SENATE.] Fortifications. tion a few years hence, are entitled to great weight, if not wholly decisive of the point. There are, however, other considerations, that cannot be overlooked. The country has been brought into imminent danger of war with a powerful nation, and the public sensibility has been awakened to the exposed situation of our commerce and our seaboard; whilst the danger was supposed to exist, a general sentiment prevailed of our total deficiency in preparations to meet such a contingency. It is only occasions of danger which arrest the mercenary spirit of the age, and awaken attention to the securities of the country from foreign aggression. The history of all countries proves this, and none more than our own. It has only been in times of danger, that the national feeling has been sufficiently aroused to give an impetus to measures for the security of the country. The defenceless condition of the seaports, during the revolutionary war, may be regarded as the cause which induced President Washington to urge on Congress the importance of providing for their protection, and of the early measures adopted by Congress authorizing the erection of fortifications. The difficulties with France, during the administration of Mr. Adams, gave an additional impulse to these measures of defence; and the evils which the country suffered during the last war, from the defenceless condition of the seaboard, led to the energetic measures, and the system of fortifications, which were adopted immediately after the peace. That this system was in some respects unwise, that many of the fortifications were on a scale too large and expensive, and requiring too large garrisons, seems now to be the opinion of the Secretary of War; and the reasons given for this opinion appear to be strong, if not conclusive. But whether that was a proper time to commence a system of fortifications for the defence of the coast, is altogether a distinct question from that whether the system adopted was a wise one, and well adapted to our situation. Was it a wise policy to have undertaken a plan of fortifying the coast at that time? If this policy was justifiable at that period, if the measures of the Government were not then altogether founded in error, it must be a wise and correct policy at this time to enter upon the completion of the necessary fortifications for the security of the seaboard. What were the reasons for resuming the system of fortifications in 1817? We were then at peace with all foreign Powers, and had as little reason to expect war as we have now! The lessons of experience, which the war then just terminated had afforded of the dangers and evils of an exposed and unprotected seaboard, led to the measures then adopted. We have now been exposed to a war, and the public mind awakened to the consequences which would have resulted from an unprotected maritime frontier. Then the country was oppressed and struggling under the weight of an enormous debt of one hundred and twenty-three millions of dollars; the interest of which alone amounted to between six and seven millions. The revenue for those first two years after the war was large, but, as might have been foreseen, rapidly fell off, and the Government was obliged to have recourse to loans to meet the current expenditures and pay the interest of the public debt. Yet so strong was the public sentiment as to the necessity and importance of putting the country in a state of security, that, with such a load pressing upon it, Congress made large appropriations for a regular system of fortifications. In 1793 and 1796, when the system was first commenced, the public debt was from seventy-five to eighty millions, and four millions of interest annually to be paid, when the population and resources of the country were not one fourth part what they are at this time. Now we are out of debt, and have an overflowing [MAY 12, 1836. | Treasury, and a large surplus, which we know not what use to make of, which is already giving occasion to numerous extravagant and dangerous projects for disposing of it; and the danger of a rupture with France, from which we have just escaped, has called public attention to the necessity of placing the country in an adequate state of defence. If there ever was a time peculiarly auspicious, and when Congress was by the highest considerations called upon to commence a system for the more perfect and complete defence of the entire country, that time is the present. To suffer the surplus we now have to be disposed of by any of the schemes of distribution, and neglect the defence of the country, would be an unwarrantable dereliction of duty. In regard to the extensiveness of the plan of fortifications, the views of the Secretary of War, contained in bis late report, appear to be generally opposed; and the only diversity of opinion seems to be, what his views are. They appear to me, however, to be sufficiently explicit, and I cannot think that there are any grounds for a difference of opinion concerning them; and I will read a single paragraph from the report, which contains a summary of the Secretary's plan: "I consider the duty of the Government to afford adequate protection to the seacoast, a subject of paramount obligation; and I be lieve we are called upon by every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy should be defended by works fixed or floating, suited to its local position, and sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against it. There will, of course, after laying down such general rule, be much latitude in its application. Upon this branch of the subject, I would give to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after the proper limitations are established.These relate principally to the magnitude of the works; and, if I am correct in the views I have taken of this branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to, and must be capable of, resisting the attacks of a European army, with its battering train and all its preparation for a regular siege. Neither our relative circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought into conflict, can justify us in such an anticipation. All the defences should be projected on a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should be calculated to resist any naval attack and any sudden assault that a body of land troops might make upon them. But further than this, it appears to me, we ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile point, at Fort Jackson, and at Baltimore, during the late war, show that formidable armaments may be successfully resisted with apparently inferior means, These, indeed, do not furnish examples to be followed as to the scale of our preparations; but they show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships of war." The system of the Secretary of War is simply this: to rely on fortifications only for the defence of towns or seaports, and not of the seacoast; he does not regard them as a means of security to the whole maritime frontier, and of excluding an enemy from the country. And at the points to be defended, he does not deem large and strong fortifications as being necessary; he only recommends such works as may be sufficient to resist a naval battery, and to withstand a sudden assault by land; but not of such magnitude and strength as to be capable of standing a siege of an invading army with the usual battering train. Except for the defence of some of our large cities, small and cheap works only are contemplated. Such are the forts provided for in the present bill. The great error of the system adopted in 1817, was, that the fortifications were on a large and expensive scale. Another error was, that they were designed to defend roadsteads and exclude an enemy from advantageous positions in our waters. The plan of the Secretary is less comprehensive and more economical. All the forts in this bill will probably cost but little more than Fortress Monroe, which covers 63 acres of ground; and its full armament would consist of 412 pieces of cannon, and, according to the estimate of the engineer department, it would require in time of war a garrison of two thousand seven hundred men. The works at Newport cover 23 acres of ground, and will mount 468 guns, and require a garrison of two thousand four hundred men. Nothing could have been more unwise than works upon a scale and magnitude like these. If fortifications on such a scale were to be erected at all the exposed points on our seaboard, it would require an army to garrison them in time of peace. The Secretary of War, whose views are concurred in by the President, manifestly disapproves altogether of this system of fortifications, and recommended one having no other objects than the defence of seaports and navy yards, by works comparatively small and unimportant. I can go as far as the Secretary of War proposes; but am no advocate for an extensive system of fortifications, or large, expensive establishments, which will foster a perpetual, burdensome charge on the country. It is the true policy of this country to keep down the expenses of the Government, both in the civil and military departments. A people cheaply governed, and lightly taxed, can hardly fail to be prosperous. Even necessary works for defence ought not to be erected when they are to throw an unreasonable burden on the country; and I do not think that Mr. Jefferson acted unwisely in discontinuing the fortifications, as at that time the public debt was a heavy burden on the country, and had been increasing since the establishment of the Government; he acted wisely, therefore, to arrest this accumulation of debt, even at the sacrifice of some desirable interests, and to commence the great work of its extinction. In addition to the objections, on the ground of expense, to a large and comprehensive system of fortifications, it does not appear to be congenial with the spirit of our institutions, and in my mind is associated, in no small degree, with the idea of a standing army, or large military establishment. For the general defence and security of the country, we must rely mainly on the militia. But for the defence of commercial towns and harbors, fortifications are necessary; and the present bill goes no further. In reference to the bill before the Senate, the Secretary says: "It cannot be doubted but that fortifications at the following places, enumerated in this bill, will be necessary: At Penobscot bay, for the protection of Bangor, &c. At Kennebec river. At Portland. At Portsmouth. At Salem. At New Bedford. At New London. Upon Staten island. At Soller's flats. A redoubt on Federal point. For the Barancas. For Fort St. Philip. "These proposed works all command the approach to places sufficiently important to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be pro VOL. XII.-91 [SENATE. moted by the passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made, such of the positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the form and extent of the works adapted to the existing circumstances, if any change be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination can commence immediately, and that of the others as soon as the places are determined upon. By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations." So far as the opinion of the Secretary is to be regarded as a guide for our action, we have there a specific recommendation to the extent of the forts embraced in the bill before the Senate. The objection which has been urged with so much earnestness, that there has been no survey of some of the proposed forts, was not overlooked by the Secretary in the specific recommendation to which I have called the attention of the Senate. In those cases in which a further examination may be required, he contemplates that it will be done before the works are commenced. That the survey and estimate should precede the appropriation, may be the more usual, and perhaps correct course; yet, to save the delay of one season, he proposes that the appropriations be made at once for the twelve forts embraced in this bill. I do not think there is much weight in this objection, as the main question for Congress to decide is, whether the places are of sufficient importance to render the fortifi. cations necessary. Mr. President, in regard to the proposed fortification in the State I have in part the honor to represent, there cannot, I believe, be any doubt of the position being one of importance. This, although classed among the new forts, is an old site, where there is at present an ancient work called Fort Trumbull, which defends the cities of New London and Norwich, places of considerable population, and extensive commercial and manufacturing interests. The plan of the engineer department is to replace the present fort by new works more substantial and bet. ter adapted to the purpose. This is, in many respects, an important position, and of some celebrity in the history of the country. On the opposite side of the river is Fort Griswold, where occurred one of the most bloody tragedies of the revolutionary war; it having been stormed and taken by the infamous Arnold after a gallant defence, and the garrison, consisting of the patriotic inhabitants of the town and vicinity, with their brave commander, Colonel Ledyard, were, most of them, barbarously slaughtered. Had there been any adequate fortifications at this important position, the lives of these valuable men might have been spared for the service of their country, and the town of New London saved from the flames. The harbor of New London is one of the safest and best in the eastern section of the Union. It is easy of access, with great depth of water, and rarely obstructed by ice. It is a safe and convenient shelter for vessels navigating Long Island sound, or those bound out or home, that might have occasion to avoid a blockading squadron lying off Sandy Hook. It is also an excellent station for the navy; and during the last war an American squadron was shut up there, by Commodore Hardy, and protected by the small fort which defends the harbor. At the present time the commerce of New London is important, and rapidly increasing; the whale fishery is extensively prosecuted, and with much enterprise. In Stonington and Mystic, ports which are in the neighborhood, there are a large number of vessels engaged in the whale fishery; and Norwich has considerable commerce, and extensive manufacturing interests. In the report of the engineer department it is said that "New London harbor is very important to the defence of Long Island sound; and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, very rarely freezing, and being easily SENATE.] Fortifications. defended, is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence, the present Forts Trumbull and Griswold give place to more efficient works, of which the expense is estimated at $314,515." The port of New London has probably as strong claims as any other; yet I feel no particular solicitude concerning it, or any other fortifications for my own State, as the events of the late war proved that the intrepidity of our citizens is some security against attacks, even without fortifications. The inhabitants of Stonington, with a single gun upon the beach, successfully repelled and drove off the enemy's barges. And as respects any advantages of local expenditures, I do not regard them as deserving of any consideration; the number of persons who may be benefited by such expenditures is too small to be of any general advantage to the contiguous population. Neither the workmen nor materials are necessarily to be procured on the spot, and a small portion of the disbursements only may in any way benefit our citizens. Mr. President, I will now notice some of the objections which have been urged against the bill before the Senate. It is contended that one million is all that can be expended the present year; and that this ought to be applied in completing the present forts. It is believed that a much larger sum may be advantageously and economically expended the present year; but if it should not be disbursed, the appropriation can do no harm. As regards confining the action of the Government to the old works, and neglecting the commencement of others for the defence of points equally exposed, and having equal claims on us for protection, that would be very unjust, and a very partial dispensation of the blessings of the Government. The existing forts are, most of them, already in a condition to afford protection to the places they are intended to defend, whilst many of the places designed to be protected by the new forts are wholly defenceless. Protection, like justice, should, as far as practicable, be extended to all, and with an equal hand. Another objection which has been urged is, that such large appropriations for public works would derange the business of the country; that it would withdraw from other pursuits so large a number of persons as to occasion serious inconvenience, if not actual embarrassment. The price of labor is said now to be unusually high, and it is contended that the price would be greatly augmented by the demands of the Government on the labor of the country, should so large appropriations be expended on fortifications; and that it would be unwise to enlarge this branch of the public service at a time when labor is at an advanced price. Whatever force there may be in these arguments, they come with an ill grace from the advocates of a measure to which they will apply with much more weight. How is it that gentlemen propose to apply thirty-six millions the current year to works of internal improvement, and yet are alarmed at appropriating three millions to objects of defence? If there are any grounds for apprehension that our legislation in the latter case should make too large a drain upon the industry of the country, would not the same objection apply with much more force to the distribution schemes? If the expenditure of three millions on fortifications is to derange the productive industry of the country, what would be the effect of the sudden application of more than thirty millions to works of internal improvement? But the present demand for labor, and the high prices consequent on that demand, can hardly be expected to continue. This has been the result of the overaction in every kind of business the past year; and that has already occasioned a reaction and a pressure for money, [MAY 12, 1836. which cannot fail to check and restrain private enterprise, and curtail the operations of every kind of business. How long the pressure may continue, and to what extent the reaction may go, no one can determine; but it would by no means be surprising if these causes now in operation should so diminish the demand for labor, as to occasion a surplus of this most useful commodity, and occasion distress among the laboring classes, for want of employment. When the embarrassments of business become such as to essentially diminish the demand for labor, a reduction in the price must take place, and a portion of the working class must be thrown out of employment, and of course will be deprived of the means of subsistence. Should this be the result of present causes, which there is some reason to fear, the usual demand which the Government might afford for labor would be extremely fortunate, by supplying the deficiency which might be occasioned by the curtailments in individual enterprise. It can be no object for the Government to desire to cheapen labor, or diminish the profits of industry. It is the policy of a wise and just Government to increase, rather than to weaken, the stimulus to industry; and whether we pay a few thousand dollars more or less for that portion of labor which the Government may have occasion to employ, is of little consequence. So far as the measures of the Government are to be influenced at all by considerations of this kind, it should rather be our object to keep the prices of labor up to their maximum, than to reduce them to their minimum standard. Another very novel, and, as it appears to me, strange argument, was urged by the Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. SOUTHARD.] It was, that the necessity for fortifications was not so great now, as when our seaports were small, and less able to defend themselves. I had supposed that the reverse was the case, and that the necessity of fortifications was in proportion to the population, commerce, and wealth of our cities, which might stimulate the cupidity of an enemy. [Here Mr. SOUTHARD explained, and said he had used no such language, and no argument of the kind.] Mr. N. said he did not profess to give the gentleman's language, but thought he had stated the substance of his argument correctly; it struck him very forcibly at the time, as he thought it a very extraordinary argument, and he noted it down. But if the Senator saw fit to disclaim it, he would not pursue his remarks upon it. He would advert to another objection urged by the Senator from New Jersey; but as he found it difficult to state the gentleman's arguments in a manner to satisfy him, he desired the gentleman to say whether his remarks were correctly stated in this instance. The observation of the Senator to which he referred was this: that the development of the powers of steam, and the improvements in its application, were such, that it might soon change the system of defence, and fortifications be superseded by steam batteries. [Mr. SOUTHARD said that his remarks were not stated exactly correct.] Mr. N. said he only professed to give the substance of the gentleman's argument, which he thought rather an extraordinary one, and he did not understand the Senator to deny that he was so far correct. Are we to neglect to put the country in a state of defence, and wait to see if the progress of science and experiments may not develop some better system? If we had unfortunately become involved in a war with France, and any of our defenceless towns had been destroyed, would they have been satisfied with this reason for our neglecting to provide the means of their defence? How will this argument hold, when applied to the common concerns of life? What would be thought of the husbandman who should neglect to cultivate the soil, from an expectation that a better system of cultivation might after a while be discovered, which would entirely supersede the present? Would not this argument apply with much more propriety of force to canals and railroads, which are comparatively of recent origin, particularly the latter? Fortifications for the defence of towns are almost as ancient, and their utility and necessity as well established, as the common arts of life—as the art of tilling the earth, by which we are supplied with food, or those mechanical arts by which some of its products are wrought into fabrics for the clothing of man. In the progress of discovery and improvement, the present plan of fortifications may be superseded, and so may all the arts of life; but if we were to neg lect to avail ourselves of those now known and in use, from an expectation that they might be superseded by better systems, we should not be acting very wisely, or hardly consistent with the instinct of self-preservation. Mr. President, whence comes the opposition to this bill? I have witnessed it with some surprise, after what has occurred the present session. How many times are we to fight our battles over? An English author gives the character of an old veteran soldier, who in his latter days was employed in fighting over the battles of his youth; but our battles have to be fought over again and again, and then remain undecided. During the early part of the session, five or six weeks were spent in debating a resolution offered by the Senator from Missouri, which declared that the public revenue ought to be applied to the defence of the country. As the resolution was introduced, it directed that the surplus revende was to be thus applied; but, on motion, I think, of the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER,] the word "surplus" was stricken out, and the Senate, after a protracted and elaborate debate, decided by a unanimous vote that the entire revenue should be applied for the defence of the country. But what did this resolution amount to? We seem now to have, on the part of some gentlemen, a practical construction of their votes. It seems that in this deliberate decision, made after so protracted a debate, that to appropriate the revenue of the country to its defence, meant nothing more than that they were willing to vote the ordinary annual appropriations for fortifications. Did gentlemen mean this, and this only, at the time? or has any thing since occurred which has changed their views? It is true at that time there was some apprehension of a rupture with a powerful nation; but it is not the less true that the mover of that resolution repeatedly declared that it was not offered in consequence of the impending danger, and that if he had the bond of fate for peace, he should press its adoption with the same earnestness. It was advocated as a settled policy, and upon general considerations, and not as a measure dictated by any immediate prospect of war. It is not for me to reconcile the votes of Senators for that resolution with their determined hostility to this bill, which appropriates less than a million and a half for new fortifications; neither will I charge them with inconsistency; I leave it for the gentlemen themselves to reconcile their speeches and votes on that resolution, with their speeches and votes on this bill. When another subject was under discussion, (the bill for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands,) it was declared by the Senator from Missouri that it was a measure in direct conflict with the defence bills; which was denied by the Senators to whom I have referred, who insisted that, after appropriating all that could be possibly disbursed for purposes of defence, which they professed to be willing to do, the surplus from the sales of the public lands would remain to be distributed. Has the passage of that bill changed the sentiments of gentlemen? After the strong declarations to the contrary, are they now alarmed that the surplus will be diminished? Is the [SENATE. secret of the opposition to this measure to be discovered in the apprehension that it may interfere with the distribution schemes? Sir, I fear we are already gathering the first-fruits of that dangerous and mischievous meas. ure; a scheme which comes in direct conflict with our entire legislation; and, by arraying the interests of the States against those of the Union, its corrupting influ ence tends to embarrass all our deliberations, and to defeat the wisest measures which the interest and safety of the country may demand. Mr. CALHOUN observed, that the Senator from Maine put these large appropriations on the ground that the Secretary would make the contracts to run through the whole time. Now he had had some little experience in these matters, and well knew the disadvantages attending the making long contracts. If they were made when prices were high, the profit consequent on the fall of prices enured to the contractor; and if they were made when prices were low, the contractor was sure to violate his contract, when he found himself losing by the fall of prices; so that in either case the Government must be a great loser. One great objection that he had to the large appropriations in this bill was, that they were calculated to empty the public purse and fill the pockets of the contractors. The Senator from Connecticut said that labor is now falling. Well, what would be the result? Why, the fall in the price of labor would put thousands into the pockets of individuals, for no earthly benefit to the public. There never was a time better fitted to make fortunes for contractors than the present. He understood this thing very well. He would not attribute motives to any gentleman; but it had been almost openly avowed on that floor, that the design was to retain the public money where it is, and prevent it from going back to the people, to whom it rightfully belonged. There were powerful combinations interested in this matter. Millions were deposited in these deposite banks, who paid no interest on it, and were, therefore, deeply interested in retaining this money; a vast number of individuals who were indebted to them, were equally interested in the same object; and this powerful combination would make every effort to prevent the withdrawal of this money. If this bill was a question of fortifications, there would be no difficulty; it would be passed at once; but these were not the real objects in view. The question now was not for fortifications, for they were not even dreamed of; but how to prevent this immense amount of public money from being withdrawn from the deposite banks. With respect to these appropriations, the passing them at this time, and in the absence of surveys and sufficient information, would be a departure from the long settled practice of the Government, for which no sufficient reason could be given. Their custom had been, to wait for the action of the other House, and to pass such fortification bills as came from that body. There was a fortification bill now in progress there, and there was no danger of its not being sent to the Senate in time to be acted on. It was not expected to expend this money this year, for the Secretary would have too much discretion to make contracts at this time. in There never was a time when there was so little use expending money on new fortifications as the present. There were only two nations in the world against whose attacks they would be wanted, and these were France and Great Britain. Our difficulties with France were, thanks to Providence, happily settled; and with Great Britain there was not the slightest expectation of our coming in conflict. Her magnanimous interference to settle our foolish and wicked quarrel with France, plainly showed her friendly intentions towards this country, and her strong desire to maintain her friendly rela tions with us. Our danger (said Mr. C.) lies not on the seacoast; it lies in another way-in the southwest. Let me tell you, (said Mr. C.,) that every dollar of our surplus may be wanted, and that soon. They knew not even what the next mail might bring them. Wait then (said Mr. C.) a few days, and watch the progress of events; let this bill lie, and rest until the Senate has time to consider and reflect upon it. They were proceeding with too much precipitation on idle schemes to prevent the surplus money from going back to the people, from whom it was derived. He was anxious to have the bill to provide for the safety of the public money taken up and considered; it being, in his opinion, a more important matter than any that could be brought before them; and he had hoped that the Senator from New York [Mr. WRIGHT] Would have called it up before this. He now gave notice that he would himself call up that bill on Saturday next, if the Senator from New York did not call it up before that day. Mr. WRIGHT expressed a wish to address the Senate on the subject; but it being late in the day, he moved an adjournment, which was carried; and The Senate adjourned. Mr. HUBBARD remarked, that he had that morning received, through the medium of one of the public journals of the country, information, which had created in his mind no inconsiderable degree of astonishment, and which information, he presumed, would produce a like effect upon the mind of every individual who should be made acquainted with the facts. He had noticed that the Legislative Council of Florida had recently established "banking institutions," the maximum of whose capital amounted to at least twelve millions of dollars. This, said he, may be all necessary for the "fair business transactions" of the Territory; but it was, however, an amount of banking capital quadruple the amount of banking capital employed in his own State, with a population of nearly three hundred thousand white male inhabitants, while there was not at this time within the Territory a sufficient white population to entitle Florida to a place among the States of this Union. There had been established a "Life Insurance and Trust Company," with banking powers, to be located at St. Augustine, its maximum capital amounting to four millions of dollars. The charter of this company extends for the term of fifty years, and it possesses the power of establishing branches in any part of the Territory. Beside this Trust Company, "there are in Florida," as he learned, "several other moneyed institutions; the Union and Central Banks at Tallahassee-one with three, the other with two millions of capital;" and he believed that it would appear, if an examination should take place into this subject, that in the course of the last winter the Territorial Government of Florida had established "banking companies" at Pensacola and at St. Joseph, the maximum capital of each consisting of three millions of dollars. From what he had stated, it would result that moneyed institutions had been recently chartered in Florida, whose maximum capital amounted to the enormous sum of twelve millions of dollars. This is, however, not the whole story. It will be found, upon examination, he had no doubt, [MAY 14, 1836. that other moneyed institutions had been previously established at Pensacola, and in other parts of the Territory. All this (as he had remarked before) may be right, necessary, and proper; the condition, the state, of the commercial business may demand this most extraordinary, if not alarming, increase of the moneyed institutions of the Territory. But it may be wrong; it may proceed, it may spring, from that uncontrollable spirit for speculation which is abroad in the land. He would not presume to pass judgment upon these transactions. The account given had made a strong impression upon his mind, and he felt it to be his duty to bring the matter to the notice of the Senate. He had prepared a resolution instructing the Committee on the Judiciary to inquire into the character, condition, and the amount of capital of the several moneyed institutions exercising banking powers, which have been chartered within the last three years by the Territorial Government of Florida, and to report to the Senate whether in their opinion any proceeding on the part of the Senate, or any legislation on the part of Congress, is necessary. He could not doubt but that Congress possessed "supervisory authority over Territorial legislation;" that Congress possessed the power to disapprove of and to annul the laws which might be enacted by the proper authority of this Territory. This was his impres sion; and he believed that our own statutes would show that we had "disapproved and declared null and void" a legislative act of Florida, years after the act had been approved. At any event, he believed it was competent for the Senate to express its own opinion, its own views, upon the legislative proceedings of Florida to which he had referred. He would, therefore, ask leave to present the resolution he had prepared, and he hoped the Senate would adopt it, and that the Committee on the Judiciary would investigate this whole matter, and make report whether the business of the Territory called for this increase of her moneyed institutions. For himself, he most conscientiously believed that there was imminent danger that the credulous, the thoughtless, the confiding portion of our community, may be overwhelmed in this deluge of speculation which is now spreading over our beloved country. Mr. H. then submitted the following resolution, which lies on the table one day: Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire into the character, condition, and the amount of capital of the several banking institutions" which have been chartered within the last three years by the Territorial Government of Florida; and that they report to the Senate whether in their opinion any legis lation of Congress is necessary to disaffirm the establish. ment of said charters. STOCKTON AND STOKES. Mr. CLAYTON, from the Committee on the Judiciary, reported a bill for the relief of Richard C. Stockton, William B. Stokes, and others. Mr. C. explained the object of this bill, which was to refer the case of those gentlemen to the Solicitor of the Treasury, who, after examining all the evidence on the subject, should decide according to the principles of equity and justice. The committee (Mr. C. said) were unanimous in favor of this bill, believing that these gentlemen were justly entitled to relief. Mr. BUCHANAN advocated the bill in a speech of some length, observing that this case was, early in the session, submitted to the committee, and there was not a member of it who was not of the opinion that these persons were entitled to compensation for the services they had rendered. Mr. B. spoke of the fidelity with which the contracts had been performed; and observed |