them, are not perfectly solvent and safe depositories of the public funds? What are the grounds on which confidence is reposed in any banking institution? Is it not its capital, and its reputation for being prudently and correctly conducted? Whatever objections, then, there may be to the present system of selecting banks for public deposites, it certainly has some advantages. The Secretary of the Treasury has an opportunity of selecting for places of deposite, such banks as have acquired an established reputation, and as are known to be conducted on safe principles; he also can select as large a number as he pleases, by which means the aggregate capital is increased, and the risk divided. Is it not apparent that the public revenues are safer deposited in thirty-six banks than they would be in one bank having the same capital? Experience proves that a bank with a large capital may as likely become embarrassed as one with a small capital, as their business is on a corresponding scale. Interest prompts all banks to extend their business to the utmost limit their capital will allow. If the public treasure was deposited all in one bank, as was the case some years since, and that, by an improper extension of its business, or by speculation, should become embarrassed, the whole revenues of the country would be in jeopardy; but if they are in numerous institutions, the danger is greatly diminished, as it is not to be apprehended that several of the deposite banks will become involved in difficulties at the same time. They are independent of each other, and their operations no way connected. The history of the Bank of England, as well as the Bank of the United States, justifies what is here stated. It is well known that the former was compelled to suspend specie payments, and to call in the aid of the Government to sustain it from total ruin. And the Bank of the United States, by a system of profligate and fraudulent speculations, unparalleled, brought itself to the very verge of bankruptcy whilst it was the depository of the public revenue. For three months, from February to May, in 1819, that bank was in the most critical situation, and daily exposed to be compelled to stop payment. To save itself, it drained the State banks of their specie-broke the banks of Kentucky, and made such forced and rapid curtailments of its loans to individuals, as greatly contributed to the severe money pressure and distress which prevailed at that period. Such was the situation of the public funds in the Bank of the United States in 1819. But the Senator told us that the deposite banks have only eleven millions of specie, and endeavored to make an impression that this was all their resources with which to refund to the Government nearly thirty-two millions. If this was a true test of the ability of banks, what has been the situation of the Bank of the United States, which the Senator has regarded as so safe a depository of the public treasure? In 1831, that bank had but $8,198,682 in specie, when the Government deposites were $7,252,249, and private deposites $9,115,836, and its circulation was $22,399,447; making in the whole, to say nothing of other debts, $38,768,532, to be paid from a specie fund of little more than eight millions. At some periods, the specie of the Bank of the United States has been less, and, if I recollect right, the President of that bank has stated, in some of his reports, that six millions in specie was all that was required for the safety of the bank and the public. Would the Senator require one rule for the Bank of the United States, and another for the State banks? The latter was regarded as perfectly safe, and as furnishing the best national currency for the country, without regard to the specie in its vaults; it was sufficient to rely on its general means and solvency; but the State banks must have specie equal to their indebtedness. In any view which can be taken of this subject, the [APRIL 28, 1836. public funds must be considered as safer, so far as regards any considerable loss, than when in the Bank of the United States. As respects capital, that bank had, exclusive of what belonged to the United States, but twenty-eight millions; that of the deposite banks is more than forty-three millions of dollars. The condition of these deposite banks, on the thirtyfirst day of March last, according to a report of the Secretary of the Treasury, of the 23d day of April, was as follows: Loans and discounts, Due from banks, Foreign exchange, Other investments, $68,850,287 67 32,775,529 42 1,929,056 68 15,931,916 22 11,107,447 78 10,885,996 92 I have made these statements, not from any partiality to the deposite banks, as I am not their advocate, and consider all banks as conducted essentially on the same principlesto make the greatest profit, without regard to the public or private interests of the community. I do not approve of their having so large an amount of the public funds, and especially without paying any interest for the same; but this is an unusual and unexpected state of things, and, I trust, will soon be remedied. My object has not been to defend these banks, but to show that the public funds are safe. He In addition to the security afforded by the capital and other property of the banks, the Secretary of the Treas ury has in some cases required collateral and personal security for the public deposites. These contracts, the Senator from Kentucky informs us, are totally void, because there is no law expressly authorizing them. asks, with apparent triumph, by what authority, and under what law, these contracts are made? This objection, if valid for any purpose, is applicable to the contract itself; for there is no act expressly authorizing the Secretary to employ agents for the safe keeping of the pub lic revenues. If the argument proves any thing, it proves that the contracts with the banks are illegal and If void, and that the money can never be reclaimed. the contracts are valid, then the stipulation for personal security is binding, as that is a part of the contract. The argument proves too much, and therefore proves nothing at all. The Senator also says, that the regulation of the Secretary requiring the deposite banks not to issue bills of less denomination than ten dollars, is an alarming assumption of power; a species of executive legislation deHe says, he will not signed to regulate the currency. inquire whether the regulation is a wise one or not; whether it is calculated to have a beneficial or an injurious influence; but asks where the Secretary gets his power to control the State banks, and regulate the cur rency of the country? He had supposed this power be longed to Congress. Why, the Senator must know full well that neither Congress nor the Secretary have any power over the State banks. This, like the requirement of personal security, is only a part of the contract. The Secretary, in employing the fiscal agents of the Treasury, can prescribe such conditions as he sees fit, not inconsistent with law, but the agent is not bound to agree to them, nor has the Secretary any means to force him to comply with his conditions. All that he can do is, to decline to employ the agent who will not comply with the conditions he may prescribe. This is the alarming usurpation which the Senator has discovered. But he will not inquire whether the object is a good one or a bad one, which, it appears to me, is the essential point. Are we to understand that he is opposed to restraining the circulation of small bills issued by the State banks? If not, why this complaint of an attempt to stop their circulation by contract with those banks, which are employed as the receivers of the public revenues? It is said that the present surplus in the Treasury, and which is deposited in the State banks, is unprecedented and dangerous. An overflowing Treasury seems to be a subject of as much alarm now, as an exhausted one did two years ago, which was then so confidently predicted. The large amount of money in the Treasury has arisen from two causes: the unprecedented sales of public lands, which, during the year 1835 and the first quarter of 1836, have exceeded twenty millions; and the delay to pass the appropriation bills, whereby money that ought to have been paid out is still retained in the Treasury. But, from the remarks which have just been made on this subject, it might be supposed that there had never before been a balance in the Treasury. But there have usually been balances, and at times very large balances, which have been deposited either in State banks, or the Bank of the United States. The balance in the Treasury, at the close of the year 1815, and deposited in State banks, was $13,000,000; in 1816, $22,033,519, more than two thirds the present amount; in 1817, when the Bank of the United States was encouraging speculations in stocks, and using the funds of the Government for that purpose, the balance was $14,989,465; in 1823, it was $9,463,922; in 1826, $6,358,586; in 1827, $6,668,000; in 1828, $5,972,000; in 1829, $5,668,000. From the last period, to the time the connexion of the Treasury with the Bank of the United States was terminated, there was a balance of from five to ten millions. The honorable Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] has alluded to the State banks, and apparently with the purpose of creating a panic, on account of the rapid increase of these institutions, and the alarming extension of the paper system. In his apprehensions on this subject I can fully participate; but can by no means concur in what he assigns as the cause of the increase of the State banks. He attributes it to the measures of the Government in hostility to the Bank of the United States, or to the overthrow of that bank. This cause rests on an assumption of a fact which is not true; the Bank of the United States has not been destroyed, nor have its operations ceased. It is true, some of its branches have been discontinued, and this circumstance, with other causes, may have had some influence on the establishment of State banks in some of the western States; but, if the withdrawal of the capital of this bank is to be regarded as occasioning the incorporation of State institutions, it is a cause that could operate only so far as to supply, by State banks, the amount of capital withdrawn by the Bank of the United States, and this would be no increase of the aggregate banking capital in the Union. Nothing can be more unfounded, and even prepos terous, than the pretension that the Bank of the United States prevented the establishment of State banks, and restrained their operations. This position, so often and [SENATE. constantly asserted, is not only unsustained, but is opposed both to facts and principle. In point of fact, the State banks have increased more rapidly since the establishment of the Bank of the United States in 1816, than they ever did previous to that period. And in respect of principle, it is absurd to contend that banking is to be limited and restricted by superadding the legislation of the Union to that of the States, in granting bank charters. The cause of the alarming multiplication of banks and increase of bank capital lies much deeper; it is to be found in the spirit of traffic and speculation which prevails so extensively in our country, and which the Bank of the United States has been, in an eminent degree, instrumental in engendering and sustaining. Shall the champions of the Bank of the United States, who maintained that its notes were the only sound national currency, reproach those who were opposed to that corporation, and to the present banking system generally, for the consequences and evils of the unprecedented increase of banks in the States? Sir, such taunts come with a bad grace from the Senator from Kentucky. Who are the advocates of State banks, and the petitioners and applicants for their charters? Are they not the supporters of the Bank, or a Bank, of the United States? In some of the States it is true that many who were, or professed to be, opposed to the national bank, are the zealous supporters of the State institutions. But there are a large portion of those opposed to the Bank of the United States, who disapprove the whole banking system, or desire to reform it by withdrawing a large portion of the paper circulation, and substituting a hard money currency in its place. In my own State, this is almost universally true; all who are opposed to the Bank of the United States are opposed to the multiplication of State corporations, and in favor of restricting the circulation of the existing institutions. The increase of State banks, the last two or three years, is truly alarming; and if this spirit be not checked, an explosion of the entire paper sytsem will be inevitable. In an able work by Mr. Gallatin, formerly Secretary of the Treasury, he states that, in 1830, there were two hundred and eighty-one banks in the United States, with a capital of ninety-five millions; and it is now estimated that there are about seven hundred and fifty banks, possessing an aggregate capital of nearly three hundred millions. Mr. Gallatin's statement was not entirely correct, and probably fell short of the true number; it was five short of the number in Connecticut. But the increase of banks and banking capital has been sufficiently rapid and alarming; it cannot have been less than one hundred per cent. the last three years. If this spirit of speculation and gambling continues, and instead of being checked, is encouraged by the improvident and reckless legislation of the States, a fatal and ruinous explosion of the whole paper system must be the consequence. This is as inevitable as those results which follow from natural causes. And will no effort be made to arrest these evils? Will the prudent, the wise, and the honest, calmly witness, and without an effort to arrest an evil of such magnitude, the gathering elements fraught with such incalculable calamities to their country? The Senator from Kentucky says that the surplus in the Treasury has already engendered a spirit of extravagance and wastefulness; that, instead of the old republican practice of inquiring what is the lowest rate of appropriations with which the service can be carried on, the inquiry now is, what is the highest rate, and how we can spend the most. On what authority was this remark made, applied, as it was, to the appropriations generally? It is wholly gratuitous and unsupported. The only inquiries of the kind which have been made of the head of any Department have been confined to forti fications and other objects connected with the defence of the country. These are no part of the ordinary annual expenditures. How far it may be wise to go, in expenditures for purposes of this kind, may be a question; but whatever it is proper to expend, in public works for the defence of the country, may as well be expended in one year as in a series of years. Indeed, this is true policy and economy; for the more time which is consumed in laying out the money, the more of it will be abstracted by the agents who have the disbursing of it. If an individual has occasion to build a house, will he not do it in one season, or in as short a period as he can find any one to contract to do the job? He does not consider it economy to be several years about it; neither does he regard the outlay as a part of his annual expenditures; he considers it as an investment, as an addition to his estate. What is true of an individual is true of the Government. Whatever it may be proper to expend on fortifications, ordnance, or other permanent means of defence, the shorter the period in which the money can be expended, the better, if there is no waste in the application. Neither are appropriations for pur. poses of this description to be regarded as a part of the annual expenditures of the Government, any more than the erection of a house is to be regarded as a part of the annual expenses of an individual. The calls for the maximum appropriations, for permanent objects of defence, are no evidence of profuse expenditure, as asserted, but of true economy, especially when we have money on hand that we have no other use for. [APRIL 28, 1836. regarded as a new scheme to amend the constitution. It would, in fact, be an amendment of the most important character. The duties on foreign importations, as the principal source of the public revenue, as well as incidentally affording protection to the manufacturing interests of the country, have been a subject of more legislation than any other, and must continue so for all time to come. The state of the Treasury, the growth of new interests at home, the decay of old ones, foreign legislation, and various other causes, will require frequent modifications of the revenue laws. To attempt, therefore, to restrict, limit, or regulate the power or action of Congress over this subject, by an ordinary law, or by any understanding or compromise among the leading members of Congress, as to the passage of that law, is preposterous. It is an attempt by one Congress to tie up the hands of their successors, and deprive them of that equality of power which the constitution has conferred on each successive Legislature. Had the high rate of duties been brought down to the proper point of reduction more rapidly, it would have lightened the taxes, and we should have had a less surplus in the Treasury to contend about. Mr. President, having disposed of the extraneous and preliminary topics, I will proceed to consider the bill before the Senate. This measure, in any view which can be taken of it, is of the highest importance. The bill provides for distributing among the States, according to the federal principle of representation, the nett proceeds of the public lands for five years, commencing with the year 1833 and ending with the year 1837. As amended at one time, it proposed to distribute the proThat amendment has been abandoned by the friends of the bill, and it now stands as at first introduced. There are some minor principles in this bill, as the grant of certain portions of lands to the new States, and the allowance to those States of ten per cent. of the sales of public land within their territories, which I do not propose to notice. The bill as it now is, should it become a law, will distribute among the States about forty-five millions of dollars. Its friends calculate upon a large Before the amendment was disagreed to, the bill would have distributed eighty-seven millions of dollars, provided the sales of the public lands for the ensuing five years should equal what the friends of the measure estimate them at-ten millions a year. I think, however, that estimate much too high. Eighty-seven millions would be nearly one half of the proceeds of all the lands now unsold in the States and Territories. The gross amount, at the minimum price, has been estimated by the Senator from New York [Mr. WRIGHT] at one hundred and eighty-seven millions of dollars. This bill, as it is, will distribute more than one quarter of the whole proceeds of the public lands in the States and Territories. sum. The compromise tariff act of 1833, to which the honorable Senator alluded with so much complacency, is not entirely irrelevant to the subject under considera-ceeds of the lands for nine years, from 1833 to 1841. tion, as that law has in part contributed to produce the surplus which the gentleman seems so anxious to seize upon for distribution. He seems to look back upon that compromise as a bright spot in the record of his political life. The gentleman appears to have been partial to compromises, and has had a hand in many, of different descriptions. The tariff compromise, so far as it was a means of quieting, for a time, a distracting question, and of calming the troubled elements in one quarter, was a salutary measure; but the principles of the compromise were unsound and unwise. The reduction of the high duties was too slow on the one hand, whilst on the other the attempt to establish by compromise a uniform principle of imposing duties was either delusory or a gross assumption of power. In consideration of retaining the high rate of duties, subject to a gradual reduction for ten years, the principle of discrimination in regulating the duties is proposed to be relinquished. Those engaged or having capital invested in manufactures in 1833 were to become rich by the protection afforded to them during the ten years of high duties; and those who might become interested in manufactures near the close or after that period, were to be left to shift for themselves. There is no reason on earth why from fifty to seventy-five per cent. should be required to protect the manufacturing interests in 1833, which could be sustained by duties of twenty per cent. in 1842. Either the high rate of duties was not required, or the point of depression is so low as will sacrifice the manufacturing interests. The experience and skill requisite to the successful prosecution of most branches of manufactures had been acquired in 1833; and although there are constantly improvements taking place in all the arts, yet as these are as great in England and other manufacturing countries as in this, they will give no advantage or security to our manufactures. In regard to the attempt to settle, by an act of Congress, under the assumption that it is a compromise, a uniform rule by which all duties are to be imposed after the year 1842, if not altogether delusory, it can only be By a report of the Secretary of the Treasury, it appears that there are in the States and Territories 122,397,462 acres of lands surveyed and offered for sale, and which was unsold on the 30th September last, and 9,772,739 acres surveyed and not offered for sale, making 132,170,210 acres, to which the Indian title has been extinguished. There are, besides, 79,126,838 acres, to which the Indian title has not been extinguished; but this will cost nearly as much as we shall get for it. The bill, in its present form, will distribute a large share of the proceeds of the entire national domain. It is retrospective in its operation, and will distribute all the money raised from the sale of the public lands since 1833, which will include nearly the entire balance now in the Treasury. The gross receipts for the sale of the public lands which will be distributed, should this bill pass, will amount to— $3,967,681 from thirty to forty per cent. interest, it can hardly be 4,875,650 supposed that money will be extensively employed in 15,200,000 land speculations. All revulsions in business immediate5,439,650 ly affect the revenue, from whatever source derived, and hence the great fluctuations which our revenue has experienced, both from customs and the public lands. The receipts from the customs in 1816, were 36,306,874 dollars; in 1817, 26,283,348 dollars; in 1819, 20,283,608 dollars; in 1820, 15,005,612 dollars; and in 1821, 13,004,447 dollars. The year 1816 was the first after the war, which accounts for the great excess of importations; but from 1817 to 1821, a period of four years, the revenue was diminished more than one half, falling off from more than twenty-six millions to thirteen millions. $29,682,981 8,500,000 8,500,000 $46,682,981 This estimate for the remainder of the current year, and for 1837, is considerably below the calculations of the friends of this measure, as they consider that the sales will be nearly or quite at the rate they were during the last year, when they exceeded fifteen millions. But I have supposed that the pressure on the money market which now prevails, and will be likely to continue, will check the speculation in lands. The estimate, however, may be low." In a financial view of this measure, the bill before the Senate may be regarded in the light of an appropriation bill. Should it become a law, it will take from the Treasury during the present year, about thirty-seven millions of dollars. The first question, therefore, is the effect it will have on the finances, and whether such a sweeping appropriation will not exhaust the Treasury, and render it difficult to carry on the different branches of the public service? Without pretending to accuracy, the following statements and estimates of receipts and expenditures may throw some light on the subject of the finances of the The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WHITE] and others have estimated the money now in the Treasury, and what will be received during the year, at seventy mil. lions. I do not understand the process by which they make so large a sum, and am persuaded that it is altogether an over estimate. I do not claim any accuracy for the estimate I have made, but believe it will be found not to vary essentially from the truth. The calculation as to the customs is based on the assumption that the importation of dutiable articles will be equal the present year to the last, when the duties on imports were about nineteen millions. But by the compromise act of 1833, one tenth part of the excess of duty over twenty per cent. is taken off, which will amount to about one million of dollars, leaving for the duties of the whole year eighteen millions. The first quarter, it is true, has considerably exceeded that rate; but the great amount of importations the last quarter of 1835, and the first quarter of the present year, will be likely to occasion less importations the last three quarters of the present year. In connexion with this cause, the extreme pressure on the money market in the commercial cities must occasion a check and reaction to all kinds of business. This cause will operate still more forcibly to check the sales of the public land, a great portion of which, the last year and the first quarter of the present, has been purchased on speculation. When good notes, as is said to be the case, are discounted in New York at Speculations in public lands commenced in 1818, sales then being made on credit; and the receipts for lands the following year were 3,270,000 dollars; in 1820 they fell off one half. In the years 1823 and 1824 the annual receipts were less than one million, and last year the sales have produced more than fifteen millions. This has been the result of speculations, which cannot continue. It is not to be apprehended that the reaction which has commenced will be as severe or as protracted as that of 1819. The embarrassment and distress then continued for three years, and extended over the whole country. The Bank of the United States, which had exerted a controlling and pernicious influence in originating the spirit of overtrading and speculation, was also the principal instrument in occasioning the distress, as it was compelled, in self-defence, to make rapid and forced curtailments of its loans. From February to December it reduced its loans twelve millions of dollars, being nearly one third of the whole amount. Of this period of distress, Mr. Crawford, in 1819, then Secretary of the Treasury, remarked: "Few instances are on record of sufferings so deep and extensive as those which have overspread the United States." Let us now examine into the probable expenditures of the present year. It must not be forgotten that appropriations for the year are one thing, and the moneys actually drawn from the Treasury for public purposes are another thing. The letter of the Secretary of the Treasury, addressed to Congress early in the session, contains the following estimates as to the appropriations and expenditures for the year 1836, viz: Estimate of appropriations required for the service of the year 1836, Appropriations for the service of the year 1836, made by former acts of Congress, Appropriations not required for 1835, which it is proposed to apply in aid of the service of 1836, Existing appropriations which will be required to complete the service of the year 1835, and former years, but which will be expended in the year 1836, Deduct wanted, appropriations not $7,306,765 $17,515,933 2,273,000 $44,707 475,321 $6,831,444 $26,965,084 Total appropriations for 1836, But the entire amount of these appropriations will not be actually expended during the year; the last year a little over seven millions were unexpended. It therefore will be reasonable to conclude that about twenty millions will be required to complete the service of 1835 and former years, and for the ordinary service of the year 1836. This estimate of the Secretary of the Treas ury is only for the ordinary service of the year, and has no reference to the extraordinary expenses of the Florida Indian war, for fortifications, (except the ordinary appropriations for that purpose,) ordnance, increase of the navy, Indian treaties, or any other extraordinary objects of expenditure. More than two millions have already been appropriated for the expenses of the Indian war in Florida, and as the hostile Seminoles have not been subdued, a considerable force must be kept there during the year, as little can be expected to be done during the warm season. Five millions will be a very moderate estimate for the expenses of this war, and it is to be feared they will exceed that sum. The two important Indian treaties now before the Senate, should they be ratified, will, it is understood, require an expenditure of about seven and a half millions; so that these two heads of extraordinary expenditure alone will amount to twelve and a half millions. But there will be others, amounting to several millions, independent of fortifications, increasing the navy, and all other objects of permanent defence. The frontiers of the States west of the Mississippi have become much exposed to Indian hostilities by the removal of nearly all the Indians east of the Mississippi to the country west of those States. There is said to be two hundred and forty thousand Indians west of that frontier. The war now raging in Texas will, from the known character of the Indians, be likely to enkindle a spirit of hostility among some of those tribes, and additional troops will be required for the defence of that exposed frontier. There is, I understand, a bill before the House providing for raising a regiment of dragoons, and authorizing the President to accept the services of companies of volunteers, not to exceed ten thousand men, for the defence of the western frontier. This bill will probably become a law, and will involve a considerable expenditure, probably not less than one or two millions. These three heads of extraordinary expenditure alone, added to the ordinary disbursements of the year, will make about thirty-four millions and a half, which, deducted from fifty-four millions, the whole revenue of the year, would leave but nineteen and a half millions. What would be the situation of the Treasury, if this bill were to pass? It would draw from it the present year about thirty-seven millions and a half. The sums given are the gross amount, from which some deductions are to be made. This would occasion a deficit of eighteen millions, without any appropriations (except the ordinary) for fortifications, ordnance, increasing the navy, or other permanent objects of defence. How is this deficiency to be supplied? There are but two ways. We must either raise the duties on imports, or borrow the money. If there was to be an increase of the customs, it must be done by restoring the duties on the free articles, as the rates of duties cannot be interfered with consistently with the compromise act of 1833. But the mode of doing it is not material; in any way, it will be a tax on the country. Will you distribute the money now in the Treasury among the States, and then raise, by increasing the taxes, fifteen or twenty millions for the public service? This is the question which Congress and the country are called on to decide. There can be no essential error in this statement; for if the estimate of the receipts from the public lands should be too low, it would not vary the result; for the whole proceeds of the land are to be distributed. Should this bill pass, the twenty-nine millions now in the Treasury, being the amount of proceeds from the lands for the years 1833, 1834, 1835, and the first quarter of the present year, would be distributed to the States in instalments, commencing in July, whether there was a dollar left in the Treasuay or not. Are the people prepared to pay fifteen or twenty millions in taxes, for the sake of having [APRIL 28, 1856. the money now in the Treasury, and which is wanted for the public service, divided among the States and squandered on works of internal improvements? All the objects, too, for the more complete defence of the country must be abandoned. If the bill should not become a law, there will, according to the estimates and statements made, be a surplus at the close of the year of about nineteen millions. The various public and private bills before Congress will probably reduce it to two or three millions below that amount. Are there no national purposes to which this fund can be applied wisely and judiciously, for the common benefit of the whole Union? Is it not wanted for the more complete defence of the country? Is there any one, however averse to an extensive system of fortifications, who can doubt that this sum is wanted for fortifications, the increase of the navy, ordnance, and the improvement of navy yards? The question is not whether this sum can be judiciously and economically expended on these objects this year, for that is not necessary; but whether it is for the interest of the Union, whether it is wise and patriotic, to retain this surplus, now we have it, and apply it, as fast as it conveniently and economically can be, to the defences of the country. On this question I should think there could be but one opinion; the sum is less than one quarter what has been estimated by the engineer department and the navy commissioners, as being required for the objects specified. On the subject of fortifications, and the defence of the country generally, the report of the Secretary of War recently made, is a most important and valuable document. His views are sound, judicious, and practical; they evince a thorough knowledge of the subject, and an eminent discrimination and judgment in the applica tion of that knowledge. He does not contemplate a system of fortifications, for the protection of the sea coast, but only for the defence of certain points, as the large cities and navy yards; and for these purposes, he does not recommend large and strong fortifications, constructed to stand a regular siege. In the views of the Secretary of War, differing somewhat from those of the engineer department, the President has added his full concurrence. The engineer department have estimated the expense for completing the military defences of the United States, including fortifications, ordnance, arsenals, depots, &c., at about sixty-one millions of dollars. This entimate is made upon a larger and more comprehensive scale of fortifications than the President and Secretary of War recommend. To complete the fortifications now under construction, the estimate is $11,609,444, and for the first class of new forts, they estimate $5,873,000; and for ordnance for the forts, $17,840,249. This is a subject on which I do not profess to be competent to form any opinion; but I have now, as I always have had, a strong aversion to an extensive system of fortifications; it does not seem to be consistent with the genius of our institutions, and has, in my mind, an intimate connexion with a standing army. The board of navy commissioners estimate the expenditures for the naval purposes, as follows: For increase of the navy and purchase of materials for preservation, to be used in case of war, $17,760,000 For ordnance for the navy 1,800,000 For navy yards, 3,600,000 Total, $23,160,000 For all these important objects, connected with the permanent defence of the country, the surplus of the present year, amounting to from fifteen to twenty millions, together with the small surplus there may be the |