but it was their duty, to object to laws inconsistent with the public good. That body had uniformly from the first organization of the government, exercised the power to the extent granted to them; whether perfectly, wisely, and discreetly, on all occasions, it was not now material to enquire. If the amendment, as reported by the select committee, should be adopted, it was not probable that the qualified veto thereby given to the executive, would ever be exercised but on constitutional grounds. With the gentleman from Oneida, (Mr. Platt) he apprehended that the power would be very seldom exerted. The national executive possesses the power it is here proposed to give to the governor, and during the operation of that government, it had been but twice exercised, and in both instances on constitutional grounds.

It was within his experience, that one third of all the laws passed at a session, had been revised by the council of revision on the last day. That body consists of several members, and the labour was divided between them. When this power shall be vested in the executive alone, and it should happen that so large a proportion of the bills should require to be examined in so short a time, it would be impossible for him to detect any errors, unless very obvious, or unless his attention should be directed to them by the very title of the act.

He apprehended that the sober minded people of this state would not be satisfied to see this column of the constitution destroyed, without having it replaced by something efficient in its character, and useful in its operation. To adopt the proposition under consideration, would give to the executive only a nominal power. It would be better to have no veto, than such as is here proposed. He would rather see laws passed by the votes of the two houses alone without any check whatever, than to adopt one so weak, inefficient, and useless. The veto as it would be constituted by adopting the report of the committee, would be a harmless power in the hands of the executive. He could never exert it to the prejudice of any other branch of the government, nor it so inclined, materially to prejudice the public welfare; at most, he could only temporarily prevent the enactment of laws, and must always prove too weal to make any successful attack on the power or influence of the legisla

ture.

The necessity of a check of this kind, was not because legislative bodies were always, or even usually, disposed to transcend and abuse their authority, or to err in the exercise of it, but because, from their organization, they were sometimes liable to act hastily and unadvisedly, from the impulse of passion, or from temporary excitement. These were evils to which popular assemblies were naturally prone, and against which they could not at all times be guardLed. It was, therefore, wise and prudent, that there should be a check lodged somewhere, of sufficient energy to control the legislature when impelled by passion, or influenced and operated upon by improper views; or with a disposition to encroach upon the other departments.

In the government of the United States, we have a precedent which certainly ought to be received with deference and respect by all. The adoption of the federal constitution was warmly and vehemently opposed by a large proportion of the people of this state. It was supposed by very many, to be hostile to our interests, and every one of its provisions was scanned and scrutinized with the greatest caution and severity; and though the most of the articles were considered more or less exceptionable, yet throughout the whole of the discussions, no one ever thought of making any objection to the qualified veto which it gave to the president. Thus have the people of this state twice most solemnly and deliberately approved of the principle for which he contended; once in the formation of our state constitution, and again in the adoption of the federal constitution.

GEN. TALLMADGE wished to add but a few remarks to those which had already been made. He urged the caution which ought to be observed in approaching the constitution. Upon every question that may arise in our progress, we ought to proceed with care and deliberation; and when we determine a point, we should do it with great circumspection, to see whether, as far as can be, we shall preserve the principles of good government, and the spirit of our present constitution. When gentlemen declare the embarrassment they feel; and speak of the magnitude of the duties committed to our charge, the conclusion to be drawn, is, that greater moderation was required; that we should pull down with the greater caution; that we should so alter as to correct the omissions and mistakes, and yet preserve the spirit, and as far as may be, the form of the present constitution; with such views, the select committee had only proposed to sever the judiciary from the council of revision, retaining, however, that feature in the government, and they had adopted the language of the constitution of the United States, from its simplicity of expression, and because the experience of the nation had given it construction. It has been remarked, that yesterday we abolished this part of the constitution; and it has been asserted on this floor, that the vote of this house and the report of the select committee, was founded on the misconduct of the judges and the odium attached to their characters. He believed that no such motive influenced the majority of this Convention in their vote of yesterday; and it is due to the select committee of which he had the honour to be chairman, to say, that in recommending the abolishment of the council of revision, and the adoption of the report which they had presented, they had acted with the sole view of separating the departments of government, and preserving the great principles of the constitution, and not under a belief that they were sapping its foundations. He disclaimed on his own part, and on the part of the committee, any intention by the recommendation which they had made, to pass any censure on the judiciary. It was not the province of the select committee to pass censure. They had looked at the great principles of government, and had unanimously agreed in the propriety of separating the judiciary from the legislative departmentconnected as they now were, it implicated them in the strifes and contentions of politics. Separate them from legislative and confine them to their judicial duties. It will leave them uncommitted, to pass upon such laws as may come before them. The rights of individual citizens ought not to be prejudged by persons in the council of revision, nor until such citizens shall have been heard by themselves or their counsel, before the judges in their judicial capacity. Make the separation; it will free them from attacks and imputations which lessen the influence of the judiciary system. It will operate as a kindness towards

that distinguished branch of the government. They ought not to be the defenders or the defamers of this or of that man. Set them apart for the performance of their particular duties. And let us hope hereafter, that the public may only know the judges by their judicial determinations.

It was with these views that the committee thought proper to separate the judiciary from the council of revision. As rumours had already gone abroad that the council of revision had been abolished from a disrespect to the judiciary, he deemed this explanation due to the committee, to shield them from the imputation of false motives. He regretted that the honourable gentleman from Oneida (Mr. Platt) had thought proper to introduce into his argument the subject of an epitaph upon the council of revision, or to excite compassion for a part of the constitution, which he was willing to see go down silently to the tomb of oblivion. We did not come here to write inscriptions, or to pronounce eulogiums on the living or the dead. We had assembled from different parts of the state, possessing a knowledge of the interests, views, and sentiments of our constituents, for the purpose of establishing a system of government, which shall be permanent in its duration, and provide for the exigencies of the comanunity.

Any government, he said, was a libel on man. If there were no weakness, no frailty, no corruption in human nature, governments would be unnecessary. The very idea of government, therefore, supposed that it was to operate as a restraint upon the vicious and the profligate, and that all its provisions should be based upon this fundamental principle.

He then went into an examination of the several departments of government, and the importance of keeping them distinct. The experience of all ages and all countries convinced us of the necessity of checks and balances in the organization of governments, and of giving to one branch a restraining power upon the others. Wherever this has not been done, the power of one department has become exorbitant, and invariably ended in tyranny. Such was the depravity of man, that restraints were in all cases found necessary to check him in his disposition to acquire power and to trample on the rights and liberties of others.

In the establishment of our system of government these great principles were woven into our constitution. The several departments were intended to act as checks upon each other. In the organization of the legislature, it was thought advisable that there should be two branches--the senate and assembly, that the one might control and check the abuses of the other, and prevent either from acquiring an overwhelming and dangerous power, if such a disposition should ever be manifested. As an additional safeguard to the rights and liberties of the people, a third branch of the legislature, the council of revision, was instituted. Its object was to resist the encroachments of the senate and assembly, whether through error or corruption, upon the other branches of the government, as well as upon the rights of the citizen, to prevent all, all, from being swallowed up by the inordinate power of the legislature. This third and supervising power was not only defensive in its nature, but it was a power to guard the people against hasty and improvident legislation.

Without this power of a veto over the bodies of legislation, in vain may you boast of the independence of your judiciary, and in confirmation point to the fixed tenure of their places, till sixty years, or even for life. Remember that the power over the subsistence, is a power over the will of man. When you have secured to them the tenure of their places, you seem to have provided for their safety because you have placed them in a citadel which cannot be stormed: but yet you have artfully retained in the legislative body, the means of their subsistence, and the power to starve them into submission. Let them venture on the integrity of their conduct to come in collision, or to thwart the legislative will, and attempt to break down some law which may violate the constitution, or have for its object the destruction of the other branches of government, and the grasping at all power, it will be then that the legislative body will show to the judiciary its dependence, and that although holding a citadel which cannot be sacked, yet their subsistence and their existence while there, is at the pleasure of that body which they vainly attempt to withstand. When

J

such a crisis shall arrive, some modern Cæsar, with a senate at his heels, may control, by his cunning and his influence, the majority in your bodies of legislation, and thus throw down the fabric of your government. I beseech you to preserve the proposed check, and thus provide against the ascendant powers of either corruption or inordinate ambition.

He considered the sheet anchor of our safety to be the wholesome principle that the majority should govern, and to this he would hold.-But the will of the majority was to be fairly expressed by the representatives of the people, in the several departments of our government, and not by the democracy in its collective capacity. Found your government upon equal rights, and extended suffrage. Clothe its officers with all requisite powers, and provide for their direct and immediate accountability to the people themselves. Upon this system, the representatives of the people will rise like the wave of the ocean, which exists for a season, rolls onward until its functions are performed, and then again subsides into the great source from which it originated. There was in this respect a wide distinction between this country and the ancient republics. In the former, the interests and sentiments of the community are represented by delegates—in the latter, the people assembled en masse, to conduct their political affairs.-The fate of ancient republics should warn us against the danger of all democracies. Their liberties were lost by the licentiousness of the people, upon which their governments provided no check. The veto, and final adoption of laws was lodged in the collective mass of the people, and was exercised with that indiscretion and madness, which always characterize

such tumultuous assemblies.

It was these popular assemblies where the laws received either the approv ing voice of the people, or were rejected, that called forth the powers of Demosthenes. These popular assembles were the schools of the eloquence of ancient times, and the causes of their country's ruin. Let us avoid the rock on which other states have been wrecked; and while we manifest a becoming confidence in the intelligence and virtue of the people, let us never abolish those checks, which are necessary to preserve us from the encroachments of power.

His honourable colleague Irad enumerated several of our sister states, in in whose governments no qualified negative on the acts of the legislature had been provided. The constitutions of those states had been cited as models for our own. But he would ask when these governments were adopted, and what had been their operation? Many of them, like our own, were established, to use the language of his colleague, amidst the noise of musketry and the thunder of cannon. Experience had proved them defective in many important points, and they ought not to be cited as precedents. Among others, the new constitution of Connecticut had been mentioned as an example for us. There was a wide difference between the population of that state and of this. They were emphatically one people, peculiar in their habits, customs, and manners. They were descended from one stock, and were united by an identity of interests and feelings. The people of this state, on the contrary, were descended from different states, and collected together from every country and every nation under heaven. There was an almost infinite variety of interests, sentiments, and feelings in the community; and hence the same government which was adapted to the people of Connecticut, would not answer for New-York. It had been found by an experience of many years, that at times there had been encroachments by our legislature-It had since been charged with corruption. This was a point which he trusted his honourable colleague (Mr. L.) would not controvert; and this being admitted, it would not be denied, that it was both wise and safe to guard against the dangers of such encroachments. In illustration of this, he cited the cases, which had been stated by his honourable friend from Westchester (Mr. Jay,) on the floor this morning, by which it appeared that money had frequently been drawn from the treasury-lands had been conveyed-the school fund meddled with-the attorney-general, and even the governor himself directed in his duties by the concurrent resolutions of the two houses of the legislature. He trembled while he reflected on these alarming strides of power. Such liberties with the treasury and the government