two ensuing years, cannot, it is believed, be deemed more than a reasonable and adequate provision. If any thing can add to the fitness and propriety of applying the present surplus to the permanent defences of the country, it is the consideration that this fund is not a surplus revenue, as seems to be supposed. Twentynine millions, out of the thirty-two in the Treasury, have been received for the sale of the public lands the last three years, and twenty millions during the past year and the first quarter of the present year. This fund has not accrued as a revenue, but from the sale of the public property-the sale of the national domain, the most valuable inheritance that any nation ever possessed, and which is rapidly wasting away. Is there not a peculiar fitness and propriety that this fund should be reinvested in permanent works for the common benefit and security of the whole country?

Mr. President, the most important view of this subject still remains. This must be regarded as a bill for the sequestration of the public lands, and the division of them, in whole or in part, among the States, and of course withdrawing this branch of revenue from the Government of the Union. Looking at this measure in this light, it is one of the highest importance, not so much in a financial point of view, as from its political bearings and influence. What may be the effects of a measure, resting on principles so new and dangerous, no one can foresee; but that its operation might be to change our political system, is perfectly clear to my mind. This measure has been attempted to be supported on two grounds, neither of which, it is believed, can be sustained:

1st. That it is constitutional, just, and expedient to divide the public lands among the States on general principles, and without any reference to the present state of the Treasury; and

2d. That it is proper, as a temporary measure to relieve the country from the evils of a redundant Treasury, by disposing of a surplus which is not wanted for the uses of the federal Government.

In relation to the last ground, it is sufficient to say, that it is not true in point of fact. There is no such surplus as this argument presupposes; and no surplus at all, which is not wanted for constitutional, legitimate, and highly useful objects, pertaining to the Government of the Union. I have already examined this question, and endeavored to show that the surplus at the end of the present year would not exceed twenty millions, and would, in all probability, fall short of that sum; which, upon the most moderate scale of providing for the more complete defence of the country, would be wanted for that object, and no doubt considerably more.

But, if there was a surplus, a distribution of it among the States would not be the proper remedy. It would be unwarrantable to attempt to remove a temporary evil by a measure resting on a new and dangerous principle. If there is an excess of revenue, which has, and is to continue to accumulate in our Treasury, the rightful and proper remedy is to remove the cause, to reduce the revenue. Stop the money from flowing into your Treas. ury, and it will then distribute itself among the people, which is the only just and constitutional distribution. This will be the only just distribution, because it will distribute the money not wanted for the purposes of this Government among the people, and in the exact proportions which they contribute towards the taxes.

It is true the present surplus has mainly accrued from the sales of the public lands; but it is within the power, and it is the solemn duty of Congress, so to shape their legislation as to prevent the accumulation of more money in the Treasury than is required for the constitutional purposes of this Government. And it is our duty so to regulate and restrict the sale of the public VOL. XII.-84

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lands, or so to reduce the customs, as to avoid a surplus. Nothing can be more unjustifiable, or a greater abuse of legislation, than to draw more money from the people than is wanted for public purposes, whether by taxation or the sale of the public property. The accumulation of revenue last year was an extraordinary result from speculations in the public lands, which cannot continue. Still there is reason to apprehend that the money received from this source, whilst the imposts are at their present amount, will, for several years, occasion some excess in the revenue. And as the tariff act of 1833 prevents any essential change in the customs for several years, it appears to be necessary that there should be some further legislation calculated to regulate and limit the sales of the public lands. There are other than financial reasons in favor of such a measure. The national domain ought to be preserved for actual settlers for generations to come. What is not wanted for actual settlement should be held by the Government, especially when we have no occasion for the revenue derived from the sale of it. As long as it is held by the Government, the same advantages of emigration and settlement on the uncultivated lands, as are now enjoyed, will extend to future generations. These advantages are of great importance to the whole country, being a sure resource for the disappointed, the unfortunate in the old States, and all who have not the means to acquire an interest in the soil in the older settlements in the Union. In the unsettled lands, the vast extent of the public domain, every individual who is so disposed, however limited his means, can acquire an interest in the soil and become a freeholder. But if these lands are suffered to go into the hands of speculators and capitalists, at the rate they have the last year, the actual settlers will have to purchase of individuals instead of the United States, and may be compelled to pay ten dollars per acre for lands they can now get at one and a quarter. The capitalists of the country should not be suffered to monopolize the national domain, and thus interpose themselves between the Government and the actual settler. A law, properly guarded, confining the sales of the public lands to actual settlers, appears to be demanded by the highest considerations. With a view merely to regulate the revenue, the law might provide the maximum beyond which sales should not be made in one year. the matter now stands, no calculation can be made on this branch of revenue, as the receipts within a few years have varied from one million to fifteen millions, and the first quarter of the present year they have been at the rate of twenty millions.

As

Mr. President, I will now proceed to make some remarks on the main question presented by this bill, which is, the constitutionality, justice, and expediency of dividing the public lands among the States. This measure is too important, and rests on a principle too novel and dangerous, to be sustained by any temporary reasons, or any other conditions, than that it is constitutional, right, just, safe, and proper, to divide the public domain or the proceeds of it among the States, and take away this branch of revenue from the federal Government.

Before considering the objections to this measure, let me ask what are its advantages? It is claimed, in the first place, that by taking the money now in the deposite banks, and dividing it among the States, it will be put in circulation, and thus relieve the present pressure on the money market. This advantage would be temporary, and of little importance, if true; but the effect of the distribution would be directly the opposite. The banks, if called on to pay the money, would have to press their debtors, which would increase the distress; whilst the money, when distributed, would be withdrawn from use for several months, as the Legislatures of the States would have to be convened before any disposition could

be made of it. But this matter, being entirely temporary, is of little moment.

The main benefit calculated upon, from the measure, is to increase the resources of the States. As the bill was first introduced, it directed the application of the money either to internal improvements or education. As it now is, it may be applied to any purpose whatever, and will be entirely subject to the disposal of the State Legislatures. They can apply it to their ordinary expenses, if so disposed. It is to be presumed, however, that in general it will be applied to works of internal improvements, and this may be regarded as the object of the bill. It is to provide for carrying on internal improvements by the funds of this Government, through the agency of the States. It is attempting to do indirectly what it is now admitted we cannot do directly. What will be the effect of the sudden application of nearly fifty millions of dollars to objects of this description? Will it not give an undue and dangerous impulse to the spirit of internal improvement? and does not that spirit now require rather to be checked than stimulated into greater activity? What will be the effect on the business of the country of withdrawing so large a capi. tal from other pursuits, to be invested in railroads and canals? And this must be the result, as the funds of the Government are loaned out to individuals, who are employing them in the various departments of useful business; and they must be collected in, when the banks are required to pay over the money. It is an error to suppose that those funds are in the deposite banks. They are in the hands of individuals, and, should this bill pass, must be withdrawn from the debtors of the banks, and of course withdrawn from those branches of business in which they are now employed. Would not the great interests of the country suffer, by withdrawing so large a capital from them, and investing it in canals and railroads?

Would not this sudden impulse to internal improvement be likely to involve the States in extravagant and ruinous projects? A considerable portion of the works of this kind are of little or no value. The principal canal in my own State, continued by another in the State of Massachusetts, both of which have cost nearly one million of dollars, is of no value. Many in other States are of a similar character. It would seem that the moneys expended by the Government of the Union on canals and roads should admonish us against wasting the resources of the country on unimportant objects of this kind. Congress has appropriated nearly ten millions of dollars to roads and canals; about six millions on the Cumberland road; one million on the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; one million on the Chesapeake and Ohio canal; half a million on the Dismal Swamp canal; and some others. What return has ever been received for these vast expenditures? and what is the value of these expenditures? and what is the value of the stock of these canals? A bill is now pending for the assumption of the Dutch loan, due by the cities in this District, making about two millions more on account of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal.

How will the States apply these funds? Some of them are constructing works in behalf of the State, and will probably apply them in that way; but most of the States will invest the money in subscriptions to stock in corporations, and thus increase the power and influence of these dangerous monopolies.

[APRIL 28, 1836.

without the consent of the company. They are allow ed to fix their own rate of tolls, whilst their advantages enable them to destroy all competition by stage lines, or other means of conveyance. Like all other monopolies, their advantages, whatever they may be, are enjoyed exclusively by the company. They are little or no benefit to the public, whilst they are a serious injury to the agricultural class, by throwing out of employment the great number of horses now used in stages, and other modes of conveyance, and destroying the market which was thus created for the products of farms.

It may be laid down as a general truth, that neither railroads nor canals are of general utility and advantage to the country, except where they tend to raise the price of the products of agriculture or increase the demand for labor. And these results are only produced by such canals or railroads as open a market, by supplying cheaper and better facilities of conveyance to por tions of country which were deprived of one. In all other cases, railroads and canals are of no general utility, and add nothing to the common prosperity. Their advantages are confined to a very small class, whilst their disadvantages affect a very numerous class. The fallacy of these, and all other expedients for advancing the prosperity of the country, by any other means than by increasing and giving greater scope to its industry, must soon become manifest. Is it right and just to tax the people for objects of this kind? or to apply the funds of the whole people to purposes which can be beneficial only to a few, and those the wealthy classes?

But it is alleged, as another advantage of this measure, that it will settle the long agitated question of internal improvement as relates to this Government, will quiet the public mind, and strengthen the Union. I cannot concur in this opinion. Is it to be supposed that this question is to be settled by agitating it in a new and more dangerous form? What is this but the old question of internal improvement in a new and disguised form, and therefore the more dangerous?

The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLAY] says the West will not long submit to have all the public money expended on the seaboard. Sir, this is a slander on the West. Will the people of the western States wish to see the constitution violated, or any dangerous principles introduced into the Government, to secure what they may conceive to be an equal participation in the advantages of the expenditures of the public money? I I do not believe it; the gentleman does great injustice to that patriotic portion of the Union. I, as a citizen of the East, and a representative of an eastern State, will defend the West against this unworthy imputation. Neither can I admit the justice of this complaint; the West have their share of the public advantages. The disbursements in relation to the public lands, and the numerous grants which have been made of them for the purposes of education and internal improvements, are at least equivalent to all the benefits enjoyed by the people in the Atlantic States from the disbursements of the Government. It is a mistake to suppose that the public money expended at any place is essentially beneficial to the contiguous population. The supplies and property purchased may come from a distant part of the Union.

But whilst the advantages of this measure, either to the States or the Union, are of a doubtful character, the objections to it are of the most serious kind. The first difficulty is the very great doubt as to the power of Con

public lands. With the exception of Louisiana and Florida, these lands were ceded by several of the States to the United States, and the rights and powers of this Government over them were derived from those cessions, which have been confirmed by the constitution. We must then look not only to the terms and conditions of

the grants, but to the circumstances and purposes for which they were made. The United States were carrying on a war, and had become deeply involved in debt; they had the civil and military expenses of a Government to meet, whilst they were destitute of revenue, and had no power to raise one dollar, either by direct or indirect taxation. Their only reliance under the confederation was upon requisitions on the States. Some of the States possessed extensive tracts of waste lands, whilst others possessed none; and the latter contended that these lands ought to be ceded to the confederation, for the security of the public creditors, and as a common fund for the benefit of the Union.

Maryland and Rhode Island had refused to join in the confederation on the ground of this complaint. The Congress had repeatedly urged the States to cede their lands to the confederacy, and in October, 1780, adopted a resolution of which the following is an extract:

"Resolved, That the unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States by any particular State, pursuant to the recommendation of Congress of the 6th of September last, shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which shall become members of the federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States;

"That the said lands shall be granted or settled at such times, and under such regulations, as shall hereafter be agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled, or any nine or more of them."

The grants of the several States were made in pursuance of this resolution of Congress, and all refer to it; and this resolution shows what was the intention and object of Congress. It proves that the Congress had two objects in view in obtaining the cessions from the States: one to promote the settlement of the territory and the formation of States to be admitted into the Union; the other, the disposal of the lands for the common benefit of the United States; not for the common benefit of the several States, or the States in their separate and sovereign capacity, but for the benefit of the whole in their confederate capacity.

In pursuance of the aforesaid resolution of Congress, the State of New York passed an act authorizing the cession of its lands. The following extract from the preamble explains the object:

"Whereas nothing under Divine Providence can more effectually contribute to the tranquillity and safety of the United States of America than a federal alliance on such liberal principles as will give satisfaction to its respective members; and whereas the articles of confederation and perpetual union, recommended by the honorable Congress of the United States of America, have not proved acceptable to all the States, it having been conceived that a portion of the waste and uncultivated territory within the limits or claims of certain States ought to be appropriated as a common fund for the expenses of the war; and the people of the State of New York being, on all occasions, disposed to manifest their regard for their sister States, and their earnest desire to promote the general interest and security, and more especially to accelerate the federal alliance, by removing, as far as it depends upon them, the beforementioned impediment to its final accomplishment."

Here it is expressly stated that the object of the cession was to appropriate the lands as a common fund for the expenses of the war, which is wholly incompatible with the idea that they were to be a common fund to be divided among the States, or for the benefit of the States, in their several capacities.

The act of cession of Virginia provides "that all the lands within the territory so ceded to the United States

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shall be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation or federal alliance of the said States, Virginia inclusive, according to their respective proportions in the general charge and expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever."

The act of cession of Massachusetts provides that the lands were to be "ceded or relinquished to the United States, to be disposed of for the common benefit of the same, agreeably to the resolve of Congress of October 10, 1780." Connecticut "réleased and ceded her right of jurisdiction and soil to the country one hundred and twenty miles west of the western boundary of Pennsylvania, to the United States in Congress, for the common use and benefit of said States, Connecticut included." The cession of Georgia provides "that the lands conveyed shall be considered as a common fund for the use and benefit of the United States, Georgia included, and shall be faithfully disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever."

Whether, therefore, we regard the situation of the States at the time, and the object of the cessions, as apparent from the circumstances under which they were made, or the language of the acts of cession, it appears perfectly clear that those lands, so far as the right of property was concerned, were vested in the United States, or such of them as had joined the confederacy, and were to constitute a common fund, for the benefit of such States, in their federative capacity, and not in their separate capacity, as independent sovereignties. The States were to share in this fund, in proportion to the general charge of expenditure, as apportioned by Congress among the States. So far as the expenses of the confederacy could be defrayed from the proceeds of these lands, the requisitions upon the States were to that extent diminished, and in the same proportion as the States were assessed. But the rule of apportionment adopted in this bill is entirely different from that prescribed in the grant of Virginia. The bill assumes as a rule the federal population, which is a principle of political power, compounded of free and slave population. The rule adopted by Virginia was that of the general charge and expenditure as established by the articles of confed. eration, which provided "That all charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common Treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land, and the buildings and improvements thereon, shall be estimated according to such modes as the United States in Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint." If there was any authority for a division of the proceeds of the lands among the States, this bill has departed from the rule laid down in the cession of Virginia, and assumed a principle then wholly unknown. The language of the Virginia grant is very strong and guarded; and it not only provides that the lands shall be a common fund for the United States, but adds that "they shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatsoever." They were not to be disposed of for the benefit of the several States, but for that of the United States, or the confederacy, which, under the confedera tion, was regarded as the general Government, with heavy charges upon it, and then carrying on a war. According to the express terms of the Virginia and Georgia grants, this fund could be applied to no other purpose whatsoever than the benefit of the confederacy. The intention of the grants was to provide a fund for the

confederacy, not for the States, which, possessing the power of taxation, could provide for themselves.

It has been contended that the clause "Virginia inclusive," proves that the fund was held in trust for the States; but there is no just foundation for this argument, as that clause was evidently inserted only from abundant caution, to secure to the granting States their share in the benefits of the fund, when applied to the purposes of the confederacy, and which would diminish the requisitions to be made upon the States. These cessions were confirmed by the constitution, with their conditions.

The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. WHITE] has referred to the opinions of the President as to the power of Congress, expressed in his annual message in 1830, regarding a division of the surplus revenue among the States. But the President then suggests doubts as to the power of Congress; and in his veto message he says: "The constitution of the United States did not delegate to Congress the power to abrogate these compacts. On the contrary, by declaring that nothing in it shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State, it virtually provides that these compacts, and the rights they secure, shall remain untouched by the legislative power, which shall only "make all needful rules and regulations" for carrying them into effect. All beyond this would seem to be an assumption of undelegated power.

These ancient compacts are invaluable monuments of an age of virtue, patriotism, and disinterestedness. They exhibit the price that great States, which had won liberty, were willing to pay for that union, without which, they plainly saw, it could not be preserved.

Considering these lands as vested in the United States, and appropriated to the uses and purposes of the Union, by the original grants, and which were confirmed in the formation of the present system of government, will it not be inconsistent with the grants to divide the fund arising from the sale of them among the States?

The federal Government possesses two means of raising a revenue, both of which were derived from the States. The first is the public lands or domain; the second, the power of levying and collecting taxes, both direct and indirect. The power of levying taxes, like all other powers of this Government, is specific and limited; it is in its very terms confined to the purposes of the Union: to paying the debts and providing for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. And if the language of that particular grant was not so limited, it could receive no greater extension, as that would be incompatible with the theory and structure of the Government. The Government of the Union was established for certain specific purposes and objects, defined in the grant of its powers; and the power to levy and collect taxes must be co-extensive with those purposes, and can extend no further. To maintain that Congress can raise a revenue for purposes beyond the sphere of its action, is a most preposterous and alarming proposition. If you step one inch beyond that boundary, there is no limit to the taxing power; and it might be so exercised as to annihilate the States.

Considering the taxing power as confined to purposes distinctly federal, it cannot be exercised, even for those purposes, except in connexion with the other source of revenue that derived from the public lands. They were both conferred by the States on the Union, and for the same purposes; and the taxing power cannot be rightfully resorted to, except to supply the deficiency there may be in the revenue derived from the sales of the public lands.

To dispose of the revenue accruing from the sales of the public lands upon objects not federal, not within the action of this Government, and then supply the deficiency by taxes, would be a most palpable abuse of the taxing power.

[APRIL 28, 1836.

The power of taxation excited more alarm and occasioned a more determined resistance than any other in the constitution; it was the point against which that distinguished champion of popular rights, Patrick Henry, directed his powerful eloquence.

This bill will withdraw one entire branch of the public revenue, and of course throw all the expenses of this Government on to the other. It is true it is limited to five years, but the principle leads to this result; and, when once adopted, it will be acted on from time to time. The great champion of this measure admits that this will probably be the case, and says it is the greatest recommendation of the bill.

Why shall this Government tax the people to raise money to distribute among the States? Will the people or the States be benefited by this operation? And what will be its influence on our institutions and the relations between the States and the Union? Would not such a principle reverse the order of things, and change the very system of the Government? The States possess the primary taxing power; they have conferred on this Government a special, limited power of taxation, for certain specific purposes, enumerated in the constitution. if Congress shall raise taxes not only for the purposes of this Government, but also for those of the States, it will engross the entire taxing power reserved to the States.

But

What would be the inevitable effect of such a principle upon the States? Would it not be a fatal blow to their independence? Would it not have a more direct tendency towards consolidation than any other, or all other measures ever yet adopted? Would it not accustom the States to depend on this Government for their revenues, and even for their ordinary expenditures? And is it supposed that one community can be dependant on another for its expenditures, without gradually losing its independence and sinking into degradation? It is impossible. Would not the influence of this measure be the most pernicious and corrupting in the Legislatures of the States, and even on public sentiment among the people? This scheme of distribution is already pressed into the service of electioneering, and has been so used during the late election in the State I have the honor, in part, to represent. The people have thus far resisted its seductive influence, and maintained their integrity: how long they may be able to do it, remains to be known.

The suggestions of the President, in his veto message, in regard to the effect of this distribution scheme on the interests, the political rights, and the independence of the States, are deserving the most profound consideration. I will call the attention of the Senate to some parts of this message.

"It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation cannot be devised. Money is power, and in that Government which pays all the public officers of the States will all political power be substantially concentrated. The State Governments, if Governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity. The economy which now distinguishes them, would be converted into a profusion limited only by the extent of the supply.

"Being the dependants of the general Government, and looking to its Treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the State officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would, in effect, be the mere stipendiaries and instruments of the central power.

"I am quite sure the intelligent people of our several States will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local Legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their State Governments, and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they

APRIL 28, 1836.]

[SENATE.

CLAY] remarked that this was peculiarly a beneficent measure to the whole Union. A beneficent measure truly; which, disguise it as you may, is nothing more nor less than an artful scheme of raising money from the peo

"It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old States or the new, from the system of distribution which this bill proposes, if it was otherwise unobjectionable. It requires no argument to prove that if three millions of dollars a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the Treasury by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old States will receive annually a sum of money from the Treasury, but they will pay in a large sum, together with the expenses of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of seven-eighths of the proceeds of the sales which they are to receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole. Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss in the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true, because it may not at first be palpable. Their receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The Governments of the States will receive seven dollars, for which the people of the States will pay eight. But a little considera. tion will satisfy the people that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were given them from the Treasury, for which they were at the same time to pay eight hundred."

In what situation will this distributing scheme place the two Houses of Congress? Will not its pernicious influence be felt in our entire legislation? Ought those who are intrusted with the high and responsible duties of making laws for the whole Union, and guarding and protecting the rights and interest of the whole country, to be placed in such a situation, that the local interests of their respective States are brought into direct conflict with those of the Union? If the principle of distribution is once established, and the States are taught to look to this Government for their revenue, will not the members of Congress be instructed to oppose all important measures calculated to diminish the general fund which they wish to distribute among the States? The interests of their immediate constituents must have a controlling influence on the minds of members, and the most zealous efforts to increase the fund for distribution would be regarded as the surest way to acquire local popularity. Every important measure for the defence of the country, or any other important object, would have to encounter this corrupting influence. This is really an agrarian law, as it virtually provides for a division of the public lands, not among the people, but among the States, where the scramble for a further distribution or division of it will be renewed. And will not this occasion all the evils and contentions which attended that species of legislation in ancient Rome? And so far as it might accustom the people of the States to look up to this central Government for money, would it not in some degree have the same pernicious influence as the laws of that ancient republic, which distributed corn among the people from the public granaries, and thus paralyzed their industry, destroyed their independence, corrupted their morals, and worked a change in the political institutions of the country? The inglorious author of those laws has transmitted his name to remote posterity, only to be despised for weakness and political profligacy.

Mr. President, I must apologize for having detained the Senate so long, and will close with one more observation. The honorable Senator fron Kentucky [Mr.

not to return it to the people from whose pockets it has been taken, but to give it to their public agents. A beneficent measure, which bears upon its very face a concealed fraud; for whilst it purports to be an act of grace and bounty, it is, in fact and truth, only an attempt to buy up the people with their own money. When Mr. NILES had concluded,

Mr. BENTON observed that, in reading over the bill that morning, as engrossed, he found that the amendments made yesterday to the second section, defining what the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands were, did not apply to the third section, where the same amendments were equally necessary. He, therefore, moved to recommit the bill, for the purpose of having it amended in that particular. At the same time that he made this motion, he would inform the Senate that there were four gentlemen, including himself, desirous of being heard in opposition to the bill; the manner in which it had been carried through yesterday having prevented them from addressing the Senate on it. If the Senate refused the motion, these gentlemen were determined to speak to-day; and he, for one, would speak, if the sun rose and set on their session. He did not mean to let this bill go off without making his sentiments with regard to it known to the American people. If the recommitment were ordered, the bill would be reported to-morrow, and gentlemen would have an opportunity of then being heard on it; otherwise, they must speak to-day.

Mr. EWING hoped the motion to recommit would not prevail, as the proposed amendment was altogether unnecessary. The designation in the second section of the current items of expenses to be deducted from the sales of the year would be sufficient information to the Department as to what Congress meant by the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands; and by it they would know the principles on which they were to make up the accounts.

Mr. MORRIS had discovered, on reading the bill, the same objections to it that had been mentioned by the Senator from Missouri; but, being altogether opposed to the bill in principle, he did not think it necessary to refer to them. He had very little concern with the details of the bill, and thought that those gentlemen who, like him, were opposed to it in principle, need not care for them. He should, however, be pleased if the motion of the Senator from Missouri prevailed, in order that those gentlemen who intended to address the Senate might have an opportunity of examining it, as it was now very different from the printed bill as it came from the committee. It was with great reluctance that he ever intruded on the time of the Senate, but he was so situated that he was compelled to address them on this occasion; indeed, he could not refrain from doing so, without violating what he considered to be an imperious sense of duty. How long it would take him to express his sentiments on this subject, he could not say-probably not long; and he hoped the Senate would indulge him as well as other gentlemen by a postponement. had been no hurrying of this bill until the last evening, and he did not see any necessity for passing it that evening. If the objections of the Senator from Missouri had any weight, the bill ought to be recommitted; and he would suggest to its friends whether it would not be better to make it so plain that nothing should be left to inference in the Departments.

There

The question was here taken on Mr. BENTON'S motion, and it was rejected.