respect to this matter during his premiership, under a [MAY 19, 1836. to monopolize so valuable an article of commerce? And I ask, sir, will she recede from the position she has assumed in relation to it, so long as she sees the whole maritime frontier of Maine, with all her shipping, her commerce, her towns and cities, naked and exposed? Will she feel any apprehension from us, while we ourselves are so defenceless? Will she fear to receive, while she can so readily give blows? Let me tell you, sir, that controversy can never be settled in a manner consistent with our honor and our rights, until the maritime frontier of Maine shall be put in a state of security. Its present defenceless and exposed condition is an encouragement-an invitation to Great Britain to hold out in her preposterous claim. But I will not detain the Senate in presenting this matter in the variety of aspects in which it exhibits itself to my mind. If you would se. I have read the extract for one other purpose, more apposite to the question under consideration. It was to show that Maine was not alone in considering this question of boundary, as it is called--more properly a question of title and territory-as one which, in its present.cure that important part of our domain by peaceable aspect, is justly calculated to produce "serious and anxious reflection." He alone, whose prophecy is knowledge, and who controls the destinies of nations, can tell in what that controversy will end. The country in dispute embraces about one-third of the State. It is equal in extent to the two States of Massachusetts and Rhode Island. It is valuable for its deep forests of timber, as well as for its soil, and the numerous streams which intersect it. It is capable of sustaining a million of inhabitants. Our title to it is as clear as language can make it. And the British Government urge their claim to it with an earnestness and pertinacity equal to the clearness of our title. Shall it be submissively yielded to her? Sir, it would be a disgraceful surrender of a clear and manifest right. How, then, is the matter to be settled? Negotiation has been tried thus far in vain. There is little prospect of its being more successful in future. And how soon the time will come when the honor and rights of the nation shall imperiously require a resort to measures of a more determinate and decisive character; I will not predict. I have reason to believe that this controversy is regarded by the Executive with anxiety and concern, from a sincere desire to preserve the friendly relations between the two nations; at the same time, resolved not to compromit the just rights of Maine, and of the Union, to the tract of country in question. measures, place the State in such a condition that Great Britain shall not find in our very defencelessness a lure to a war of conquest and acquisition. Let her at least not see us in such a condition, that we may be supposed unwilling to hazard a vindication of our rights. With the panoply of defence thrown over us, we might reasonably hope that a negotiation so long protracted would at last terminate in the successful establishment of our just territorial and jurisdictional limits. We might hope to avoid a war, which otherwise may sooner or la ter be inevitable. Let no man attempt to reconcile himself to the idea of abandoning that country on the ground of its trifling value. I will not stop to estimate its value as matter of property. It is sufficient that it is a portion of the United States--a large part of one of the sovereign States of this Union; and to surrender our right to it on the extraordinary claim and demand of Great Britain, would be an ignominious act of national degradation, as much so as would be the surrender of the District of Columbia. Twenty years ago, instead of claiming title in herself, she was seeking to to acquire from us a right of way-a communication through this territory from New Brunswick to Quebec. After diplomacy had put her spectacles on, after the treaty of Ghent, she began to view the matter in a different light; and now, instead of negotiating for a right of way she is claiming full right and title in herself, and even denying us a right of way to the St. John's, and upon its waters to the ocean! Some of the consequences resulting from the condition in which that country is now placed, are the subjection of American citizens to the vexatious dominion of a foreign Power, the destruction and waste of timber, delaying the settlement and agricultural improvement of a fertile portion of our territory, and imposing restraints upon the extension of public and private enterprise. Under these circumstances, the obligation and the re Now, sir, to what extent future negotiations would be influenced by placing the maritime frontier of that State in a condition of security, is a question worthy of consideration. Great Britain considers the possession of this territory of great importance, as well from its intrinsic value as from its location. A large portion of it, as the Senator from Massachusetts remarked, is covered with a thick growth of white pine. Much of that valuable timber, and of the timber spruce, nearly as valuable-for some purposes more so-still remains within the undisputed boundaries of the State. But that is rapidly dis-medy are with this Government. What can Maine do? appearing before the axe of the lumberman. Many have estimated that on the Penobscot waters alone, between 300 and 400 millions of feet of lumber are cut and saw. ed annually. Proportionate quantities are cut on several other of the rivers in Maine; and the business is increasing rapidly, and the prices and value still more rapidly, from the increasing demand of the country. Does not Great Britain perceive that the time will soon come when that forest of timber, which she is endeavoring to appropriate to her own use, will be the only resource left of that valuable species of lumber, for all New England, New York, and the Middle States, to a considerable extent, and for the South to some extent also? 1 speak of this peculiar and valuable kind of lumber, which is found in no great quantity anywhere else in the United States, readily accessible from the ocean. I say, sir, does not Great Britain perceive this, and is not her anxiety to hold that territory greatly increased by a desire Your constitution, to which no State is more faithful, tells her she has no right to make war. She can enter into no negotiation, make no treaty, levy no impost duties. She has yielded up most of the means and the power of vindicating her rights against foreign nations, in exchange for the national guaranty of protection. And you have admonished her that she should be careful not to embroil the two countries in war by her impru dence. She has been told that negotiations of some sort were going on, that diplomacy was at work, and that her rights should be secured to her; that you had difficulties with other Powers to settle, and that it was not politic or prudent to engage in too many controversies at the same time. Well, sir, all this we thought very reasonable; and we have waited till all other controver sies have been settled. We have remained quiet, and, from a sincere desire to avoid every act which should tend to disturb the friendly relations between the two countries, we have afforded many practical examples of the virtue of forbearance, while our neighbors have advanced and moved back our landmarks. But, sir, here we stop. This matter demands the serious attention of this Government. If neglected now, it may, at no distant day, involve a question of the most serious import. I know that whatever can be done to secure our rights by negotiation, will be done. All peaceable measures will be first tried. All the influence of a just, temperate, and wise policy, will be brought in aid of a firm and resolute assertion of the rights and honor of the nation. But without a preparation for enforcing and vindicating them, I have too much reason to apprehend that negotiation will be fruitless. That argument with nations is often most convincing, which has something besides diplomatic logic to support it. I I make no unavailing complaints about the past. take the question as I find it. And how is that? Why, sir, a considerable portion of one of the sovereign States of this Union is subjected to the dominion of a foreign Power; and all the other States, save one, seem to look quietly on, wholly unconcerned so long as their territory remains undisturbed! Is it not so? Hitherto, the constitution has afforded us no practical guaranty either for the defence of our seaboard or the integrity of our territory. If such is to be its practical exposition in future, I would be quite willing to exchange it for the old articles of confederation, as loosely and feebly as they held the States of this Union together. Sir, Maine is not disposed to claim more than justly belongs to her, nor to assume any attitude unbecoming the dignity of political sovereignty. She has not been, she will not be, unreasonable in her claims. She asks only those rights which the national compact secures to her in common with all the other States. In urging them with energy and firmness, she will not lose sight of what is due to her own character, nor what is due to the character of this Government. She has the highest confidence that nothing will be left undone to secure her rights, which the constitution has placed in the power of the executive department of the Government to do. She now asks that Congress will place her on an equal footing with the other States, in respect to frontier defences, having regard to her local position and the high interests she has at stake. Instead of the amount appropriated by the bill for the defences of Maine being greater than her condition requires, in my apprehension it falls far short of it. But three positions are provided for. In reference to the important considerations to which I have adverted, I cannot but believe that a prudent forecast would lead to the immediate commencement of fortifications at other points for which no appropriations are made. If we should be so unfortunate as to be engaged in another war with England, which no State has so much reason to deprecate as Maine, her borders and her coast would be the first, if not the principal, scene of conflict. Provide her, then, with armor. She is young, but robust and athletic. Give her but her helmet and shield, and in peace or war she will do you no dishonor. The mouth of every river should be guarded. Every town on our seaboard, of sufficient importance to excite the cupidity of an enemy, should be provided with some suitable work of defence. I do not ask great and extravagant expenditures. We want no such expensive fortresses as the South "fought up" for her defence. We want none covering sixty or seventy acres. We want no Monroe fortresses; no Rip Rap defences. We ask only such as are suited to the positions they may occupy; suited to the objects to be defended, to the inducements an enemy would have, to make an attack. The repulsive, should always be proportioned to the attractive power. [SENATE. The position at the mouth of the St. Croix is becoming one of great importance. Calais, situated at the head of navigation, some thirty miles above Eastport, which in 1830 contained but one thousand six hundred and eighty-six inhabitants, is now estimated to contain upwards of four thousand. The commerce carried on from those waters is very considerable, and is rapidly increasing. The returns for 1834 show that the foreign vessels which entered and cleared at Eastport, in that year, amounted to nearly ninety-eight thousand tons. This was nearly equal to the entry, and exceeded the clearances of foreign vessels, at New York; and very far exceeded those of any other commercial place in the Union. It was greatly disproportioned, however, to the clearances of American vessels. The harbor of St. Andrew's, where an enemy's fleet could rendezvous, lies on the opposite side of these waters, and is within striking distance of Eastport and other places on the river. This important and exposed position has received much less consideration than it is entitled to; and I hope the attention of the proper department will be called to it, and that all necessary examination and surveys, preparatory to the construction of suitable works of defence, may be speedily made. It appears to be understood, that, because the positions at the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers are named in the third class in the classification made by the board of engineers in their report of 1821, they are therefore to be considered third rate positions in point of importance. Whatever was the object of so classing them in 1821, it ought not to be overlooked that, by the able report of the same board in 1826, those positions are placed in the second class; and by a recent report of the board just communicated to the Senate, they are embraced in the first class. Those formerly considered as entitled to the earliest attention, have already been provided with works of defence. And those which, in 1826, were regarded in the second class, now become the first class of positions remaining to be fortified. The work has been going on. The system of public defences has been adopted and pursued, sometimes with more, and sometimes with less, energy and zeal. The South has had the benefit of appropriations for the fortification of the Mississippi, Mobile bay, Pensacola, Savannah, Charleston, and other places. So far as regards that section of the Union, the system has been carried into execution, and the vote of the North has never been wanting on any question of appropriation for that purpose. But when, in her turn, the North claims her share in this matter, the South-no, sir, not the whole South, I trust, but South Carolina--rises up against it. She "fought it up" for her benefit, and now would fight it down for--nobody's benefit. South Carolina, with her one or two ports of entry, has received the benefit of appropriations for this purpose to the amount of nearly a million of dollars. Maine, with her twelve ports of entry and forty ports of discharge and delivery, has not had a single dollar expended under the new system on any permanent work of defence. The State of South Carolina, which builds but 640 tons of shipping, and owns but 14,000 tons, has, in regard to the defence of her one or two harbors, received the first and earliest attention of the Government; while Maine, which builds more than 50,000 tons of shipping, and owns 225,000, has been postponed and passed over! and this, too, by a Government acting under a constitution which imposes upon it the obligation of providing for the common defence of the whole country, and the general welfare and protection of all its parts. Mr. President, I have intended nothing invidious in the reference I have felt myself called upon to make to the comparative claims of the South and the North. I regret that occasion has been given to present the dif ferent sections of the country in comparison or contrast. I have done so, but in answer to the disparagement of fered to the right of the State I represent here to be embraced in the plan of common defence proposed by the bill. I would never volunteer, on any subject, in a gratuitous argument founded in sectional interests and distinctions. Such considerations ought never to control the legislative action of Congress, nor in any manner characterize its deliberations. The States of this Union constitute one great political family, all the members of which have a common interest, and should act from a common impulse. The different parts of the country they embrace seem designed by the God of nature for mutual dependence and a community of interests. Their very variety of climate, the diversity of productions to which they are adapted, and all the opposites and apposites which are presented in the different sections of our widely extended country, serve but to give them an adhering affinity, and bind them more closely together. After some remarks from Messrs. EWING of Ohio, WALKER, and PRESTON, Mr. PRESTON moved to amend the pending amendment by making it read as follows: "for fortifications at Penobscot bay, the sum of dollars annually for two years," which motion was accepted by Mr. BENTON as a modification of his amendment. Mr. WEBSTER suggested that the question on this amendment had better be taken when the Senate was full; and, as it was late in the day, he thought that they had better adjourn. The Senate then adjourned. FRIDAY, MAY 20. VOLUNTEERS. Mr. CALHOUN, from the committee of conference appointed on the part of the Senate, to confer with a committee of the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses as to the Senate's amendment to the bill authorizing the President to accept the services of ten thousand volunteers for the defence of the western frontiers, reported that the committees of the two Houses had had a meeting, but that they had not been able to effect the objects for which they were appointed, having sat the whole day without coming to any agreement whatever. Mr. KING, of Alabama, (from the same committee,) observed that it was true that they had come to no agreement on the point at issue between the two Houses, inasmuch as some gentlemen seemed to think that they had the whole bill under consideration, and that they had the power to modify it at pleasure. He hoped that when the Senate again appointed a committee of conference, they would appoint gentlemen who would be willing to confine their deliberations to the subject of disagreement, and not think themselves authorized to take the range of the whole bill. Mr. CALHOUN replied that the committee did confine themselves to the subject of disagreement, until finding that there was no possibility of coming to an agreement on that point, they entered into a more enlarged discussion, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the bill could not be so framed as to meet the concurrence of both Houses. His understanding was, that when a committee of conference came to a proposition that could not be agreed on, the whole subject was open to them. the case. Mr. KING of Alabama recollected exactly the state of The proposition last made was, that they should extend the term of service of the militia force of the United States for a year, instead of its being a volunteer militia force. This was the last subject of confer [MAY 20, 1836. ence; and, after taking until half past five o'clock, the committee found that they could come to no agreement whatever. Mr. CALHOUN said it was true that that proposition was made, but another one was also made, and that was, that the President should receive these volunteers from the States by battalions, regiments, and brigades, officered by the States. The committee of the other House was unanimous in the opinion that it was unconstitutional for the President to officer this force, unless it was made a part of the regular army, and that then he must appoint the officers in the same way that other officers of the regular army are appointed. He must say this bill had been passed under the pressure of very extraordinary circumstances, and that, consequently, that consideration was not given to it in this particular that its importance deserved. It had been called up by the Senator from Alabama, under the apprehension of a Creek war, and its immediate passage was insisted on. They were told that there were precedents to sanction it; but, on examination, he found that there was not one. The precedent referred to, was the volunteer bill of 1812, which was passed the very day preceding the adjournment of Congress. By it, authority was given to the President to commission these volunteers; but on what condition? They Why, on the condition of enrolment. The bill provi ded, that, after these companies should be organized, and their services accepted, they should enrol themselves as part of the army; and then, and not till then, the President was to commission them. Now, be would ask gentlemen to consider the difference between this bill, which had been cited as a precedent, and the one before them. By the present bill, they were to have a dormant military force in the country, mixed up with the militia; and this dormant force was to be officered by the President, to mingle with our citizens, entirely contrary to the provisions of the constitution. ought to be cautious how they established precedents. They all remembered the circumstances under which this volunteer bill of 1812 was passed. Unfortunately, some of the New England States held up their militia, and Congress wanted to get that military force without going to the Executives of those States for them. They authorized the President to accept the services of this militia in companies; and what was the next step? It was first to enrol, and then commission them. And what was the next step now? We get, said Mr. C., a military force mixed up with the citizens of the United States, not organized as part of the standing army, but officered by the President; thus having, at the same time, two militia forces, one officered by the States and the other by the President. Again: the power of appointment of the subordinate officers was virtually taken from the President, and given to the men. He wished to know the necessity for this departure from the constitution. The gentleman from Alabama said that the mode of appointment, provided by the bill, would render the force more effective. Why should it be so? Why would a force officered by the President be more effective than one officered by the States? He did not think that the description of force contemplated by the bill could be raised. The difficulty would be in getting the men to enrol themselves; for officers who were in the late war said that the same thing had been ineffectually tried then. There were but two ways of getting men for a military force: the one was by volunteers raised on the spur of the occasion; and the other was by enlisting men for the regular army from the dregs of society. Now, the men could not be raised under the provisions of this bill, and the result would be, that there would be a multitude of officers appointed by the President, and no men to be commanded by them. The CHAIR here stated that the debate was irregular, MAY 20, 1836.] Volunteers. [SENATE. the message of the House on the subject of its disagree-sident. Congress possessed the power to raise armies in ment not being before the Senate. Mr. KING of Alabama, to give the Senator from South Carolina an opportunity of continuing his speech, moved to take up the message of the House, with the amendment. Disagreed to. The message of the House was then received, stating that that body insisted on its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate. Mr. CALHOUN moved that the Senate also insist on its amendment, and that it ask for another committee of conference. Mr. KING of Alabama said, although the committee were very unfortunate in their conference upon the disagreement between the two Houses, yet he still hoped they might come to some conclusion in a matter of such vital importance as this. He could not assent to the declaration of the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CAL HOUN] that this bill was forced on the Senate by surprise. It was sent from the other House, and was some time under discussion before the Senate. It was time it was acted on with despatch, as it ought to be, for the bleeding citizens of our frontier demanded it, and it passed with out opposition even from the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] himself. He hoped one more effort might be made, so that we might have a force in the field sufficient to meet the emergency. Mr. CALHOUN said there had not been, nor should there be, any thing wanting on his part to give a safe, prompt, and efficient force for the protection of the frontiers. If the gentleman from Alabama believed that, for the sake of having an efficient force, these volunteers should be officered by the President, he had wholly overlooked the constitution. He entertained the deliberate opinion, that this bill was wholly unconstitutional, and was not supported by a single precedent. In reply to the Senator from Alabama, he asked, if it was not under the pressure of extraordinary circumstances, that this bill was called up and hurried through? Mr. BUCHANAN said that he had been a member of the committee of conference; and if a second committee should now be appointed, he hoped he would be excused from serving upon it. He did not believe that the appointment of the same committee by the Senate and the House could result in any practical good. They had been busily engaged in the conference chamber until a late hour yesterday; and when they had separated, they were further, if possible, from agreeing, than when they had first met. For his own part, he could not feel the force of the constitutional objections which had been made by the Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. CALHOUN.] It was true that the amendment which had been proposed by the Senate to the bill of the House was somewhat vague and ambiguous in its terms. He had thought, at one time, during the conference, that we should have agreed upon an amendment to the Senate's amendment, which would have made the bill much more explicit, and would have removed all the constitutional objections of the gentleman. When it came to the final vote, he found he had been mistaken. The amendment proposed in the committee of conference provided that none of the officers should be appointed by the President, until the volunteers were actually mustered into the service of the United States. Until that moment, the companies which might be formed would thus be considered as mere voluntary associations, under no pledge whatever, except that of honor, to enter the service of their country. When once, however, this pledge was redeemed-when they were mustered into the service, they became a portion of the army of the United States for the period of six or twelve months; and then there could not possibly be a constitutional objection to the appointment of their officers by the Pre VOL. XII.-95 any manner they thought proper. Whether they obtained soldiers by individual enlistments, or whether the patriotic young men of the country chose to associate together as volunteers and come in masses, we had an equal right to receive them. The one mode of obtaining soldiers was just as constitutional as the other. The amendment which had been proposed, whilst it practically insured to the companies the selection of their own company officers, did not interfere with the constitutional powers of the President. The volunteers themselves were to designate such officers, and, if the President approved of such designation, these officers would be appointed. This would be the best and strongest recommendation which could be presented to him; and, no doubt, he would always obey the wishes of the companics, unless in cases where powerful and satisfactory reasons existed to render it improper. Until these volunteers should actually enter the service, they would continue to be militiamen of the States, and liable to perform militia duty in the States. Their character would not be changed. They would not constitute a dormant standing army in the States, with officers appointed by the President, as had been urged; but would be mere associations, bound together by no law but that of honor. Such men would always be ready to obey the call of their country in case of neces The Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] had argued that it would be a violation of the constitution for the President to appoint these officers without the previous advice and consent of the Senate. Whatever doubt might have rested upon this point at the organization of our Government, this power had been exercised, over and over again, ever since the adoption of the constitution, under all administrations. The precedents were numerous. One act had been read, which passed during the late war, conferring upon the President, in express terms, the power of appointing all the officers of the military force to be raised under its provisions, but requiring him to submit these appointments to the Senate for their approbation at the next session. The very same thing was proposed to be done by this act, in regard to all officers above the rank of captain. Mr. B. said he was afraid to trust his memory in attempting to state the proceedings of the committee of conference. So much had been said, that he could not, if he would, undertake to report it all. We did not confine ourselves to the point of disagreement between the two Houses; but almost every question relating to the military defence of the country had been ably and eloquently discussed. He had derived much informa tion on this subject from the members of that committee. There was one fact which he would mention, and which demanded the serious consideration of the country at the present crisis. A gallant and distinguished officer, who was a member of the committee, (General Ripley,) had stated, that, according to his recollection, the history of our Indian wars did not present a single case in which a volunteer force had been beaten by the Indians. Our disasters in this kind of warfare had always been suffered by the regular troops. Our recent experience was certainly in accordance with this statement. This important fact, however, established the necessity of raising volunteer corps, in some form or other, composed of our brave and hardy youth, accustomed to the modes of Indian warfare, and who were able and willing to fight the Indians, man to man, according to their own custom. Such men would best protect our citizens from the ravages of the Indians, and would soon put an end to the Creek war. He had said more than he intended, as his chief object in rising had been to request that he might not be appointed a member of the new committee of conference. Mr. CALHOUN would have been glad if the Senator from Pennsylvania had stated the whole of his objections to this bill. He did object to the President's appointment of the officers in the recess; because he believed there was no necessity for giving him such power. The volunteer bill of 1812, referred to as a precedent, was passed on the last day of the session, and there was therefore no time to have the appointments submitted to the revision of the Senate. But here there was no such exigency; if this force was to be at all valuable in the Creek war, they would certainly sit there long enough to provide for its constitutional organization. The Senator from Pennsylvania had omitted another of his objections. This bill conferred on the companies the power of appointing the officers, from the rank of captain, down; and there was not the slightest authority for this in the constitution. Remember (said Mr. C.) that this bill provides for an army of the United States: it can only be defended on that ground; and the bill conferred on the companies the power of appointing their own officers, while the constitution provided that they should be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The proposition was to treat all the officers, from captain, down, as inferior officers, and this, too, in the regular army; and to have them appointed by the President, without the previous consent of the Senate. They well knew how an ambitious man would proceed, when he wanted to seduce the army to aid his views. He would not go first to the general officers; it would be the subordinates that he would first practise on; Cromwell like, he would take the corporals to his bed. The proposition was, in creating this regular army, to confer on the President the power of appointing the officers of every grade. A member of the committee of the other House, who was a distinguished officer in the late war, told them that it would be impossible to raise the force contemplated by the bill, as it now stood; that the experience of the late war had fully shown that but an inconsiderable force could be raised in this way. This gentleman was most decidedly in favor of a volunteer force in the constitutional way. He said further, that, if officered by the States, a trained force of twenty thousand men could be got in a very short time, without the least difficulty. Mr. C. believed that if the bill passed in its present form, there would be a multitude of officers, without men to be commanded; and that if it passed in the form recommended by the Senator from Pennsylvania, there would be neither men nor officers: and this Creek war would have to be ended without this volunteer force. He hoped that it would soon pass off; indeed, he had just been informed that it was not likely to prove as serious as bad at first been apprehended. He believed that a volunteer militia force would be as efficient as the force proposed by the Senator from Alabama. Why should not a volunteer militia force, the officers having commissions in their pockets signed by Governor Clay of Alabama, Governor Lynch of Mississippi, or Governor Cannon of Tennessee, be as efficient as if their commissions were signed by Andrew Jackson? With respect to himself, he was not ambitious of serving in this committee of conference, neither had he any objections to doing so. He held himself at the disposal of the Senate, and was content to serve, or not to serve, as it pleased. Mr. PRESTON desired to state the history of the bill, which was a proposition to raise ten thousand volunteers; and the 4th section provided the manner in which they should form themselves into battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions, out of which had arisen the difficulty in relation to the officering of them. It was yielded that they were not the militia, and, as his colleague had correctly stated, they turned out to be somewhere between the militia and regulars. In forming a battalion or [MAY 20, 1836. regiment, if one company belonged to one State, and the other companies necessary to form it belonged to another State, how were the commanding officers of such battalion or regiment to be chosen? If chosen by the States, which State should have the appointment of them? Here was a difficulty that presented itself in regard to appointments by States; to obviate which, it was necessary that something should be done; and in the discussion in the Senate, they decided that the volunteers should not be officered by the States, and the bill was accordingly recommitted to the committee with instructions; and, in obedience to the instructions given by the Senate, the committee reported the bill. The constitutional question which had been raised in regard to the power of appointment by the President, vanished the moment it was decided that the volunteers were not militia. He cited the act of July, 1812, as a precedent for this bill. But his colleague had drawn a distinction between that act, and this bill, and spoke of a force ly. ing inert and scattered over the country, and not under the control of the States, but subject to the call of the President. With all proper deference to the opinion of his colleague, he thought he had not construed this act correctly. By the act of 6th February, 1812, the President was authorized to receive 50,000 volunteers in companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions, who were liable to be called into service, by the terms of that act, within two years from the time the President accepted their services. And where, he asked, were these battalions and divisions during this time? They were lying inert, and scattered over the country, organized and officered for the service of the country, whenever the President called them into service; and in the mean time were not subject to militia duty. And so it was in the other case: they would be inert for two years, from a corporal, up. The enrolment was not to take place after they were brought into actual service, but when organized, to tender their services. Although the President might issue commissions, be did not do it until they were enrolled for actual service, and subject to the articles of war. He was authorized to form them into battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions. Mr. P. cited the language of the act, to show that they belonged to, and were entitled to the privileges of, the mass of the people, until called into actual service. A portion of that organization must necessarily, he said, be by the appointment of officers. Taking it for granted that this species of force was desirable, the committtee were not willing, on the grounds of expediency, to endow it with all the constitutional powers of the militia. From 1807 to 1814, this species of force was frequently appealed to in our difficulties with Great Britain. The act of the 3d July, 1812, passed about a week before the other act referred to; the old republican party who voted for the war voting for it, and the federal party, who, voting against all the war measures, of course voted against it. In the ordinary course of militia organization, the companies, battalions, regiments, brigades, and divisions, were all officered complete under the laws of the States; and in his State (South Carolina) they had recently taken some pains in their organization. But who was to command this force? Could the Governor call out one of these brigadiers to take command of a force raised partly out of his brigade, and partly out of other brigades? He could not do it; and, without calling on the State Legislatures, their system could not be altered. For one, he would make no invidious distinction between a commission signed by George McDuffie and one signed by Andrew Jackson. But if 80 or 100 men went beyond the boundary of the States, he would prefer their officers being appointed by the President. Mr. BUCHANAN said he could not now but hope, after |