tended by this provision of the constitution. The power to establish post offices surely does not authorize Congress to build houses for each post office in the United States. Such a construction no one, I presume, would contend for; yet I can see no difference in the two cases. Upon the whole, then, I conclude that roads, canals, and works of internal improvement of a like kind, are not such works as Congress can rightfully construct with the money of the nation. But, sir, I can readily conceive works which Congress can order; and it is from the nature and use to which the object is to be applied, and not from its extension or quantity, that gives Congress this right. A ship of war is a national work; therefore, Congress can order ships of war to be built. The casting of a cannon ball, and the making a musket, are also national works; and even the printing the journals of this body. Congress can, therefore, have all this done; and so of every other object which is absolutely necessary to carry on the operations of this Government. The quantity, as well as the time and manner of performing the work, is altogether within the discretionary power of Congress; and to all these objects, and none other, can this power cr the money of this Government be rightfully extended. I have thus far considered the report of the committee, and have shown, I trust, that the public lands of the United States are not revenue, and that they were not ceded to the United States, as trustee, for the benefit of the States severally, but for the use and benefit of the United States, as Government property; nor were the deeds of cession accepted as trustee, but as an independent sovereignty, the land to be disposed of in such manner as Congress should think expedient; but when sold and converted into money, that money becomes part of the revenue of the country, and is, to all intents and purposes, in the same condition, to be disposed of in the same manner, and none other, as money's received into the Treasury from taxes, customs, or any other source. I am glad to be informed that I am not alone in this opinion. I find in the Debates on this question, in 1832, which has this moment been put into my hands by a friend, the same opinion expressed by an honorable Senator of exalted intellect, commanding talents, and great power in debate, and whose speeches I have read not only with admiration, but delight; and when I say this, I need hardly inform the Senate that that gentleman was from South Carolina. "Mr. Hayne moved to strike out the words which provide for the distribution of the proceeds (public lands) amongst the States. He was opposed to the introduction of the principle of distributing the revenue among the States. He insisted that the proceeds of the public lands did constitute a part of the revenue. The clause which he moved to strike out cut off a part of the public revenue, taking it from the Treasury to divide it among the States;" and further, in reply to the Senator from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay,) Mr. Hayne contended, "that if the construction of that Senator was correct, there was no limitation to the powers of the general Government, and they might be exercised under a wild discretion, the extent of which could not be anticipated or controlled. He asserted there ought not to be any surplus money in the Treasury, but that care should be taken to regulate the taxes, so as to have no unnecessary amount in the Treasury." It seems to me that this argument ought to have forever settled this question; but, unfortunately, it has not. It remains now that we inquire whether the money called the surplus in the Treasury, should it be admitted to be altogether the proceeds of the public lands, can constitutionally be drawn from the Treasury, and distributed to the several States, as contemplated by the bill before us. The report of the committee itself seems to doubt the unlimited power of Congress over [SENATE. every part of the public revenue, to be disposed of as mentioned in the bill; and well may the committee doubt, for no money can be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and all appropriations must be, as the friends of the bill on a former occasion rightfully contended, made for some specific and certain purpose, and such purpose clearly within the granted power of Congress. To this doctrine I do not object; it is the only safe doctrine for this Government to pursue; and it would be far better, and more satisfactory to the country, should Congress adhere to it more strictly in future, than has been done in times that are past; but like all other sound texts in the hands of commentators, it can be construed to cover the worst of purposes. It is attempted, however, to get over this objection--the want of specific object in drawing this money from the Treasury-by endeavoring to prove that there is a difference in the exercise of the power of Congress over moneys in the Treasury, arising from the sale of public lands, and that received from other sources; but in this attempt I think the committee have entirely failed. I object, then, to the passage of this bill, because, in the first place, it makes no appropriation at all, for there is no purpose mentioned in the bill to which the money is to be applied. But should I waive this, and consider the distribution to the States a sufficient designation, I would still contend that this is no appropriation for any definite object, or for any pur pose over which Congress can exercise any constitutional authority whatever. I wish to be clearly and distinctly understood on this point. The distribution of any part of the revenue to the States, whether the same be called surplus, or by any other name, will be an unauthorized act of Congress, because Congress have no power to compel the States to apply the money to any specific object; for I presume no one will contend that Congress can coerce State legislation. If the money, then, is appropriated to the States, it surely must be without constitutional authority, because it is not given for the defence, protection, or welfare of the United States; nor is any other object whatever designated, to which it is to be applied, over which Congress can have the least control. I remind gentlemen of the three million appropriation, passed by the House at the last session, and sent to the Senate for concurrence, which was strongly objected to as unconstitutional; not because the use contemplated by the bill, to which the money was to be applied, was not within the power of Congress, but because the appropriation was not sufficiently specific. Yet that appropriation was to be applied by the President to fortifications, increase of the navy, and general expense of the country, should circumstances occur making its expenditure necessary before the next meeting of Congress. But so obnoxious to the constitution was it deemed, that if an enemy was battering the very walls of the Capitol, gentlemen would not vote it to save them. I think we have the right to expect their votes now, when the constitution, according to their doctrine and understanding of it, is threatened with a thousand times more deadly assault than that which they feared in the three million appropriation, and that they will step forward at once to its rescue. Here is an appropriation, or at least an application, to take from the Treasury of the United States nearly thirty millions of dollars. It is asked for without its being applied by Congress to any specific purpose under heaven; but placed under the power of men over whom Congress has no earthly control, and by whom it may be used for that purpose which we have so often heard mentionedthe dissolution of the Union itself, and the destruction of the very Government which bestows it. But this is not all. Congress, by this act, becomes the evil genius of the country, instead of its benefactor; because, the money being collected of all the citizens, without object or necessity, it seems to be admitted that Congress cannot devise the means by which this ill-gotten treasure shall be returned to those from whom it was actually taken; it is, therefore, concluded to return it to a part only. This money has been collected from the poor and laboring classes, in (comparatively speaking) small quantities; it is to be returned in masses to the States, and I defy the ingenuity of man--at least man as he now exists--to prevent it, under this process, from passing into the hands of the more wealthy and speculating part. And we shall surely find that the appropriation by the States of money collected by this Government, and distributed to them, will be to make the rich more wealthy and to keep the laboring classes in perpetual indigence. It is a palpable truth that the real wealth of a country must arise from the actual labor of the country. Trade is always fictitious, and in this country this fact is true to a proverb; and it is also true, that the great body of our laborers are agriculturists, and our greatest staples are the products of the earth. All that this productive class of men ask of Government is, to provide for their security; for the earnings of their daily toil; that, when the evening sun shall go down, they may rest in quiet, and none, by force or fraud, private or public, be permitted to rob them of their labor, or disturb their repose; they ask not, they want not, gifts or gratuities from the Government, because they well know that the means of bestowment must be the oppression of their own or a foreign country. If we are to consider the distribution contemplated by the bill as a mere gratuity on the part of this Government, and that Congress has no power to define the purposes to which the States shall apply it-and this principle seems to be admitted by the bill itself—I should be glad to know what could prevent Congress from distributing to twenty-four individuals, or any other num. ber, this money, instead of a distribution among the States. I can see no difference in the principle governing the two cases; and the exercise of power, in my view of the subject, is as clearly unconstitutional in the one case as the other, though a distribution to individuals would so shock the moral sense of every man that, with one united voice, it would be declared that Congress had most grossly violated the constitution, as well as been guilty of an act of moral turpitude. [APRIL 29, 1836. directly to the payment of State officers as additional salaries, allowing to each such sum as shall be deemed just, to be paid out of the Treasury of the United States on the warrant of such officer. There is another view of this subject still more appalling. It is true that Congress, by the constitution of the United States, have no power to make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; but if Congress have power to create a surplus revenue, and power to make a distribution of the same, they can in effect render null and void this provision of the constitution; they can distribute this money to any church or sect they please, and thus, as far as money and the favor of the Government will answer, give such church or sect the ascendency, whether the same be Protestant or Catholic. It is said money answers all things. Congress can then, by its use, make an establishment of religion. There can be no doubt on this subject, if Congress possesses the power to make the distribution as contemplated by the bill. I feel confident that I have not extended the argument further than the premises will warrant; and I now seriously put the question to every member of this body, if he is prepared to say that, by virtue of the power vested in him by the constitution of the United States, he has the right to vote an appropriation of money to be paid out of the Treasury of the United States for any of the purposes which I have mentioned. I do not believe there is one Senator who will openly and positively avow such right. We test principles by their application to individual cases; take, then, a single case. A bill is presented making an appropriation of money for the payment of the salary of the Governor of Ohio, with the condition that it shall be in full, and that he shall not receive any other pay or emolument from the State, or without any condition whatever. Such a bill would not, I am sure, receive a single vote in this body; and yet, if we pass this bill, we are doing that indirectly, which we would not dare to do directly, by creating or appointing an agent to receive this money, who has the power to apply it to the very purpose above mentioned. The bill, as amended by the committee, is more objectionable on this account than the original, for that required an application of the money to certain specified objects; and, if Congress had power to apply money to these objects, there may be a color of right in the idea that Congress may designate the agent to make its application. The bill before us, however, opens the very flood-gates of corruption, for it establishes the doctrine that Congress may levy upon the people of the United States any sum or sums of money they may think proper, and bestow, or, to use the language of the bill, distribute any part thereof when and to whom it pleases. I deny the whole power of this Government to collect and distribute a surplus revenue. The next question is, can the States rightfully, and in conformity to their own constitutions, permit Congress to become their almoner, and accept this profIf Congress has the power to divide a part of the fered bounty? This is an important consideration for revenue collected by this Government amongst the the States themselves. Have they so divested themStates, the right certainly exists to require the States to selves of power as to be made the mere and inactive remake such application of the money as Congress shall cipients of the bounty of this Government, and suffer think proper. Such, indeed, was the principle of the their own treasury to be replenished by whosoever is original bill in this case, and it must be, that, under this disposed to do so? Must they permit individuals, banks, claim of power, Congress can direct and control State or even foreign Governments, to pour into their treaslegislation; can require the different State Legislatures uries such sums of money as shall be thought proper, as to apply the money in payment of Governor, Judges, a mere and naked gratuity to the State? I am clearly and other officers of the State Government; and even of opinion that no State Government in this Union ought the payment of their own wages. Congress can still go to open the doors of their treasury for any such purone step further; they can direct the payment in such pose; for the accepting or rejecting of gifts is a private sums as they may think proper, and in addition to the and individual power, not transferable to the representsalaries allowed by the States. If the doctrine of divid-ative of a State, because the act is matter of conscience, ing the surplus revenue be once admitted as correct, I cannot see why Congress has not the power to apply it To bestow money as an act of government, and leave its application to the recipients, is one of the first, and commonly the surest, means that despots resort to, not only to gain, but secure power, and strengthen their hold in every country where despotism has existed; and it is despotism in any Government-I care not by what name it is called-to exercise the power of collecting money of the people more than sufficient to defray the necessary expenses of the country, and bestowing or dividing the surplus, according to its own pleasure, either amongst States, corporations, or individuals. not of law. But if the States are to have any agency in this distri bution, if it is necessary for them to do any thing in conformity to the act of Congress to enable them to take and possess this surplus revenue, I hold that such act would be in contravention of the tenth section of the first article of the constitution of the United States, because it would be a treaty of confederation with another Government; and the States surely intended to divest themselves of this power by accepting the constitution of the United States, for its exercise had led, and would continue to lead, to inextricable difficulties and dangers to the equal rights of the States, as well as to their peace and union. To levy and collect taxes, duties, and im posts, is an attribute of the sovereign power of a country. Congress could not have exercised it but by express grant. The States, having granted it to Congress so far as the grant extends and is exclusive, cannot exercise the power themselves; but the divestment of power by the States would be an idle ceremony, if the same power can be exercised by Congress for the benefit of the States; and thus would there be two distinct and separate powers, each possessing the right of raising a revenue off the people for the same object and purposes-a condition to which, if rightly understood, I am sure the people would never submit; and thus the States, by the creation of this Government for special ends, would only keep the word of promise to the ear, but break it to the sense. This is the first attempt, since the formation of the constitution-the existence of this Government-to bestow money collected as revenue gratuitously upon the States. It is a new invention to rid ourselves of money which, through mistaken policy, has been improperly collected in the Treasury. And as error constantly begets error, multiplying in size as well as number as it progresses, the error of a protective tariff begot the greater error called the compromise bill, by which it is claimed that in the passage of that bill Congress made an agreement or bargain, by way of compromise amongst the members with each other, by which more money has been brought into the Treasury than is ne cessary for the legitimate expenses of the Government; and it is now insisted that the law passed in pursuance of this agreement ought not now to be interfered with; and to remedy the evil occasioned by this law-a surplus revenue in the Treasury--instead of repealing or amending the law, it is proposed to distribute it amongst the States, which would be a still more palpable and dangerous error. The very silence which has so long existed under this Government as to the power of Congress, as contemplated by the bill, is strong and almost conclusive proof, to my mind, that the power does not exist. I have looked in vain into the report of the committee for the provision of the constitution on which they intend to rest this bill. The report to me, however, on this point, is a sealed book. The honorable chairman can, no doubt, turn us at once to that grant of power on which the committee relied for the passage of an act of Congress for the raising more money than sufficient for all the purposes of this Government, and distributing the surplus to the several States. I hope, however, we shall not be told that it is to be found in that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress the power to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. This provision, which, upon every fair principle of construction, can only be viewed as a declaration of the manner in which the following granted specific powers shall be exercised, has been so often pressed into service for other purposes, that it can now be made to almost prove whatever may be desired. It is a kind of Swiss corps, to serve wherever the highest reward can be obtained. I cannot, however, admit its service in the distribution of a surplus revenue; and I can see no other provision of the constitution the advocates of this bill can rely on for support. [SENATE. If, however, any one should believe that Congress possesses the power, in the imposition of taxes, duties, customs, and excise, or in any other manner, to collect more funds than will be necessary to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, for the purpose of distributing the surplus amongst the States in their separate and individual character, I would still insist that the exercise of such power would be highly impolitic, unjust, and dangerous to the safety and happiness of the country. It is with States as individuals; the possession of money, without the application of their own means for its attainment, almost universally produces a disposition to idleness and premature decay. No possible plan could, in my opinion, be better devised for the prostration of the State Governments, and the establishment of centralism and eventual consolidation, than this: what at first is granted as a gratuity, arising out of temporary causes, will soon be claimed as matter of right and justice, and insisted on until it shall obtain permanency of character, and be deemed essential to the existence of the State Governments; and thus the very existence of the States will depend on the bounty of Congress. I am well aware that direct payment of the salaries of State officers, by an act of Congress, would, at first, as has been observed, shock the moral sense of the community, and defeat the very object to be gained. We are about to give the money in a more coy and coquettish manner; we begin by saying it is the money of the people, and, having no use for it here, we will return it to those who paid it. We in the next breath acknowledge that this cannot in fact be done, and we conclude to give it in masses to the States, to be disposed of as they think expedient. This squeamishness will soon wear off, and we shall shortly find more open attempts made to debauch the States, and the States themselves will accept the price of their prostitution, as a business matter necessary to their existence. Having the large sums of money which this bill proposes to place at their disposal, the State Legislatures may quickly see a great propriety in an increase of salaries and wages of the State officers; and although there may be a little higgling about it at first, yet the propriety of an increased compensation to themselves will soon appear evident-this will be almost a matter of course; while to blind the eyes of the people, a reduction of taxes will take place. "Lead us not into temptation." Although we may forget this excellent prayer here, I fervently hope that it may be remembered by the States. "The love of money is the root of all evil." This principle and patriotism cannot dwell together; they will never be found in the same breast; they are antipodes to each other, and cannot be brought together; and money, like every other witching concern of life, the possession of it creates the desire for more. Legislative bodies are men, and subject to all the frailties of men in other situations; and if an ass laden with gold could open the gates of a city which the conqueror of Greece could not force, what may we not expect that money can and will do in these degenerate times, when gain is evidently the ruling passion of the land? Suppose, sir, that the bank, called the Bank of the United States, should offer to distribute to the several States some millions of its ill-gotten wealth, on the ground that the people of the States were entitled to it, because the bank had collected a surplus in the mode that institution has adopted in raising a revenue: should it go one step further-offer to become a subscriber to every corporation in the States, and, under the doctrine of vested rights, thus acquire not only a foothold, but a freehold in each State; no State ought for a moment to hesitate in rejecting this harlotory embrace, this unnatural connexion, the issue of which would be a monster, abhorred and hated by all just and good men; and although it might for a time acquire a rickety growth, yet its deformity could never be hidden. And the moment that patriotism, virtue, and love of country should gain the ascendency, its power and influence would be in a moment driven from the land. One State, it is feared, has already fallen; and that State, too, which has heretofore been considered the pride, strength, and glory of our Union. Its democratic citizens, it is yet hoped, will redeem themselves from this thraldom, and will shiver in to a thousand atoms the fetters with which it is attempted to bind them; that they will grind the golden calf to powder, strew it upon water, and compel its votaries to drink thereof. [APRIL 29, 1836. the land the seeds of that corrupting influence which must end in the subserviency of the States, and the consolidation of all power in the hands of those who have the means and the will to collect money without limitation, and distribute it to whom and when they please; for when this bill passes, the last nail will have been driven into the coffin of State sovereignty. It seems to me there cannot exist a doubt but that the distribution of any part of the public revenue amongst the States, will be the means of changing the relations now existing between the General Government and them. That the change of that relation will be the destruction of one Government or the other, I have no doubt. I am myself of opinion that the State Govern ments will be the victims; but it is possible, in the nature of things, that the reverse may be the case. That money which is collected by this Government by indirect taxation, when sent into the States, may influence the people to view this Government as a fit instrument for the collection of money that may be used for the promotion of individual interest or the advancement of State pow. er, and be used to operate on elections, so as constantly to send to Congress men who will be under an obligation not to repeal the system, but to extend and increase it. In such case, the necessary appropriations for the army, navy, or even the civil list, may be so neglected or reduced, as to impede and weaken all the operations of this Government. Large and powerful States that will, under this system of distribution, receive the greatest sums, may find it to their interest to continue the same, and push it to the utmost extent; and by this means may, in time, be able to overawe the power of the confedera biters of the fate of this country. Many gentlemen, for whose judgment I have the highest respect, entertain this opinion and these views. I confess I am alarmed at the pertinacity with which this bill is pressed forward. That more is expected by its friends than at first view meets the eye, I have no doubt; and that it may change the policy and power of the country is the real motive that impels it. In whatever light I have been able to look at this measure, to my mind it appears fraught with fearful events. If the potency of money in the hands of a bank is of such dangerous tendency, when improperly used, what may we expect and look for from the same cause, when the United States is the agent to carry on the operations? As you lessen the necessity for the States relying on their own means and exertions for their support, you destroy their ability to do so; their increasing weakness becomes the strength of this Government, and thus enables it to supply additional means to make the States still more weak. The very money you bestow, although it may make the State rich in a pecuniary point of view, yet those very riches will be the bane of equality and freedom. Suppose the money you bestow should be sufficient to enable the State to become the owner of every canal and leading road in its jurisdiction, and to hold the same as Government property; the first result would be a host of officers to "eat out the substance of the people, and destroy their living;" the next to bring into existence a class of men who would of course become the tenants, laborers, and dependants of the Gov-cy, and set it at defiance, and thus become the sole ar ernment, instead of being free citizens of the State. When Government is a large property holder, the inevitable consequence must and will be distinctions in society. The wealth of the country will be found in the lesser number, and power will be more secure in the hands of those who are intrusted with the management of public affairs, until the very condition of landlord and tenant will be found to exist between the officers of Government and laborers for the State. It is, in my opinion, a perfect absurdity to suppose that the principles of democracy and equal rights can long exist in a State that is herself a large property holder. It has been said that money is power, and that "power is always stealing from the many to the few." And if what money we have collected into the Treasury of the United States be the leaven by which the officers of this Government are to be corrupted, I very much fear that its power will be far more deleterious, and operate far more extensively, when divided and sent into the State treasuries. If the State Governments can be preserved pure and uncontaminated, this Government, which cannot exist but by action of the States in their sovereign capacity, cannot well become corrupt, or long remain So. It will be brought back by the influence of the States to correct principles. The power of the States in prescribing the manner of electing the President, and in their direct power in electing Senators in this body, will be sufficient to do this, although instructions from the constituent body to the representative here may be disregarded. But if the State Governments once become corrupt, there is no possible means by which this Government can be kept pure: the fountain being poisoned, the stream must become of the most noxious character. I hope, then, that the wealth of this Government, whether acquired by force from other countries, or by fraud upon our own-a fraud in taxing them more than sufficient to answer all the demands of the United States-will never be sent into the States: at least, I hope the State in which I reside will not receive it; for the very scheme is scattering broadcast through I have heard it often said there is a large amount of money in the Treasury over and above what is necessary to supply all the wants of the United States, and that it is impolitic to permit it to remain there, because it may be used to increase the influence of the executive power. I cannot admit either the fact or reasoning to the extent urged; but my first answer is, that it ought not to have been brought into the Treasury. The tariff, upon the payment of the national debt, should have been reduced to the wants of the Government, and should be now so reduced. I hold that I am not bound by an agreement entered into by members of a prior Congress, in order to obtain the passage of any law. It is not only the right but the duty of the present, as well as any subsequent Congress, to repeal or amend such law, if in their opinion the public good requires it. There is another view which attends the accumulation of a surplus revenue in the Treasury, which, to my mind, is of considerable importance, and which surplus, I believe, will not be reduced but increased by the passage of the present bill. The sale of the public lands for the last year has been large beyond all calculation: millions of mo. ney have come into the public Treasury from that source only. These purchases have, in a great degree, been made for speculation alone. The facility of obtaining money has been the cause of engaging many in this business, and that facility has, no doubt, been increased by the deposite banks discounting on the public money in their vaults; and while this is the case, speculation in public lands will continue, and large purchases be made at the present Government price; and that price the bill contemplates in all future purchases. The money thus laid out will return immediately into the deposite banks, on which new discounts will be made and new purchases followed; and thus this bill will enable speculation to make the very meat it feeds on, until the whole public domain will be found in the hands of the rich and wealthy, to the great detriment of the States and the oppression of the laboring classes and men of small capital. The system, then, which continues the present price of the public lands, although you may distribute the public revenue, will constantly furnish a new supply; and the temporary evil now complained of will grow into a permanent and incurable one. The public lands are the property, not the revenue, of the United States; but when converted into money, that money is revenue. While they remain as property, Congress has full power to cede, grant, or dispose of them in any manner, or for any cause or purpose that may be thought proper; but the moment you sell and convert them into money, that money is a part of the Treasury of the United States; and Congress cannot, in the proper exercise of its constitutional powers, give it away--cannot barter or sell it--cannot, in fact, apply it to any use or object but those which are clearly within the power of Congress, by the grants of the constitution. I am fully aware that here is the real difficulty, the disputed question--what are the objects which are within the power of Congress, and upon which they can constitutionally expend the money of the nation? We, no doubt, each of us, have a rule by which to test this question of power. I have long since formed one for myself, and every day's experience confirms me in its correctness. It is, that Congress have no power over any subject whatever, where the States possess power over the same subject; or, in other words, where the States have power over a subject, Congress possess none, except it be given by the express words of the constitution, and even then it cannot be exercised to the injury or detriment of the State power; and, in all such instances, the power of Congress is subordinate to that of the States. The only instance in which power is thus dispused, that I can now call to mind, is that of levying and collecting direct taxes--that mode of taxation which is considered as different from that of duties, imposts, customs, and excise; and where full power is given to Congress, the States have none over the same subject. The States cannot levy war, regulate commerce, coin money, or regulate its value, establish post offices and post roads, or provide or maintain a navy; and for the very plain reason that Congress have full power over these objects. On the contrary, Congress have no power, nor can they rightfully, within the States, make roads or canals, or internal improvements of any character, establish any system of education, raise money for any State purpose, or in any manner, or by any means, provide for the current expenses of the State; and for a like plain reason, the States have power to do all these acts. Our Government is so admirably formed that our citizens do not owe a divided duty; what the States have reserved, and can require of them, this Government has not the right to do; and what this Government has the right to require, the States have entirely divested themselves of the power of doing; and we should be the most happy and prosperous people on earth if the different Governments, under which we live, would each confine itself to its appropriate sphere as designated and marked out by its framers. There would be no clashing of powers, nor doubt in the discharge of duties we owe. Our first duty is to the State, and, when that ceases, our duty to this Government begins. The distribution of money, collected by the order of this Government [SENATE. amongst the States, is not only an arbitrary and unwarrantable stretch of power, but is one of those wild speculative schemes into which the visionary and disappointed are sometimes apt to fall. This propensity to extravagant speculation, into which our people are at this time rushing, as well in political as moneyed matters, ought, as far as possible, to be checked by the influence and operation of this Government. It is a moral cancer, to which if the cautery or the knife be not speedily applied, will consume every principle of patriotism and political honesty in the country. The disease is deeply seated, and its progress is, indeed, obvious to us all. i have no hope or expectation that mild and gentle means will effect a cure. Strong and energetic measures must be adopted; and we ought to begin here at home. Many of the streams that are pouring money into the public Treasury, and swelling the amount beyond the necessary wants of the Government, ought to be instantly dried up; this all will admit, but the mode of effecting that desirable end creates the difficulty. It is our duty to apply such remedy as we think will come at the evil; I will suggest one. It may be deemed a weak and incompetent one, but it is one which has presented itself to my mind, and which my judgment approves. The State which I have the honor in part to represent, ought, in this important matter, to know my whole opinion, that, if in error, it may be corrected. I would begin with the public land, by a reduction of the price to at least one dollar per acre, and confine the sale to actual settlers in limited quantities, and would not make a complete title until after three years continuous occupancy, and a conditional forfeiture of the purchase money in default of so doing. The public lands ought to be looked to as a source of wealth belonging to future generations, not on account of the money they will bring, but for the population they will sustain. A steady, industrious, contented, and fixed population, are the riches of a country. A provision of the above kind would, in my opinion, produce that effect; a residence of three years would produce the blessings and attachments of home, while the sale of the freehold, even at an advanced price, would seldom be an inducement to part with it, because a larger quantity of land in most cases could not be purchased elsewhere; and thus contentment would ensue, while the products of the farm would enable the younger branches of the family to provide themselves a home upon the same terms. The next beneficial result would be, to check at once the fearful speculation in public lands that is now in progress, and that ruinous system of borrowing that is resorted to for that purpose; and those now engaged in that business would then turn their attention and means to some other pursuit that would advance the growth, prosperity, and permanent wealth of the country. And last, though not least, it would dry up one of those sluices through which money that is not needed is constantly pouring into the Treasury; and it would preserve for our children and our children's children, even to remote generations, an opportunity of acquiring a freehold on the same terms as was afforded to their fathers. But if we sell this valuable estate now as fast as possible, for the highest price that can be obtained, and make that and not the settlement of the country our object, and then distribute the proceeds amongst the several States, for the purpose of having it expended, spent, or squandered, we act the part of an improvident spendthrift, who, having acquired by descent a large landed estate, converts it into money as fast as possible, for the purpose of gratifying his vanity, or acquiring power and influence by corrup tion and fraud. In the next place, I would repeal the entire duties on all articles that are used in any manner or form in the diet of the country; and to show its effects upon that |