Mr. MORRIS then moved that the Senate adjourn. This motion was decided in the negative: Yeas 20, nays 24, as follows: YEAS--Messrs. Benton, Brown, Cuthbert, Ewing of Illinois, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, Morris, Nicholas, Niles, Rives, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Walker, Wright--20. NAYS--Messrs. Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Webster, White--24. Mr. PORTER then observed, that he would make a compromise with gentlemen opposed to the bill. If they would agree that the final question should be taken to-morrow, he would move to adjourn, and he hoped his friends on his side of the House would agree to it. He did not wish to compel gentlemen to speak at that late hour, and his friend from Missouri, as well as every member of the Senate, must see that the delaying of this bill delayed other important business which was suffering by the delay. He, for one, was determined that this bill should have precedence of all others. Mr. BENTON said he fully appreciated the sentiments expressed by the Senator from Louisiana, out he could make no compromise. He was determined to speak on that bill before it passed. Mr. MORRIS said he would much prefer addressing the Senate to-morrow than at that late hour. His address would not probably occupy a long time, and, if the Senate would agree to adjourn, he would agree that the final question should be taken to-morrow. On motion of Mr. PORTER, FRIDAY, APRIL 29. Mr. BENTON submitted the following resolution, which was considered and adopted: Resolved, That the President of the United States be requested to cause the Senate to be informed whether any branch of the public service has suffered, or is likely to suffer, any injury, loss, neglect, or delay, for want of timely and adequate appropriations. Mr. WEBSTER rose to move a reconsideration of the vote on agreeing to the resolution just submitted by Mr. BENTON. It was an extraordinary resolution, he said, and ought to take the usual course of lying on the table one day. Had he been in his seat when the vote was taken, he should have opposed its consideration at that time. Mr. BENTON said he was willing to have the vote reconsidered, and for the resolution to lie one day. It was, he admitted, an extraordinary resolution, but it was introduced on an extraordinary occasion. Here they were voting money to distribute among the States, while they refuse to appropriate money for the expenditures of the Government, though it was known that the public service was suffering. Mr. WEBSTER said that he only wanted the resolution to take the usual course. The vote on adopting the resolution was then reconsidered, and the resolution lies on the table one day. VERMONT MILITIA. On motion of Mr. KING, of Alabama, the bill to provide for the payment of a regiment of Vermont militia, who served at the battle of Plattsburgh, was taken up. The bill (Mr. K. said) had, in the absence of some necessary information, which he believed was now in the possession of the Senator from Vermont, been laid [APRIL 29, 1836. on the table on his (Mr. K's) motion, and it was for that reason that he moved to take it up. The bill was then taken up, and considered as in Committee of the Whole, and, after some remarks from Messrs. PRENTISS and GOLDSBOROUGH in its support, and from Mr. KING, of Alabama, in opposition to it, on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient, the bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading. LAND BILL. The Senate proceeded to the question of the passage of the bill to appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of the public lands, &c.; when The Mr. MORRIS rose and addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. President, it is with extreme reluctance that I rise to address the Senate on the present occasion, though somewhat used to legislative debates; yet, in this body, could I suffer my own feelings to be my guide, I should remain a silent listener, and be content with that vote which my judgment should dictate, rather than mingle in debate on this or any other question. But there are circumstances under which individual feeling must give way to duty; and individual judgment must be governed by the calls of public opinion, and when silence is no longer commendable, but is in fact a fault. Under these circumstances I find myself now placed. The bill under consideration is of an important character; it deeply affects not only the interest of the western country, but the United States generally. Senators from Ohio have different views on this subject; and as one of them has had the opportunity, as chairman of the Land Committee, to express his views in a report, on the introduction of this bill, it seems to require of the other a duty with which he cannot dispense, and which he will now attempt to discharge. Before, however, I proceed to the examination of the principles of the bill, and the report upon which it is founded, I feel constrained to give a passing notice to some topics that have been introduced into this discussion. Like most others that have gone before, it has not been permitted to pass without some severe animadversions and strictures upon the course pursued by the present administration. And to alarm the country, and to hide the real deformity of this measure from the public view, it has been attempted to be shown that the public money in the deposite banks is unsafe, and, if not speedily drawn from those institutions, will be entirely lost to the country; and, as connected with this question, the safety and necessity of a United States Bank bas again been urged on the American people. I will not attempt to examine the assertions on these points. They have been so often met and refuted, that I will only say that I am entirely satisfied that they have no foundation in reality on which to rest. Connected, however, with this subject, there has been another charge made of a more grave and serious nature, and that, too, from a quarter which is calculated to give it force and effect in the country, and which, if true, would be just cause of fear for the safety and perpetuity of our institutions. It has been said, and that with a boldness that seemed to bid defiance, that there was a constant propensity and apparent determination, on the part of the friends of the administration, to increase the power of the Executive, and to decrease and bring into disre pute the legislative power; and this is attributed to that undue influence which, in the fancy of gentlemen, General Jackson is said to have, not only over members of this body, but over the country generally. That General Jackson is a popular President, I freely admit; that he is deservedly so, I prove by the united voice of the great body of the American people; but that he has any of that servile class of friends who surrender their own judgment in obedience to his wish, I APRIL 29, 1836.] Land Bill. [SENATE. am not disposed to believe; and while gentlemen com- of the United States. Whether these assertions be well plain in such strong terms of his withering popularity, as founded or not, I think it unnecessary to inquire. I they call it, it would be well for them to examine why have never been alarmed at the cry of danger from Exeit is so, and ascertain the true principle upon which it cutive power. That power, though extensive in its rests. The people of this country sustain General Jack-operations, is held under so many checks and restraints, son, not because his word is a law to them, but because that I have always viewed it the weakest and least danthe public will is the law that governs his action. It will gerous of the three great powers of this Government. be remembered that during the administration of Mr. It is, in the first place, an elective power by the whole Monroe, and under the auspices of the Bank of the people for a short period of years; and being intrusted United States, there had been a constant tendency in the to a single person, it is watched with the most vigilant proceedings of Congress to build up systems and forms attention; and the least departure from correct principles of government unknown to the constitution. The Ameri- is deeply noted in the public mind. It is a power which can system, claiming within itself an undefined and uncan originate no measure, but is the agent and subject to definable power, began to develop its objects under the orders of the other great powers of the Government. the next administration; it had brought that administra- Being in the hands of one man, he is subject to impeachtion into power, against the known wishes and opinions ment by the representatives of the people; and the Senate, of the American people. The whole doctrine of inter- with the Chief Justice at its head, are his judges. It would nal improvement, protecting tariffs, and, in fact, the be strange, indeed, if the executive power, thus checked whole domestic industry of the country, was claimed by and circumscribed, first by the people, then by the other Congress to be within its constitutional power; and the powers of the Government combined, should ever become doctrine was openly avowed, that the representative dangerous to the liberty of the country. The framers should not suffer himself to be palsied by the will of his of the constitution have thrown too many guards around constituents. These alarming encroachments upon the it to excite any such fear. I am myself clearly of opinconstitutional rights of the people convinced them of ion, that if the liberties of the people of this country the necessity of a change of measures, which was begun are ever destroyed, it will be the act of an American during the latter term of Mr. Monroe's administration; Congress; and the first scene of the grand drama, conand General Jackson was looked to as a successor, not stituted as the Senate now is, will take place in this on account only of the military glory he had acquired at body. New Orleans, but for the firm integrity and disinterested patriotism he had displayed in every situation in which he had been placed, and his well known and inflexible republican principles. There was no local influence or personal feeling connected with his circumstances that would prevent him from being (what in fact he is) the second father of his country; and the people brought him into power by a most triumphant majority, for the express purpose that his administration might break down these newly created systems; and he has not disappointed their just expectations, but has faithfully, as far as in him lay, carried out those principles that brought him into power. This, sir, is the whole secret of his popularity; and though a combination of money, talent, and influence, before unknown in this country, has constantly assailed his administration, and, aided by the power of Congress, and in particular this branch, has endeavored to keep alive and preserve those systems, opposition to which brought him into power; yet his firmness in resisting them has been constantly met by increased popularity, and the people have been compelled to look to General Jackson to save them from the improvident legislation of Congress. I regret that this necessity has been imposed on the country; yet such will be the result until the will of the constituent body is faithfully carried into effect in the halls of legislation. Let gentlemen who occupy seats in Congress, and who complain of the popularity of the President as dangerous, if not ruinous to the country, profit by the example he has set them; let them faithfully represent the public will, and not attempt to build up systems to advance the interests of one portion of the community at the expense of the other; let them carry into operation the power of the people, and no longer endeavor to exercise power over them, and they will be equally popular with the President, and render the exercise of executive power uncalled for in curtailing their acts. It is not the condition of men that renders them honorable or popular in this country, but a faithful discharge of the duties which they undertake to perform. It has been also said in the course of this debate, as matter of alarming tendency, that it is claimed for the President that he is the representative of the people, and that General Jackson has put up such claim in his own behalf, as the single representative of the whole people But, sir, we are told of danger, because it is said that the President is the representative of the American people. And pray, sir, what ought he to be? Ought not each and every branch of this Government to faithfully represent the American people in the discharge of the duties assigned them? I hold they ought. The President ought so to execute the laws as the people would do, could they act collectively on the subjects; in fact, public opinion ought to be the rule of his conduct; and I venture still further, and say that the judges, in the construction of laws, ought to be guided by the weight of public sentiment: it is public virtue and public opinion that sustains, and ought to direct, each and every department of the Government, as well as the collective energies of the whole. An attempt to overturn this principle was made by the introduction of the American system; a branch of that system, the doctrine of internal improvements, was recognised by Congress, but overthrown by the veto of the President. He has been triumphantly sustained by public opinion. The Bank of the United States, another branch of the same system, has also fallen under the veto power, and a like result has followed. But still gentlemen are not satisfied, or disposed to abandon this hopeless contest. They have, by the introduction of the bill under consideration, changed the mode of attack, but not the nature of the war. Adhering to the doctrine, that by patronage they can acquire popularity, having been foiled in their attempts heretofore to appropriate money to favorite objects and persons, to be expended by the agents of this Government, they are attempting by this bill to bestow money upon the States, by which it is no doubt hoped that the very objects which have heretofore been attempted may be gained in a more covert, insidious, and hidden manner; and that popularity which was to be gained from individuals, is to be transferred to States. Sir, I predict this last scheme will prove more fatal to its friends than any of the class to which it belongs. It is true we have heard much said in its favor, and both talent and eloquence have been employed in its support; but, for myself, I have heard nothing new in principle, or forcible in argument, that is not contained in the report of the committee on this subject. I have turned my attention to that report, as embodying in the ablest manner all the argument and reason that can be brought together in support of the bill; a report drawn up, no doubt, with great care and deliberation. I shall endeavor to examine that report, and show that it is both fallacious and inconclusive. The committee assume in their report that there is a vast surplus of revenue in the Treasury; that this state of things is not desirable, because its natural tendency is to produce extravagance in appropriation, and wastefulness in the expenditure of the public money. This is a truism in part, not to be controverted; but if it be true that this surplus actually exists, it is strange that the committee, after having discovered this wasteful disease and its cause, instead of recommending a radical cure, should propose to extract the infectious matter from this Gov. ernment, and diffuse it into the State Governments, and thus innoculate the entire body politic. To prevent its effects here, this political empiricism would be productive of the most fatal results. The reduction of the customs, which would be a complete and effectual cure, the committee believe cannot, or rather ought not, to be resorted to, because it would awaken, as they say, feelings dangerous to the peace and harmony of the country. And the reason assigned for this strange conclusion is, that the tariff law now in force is the result of compromise of the opinions of citizens in different sections of the Union, and ought not to be disturbed, unless a strong political necessity calls for some new modifica tion. The first position assumed by the committee I believe to be founded in error, and calculated to mislead the public mind. The tariff, as it now exists, is not the compromise of the opinions of the citizens in the different sections of the country, because it is too evident to require proof that the citizens of the United States have constantly been opposed to a protective tariff, and to the collection of taxes, either directly or indirectly, to a greater amount than would be necessary for the support of the Government; and on this ground have they constantly opposed the whole doctrine of internal improvements by Congress. The present tariff law is rather the result of a compromise between individual members of Congress, representing different sectional interests of the country, and was entered into for the advancement of those interests, independent of any consideration of results, as ope rating upon the citizens, generally, in each and every section of the Union. The measure was a foul conception, and produced an unnatural offspring. Its firstborn was an attempt to bind the hands of any future Congress from legislation on the subject, for a given term of years; its next has been to accumulate money in the Treasury, which may be used to corrupt this Government, or be used for corrupting the Governments of the States, as may best suit the interest or convenience of those who have for the time being the power of its disposal. And under this unnatural state of things, it is said that the present rate of duties must be continued, and kept up for the proper regulation of commerce, and may be necessary for the ordinary wants of Government. If this last be true, then indeed ought not the customs to be reduced; and if sufficient for the ordinary wants of the Government is to be raised by the customs, then the public lands ought no longer to be considered as a source of revenue; but I confess I am unable to see either the truth or force of the former part of the argument. Duties for the proper regulation of commerce do not depend on the amount, but on their equality in the different ports of entry in the United States. If this be correct, (and I deem it an undeniable position,) then the whole argument, on this point, falls to the ground; for surely the customs can be so lessened as to reduce entirely the whole surplus revenue in the Treasury. The attempt to tie up the hands of a future Congress, by the mere operation of a law, is a still more palpa [APRIL 29, 1836. ble error. The legislative power of the country is at all times equal; it has no bounds but the constitution, and ought to have no other guide than the public will: where that leads, it ought always to follow. It is essential to the welfare of the country, as well as the maintenance of equal rights, that the legislative power should constantly be free and unincumbered, except as has been mentioned; but this never would be the case if its deliberations could be prevented from being had on any subject by existing laws, over which it ought not to exercise any control. It would establish this dangerous principle, that the power of the people is not always competent for the maintenance of their rights. The proposed measure of increasing the appropriations for fortifications, the navy, and general defence of the country, is not by the committee attempted to be directly negatived; but it is said that large and liberal appropriations of money for these purposes, though just and proper in itself, cannot be well applied, and ought not to be made; because it is not in our power to supply proper materials and skilful engineers for this purpose. This is, at least, the force of the argument; and on account of this exigency, no more than ordinary appropriations ought to be made. I am at a loss for words to express my surprise at this argument; nor can I for a moment admit its correctness; I can view it in no other light than a libel upon the American people, and an imputation on their skill and industry that people, whose inventive faculties and mechanical genius have not only surpassed former ages, but are the wonder of our own, and who have subjected the very elements to the condition of a laborer in their employ; that this people should be told by their representatives that they have not sufficient knowledge to erect forts, build ships, and other public works to any extent, and in the best possible manner, is an assertion as new as it is unjust. But the committee, as if they felt the full weight of the objections that could be rightfully urged against this proposition, and the fallacy of their own argument in its support, endeavor to sustain themselves by another, and, as they suppose, a serious objection to the appropriation of liberal sums for the protection of the country; and that is, that the appropriations, or the larger portion thereof, would be expended upon the seacoast, or in our great commercial cities; and the committee seem to claim, as a matter of right, the expenditure of money by this Government in a general distribution over the whole surface of the United States. This again is a delusive argument, addressed to the selfish passions of men, and more particularly to western citizens; and it is well calculated to ensnare public opinion, and draw it aside from the real merits of the case. To object to the application of the public revenue in the erection of fortifications and building of ships, because it does not at once scatter the money over the whole United States, is an argument in itself a perfect solecism. well might an objection be urged, that food is conveyed into the stomach alone, and that the other members of the body are neglected, as complain of the erection of defences upon the seaboard, or in our commercial cities. It is the fitness of the place for sustaining the body politic that should require our care, and not any partiality for its inhabitants. The protection and safety of our large commercial cities, as well as the seaboard, are essentially connected with the welfare of the interior country, and the interest and prosperity of the far west; a blow struck there, would vibrate through the whole Union. It is the safety of the outposts that gives peace and security to the country. We of the West ought to feel as deep an interest in the safety and security from foreign aggression of New York or Philadelphia, as any of our own cities; and this would be the case, could we divest ourselves of that selfishness to which all men are more or less liable. There is nothing, As Many, then, in this argument, when rightfully considered, that we ought not to make large, liberal, and extensive appropriations of money for the defence of the country, because the greater part thereof will be expended in our great commercial cities, or upon the seaboard. and I have no doubt most of our constituents, have never seen this Capitol, with all its gaudy and expensive decorations; and a goodly number, it is highly probable, have never seen the hall of legislation in their own States, or even the court-houses in their own counties: nor have they felt any direct influence or gain arising from the expenditures of money in the erection of either; yet they have contributed, and cheerfully too, for the erection of all those objects, because they are necessary in the due and regular administration of justice, as well as for the safety and security of individual rights; and they have done this without a complaining murmur that no part of the money was disbursed on their own farms. The reducing the price of the public lands, or the ceding them to the States in which they lie, is next considered by the committee. The first objection to a reduction of price is, that it would tend to reduce the price of real estate generally. This objection is not well founded; the price of an article is a relative term, wanting both stability and uniformity: it is the effect not of reason or justice, but frequently of caprice or whim; and not unfrequently of taste, convenience, or necessity. But as to the public lands, justice, reason, convenience, and necessity, all seem to unite in requiring Congress to reduce the price; and if this argument of the committee be valid, it applies with equal force against the introduction or erection of any new machinery, or the establishment of any new trading-house, for those now in existence will be lessened in value thereby-a position which I believe the committee themselves would not contend for. The next objection to a reduction of the price of the public lands, is, that it would operate to the injury, not the benefit, of the country in which the lands are situated. This argument is attempted to be sustained on the same ground as the former, by making its application more local, by the assertion that it would reduce the price of all land in the neighborhood pro rata with that of the public land. In reply to this argument, I beg leave to remind the committee that the united voice and almost unanimous opinion of the people, in all the States in which the public lands are situated, is against them as well as the opinion of every intelligent and unbiased citizen who has any correct knowledge of the new countries. They all well know that the Govern ment, which secures the greatest quantity of happiness and comfort to the people is unquestionably the best; and that the surest means to accomplish this desirable end is to enable every man to become a freeholder, so that he can have the satisfaction of saying that some spot, however small, is his own; that the Government of his country is bound to protect him in its quiet enjoy ment; and that, when he shall return from his daily labor to his hearth and his fireside, none shall be suffered to make him afraid: the sleep of such a man will be quiet, and his repose sweet; and, no matter how coarse his fare may be, his love of country will never fade nor languish. Such men as these are the true riches of government, and will always be found ready to defend their country for their country's sake. It ought to be our most ardent wish and constant policy to provide means by which every man in the United States might become a freeholder, if that freehold did not consist of more than twenty-five acres; indeed, it matters not so much as to quantity, if a right to the sale be the lot of every citizen. Another objection made to a reduction of the price of the public lands by the committee is, that it would encourage speculation, and throw the whole of the public VOL. XII.-85 [SENATE. domain into the hands of sharp-sighted capitalists, who would be enabled to retail it at advanced prices to actual settlers. This objection is more showy than solid, for every day's experience teaches us that speculation in articles of high value is more common than in those of low; when the Government lands were sold at two dollars per acre, speculation was as much complained of then as now. It is the relative, not the actual value of an article, that induces speculation. But this objection is easily obviated by providing for the sale of the public land to actual settlers only, and in limited quantities. The last, and which the committee consider the most important, objection to the reduction of prices in the sale of the public lands, or ceding them to the States in which they are situated, is, that the several States, by their deeds of cession to the United States, vested only a trust power; and that the Government of the United States is only the mere trustee of the several States, bound to carry into effect the grants made by the States for the specific purposes intended by the grantors; and when those purposes are fulfilled, the residue of the grant does, and of right ought, to revert to the States; and, extending the trust power further than I believe it has ever been extended in equity, they give the trus tee the power to change the nature of the trust, and convert the land into money, and distribute that among the States. And one further stretch of the imagination leads the committee to conclude that lands acquired by the United States, by virtue of treaties made since the adoption of the constitution, have been paid for by money had from the sale of lands ceded by the States, and, according to the rule laid down, they subject the proceeds of these lands to the like disposition. My first objection to this fine-spun and subtle theory is, that I have serious doubts that the sovereign power of a country, at least the sovereign power of this Government as vested in Congress by virtue of the constitution of the United States, can, in any case, become a mere and naked trustee; though it may be said the idea is borrowed from monarchical power, yet it is no less correct, that the sovereign power of a country, be it vested in whom it may, is supposed to be constantly employed for the public good, and that no partial care can enter into its composition. It cannot subject itself to control by any part of those over whom its constant duty is to watch for the welfare of all; nor can it act in subordination to any other power; for, in either case, it would be an abrogation of sovereignty. But it is not absolutely necessary to sustain the argument that I should rely exclusively on the general doctrine that the sovereign power, where it is primary, original, and confined in its operation only by constitutional limits, as is the case with the legislative power of the States, cannot be a trustee; yet in a Government like that of the United States, where its whole action exists and is brought into operation by grants, the exercise of its power must be limited and brought expressly within those grants; and I contend that in no part or clause of the constitution of the United States is the power granted to Congress to become a trustee in any case; no, not even for the purpose of diffusing knowledge amongst men. if such power can be inferred from the constitution, it must be from some general grant in that instrument; and, if so, by virtue thereof, the United States can not only act as trustee for the several States, but may be the trustee of any foreign gentleman or State whatever. This Government, if this position be correct, can become the trustee of the Barings or Rothschilds in the management of any money concerns they may think proper to establish in this country, whether it be for the diffusion of knowledge amongst men, or of buying men for political purposes without knowledge, or, at least, without virtue. Under this general trust power, But SENATE.] Land Bill. [APRIL 29, 1836. Treasury of the United States, they assume a different character; they are revenue; and that Congress can apply the revenue of the country to internal improvements, or make a donation of it to States or individuals, has been constantly denied by a great majority of the American people. The approval by the people of the veto of the President on the Maysville and Lexington road bill is, to my mind, conclusive evidence on this point, and is in accordance with my own opinion, which has been long settled, that Congress does not possess the power to appropriate money for internal improvements in any case; though some, whose judgment I highly respect, contend that Congress have this power, if the improvement is of a national character. I have never been able to make this distinction, because I am unable to discover what gives nationality to a road or canal, or other works of a like kind; no one yet has, I believe, been able to settle the question satisfactorily to himself. Whether it be length, width, or the cost of construction, or its locality, remains yet an unsettled point. Some contend that a road or canal which has its route in two or more States, or con as it is presented to my mind, and as admitted, and, indeed, contended for by the committee, Congress can become the trustee of the Bank of England, the trustee of the East India Company, or of any foreign Govern ment whatever; and thus act in the double capacity of an American Legislature, and as agent or trustee for another power, however inimical that power may be to our own. Indeed, I cannot see but Congress, by becoming trustee, can effect any object they wish, no matter what that object is, whether within the granted pow ers of the constitution or not. Congress may have in view a favorite object of internal improvement, for the benefit of two or more favorite States; they may bestow upon, or, in the language of the bill, distribute to these States millions of the public revenue; and it may be well understood that the States are to create Congress a trustee for the express purpose of expending this mo ney according to their own wish. There can be no end of abuses of this kind, if Congress can act as trustee, and accomplish that which they cannot do by direct acts of legislation. I contend, in the next place, that the deeds of cession made by the States to the United States did not create a trust, nor were they so intended; they connects with two or more large cities, is national, and ought tain no words of limitation but such as are applicable to the exercise of power by Congress in every other case. Take for example, as the committee have, the deed of cession made by Virginia. The only words of limitation mentioned by the committee, (and they are the only ones in the deed,) are, that the land ceded shall be considered a common fund for the use and benefit of all the United States, members of the federal alliance, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for no other use or purpose whatever. Those words, which are now to operate as a talisman, and change of the money received for public lands from the character of revenue into that of property held by the Government in trust for the States, are nothing more, nor can they rightfully receive any other construction, than to place the avails of the public lands on the same footing as the proceeds of taxes, duties, or customs. The money received from all or either of these sources, is the revenue of the country; and Congress is bound in good faith to consider it a common fund for the use and benefit of all the United States, as a joint confederacy, and not as a fund belonging to the States, severally; and Congress have power only to apply the whole, or any part thereof, to such objects as are exclusively with in the power of this Government, and to no other use, intent, or purpose, whatever. But there is an inconsistency in the views of the committee, which they seem to have entirely overlooked. They contend that this Government, as trustee, ought to distribute the proceeds of the public lands to the States in severalty, while the very words of the trust which they claim are, that the land shall be a common fund for the use of the States as a joint confederacy. This very inconsistency proves the fallacy of their whole system. That the United States acquired a full and absolute title to the lands ceded by the States, I think is clearly evident, because Congress have granted portions of these lands to States, as well as individuals, without any compensation given for the same; and titles made in pursuance of such grants are unquestionably valid in courts of law; and the power of Congress in this particular, as being rightfully exercised, has never been questioned in public opinion. In my own mind, I am perfectly satisfied that the public lands of the United States may be granted by Congress to the individual States in which they lie, or to individual persons, with or without compensation, as the safety or security of the United States shall require; but when converted into money, and paid into the But to be constructed by Congress with the money of the In |