SENATE.] Public Deposites. service may require, on which it imposes like regulations and conditions, and places in like manner under the protection of law. In all this the amendment pursues a very different course. It begins with authorizing the Secretary to select the banks of deposite, and limits the regu lations and conditions it imposes on such banks; leaving, by an express provision, the present banks wholly under the control of the Treasury or the executive department, as they now are, without prescribing any time for the selection of other banks of deposite, or making it the duty of the Secretary so to do. The consequence is obvious. The Secretary may continue the present banks as long as he pleases; and so long as he may choose to continue them, the provisions of the amendment, so far as relates to the deposites, will be a dead letter; and the banks, of course, instead of being under the control of the law, will be contrary, as I have said, to the professed object both of the bill and amendment-subject exclusively to his will. The Senator has attempted to explain this difference, but I must say very unsatisfactorily. He said that the bill prohibited the selection of other banks; and, as he deemed others to be necessary at certain important points, in consequence of the present enormous surplus, he inserted the provision authorizing the selection of other banks. The Senator has not stated the provisions of the bill accurately; so far from not authorizing, it expressly authorizes, the selection of other banks where there are now none; but I presume he intended to limit his remarks to places where there are no existing banks of deposite. Thus limited, the fact is as he states; but it by no means explains the extraordinary omission (for Such I must consider it) of not extending the regulations to the existing banks, as well as to those hereafter to be selected. If the public service requires additional banks at New York and other important points, in consequence of the vast sums deposited there, (as I readily agree it does,) if no disposition is to be made of the surplus, it is certainly a very good reason for enlarging the provisions of the bill, by authorizing the Secretary to select other banks at those points; but it is impossible for me to comprehend how it proves that the regulations which the amendment proposes to impose should be exclusively limited to such newly selected banks. Nor do I see why the Senator has not observed the same rule in this case, as that which he adopted in reference to the compensation the banks ought to pay for the use of the public money. He omitted to provide for any compensation, on the ground that his amendment proposed to dispose of all the surplus money, leaving in the possession of the banks a sum barely sufficient to meet the current expenditure, for the use of which he did not consider it right to charge a compensation. On the same principle, it was unnecessary to provide for the selection of additional banks where there are now banks of deposite, as they would be ample if the surplus was disposed of. In this I understood the Senator himself to concur. But it is not only in the important point of extending the regulations to the existing banks of deposite, that the bill and the amendment differ. There is a striking difference between them in reference to the authority of Congress over the banks of deposite embraced both in the bill and the amendment. The latter, following the provision in the charter of the late Bank of the United States, authorizes the Secretary to withdraw the public deposites, and to discontinue the use of any one of the banks, whenever, in his opinion, such bank shall have violated the conditions on which it has been employed, or the public funds are not safe in its vaults, with the simple restriction, that he shall report the fact to Congress. We know from experience how slight is the check which this restriction imposes. It not only requires the concurrence of both Houses of Congress (MAY 27, 1836. to overrule the act of the Secretary, where his power may be improperly exercised, but the act of Congress itself, intended to control such exercise of power, may be overruled by the veto of the President, at whose will the Secretary holds his place; so as to leave the control of the banks virtually under the control of the executive department of the Government. To obviate this, the bill vests the Secretary with the power simply of withdrawing the deposites and suspending the use of the bank as a place of deposite, and provides that, if Congress shall not confirm the removal, the deposite shall be returned to the bank after the termination of the next session of Congress. The next point of difference is of far less importance, and is only mentioned as tending to illustrate the differ. ent character of the bill and the amendment. The former provides that the banks of deposite shall perform the duties of commissioners of loans, without compensation, in like manner as was the duty of the late Bank of the United States and its branches, under its charter. Among these duties is that of paying the pensioners--a very heavy branch of disbursement, and attended with considerable expense, and which will be saved to the Government under the bill, but will be lost if the amendment should prevail. Another difference remains to be pointed out, relating to the security of the deposites. With so large an amount of public money in their vaults, it is important that the banks should always be provided with ample means to meet their engagements. With this view, the bill provides that the specie in the vaults of the several banks, and the aggregate of the balance in their favor with other specie-paying banks, shall be equal to one fifth of the entire amount of their notes and bills in circulation, and their public and private deposites-a sum, as is believed, sufficient to keep them in a sound and solvent condition. The amendment, on the contrary, provides that the banks shall keep in their own vaults, or the vaults of other banks, specie cqual to one fourth of its notes and bills in circulation, and the balance of its accounts with other banks payable on demand. I regret that the Senator has thought proper to change the phraseology, and to use terms less clear and explicit than those in the bill. I am not certain that I comprehend the exact meaning of the provision in the amendment. What is meant by specie in the vaults of other banks? In a general sense, all deposites are considered as specic; but I cannot suppose that to be the meaning in this instance, as it would render the provision in a great measure inoperative. I presume the amendment means special deposites in gold and silver in other banks, placed there for safe keeping, or to be drawn on, and not to be used by the bank in which it is deposited. Taking that to be the meaning, what is there to prevent the same sum from being twice counted in estimating the means of the several banks of deposite? Take two of them, one having $100,000 in specie in its vaults, and the other the same amount in the vaults of the other bank, which, in addition, has besides another $100,000 of its own: what is there to prevent the latter from returning, under the amendment, $200,000 of specie in its vaults, while the former would return $100,000 in its own vaults, and another in the vaults of the other bank, making, in the aggregate, between them, $400,000, when, in reality, the amount in both would be but $300,000? But this is not the only difference between the bill and the amendment, in this particular, deserving of notice. The object of the provision is to compel the banks of deposite to have, at all times, ample means to meet their liabilities, so that the Government should have sufficient assurance that the public moneys in their vaults would be forthcoming when demanded. With this view, the bill provides that the available means of the bank shall never be less than one fifth of its aggregate liabilities, including bills, notes, and deposites, public and private; while the amendment entirely omits the private deposites, and includes only the balance of its deposites with other banks. This omission is the more remarkable, inasmuch as the greater portion of the liabilities of the deposite banks must, with the present large surplus, result from their deposites, as every one who is familiar with banking operations will readily per ceive. I have now presented to the Senate the several points of difference which I deem material between the bill and the amendment, with such remarks as to enable them to form their own opinion, in reference to the difference, so that they may decide how far the assertion is true, with which I set out, that, wherever they differ, the amendment favors the banks against the interests of the public, and the Executive against the banks. The Senator, acting on the supposition that there would be a permanent surplus, beyond the expenditure of the Government, which neither justice nor regard to the public interest would permit to remain in the banks, has extended the provisions of his amendment, with great propriety, so as to comprehend a plan to withdraw the surplus from the banks. His plan is to vest the commissioners of the sinking fund with authority to estimate, at the beginning of every quarter, the probable receipts and expenditures of the quarter; and if, in their opinion, the receipts, with the money in the Treasury, should exceed the estimated expenditure by a certain sum, say $5,000,000, the excess should be vested in State stocks; and if it should fall short of that sum, a sufficient amount of the stocks should be sold to make up the deficit. We have thus presented for consideration the important subject of the surplus revenue, and with it the question so anxiously and universally asked, What shall be done with the surplus? Shall it be expended by the Government, or remain where it is, or be disposed of as proposed by the Senator? Or, if not, what other disposition shall be made of it? Questions, the investigation of which necessarily embraces the entire circle of our policy, and on the decision of which the future destiny of the country may depend. But before we enter on the discussion of this important question, it will be proper to ascertain what will be the probable available means of the year, in order that some conception may be formed of the probable surplus which may remain, by comparing it with the ap. propriations that may be authorized. According to the late report of the Secretary of the Treasury, there was deposited in the several banks little upwards of $33,000,000 at the termination of the first quarter of the year, not including the sum of about $3,000,000 deposited by the disbursing agents of the Government. The same report stated the receipts of the quarter at about $11,000,000, of which lands and customs yielded nearly an equal amount. Assuming for the three remaining quarters an equal amount, it would give for the entire receipts of the year $44,000,000. 1 agree with the Senator, that this sum is too large. The customs will probably average an amount throughout the year corresponding with the receipts of the first quarter; but there probably will be a considerable falling off in the receipts from the public lands. Assuming $7,000,000 as the probable amount, which I presume will be ample, the receipts of the year, subtracting that sum from $44,000,000, will be $37,000,000; and subtracting from that $11,000,000, the receipts of the first quarter would leave $26,000,000 as the probable receipts of the last three quarters. Add to this sum $33,000,000, the amount in the Treasury on the last day of the first quarter, and it gives $59,000,000. To this [SENATE. add the amount of stock in the United States Bank, which at the market price is worth at least $7,000,000, and we have $66,000,000, which I consider as the least amount at which the probable available means of the year can be fairly estimated. It will probably very considerably exceed this amount. The range may be put down at between $66,000,000 and $73,000,000, which may be considered as the two extremes, between which the means of the year may vibrate. But in order to be safe, I have assumed the least of the two. The first question which I propose to consider is, shall this sum be expended by the Government in the course of the year? A sum nearly equal to the entire debt of the war of the Revolution, by which the liberty and independence of these States were established; more than five times greater than the expenditure of the Government at the commencement of the present administration, deducting the payments on account of the public debt, and more than four times greater than the average annual expenditure of the present administration, making the same deduction, extravagant as its expenditure has Deen. The very magnitude of the sum decides the question against expenditure. It may be wasted, thrown away, but it cannot be expended. There are not objects on which to expend it; for proof of which I appeal to the appropriations already made and contemplated. We have passed the navy appropriations, which, as liberal as they are admitted to be on all sides, are raised only about $2,000,000, compared with the appropriations of the last year. The appropriations for fortifications, supposing the bills now pending should pass, will amount to about $3,500,000, and would exceed the ordinary appropriations, assuming them at $1,000,000, which I hold to be ample, by $2,500,000. Add a million for ordnance, seven or eight for Indian treaties, and four for Indian wars, and supposing the companies of the regular army to be filled as recommended by the War Department, the aggregate amount, including the ordinary expenditures, would be between thirty and thirty-five millions, and would leave a balance of at least $30,000,000 in the Treasury at the end of the year. But suppose objects could be devised on which to expend the whole of the available means of the year, it would still be impossible to make the expenditure, without immense waste and confusion. To expend so large an amount regularly and methodically, would require a vast increase of able and experienced disbursing officers, and a great enlargement of the organization of the Government in all the branches connected with disbursements. To effect such an enlargement, and to give a suitable organization, placed under the control of skilful and efficient officers, must necessarily be a work of time; but, without it, so sudden and great an increase of expenditure would necessarily be followed by inextricable confusion and heavy losses. But suppose this difficulty overcome, and suitable objects could be devised, would it be advisable to make the expenditure? Would it be wise to draw so vast an amount of productive labor, to be employed in unproductive objects, in building fortifications, dead walls, and in lining the interior frontier with a large military force, neither of which would add a cent to the productive power of the country? The ordinary expenditure of the Government, under the present administration, may be estimated say at $18,000,000--a sum exceeding, by five or six millions, what, in my opinion, is sufficient for a just and efficient administration of the Government. Taking eighteen from sixty-six, would leave forty-eight millions as the surplus, if the affairs of the Government had been so administered as to avoid the heavy expenditures of the year, which, I firmly believe, with early and prudent SENATE.] counsel, might have been effected. Public Deposites. But The expenditure of this sum, estimating labor at $20 a month, would require 200,000 operatives, equal to one third of the whole number of laborers employed in producing the great staple of our country, which is spreading wealth and prosperity over the land, and controlling, in a great measure, the commerce and manufactures of the world. take what will be the actual surplus, and estimate that at half the sum which, with prudence and economy, it might have been, and it would require the subtraction of 100,000 operatives from their present useful employment, to be employed in the unproductive service of the Government. Would it, I again repeat, be wise to draw off this immense mass of productive labor, in order to employ it in building fortifications, and swelling the military establishment of the country? Would it add to the strength of the Union, or give increased secu rity to its liberty, or accelerate its prosperity?—the great objects for which the Government was constituted. To ascertain how the strength of any country may be best developed, its peculiar state and condition must be taken into consideration. Looking to ours with this view, who can doubt that, next to our free institutions, the main source of our growing greatness and power is to be found in our great and astonishing increase of numbers, wealth, and facility of intercourse? If we desire to see our country powerful, we ought to avoid any measure opposed to their development, and, in particular, ought to make the smallest possible draught, consistent with our peace and security, on the productive powers of the country. Let these have the freest possible play. Leave the resources of individuals under their own direction to be employed in advancing theirs and their country's wealth and prosperity, with the extraction of the least amount required for the expenditure of the Government; and draw off not a single laborer from their present productive pursuits to the unproductive employment of the Government, excepting such as the public service may render indispensable. Who can doubt that such a policy would add infinitely more to the power and strength of the country than the extrav agant scheme of spending millions on fortifications and the increase of the military establishment? Let us next examine how the liberty of the country may be affected by the scheme of disposing of the surplus by disbursements. And here I would ask, is the liberty of the country at present in a secure and stable condition; and if not, by what is it endangered? And will an increase of disbursements augment or diminish the danger? Whatever may be the diversity of opinion on other points, there is not an intelligent individual of any par ty, who regards his reputation, that will venture to deny that the liberty of the country is at this time more insecure and unstable than it ever has been. We all know that there is in every portion of the Union, and with every party, a deep feeling that our political institutions are undergoing a great and hazardous change. Nor is the feeling much less strong, that the vast increase of the patronage and influence of the Government is the cause of the great and fearful change which is so extensively affecting the character of our people and institutions. The effect of increasing the expenditures at this time, so as to absorb the surplus, would be to double the number of those who live, or expect to live, by the Government, and in the same degree augment its patronage and influence, and accelerate that downward course which, if not arrested, must speedily terminate in the overthrow of our free institutions. These views I hold to be decisive against the wild attempt to absorb the immense means of the Government by the expenditures of the year. In fact, with [MAY 27, 1836. the exception of a few individuals, all seem to regard the scheme either as impracticable or unsafe; but there are others who, while they condemn the attempt of disposing of the surplus by immediate expenditures, believe it can be safely and expediently expended, in a period of four or five years, on what they choose to call the defences of the country. In order to determine how far this opinion is correct, it will be necessary first to ascertain what will be the available means of the next four or five years; by comparing which with what ought to be the expenditure, we may determine whether the plan would, or would not, be expedient. In making the calculation, I will take the term of five years, including the present, and which of course will comprehend 1840; after the termination of which, the duties above twenty per cent. are to go off, by the provisions of the compromise act, in eighteen months, when the revenue is to be reduced to the economical and just wants of the Government. The available means of the present year, as I have already shown, will equal at least $66,000,000. That of the next succeeding four years (including 1840) may be assumed to be twenty-one millions annually. The reason for this assumption may be seen in the report of the select committee at the last session, which I have reviewed, and in the correctness of which I feel increased confidence. The amount may fall short of, but will certainly not exceed, the estimate in the report, unless some unforeseen event should occur. Assuming, then, $21,000,000 as the average receipts of the next four years, it will give an aggregate of $84,000,000, which, added to the available means of this year, will give $150,000,000 as the sum that will be at the disposal of the Government for the period assumed. Divide this sum by five, the number of years, and it will give $30,000,000 as the average annual available means of the period. The next question for consideration is, will it be expedient to raise the disbursement during the period to an average expenditure of $30,000,000 annually? The first and strong objection to the scheme is, that it would leave in the deposite banks a heavy surplus during the greater part of the time, beginning with a surplus of upwards of thirty millions at the commencement of next year, and decreasing at the rate of eight or nine millions a year, till the termination of the period. But, passing this objection by, I meet the question directly. It would be highly inexpedient and dangerous to attempt to keep up the disbursements at so high a rate. I ask, on what shall this money be expended? Shall it be expended by an increase of the military establishment? by an enlargement of the appropriations for fortifications, ordnance, and the navy, far beyond what is proposed for the present year? Have those who advocate the scheme reflected to what extent this enlargement must be carried, to absorb so great a sum? Even this year, with the extraordinary expenditure upon Indian treaties and Indian wars, and with profuse expenditure in every other branch of service, the aggregate amount of appropriations will not greatly exceed $30,000,000, and that of disbursements will not probably equal that_sum. To what extent, then, must the appropriations for the army, the navy, the fortifications, and the like, be carried, in order to absorb that sum, especially with a declining expenditure in several branches of the service, particularly in the pensions, which, during the period, will fall off more than a million of dollars? But, in order to take a full view of the folly and danger of the scheme, it will be necessary to extend our view beyond 1842, in order to form some opinion of what will be the income of the Government when the tariff shall be so reduced, under the compromise act, that no duty shall exceed twenty per cent. ad valorem. I know that any estimate madé MAY 27, 1836.] sum. the value of the imposts, when on the eve of discharging the debt, and when, of course, there would be no objects on which the immense income from such extravagant duties could be justly and constitutionally expended. It is amazing that there was such blindness then as not to see what has since followed-the sudden discharge of the debt and an overflowing Treasury, without the means of absorbing the surplus; the violent conflict resulting from such a state of things; and the vast increase of the power and patronage of the Government, with all its corrupting consequences. We are now about, I fear, to commit an error of a different character: to raise the expenditure far beyond all example in time of peace, and with a decreasing revenue, which must, with equal certainty, bring on another conflict not much less at this time cannot be considered much more than conjectural; but still it would be imprudent to adopt a system of expenditure now, without taking into consideration the probable state of the revenue a few years hence. After bestowing due reflection on the subject, I am of the impression that the income from the imposts after the period in question will not exceed $10,000,000. It will probably fall below, rather than rise above, that I assume as the basis of this estimate, that our consumption of foreign articles will not then exceed $150,000,000. We all know that the capacity of the country to consume depends upon the value of its domestic exports, and the profits of its commerce and navigation. Of its domestic exports it would not be safe to assume any considerable increase in any article except cotton. To what extent the production and consump-dangerous, in which the struggle will not be to find obtion of this great staple, which puts in motion so vast an amount of the industry and commerce of the world, may be increased between now and 1842, is difficult to conjecture; but I deem it unsafe to suppose that it can be so increased as to extend the capacity of the country to consume beyond the limits I have assigned. Assuming, then, the amount which I have, and dividing the imports into free and dutiable articles, the latter, according to the existing proportion between the two descriptions, would amount in value to something less than $70,000,000. According to the compromise act, no duty, after the period in question, can exceed twenty per cent., and the rates would range from that down to five or six per cent. Taking fifteen per cent. as the average, which would be probably full high, and allowing for the expenses of collection, the nett income would be something less than $10,000,000. The income from public lands is still more conjectural than that from customs. There are so many and such various causes in operation affecting this source of the public income, that it is exceedingly difficult to form even a conjectural estimate as to its amount beyond the current year. But, in the midst of this uncertainty, one fact may be safely assumed, that the purchases during the last year, and thus far this, greatly exceed the steady progressive demand for public lands, from increased population, and the consequent emigration to the new States and Territories. Much of the purchases have been unquestionably made upon speculation, with a view to resales, and must, of course, come into market hereafter in competition with the lands of the Government, and to that extent must reduce the income from their sales. Estimating even the demand for public lands from what it was previous to the recent large sales, and taking into estimate the increased population and wealth of the country, I do not consider it safe to assume more than $5,000,000 annually from this branch of the revenue, which, added to the customs, would give for the annual receipts between fourteen and fifteen millions of dollars after 1842. I now ask whether it would be prudent to raise the public expenditures to the sum of $30,000,000 annually, during the intermediate period, with the prospect that they must be suddenly reduced to half of that amount? Who does not see the fierce conflict which must follow between those who may be interested in keeping up the expenditures, and those who have an equal interest against an increase of the duties as the means of keeping them up? I appeal to the Senators from the South, whose constituents have so deep an interest in low duties, to resist a course so impolitic, unwise, and extravagant, and which, if adopted, might again renew the tariff, so recently thrown off by such hazardous and strenuous efforts, with all its oppression and disaster. Let us remember what occurred in the fatal session of 1828. With a folly unparalleled, Congress then raised the duties to a rate so enormous as to average one half jects to absorb an overflowing Treasury, but to devise means to continue an expenditure far beyond the just and legitimate wants of the country. It is easy to foresee that, if we are thus blindly to go on in the management of our affairs, without regard to the future, the frequent and violent concussions which must follow from such folly cannot but end in a catastrophe that will ingulf our political institutions. With such decided objections to the dangerous and extravagant scheme of absorbing the surplus by disbursements, I proceed to the next question, Shall the public money remain where it now is? Shall the present extraordinary state of things, without example or parallel, continue, of a Government calling itself free, extracting from the people millions beyond what it can expend, and placing that vast sum in the custody of a few monopolizing corporations selected at the sole will of the Executive, and continued during his pleasure, to be used as their own from the time it is collected till it is disbursed? To this question there must burst from the lips of every man who loves his country and its institutions, and who is the enemy of monopoly, injustice, and oppression, an indignant no. And here let me express the pleasure I feel, that the Senator from New York, in moving his amendment, however objectionable his scheme, has placed himself in opposition to the continuance of the present unheard-of and dangerous state of things; and I add, as a simple act of justice, that the tone and temper of his remarks in support of his amendment were characterized by a courtesy and liberality which I, on my part, shall endeavor to imitate. But I fear, notwithstanding this favorable indication in so influential a quarter, the very magnitude of the evil (too great to be concealed) will but serve to perpetuate it. So great and various are the interests enlisted in its favor, that I greatly fear that all the efforts of the wise and patriotic to arrest it will prove unavailing. At the head of these stand the depository banks themselves, with their numerous stockholders and officers; with their $40,000,000 of capital, and an equal amount of public deposites, associated into one great combination extending over the whole Union, under the influence and control of the Treasury Department. The whole weight of this mighty combination, so deeply interested in the continuance of the present state of things, is opposed to any change. To this powerful combination must be added the numer ous and influential body who are dependant on banks to meet their engagements, and who, whatever may be their political opinions, must be alarmed at any change which may limit their discounts and accommodation. Then come the stock-jobbers, a growing and formidable class, who live by raising and depressing stocks, and who behold in the present state of things the most favorable opportunity of carrying on their dangerous and corrupting pursuits. With the control which the Secretary of the Treasury has over the banks of deposite, through transfer warrants, with the power of withdrawing the SENATE.] Public Deposites. deposites at pleasure, he may, whenever he chooses, raise and depress the stock of any bank; and, if disposed to use this tremendous power for corrupt purposes, may make the fortunes of the initiated, and overwhelm in sudden ruin those not in the secret. To the stockjobbers must be added speculators of every hue and form; and, in particular, the speculators in public lands, who, by the use of the public funds, are rapidly divesting the people of the noble patrimony left by our ancestors in the public domain, by giving in exchange what may in the end prove to be broken credit and worthless rags. To these we must add the artful and crafty politicians who wield this mighty combination of interests for political purposes. I am anxious to avoid mingling party politics in this discussion; and that I may not even seem to do so, I shall not attempt to exhibit, in all its details, the fearful, and, I was about to add, the overwhelming power which the present state of things places in the hands of those who have control of the Government, and which, if it be not wielded to overthrow our institutions and destroy all responsibility, must be attributed to their want of inclination, and not to their want of means. [MAY 27, 1836. The Senator should also have informed us, not only as to the amount of the stock, but how it is distributed among the States, in order to enable us to determine whether his scheme would operate equally between them. In the absence of correct information on both of these points, we are compelled to use such as we may possess, however defective and uncertain, in order to make up our mind on his amendment. We all know, then, that while several of the States have no stocks, and many a very inconsiderable amount, three of the large States (Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New | York) have a very large amount, not less in the aggregate, if I am correctly informed, than thirty-five or forty millions. What amount is held by the rest of the States is uncertain; but I suppose that it may be safely assumed that, taking the whole, it is less than that held by those States. With these facts, it cannot be doubted that the application of the surplus, as proposed to be applied by the Senator, would be exceedingly unequal among the States, and that the advantage of the application would mainly accrue to these three States. To meet these objections, the Senator, while he does not deny that the application of the surplus will greatly raise the price of stocks, insists that the States issuing them will not derive any benefit from the advance, and consequently have no interest in the question of the application of the surplus to their purchase. Such is the power and influence interested to continue the public money where it is now deposited. To these there are opposed the honest, virtuous, and patriotic, of every party, who behold in the continuance of the present state of things almost certain convulsion and overthrow of our liberty. There would be found on the same side the great mass of the industrious and laboring portion of the community, whose hard earnings are extracted from them without their knowledge, were it not that what is improperly taken from them is suc cessfully used as the means of deceiving and controlling them. If such were not the case-if those who work could see how those who profit are enriched at their expense-the present state of things would not be endured for a moment; but, as it is, I fear that from misconception, and consequent want of union and co-operation, things may continue as they are, till it will be too late to apply a remedy. I trust, however, that such willing the surplus as he proposes, we must first ascertain not be the fact; that the people will be roused from their false security, and that Congress will refuse to adjourn till an efficient remedy is applied. In this hope I recur to the inquiry, what shall that remedy be? Shall we adopt the measure recommended by the Senator from New York, which, as has been stated, proposes to authorize the commissioners of the sinking fund to ascertain the probable income of each quarter, and, if there should be a probable excess above $5,000,000, to vest the surplus in the purchase of State stocks; but, if there should be a deficiency, to sell so much of the stock previously purchased as would make up the differ ence. I regret that the Senator has not furnished a statement of facts sufficiently full to enable us to form an opinion of what will be the practical operation of his scheme. He has omitted, for instance, to state what is the aggregate amount of stocks issued by the several States-a fact indispensable in order to ascertain how the price of the stocks would be affected by the application of the surplus to their purchase. All who are in the least familiar with subjects of this kind, must know that the price of stock rises proportionably with the amount of the sum applied to their purchase. I have already shown that the probable surplus at the end of this year, notwithstanding the extravagance of the appropriations, will be between thirty and thirty-five millions; and before we can decide understandingly whether this great sum can with propriety be applied as the Senator proposes, we should know whether the amount of State stocks be sufficient to absorb it, without raising their price extravagantly high. If by States he means the Government of the States, the view of the Senator may be correct. They may, as he says, have but little interest in the market value of their stocks, as they must be redeemed by the same amount, whether that be high or low. But if we take a more enlarged view, and comprehend the people of the State, as well as the Government, the argument entirely fails. The Senator will not deny that the holders have a deep interest in the application of so large a sum as the present surplus in the purchase of their stocks. He will not deny that such application must greatly advance the price; and, of course, in determining whether the States having stocks will be benefited by applywho are the holders. Where do they reside? Are they foreigners residing abroad? If so, would it be wise to apply the public money so as to advance the interests of foreigners, to whom the States are under no obligation, but honestly to pay them the debts which they have contracted? But if not held by foreigners, are they held by citizens of such States? If such be the fact, will the Senator deny that those States will be deeply interested in the application of the surplus as proposed in his amendment, when the effects of such application must be, as is conceded on all sides, greatly to enhance the price of the stocks, and consequently to increase the wealth of their citizens? Let us suppose that, instead of purchasing the stocks of the States in which his constituents are interested, the Senator's amendment had proposed to apply the present enormous surplus to the purchase of cotton or slaves, in which the constituents of the southern Senators are interested: would any one doubt that the cotton-growing or slave-holding States would have a deep interest in the question? It will not be denied that, if so applied, their price would be greatly advanced, and the wealth of their citizens proportionably increased. Precisely the same effect would result from the application to the purchase of stocks, with like benefits to the citizens of the States which have issued large amounts of stock. The principle is the same in both cases. But there is another view of the subject which demands most serious consideration. Assuming, what will not be questioned, that the application of the surplus, as proposed by the amendment, will be very unequal among the States, some having little or none, and others a large |