part of the country in which I reside, I would instance the duty on sugar alone, which we now pay either into the Treasury or as a bounty to the manufacturer: take the duty off that article, and the price would be reduced at least two cents on the pound. The bill contemplates giving to the State of Ohio about one and a half million of dollars as her proportion of the spoils for three years; and the profession of the friends of the bill are, that they wish to give this money back to those who paid it; and as they cannot do that, they will approximate as nigh as possible by giving it to the States. Every family in the United States I presume uses sugar, and for the argument I will allow one hundred pounds per annum to each family of five persons. In Ohio we have probably 300,000 families, who pay a tax on sugar of $600,000 yearly. In three years we pay $1,800,000 tax on sugar alone; repeal this tax, and you in effect give to each family two dollars per annum-a sum larger than will be distributed to them by this bill, could its friends make its operation as they profess to wish. But if the surplus revenue be so extravagantly large as has been represented, I would go one step further-reduce the duties on articles of wearing apparel of the coarser texture, which are used mostly by the laboring classes, so that the revenue of the Government will not exceed its just wants, and you will relieve the State of Ohio in one year from the payment of a much larger amount than is proposed to bestow upon her by the provisions of this bill. But should all this be done, there seems to be still a remaining difficulty: the money we have on hand, the surplus in the Treasury-what shall be done with regard to that? how is it to be disposed of? A few more Indian campaigns, Indian treaties, and city debts and private claims, will give an effectual answer, and dispose of that difficulty: indeed, our present situation itself seems a sufficient reply. If after our naval defences, fortifications, and the necessary increase of the army, are completed, as sound policy and justice require, and the wants of the country demand, are all supplied, I am disposed to believe that little danger need be apprehended from the remaining balance: it will neither make nor unmake Presidents. And if, in addition to all these, a speedy completion of the public works now begun, and which Congress ought, and I presume will finish, should take place, and sufficient appropriations be made for that purpose, the surplus revenue on hand will no longer be cause of alarm or contention. I have, in what I have said, fully and freely expressed my opinion, though in as concise and condensed a manner as I was able. I have not sought for precedents, or looked into the opinion of others, out of which to manufacture one for myself. In political, as well as in matters of religious faith, I think the original text a far more safe and sure guide than any commentary, however wise and good the commentator might have been. I have chosen to rely on the constitution as my only sure guide, and that moral principle which ought to govern the actions of men in all situations, and under every circumstance. How far I am correct and ought to be sustained, those who sent me here are the best able to decide. Mr. President, when we look back a few past years and find this bill first introduced into Congress, although it passed both Houses, yet we have full, and to our minds conclusive evidence, that it was disapproved by the great body of the American people. We ought not to regret its introduction now; it is but a new trial of the intelligence and virtue of our constituents, who have always been found sufficient for the evil of the day. It is but an attempt to revive that principle which was found active at the very commencement of our Revolution-the principle of Government power over individual liberty. This principle was first brought into operation by the charter of the old Bank of the United States, and con [APRIL 29, 1836. tinued progressing until it produced the alien and sedition laws; this brought about the civil revolution of 1800, in which the patriotism, virtue, and intelligence of the people were triumphant, and a most signal victory was obtained. The vanquished enemy then retired from the contest, and remained quiet for a number of years, waiting for an opportunity favorable to his views. The war of 1812 presented one, as he thought. Having changed his colors, he again entered the field under the banner of the American system, and another United States Bank began this second Punic war. This institution, forced upon the people against their wishes and better judgment, met with resistance at its very com. mencement. During its first years it shared but little of the public favor. Its friends, however, were in power; and during the next administration after it was created, it acquired much strength and force. Under its auspices the American system was strengthened and invigorated, and the whole doctrine of internal improvement was spread in wild array before the American people; while a protective tariff, the necessary consequence, was gnawing at their substance. The party conducting these measures assumed a new name; they were national republicans. But all would not do; their strides for power were too plain to be overlooked. The country became awakened to its situation, and Andrew Jackson was the man the people selected to save them from these dangerous innovations, at least as far as the Executive power could effect that object. The election of 1824 took place; General Jackson received a large plurality of the electoral votes, as well as the primary votes of the people; but not having a majority of the votes, his name, with two other gentlemen, according to the provisions of the constitution, was returned to the House of Rep resentatives for the election of a President. The result is well known. The voice of the people was disregarded, and those opposed to individual liberty and in favor of Government power prevailed. Flushed with this temporary victory, they felt sure of ultimate success, and the most extravagant pretensions to power were openly avowed; but the public indignation, if it was not loud, was deep. The ship of state was not to be given up; and when the election of 1828 came round, like a clap of thunder it awoke the band of schemers from their golden dreams. General Jackson was brought into power by a most triumphant majority; the rank and file of the bank and American system party were scattered, and many of them left the colors of their chieftains; but the principal leaders still retained their places, and, though defeated, were not disheartened; they still held a majority in both branches of Congress. A bank bill and interual improvement bills were successively passed and vetoed by the President. The election of 1832 took place, and General Jackson was again elected by an increased majority. Thus all the splendid prospects of power and grandeur which gentlemen thought they were just realizing, were dissipated by the force of public opinion, and the popularity of General Jackson's administration seemed to wither all their hopes. One might have reasonably expected that this mountain labor would have ceased when a majority of the House of Representatives was found on the side of the administration. But no! General Jackson had caused the public money to be removed from the Bank of the United States; this gave new hopes to the panders of power. A panic was created in the monetary concerns of the country, and General Jackson was denounced by men high in power, as a violator of the constitution and laws of his country. It was now believed by the knowing ones that the scattered fragments of all their broken forces could be again rallied to the fight, at least under a new name, and that of Whig was adopted: yes, the whigs were called on to come to the rescue of the bank, against the power of the country. A new banner was also unfurled-inscribed on one side, executive usurpalion; on the other, lost Treasury, ruined country; but these efforts proved also unavailing. The country is prosperous beyond former example. The Treasury is full to overflowing. And now, out of the midst of all these convulsive throes, creeps this public measure, an attempt to buy up the people with their own money-a distribution of the revenue of this Government amongst the States on the eve of a presidential election. We have a perfect confidence that this scheme, like all its progenitors, will die for the want of public nourishment. Reminiscence is valuable in all the affairs of life, and in none more so than political matters; a knowledge of the family from which this land bill springs is sufficient to fix its character. The short time the public have been acquainted with it has caused the loss of many friends; and although three Senators, who formerly voted against it, have now voted for it, yet its majority here is less than formerly. Of the fourteen Senators representing the new States, five have voted for it, and nine against it. This proves it is considered ruinous to the interest of those States. I include one Senator from Indiana, who formerly voted against this measure, but who was not present when this bill was ordered to be engrossed. Eight States have now voted for the bill, containing a population of 3,619,000. (I omit fractions.) Seven States voted against the bill, population 3,567,000; nine States are divided, population 4,758,000; three of the Senators from these last States, if not on this, yet on other subjects, disregarded the instructions of their State Legislatures; and the people of three of these last States have constantly maintained the doctrine of a strict construction of the constitution. No one, after this, can doubt the fate of this measure before the American people. Should this bill by possibility pass the House of Representatives, that the President will put his veto on it, no one, I presume, doubts. Personal honor, political consistency, as well as duty, seem to require this at his hands. That this act will add to his fame and his usefulness, if addition can be made, I have every confidence; and I predict that his enemies now in this conflict will meet with what his enemies, both in war and peace, have heretofore done-more than a Waterloo defeat. When Mr. MORRIS had concluded, Mr. WALKER rose and addressed the Chair as follows: Mr. President: I am constrained, by an imperious sense of public duty, to participate in the debate upon the question now under consideration. The measure proposed for our adoption is deeply interesting to the whole Union. To the new States, especially, it is a subject of the highest importance. Indeed, so deeply am I impressed with the momentous consequences to my constituents which must follow the adoption of this measure, that I am appalled by the contemplation of these results, and oppressed by a sense of the responsibility which is devolved upon me. My opposition to this bill may be wholly unavailing; but my resolution is to resist its passage to the uttermost, consoled by the reflection that, in any contingency, I have at least endeavored to discharge my duty. The proposition is to divide among all the States of the Union, according to their representative population at the last census, the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands for the years 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, and 1837. It is a proposition to subtract at least fifty millions of dollars from the revenues, past and prospective, of this Government, for distribution among the States. It reaches back to the 1st of January, 1833, and stretches forward to the 1st of January, 1838. The nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands for 1833 have heretofore been expended by the Government; yet these proceeds are recap. VOL. XII.-86 [SENATE. tured by this bill for distribution among the States. We do not, in fact, distribute those proceeds, for they have long since been expended; but we take an equivalent sum from the general revenues of the Government, and call it the nett proceeds of the public lands for 1833. If, then, it be unconstitutional to distribute among the States the general revenues of this Government, this bill involves this principle. If we may take for distribution a sum equivalent to the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands for 1833, we may take similar equivalent sums for the nett proceeds of the sales for 1800, and from that period to the present moment, and call it a distribution of the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands. Might we at this moment pass a bill for the distribution among the States of the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands from the organization of the Government to the present period? and, if not, how can we adopt the present measure? It is vain to disguise the fact, that we are in reality distributing the revenues of the Government, generally, by the retrospective operation of this measure. The unexpended balance in the public Treasury upon the 4th of July, 1836, the distribution of which is then recommended, is composed, in part, of the revenues arising from the tariff. A very large portion of this balance is appropriated, but not expended, under existing laws. By this bill we either repeal the laws, or make a double appropriation of the same money. This bill, we have seen, also reaches forward to 1st of January, 1838. It makes prospective calculations for two years in advance of the wants as well as the revenues of this Government, and subtracts during all this period, for distribution among the States, the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands. This prospective distribution is based upon calculations of an overflowing Treasury in 1837-predictions made by the same party who foretold the insolvency of the Treasury and ruin of the country as the result of the measures of this administration. Others may legislate for years in advance upon the faith of their predictions, but their conjectural estimates of the future wants and revenues of this Government furnish no sufficient data upon which I can rest my vote. They may be as greatly mistaken now, in their prophetic visions of 1837, as they were in 1834; and, if so, this measure would prove disastrous to the country. We are now asked to abandon the settled usages of the Government, and embark in new projects and new experiments. It is proposed to divide among the States a vast portion of the revenues of this Government. A division among the States of the revenues of the Government of the Union is a fearful omen of the division of the Union itself. It is a movement towards that dread catastrophe. It will be the cause, as it is the precursor, of other assaults upon the Government of the Union. Division-division is now the watchword of assault upon appropriations for national defence. The constitution is assailed here, in the very citadel of its power, by a corrupting demand for the spoils of this Government for distribution. The prayer of inspiration, "lead us not into temptation," is wholly disregarded; and the States are sought to be dazzled and corrupted by golden visions of millions upon millions for distribution. Defence is to be erased from the tablets of the constitution; and distribution, a word not to be found in that instrument, is to be interpolated, by an appeal to the States to divide the spoils of the Government. National honor and national glory are to become an empty sound; and money, money for distribution, is to absorb all other considerations. When I reflect that the proposition before us is not a temporary measure, that it is not a single operation upon an accidental surplus, but that its author, the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY,] declares it to be one of the great recommendations of this project, that it will be SENATE.] Land Bill. perpetual, I shrink back appalled by the contemplation of the evils which this measure is preparing for this now happy, happy Union. Dark and gloomy visions flit before me when I survey the corrupting consequences of this surplus and distribution system. The country must pass through the valley of the shadow of death, if it can withstand the results of this system, by which the States are to be arrayed against the general Government, in a struggle for millions for distribution. Postponing, for the present, the consideration of this branch of the subject, I will now endeavor to demonstrate that this measure is calculated to revive the tariff. The bill, as it now stands, strips the general Government of all resources from the sales of the public lands: it does more--it refuses, by a direct vote of the Senate, to pay the expenses of Indian wars, or treaties, or annuities, or removals, from the proceeds of the sales of the public lands; but throws all this vast expenditure, amounting, during the present year, to about twelve millions of dollars, upon the tariff. The whole expenses of the Government, ordinary or extraordinary, are henceforth to be devolved upon the tariff. The nett amount realized from the tariff since the year 1833, is about seventeen millions of dollars. By the compromise act of the 2d of March, 1833, the duties decrease annually by a descending scale, until in 1842 twenty per cent. is the maximum, and twelve and a half per cent. is about the average rate of duties. Our revenue, derived from the tariff, could not then much exceed twelve millions of dollars per annum. Deduct from this amount the probable average annual expense of Indian treaties, annuities, wars, and removals, and the sum left is wholly insufficient to support the Government. There is no man more opposed than myself to extravagant expenditures; but the most rigid economist cannot calculate that the expenditures of this Government, great as is the wonderful growth of the country, can be less in 1842, for all purposes, ordinary and extraordinary, than seventeen millions of dollars per annum. Withdraw the revenues from the public lands, and how is the deficiency in the revenue to be supplied? An increase of the tariff will be inevitable; and shall southern Senators support a bill, and maintain a policy, which will render necessary an increase of the tariff? Would not our own votes be arrayed against us, as at once the cause and the apology for such augmentation? This result seems to me to have been indirectly conceded by the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY.] He, however, consoled us by stating that the duties may be increased on wines and silks. And how will this operate on the South? France buys a large portion of our cotton, and we purchase her wines and silks. The exchange is not direct, but the operation on prices is nearly the same. This is a principle conceded by the friends of free trade throughout the Union. Increase the duties upon wines and silks, and we will diminish the price of our cotton. This diminution of price may not be in the same proportion as the increase of the tariff upon imports; but it will be in a ratio approximating the rate of duties, and diminishing gradually, from year to year, the price of the export, till the loss arising from the tariff is nearly equalized between the importing and exporting nation. But an increase of duties upon wines and silks will not alone produce the required revenue. No; a general augmentation of the tariff will be necessary. It will be called a tariff for revenue, but will be, in fact, a protective tariff; for the revenues from the duties, added to the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, even at reduced prices, would, in the absence of this distribu- | tion, be fully sufficient for all the wants of the Government. Can any southern man be so blind as not to perceive that this bill throws the whole expenditures of the Government upon the tariff, and renders its increase in [APRIL 29, 1836. evitable? The author of this bill is the father of the tariff, and, with but few exceptions, the votes for this bill come from States favorable to the tariff. The only southern State which gave a united vote for the bill is Louisiana, a tariff State, and which I would gladly see cut loose from the protective system, by a repeal of the duty on sugar. It is perceived by the friends of the tariff, that, unless the surplus is distributed, a reduction of the duties is inevitable. Heretofore, immense expenditures for internal improvement, by the general Government, constituted a pretext for retaining the duties; now that system is abolished, and distribution is the substitute. And here let me ask the Senate to consider that, when the tariff was partially abandoned by the author of this bill in 1833, it was accompanied by the hope that the system would be revived under more favorable auspices. That revival will take place if this bill becomes a law. Fifty millions of dollars under this bill are to be distributed among the States, which are thus to be corrupted and controlled by this mighty mass of treasure. States are to be pensioned upon the general Government, rendered stipendiaries of their bounty, and distributees of their revenue. The whole taxing power The is ultimately to be absorbed by the general Government, and State taxation to be discontinued. The State taxes in all the old States are to be paid from the sales of the lands in the new. This result has been openly proclaimed in several States friendly to this bill. If we may take one portion of the national revenue for distribution among the States, why may we not take any other portion? If we may distribute fifty millions of dollars of the national revenue, why may we not distribute five hundred millions? Concede the principle, and the result may easily follow. Protection was the pretext for the former tariff; now, something more universally corrupting, to influence all the States, is sought for, and distribution is the scheme for perpetuating the tariff, and augmenting it to an unlimited extent. Distribution is the great and only efficient antagonist of a reduction of the tariff. Let us refuse to distribute, and the people will demand a reduction of the tariff. On the one hand, is economy in expenditures, and a reduction of the duties and of the price of the public lands; on the other, is a refusal to reduce the price of public lands, an augmentation of the tariff, and a distribution of millions among the States. On the one hand, you are asked to reduce all the burdens of the people, and leave your uncollected millions in their pockets; on the other, you are required to keep up the price of the public lands, augment the tariff, and distribute the surplus among the States. On the one hand, we are asked, at a great expense of collection, to extort from the people forty or fifty millions of dollars annually, for the purpose of distributing one half the amount among the States; on the other hand, we are asked to collect no more money than is essentially necessary to carry on all the operations of a Government administered in a spirit of republican economy and simplicity, and leave this immense surplus in the hands of the people, to be used by each citizen as he may think proper. The one system will take annually from each free male citizen and head of a family in this Union an average sum of at least twenty dollars, to be distributed among the States, and never return to those who paid it. This annual contribution may be but a small amount to the wealthy, but to the poor man it may be a large portion of his annual income. This bill is, in fact, a scheme to levy an annual tribute for unnecessary revenue. What consolation will it be to the man who raises a small or large crop of cotton, that his State, not himself, receives a portion of the public revenue, when the price of his crop is greatly reduced by an augmented tariff, and the price of every article he may purchase greatly enhanced thereby? Let him make a table of the profit and loss from this system, and he will find that where he gains one dollar by this system he loses twenty. Again: what consolation will this distribution be to the farmer who wishes to buy a tract of the public lands to make a new farm, or enlarge an old one, that all reduction of the price is refused, or that speculators have entered the land, and ask for it ten or twenty dollars per acre? What consolation will this State distribution be to the settler upon the public lands, to whom a preemption law is refused, in order to increase the sum for distribution, and his farm thereby sacrificed to speculators? Ten or twenty per cent. of the amount will be lost in the process of collection, and swarms of unneces. sary officers created to make the collections and distributions, and eat out the substance of the people. The new States, and especially the new States of the South, will have to bear nearly the whole burden of this system. Mississippi, in payment for public lands, and in decreased prices of her cotton, and increased prices for cotton bagging, clothing, sugar, and almost every article of consumption, under an increased tariff, will be drained annually of at least five millions of dollars, and get back annually about two hundred thousand dollars. I speak not now of the mass collected for a single distribution, by the retrospective operation of this law, but of the system as a system; and such it is admitted it will become, if this bill be passed into a law. To the State of Mississippi such a system will be utter ruin and desolation. All property will fall in value, and distress and embarrassment pervade the community. Let us leave this surplus uncollected, reduce the tariff, reduce the price of public lands, confine the sales to settlers only, and Mississippi will save more in a single year than she would gain in a long series of years from the distributive system. Confine the system to the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, and how does it operate? Nearly all the moneys are paid for these lands by the new States, and what do they get in return? About one fifth of the amount paid by themselves, with the addition of ten per cent on the money paid by their own citizens. A single old State that pays, perhaps, not one dollar of this money into the Treasury, receives, by distribution, nearly twenty times as much as certain new States, paying millions of this money annually into the Treasury. The States, we are told, are now satisfied with fifty millions for distribution under the present tariff and present price of the public lands. But how long will they be thus satisfied when this corrupting system shall have commenced? or where will it terminate? The next assault will be directly made upon the revenues arising from the tariff. Augment the tariff, and increase the fund for distribution, will be the next requisition. Who can doubt this result if the South consent to the distributive system? Our own votes would rise up in array against us, and all resistance would be vain and impotent. Nor will there be any limit to the sum that may be demanded for distribution. The system will work a complete revolution in the form of our government, and, by the unlimited increase of the money power in the general Government, will subvert all the checks and guards of the constitution. The money wanted by a majority of the States for distribution, will be the only limit of the taxing power of this Government. Is the South prepared for this result? Let us not console ourselves with the reflection that the distribution will stop at a demand for the proceeds of the sales of the public lands. Already a distribution of the whole unappropriated revenue has been openly proposed in Congress and has many advocates. A part of the revenues derived from the tariff is, in fact, as I have heretofore [SENATE. shown, distributed under this bill. The nett proceeds Sum paid for Louisiana, and interest General Land Office expenses Salaries of surveyors general, and surveys of special claims Surveys of public lands Charges on lands in Indian Department Total $23,529,353 6,489,768 1,250,000 5,956,024 1,832,375 797,748 91,153 860,567 2,780,630 17,541,560 $61,129,178 leaving a deficit of $2,509,655 against the public lands on the 30th of September last. But to the amount paid on account of public lands as before stated, the Committee on Public Lands, which reported this distribution bill, have added four items, amounting to $5,409,973. Several of these items, the Senator from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT, ] in a very clear and lucid argument, has shown not to be properly introduced by the committee; but in. cluding them all, and the gross proceeds of the sales of the public lands, as estimated by the committee themselves, is but $64,029,496; from which deduct the charges before enumerated, and it will leave a balance in favor of the public lands on the 30th of September last, of $2,900,318, at the highest possible estimate. Now the proceeds of the public lands distributed under this bill, prior to the 30th of September, 1835, are, as given by the committee themselves, $17,991,873. Deduct from this last sum the balance in favor of the public lands on the 30th of September, 1835, and the sum of $15,090,853 is distributed under this bill, not derived from the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands, but from the tariff. The South denied the constitutionality as well as expediency of a tariff for protection; and do we, or can we, concede the constitutionality or expediency of a tariff for distribution? May we raise by a tariff fifteen millions, or five hundred millions, not for revenue for the wants of this Government, but for distribution? It is SENATE.] Land Bill. [APRIL 29, 1836. will cause the public lands to bring these prices. The mode of operation has also been disclosed by him. Se. cret sealed bids for all the public lands, by which the settler must bid for his farm, not only against the speculator, but against himself; for no human being can tell what amount of bid will secure his farm. Whilst, then, in point of form, the price of public lands is not increased, in point of fact it is sought to be augmented by the leading friends of the distribution bill, from one dollar and a quarter to ten or twenty dollars per acre. Sales of the public lands at small prices, for actual settlement, are to be wholly abandoned, and the new States treated as some distant colony, to be looked to only as a source for draining money for distribution. A direct State interest in the moneys arising from the sales of the public lands is to be given to each one of the old States of the Union. These States constitute a large majority in both Houses of Congress, and will, if this bill is passed, direct their views to the sales of the public lands, with the sole object of deriving from those sales the largest fund for distribution; all reduction of price, all donations or preemptions to settlers, will be utterly refused. These results were all predicted by me, in a speech against this bill, delivered at Raymond, Mississippi, in September, 1834; and these predictions have been all too fully realized. Each one of the old States desires to render as large as possible her distributive share of the proceeds of these sales, and, if this bill is passed, will never consent to diminish that share, by any reduction of the price. Pre-emption laws will be-they are-refused; and sales for speculation encouraged. If there is one man who can doubt the operation of this system, let him examine the report in which it originated. That report was made to the House of Representatives of Congress, on the 25th of February, 1829, by a committee of that House, in favor of this distribution of the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands. From that report I read the following extracts. perfectly obvious that this bill adopts the principle of distributing the moneys realized from the tariff, for the following reasons, each of which is sufficient to sustain my position: first, because it distributes nearly four millions of dollars as nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands in 1833, when this sum had been already fully expended for the purposes of the Government and the payment of the public debt; and the sum now taken is realized from the tariff. Second, the Senate distinctly refused to deduct from the sum for distribution four very large items, clearly chargeable on the public lands; and thirdly, the sum of at least fifteen millions, as heretofore proved, is distributed under the provisions of this bill, prior to the 30th of September, 1835, beyond the nett amount then received from the public lands. It is in vain, then, to escape the conclusion that this is a bill for a distribution of the general revenues of this Government. Have we the power to impose a tariff to raise money for distribution among the States? If so, in what clause of the constitution is the power given? May the general Government collect taxes from the South, by the tariff, to support the State Governments of the North, and pay their State taxes, under the operation of this distribution? May Massachusetts, through the operations of the general Government, tax Mississippi for the benefit of the people of Massachusetts alone, by the intervention of a tariff for distribution? But I will go further, and ask, conceding this bill to be limited to a distribution only of the nett proceeds of the sales of the public lands, has Massachusetts, through the operations of this Government, a right to collect vast sums of money from the people of Mississippi for the use of Massachusetts? and if the power exists, is it expedient to permit its exercise? Surely there can be but one response to this last question. That the old States, through the operations of distribution, should receive a State income for State purposes out of moneys received from the people of the new States from sales of the public lands, is a most dangerous principle. It renders the new States the colonies of the old States. It establishes in fact, in its practical operations, the principle of taxation without representation, and strikes a deadly blow at the prosperity and independence of every new State institutions, of small tracts, having been obtained with the Union. Destructive to the South, ruinous to the new States, threatening to the Union, will be the adoption of this fatal, fatal measure. It should not be forgotten, that this bill is the same in substance heretofore vetoed by President Jackson; that it was reported originally by the Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY,] from the Committee on Manufactures, when that Senator was urging a rigid adherence to a protective tariff. The system of extravagant expenditures by the general Government for local improvements had been arrested by the Maysville veto. That branch of the American system having been broken down by that veto, the system of distribution has been resorted to as the only means of preventing a reduction of the tariff, and of the price of the public lands. Nor is the revival of the tariff the only evil that will result from the adoption of this measure. It will forever prevent the reduction of the price of the public lands, or the adoption of any provision in favor of actual settlers. The pre-emption system, to secure his home to the industrious occupant, has already been sacrificed in anticipation of the passage of this bill. The committee who reported this bill have reported against the whole pre-emption system; they have done more-they have reported against allowing pre-emptions to those settlers whose settlements have been covered by contingent Choctaw floats. Their chairman (who reported, this year, this distribution bill) has declared that the public lands are worth from ten to twenty dollars per acre, and announced his determination to bring in a bill which Speaking of the policy which prevailed prior to the system of distribution proposed by the committee, they say"Claims rejected at the land offices have been readily allowed by Congress. Grants to colleges and other in * * * facility, and other evidences having been manifested of * * * |