Public Deposites. - 17,500,000 4,379,772 $13,120,228 There was another class of appropriations of a public character, which he thought ought to pass, and he hoped might pass before the adjournment of Congress. One of these measures was the filling up of the ranks of the army, and which, if successful, he supposed would incur an annual expenditure of at least - $1,000,000 Several bills were before Congress for the erection of new custom-houses, some of which, and especially one at New Orleans, and at one or two other points, he hoped would pass, and they would appropriate about Bills were before Congress, and surely ought to pass, for rebuilding the Treasury buildings, and there was asked for that object, for the present year, A bill was also now before the Senate recommending the erection of a fire-proof building for the Patent Office, and proposing to appropriate for that object something more than Several bills were before the two Houses of Congress, to provide for the erection of new marine hospitals, and he supposed some of them would meet our favorable action. He had estimated that the appropriations for these objects would be Bills were before Congress to remit the duties upon goods destroyed by fire in the original packages, many of which he thought ought to pass, and would appro priate, if they did pass, at the least, A bill is now before Congress proposing to advance the unpaid indemnities under the treaties with France and Naples. This bill would be eminently calculated, to its extent, to relieve the present mercantile pressure, and ought to pass. It would appropriate about A bill has passed the Senate, and been sent to the House, to purchase the remaining stock held by private stockholders in the Louisville and Portland Canal Company, and appropriating for that object Here, then, is a further amount, unprovided for, except by future receipts into the Treasury, of Add to this the balance unprovided for except by future receipts into the Treasury, as shown by the result of the last preceding calculation, And we have an amount of existing and probable appropriations, beyond any means now in the Treasury, equal to [JUNE 17, 1836. with strong claims; of many of them he could say with claims which seemed to him almost, if not altogether, irresistible. He would then ask gentlemen who disputed his conclusions to point out the important bills he had enumerated, which would not and ought not to pass. He had given particular reference to the measures, and he hoped they would put their finger upon those which they would oppose. Mr. CALHOUN said the Senator had made use of the best of all possible arguments for preserving the surplus. No Senator had estimated the whole surplus at the end of the year, including the $7,000,000 in the United States Bank, and exclusive of the year's expenditures, at less than $66,000,000. The Senator from New York had earnestly endeavored to prove that the expenditures of this year of this administration would amount to this $66,000,000. Mr. C. made a solemn appeal to Senators, whether they were prepared to rise so soon from an annual Government expenditure of $12,000,000, then deemed prodigal, to the enormous sum of $66,000,000, and that in a time of profound peace. There could possibly be no stronger argument in favor of taking care of the surplus. Mr. C. made a comparison 300,000 between the State stock and State deposite projects, and drew the obvious deductions in favor of the latter, expressing his satisfaction at the great unanimity of the Senate on the subject, and his belief that but for 250,000 the opposition from the Senator from New York the vote would have been unanimous. Mr. WALKER followed Mr. CALHOUN, Mr. BUCHANAN said he had risen for the purpose of stating, as briefly as he could, some of the reasons 100,000 which had induced him to vote for the engrossment of this bill, and which should govern his vote upon its final passage. He wished to place them distinctly before his constituents, so that they might decide upon the propriety of his conduct. He should have given a silent vote upon the question; but the unexpected debate which 50,000 had arisen to-day upon the final passage of the bill rendered some explanation, upon his part, necessary. 1,100,000 4,000,000 What, sir, said Mr. B., is the true nature of this question, in the form in which it now presents itself to the Senate? To state it correctly is at once to answer all the arguments which have been urged against the bill. If we were to infer what the question was from the remarks of my friend from Mississippi, [Mr. WALKER,] we might be induced to believe that this bill proposes a donation, not only of the present, but of every future surplus in the Treasury, to the several States: to use his own language, that we are now about dividing the spoils among the people. Can any thing be more remote from a correct statement of the case? This bill provides merely for a deposite of the public money with the States; not for a donation of it to them. In its terms and in its spirit, it proposes nothing more than to make 750,000 the State treasuries the depositories of a portion of the public money, instead of the deposite banks. If the States should derive incidental advantages from the use of this money, without interest, the deposite banks have heretofore used it, and, under the provisions of this bill, will continue to use it, upon the very same terms, to the extent of one fourth of their capitals. Surely no Senator upon this floor can complain of the benefits which may be conferred upon the States by the adoption of this 7,550,000 - 13,120,228 -$20,670,228 Mr. W. said he did not say that these appropriations would all be made. He did not believe they would all be made; but he had intended to select, with care and caution, such only as were presented to Congress measure. In discussing this subject I shall imitate the example of my friend from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT,] and present to the Senate a concise history of the progress of that portion of the bill which relates to the deposite of the public money with the States. Its features have been very much changed, and, in my opinion, it has been greatly improved, since the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] presented bis original proposi JUNE 17, 1836.] tion. Public Deposites. That gentleman had proposed to deposite the annual accruing surplus in the Treasury, until the year 1842, with the several States, without making any provision that they should issue certificates for these deposites, to be placed in the hands of the Secretary of the Treasury. Before this money or any portion of it could be recalled, his amendment required that a special act of Congress should be passed for that purpose; and that six months notice must be given to the States prior to the payment of any instalment. This would have been, in effect, a system to distribute the surplus revenue in the Treasury among the States for a period of six years. I need not again state my objections to this proposition, having urged them at some length upon a former occasion, before the appointment of the select committee. It is sufficient now to say, that to my own mind they were conclusive. Next came the proposition of the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. WEBSTER.] In one important particular it had removed the objections to which that of the Senaor from South Carolina was exposed. It proposed but a single operation, and was confined to the money which might be in the Treasury at the end of the present year. Under it, however, the States were not required to issue certificates of deposite, nor could the money deposited with them be applied by the Secretary of the Treasury to the payment of our current appropriations, without a previous act of Congress for that purpose. In these particulars it was essentially the same with the proposition of the Senator from South Carolina. Those features were still wanting which could alone fairly give to the transaction the character of a deposite. The sums thus deposited could not have been used as ready money, always at hand, whenever they might be required by the wants of the Treasury. Without some provision to remove this objection, I could not have voted even for the proposition of the Senator from Massachusetts, although in one respect it received my cordial approbation. The overflowing condition of the Treasury presents an extraordinary spectacle, not only in our own history, but in that of all other countries. The present bill is the medicine, and ought not to be converted into the daily bread, of the constitution. It ought to be confined, as the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts had proposed, to the existing evil, and ought not to extend to future years. It was one of those cases in which futurity ought to be left to provide for itself. [SENATE. Secretary of the Treasury certificates of deposite for such amounts, and in such form as he may prescribe, payable to the United States or their assigns; and, without any direction from Congress, he is authorized to sell and assign these certificates, ratably, in proportion to the sums received, and thus convert them into money whenever it shall become necessary for the payment of any of the appropriations made by Congress. These certificates, which, after their assignment, will bear an interest of five per cent. per annum, are to all intents and purposes so much money in the Treasury. They are as good; nay, they are far better, because they are much more secure, than the best bank notes in the country. Within the period of a single day, they will always command gold and silver, if that be required, in any of our large commercial cities. Do not assignable certificates of deposite in solvent banks circulate from hand to hand as money throughout the commercial world? And when the faith of the sovereign States of this Union is solemnly pledged upon their very face for the redemption of these certificates, are we still to be told that this is a mere donation of the public money to these States? Under this bill Congress may still proceed to make appropriations precisely as they would have done had it never passed, with a perfect assurance that they will be satisfied as promptly and as certainly as though the whole surplus should remain where it now is, with the deposite banks. How any constitutional objection can arise to this disposition of the public money, I am utterly at a loss to conceive. In order to maintain such an objection, gentlemen must establish the position that Congress do not possess the power of depositing the public money where they think proper. This would, indeed, be a Herculean task. There is one view of this subject which ought not to escape attention. It is always embarrassing, and may become dangerous, to establish the relation of debtor and creditor, for large amounts, between the States and the United States. The present bill avoids this difficulty. The moment it becomes necessary to use these certificates of deposite, that moment they pass by assignment into the hands of individuals, who thus become the creditors of the several States, instead of the General Government. Such individuals will hold these certificates as they would hold any other certificates of a similar character issued by the States, and the General Government will cease any longer to have any connexion with those States in the character of a creditor. In this state of the question the whole subject was referred to the select committee. They had advanced one step further towards making the bill purely one of I admit, (said Mr. B.,) some danger exists that this deposite. After deciding against the system of continu- bill, restricted as it is to the money which will be in the ing to deposite the surplus with the States until the year Treasury at the end of the present year, may be drawn 1842, and in favor of restricting it to the money in the into precedent for the purpose of sanctioning annual deTreasury at the conclusion of the present year, they re- posites, and, afterwards, annual distributions of the ported to the Senate a provision requiring the States surplus revenue. Such a system would be hostile to the which might receive the money to issue certificates of correct and efficient administration of this Government. deposite, to be placed in the hands of the Secretary of the It would naturally create some bias in our mind against Treasury. A previous act of Congress, however, still re-appropriations for the benefit of the Union, in order that mained necessary before these certificates could be used. the dividends of our own State might thereby be increased. This danger, however, is but future and contingent. It is an evil within our own control. We may, I hope, safely trust ourselves; still I consider the bill, amended as it has been, but a choice of evils. It is far from being the mode of disposing of the surplus which I should have selected. But let that pass. As a member of the select committee, I endeavored to obviate this objection. Before that committee I made an unsuccessful motion of a character similar to that which has been since adopted by the Senate, on the motion of my friend from New York, [Mr. TALLMADGE.] A necessity no longer exists for a special act of Congress, before these certificates of deposite can be used by the Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of discharging the appropriations made by Congress. What, then, (said Mr. B.,) is the true nature of the measure now before the Senate? It is a deposite with the States in form, and a deposite in effect. It is no distribution-no gift of the public money. The bill requires the States receiving the money to deliver to the What are the evils, on the other hand, which we shall avoid by the adoption of this measure? If they are greater and much more alarming than the dangers which we should encounter from its passage, it is the part of wisdom to pass the bill. It is perfectly clear either that we must adopt this measure, or leave all the public money in the deposite banks. There is no other alternative. The one thing or the other must be done. There are, at present, thirty-six of these deposite banks; and the aggregate amount of public money in their possession, at the date of the last returns, was between thirty-three and thirty-four millions of dollars. This sum has since been daily increasing with the daily flow of money into the Treasury. I am free to say that, in my opinion, the public money is safe in their possession; yet the fact neither can be disguised, nor ought to be disguised, that the Senate has felt itself under the necessity, but against my vote, of striking out every provision from the bill which required them to keep any fixed proportion of specie in their vaults. We could have established no reasonable standard upon this subject which would not have deprived a number of these banks of the public deposites. Hence the amount of specie to be kept in each of them is now left altogether to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. How ever safe the public money may be in these banks, it will be equally secure, to say the least, in the treasuries of the several States. In the opinion of the people it will be more secure there; and this, of itself, is a matter of great importance in deciding the present question. These deposite banks are located chiefly upon our commercial and upon our western frontiers. This arises from the circumstance, that the receipts into the Treasury are derived from two grand sources-the customs and the sales of public lands. Vast sums of public money are thus accumulated in the banks of our commercial cities. Who are chiefly benefited by this accumulation? Why, sir, the stockholders in these banks and their customers. It is a notorious fact that the banks discount largely upon these deposites. It is both their duty and their interest to pursue this course. Their profits, and the dividends to their stockholders, are thus greatly increased. But what benefits do my constituents in the interior of Pennsylvania derive from the use thus made of their own money? None, none whatever. Change these depositories to the extent proposed by this bill, and what will then be the consequences? The diffusion of numerous benefits and blessings among the people of the several States. This money, now used by the banks for the benefit of their stockholders, will be applied by the State Legislatures to promote education and internal improvements. It will shed a benign influence over the face of society, and will confer blessings upon the whole people. Its benefits will no longer be confined to the corporators in these selected institutions, but will be as extended as the limits of the republic. Besides, this money will always be ready for the use of the Government, whenever the necessities of the country may require it. The mass of the people are now deeply impressed with a conviction of these truths. They are jealous of the deposite banks. They believe that undue advantages are conferred upon these institutions by the action of the Government. The public mind is excited upon the subject; and the only practicable, I shall not say the best, mode of calming and tranquillizing it, will be the passage of the present bill. On this branch of the question I shall make another remark. If I were capable of acting merely as a party man upon such a subject, which I trust I am not, I should say to my political friends, adopt this measure. It has been repeated over and over again, that the present administra. tion desire to retain this money in the deposite banks in order to use it for political effect. This charge, it is true, is perfectly ridiculous. It is well known that all or nearly all these banks are governed and controlled by our political enemies. So far as I have ever been informed, a large majority of their stockholders and directors are opposed to the present administration. I have heard of but one of these banks which is an exception, though there may be more. Still the clamor continues, and still the charge is made that we desire to [JUNE 17, 1836. keep all the public money in these banks for the purpose of acquiring political influence. A deposite of this money with the States will at once put an end to these unfounded suspicions. I might speak of the wild and extravagant speculations, especially in public lands and in stocks, which have been greatly encouraged and promoted by the immense sums of public money on deposite in the banks, and of the injuries which have thus been inflicted upon the country. But I forbear at present from doing more than barely to suggest this argument in favor of the passage of the bill. It must strike every mind. But it has been urged, as a serious objection to this measure, that the money never will be required from the States for the use of this Government. Does it not occur to gentlemen that upon the very same principle, if this bill should not become a law, it will never be required from the deposite banks? And if, from the redundance of our revenue, we must have a perpetual deposite, is it not more just and more politic, in every point of view, that this deposite should be made where it will benefit the people of all the States, than where its advantages will be confined to the stockholders of certain selected banks? It is not certain, however, that a portion of these deposites may not be demanded from the States before the close of the next year. I have been astonished at the statement made by my friend from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT,] of the sums already appropriated, and which will yet probably be appropriated during the present session of Congress. If this statement be correct, it is highly probable that the unexpended balance of these appropriations, at the end of the present year, may equal, if it does not exceed, the highest estimate of the Senator from Ohio, [Mr. EwING,] and amount to eighteen millions of dollars. In that event, this sum will be a charge upon the current revenue for the year 1837, in addition to the current expenses of that year. It is, therefore, far from being certain that a portion of the deposites made with the States may not be required by the Treasury before the first day of January, 1838. This will depend upon the amount of the sales of the public lands during the year 1837. Should any cause arise greatly to reduce this source of income, the money then in the Treasury will not be sufficient to pay the current expenses of the Government during that year. In any thing I may have said, I did not intend to cast the slightest reflection upon the conduct of the deposite banks towards the Government. Far from it. The experiment, as it is called, has not failed. These banks have made all the necessary transfers of public money, and have conducted the business of the Treasury as well as it has ever been conducted by the Bank of the United States. For this they deserve the thanks of the country. I wish to make them a fair and liberal compensation for their services. I strongly advocated the provision which now constitutes a part of the bill, that the sum of five millions of dollars should be deducted from the amount in the Treasury on the 1st day of January next, and that only what remained should be deposited with the States. These five millions will, of course, continue in the deposite banks. Besides, the amount to be deposited with the States will be drawn from the present depositories in equal quarterly instalments; and thus they will experience no sudden shock in their business. They will have ample time to make all necessary preparations to meet these payments. Before I conclude, I shall advert to another argument of my friend from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT.] That gentleman objects to this bill, because the money to be deposited with the States is not in proportion to the fed. eral population of each, according to the last census, but in proportion to the compound ratio of the number of their Senators and Representatives in Congress. He asks, why should we adopt a different rule from that of direct taxation, in our distribution of these deposites? The answer is very easy. This money was not raised by direct taxation. If it had been, it should, undoubtedly, be returned to the States in the same proportions it had been received from them. The two grand sources from which we have derived this money, are the duties upon imports, and the sales of the public lands. If we could accurately ascertain the federal popula tion of the different States at this moment, it would present the just standard of apportionment. But that is impossible. The Senator from Kentucky, [Mr. CLAY,] upon the discussion of the land bill, had proved, conclusively, that the new States in the West have increased in population with such rapidity, since the census of 1830, when compared with the other States, that it would be manifestly unjust to apply that standard to them. Hence his bill provided that they should each receive ten per cent. of the nett proceeds of the sales of the publie lands within their limits, before any distribution should be made of the remainder. It ought not to be forgotten in this argument that a very large proportion of the surplus in the Treasury has proceed ed from the sales of public lands within these very States. The truth is that, whether you adopt the cen sus of 1830, or the number of Senators and Representatives in Congress, as a standard of apportionment, you cannot do exact justice. You must either be unjust to the new States in the West, or you must deposite a little more with Delaware, Rhode Island, and some of the smaller old States, than they are entitled to receive. It is a choice of difficulties arising from the necessity of adopting a general rule on the subject. I do not believe, therefore, that the mode of apportionment proposed by the bill presents a sufficient objection against its passage. This view of the case is rendered more impressive by the consideration that the bill proposes a mere deposite with the States, and not a donation to them; and it cannot make any material difference whether one State shall receive a few thousand dollars too much or too little upon deposite. Mr. WEBSTER expressed his regret at the provision introduced into the bill for apportioning the State deposites to the presidential electors, as likely to produce opposition to the bill. He renounced entirely the principle of taxing for distribution, and represented the case of the present surplus as a now unavoidable emer gency. He said the bill would be inoperative if there should be no surplus, and could, in that case, do neither harm nor good; though, if there could be occasion for Mr. WRIGHT's State stock project, there was the same occasion for this bill. He made an estimate, in detail, of the expenditures of the year, which went to show that Mr. WRIGHT'S estimate had been at least doubly too large. He expressed his congratulations to the country at the success which had attended this measure in the Senate, and his belief that it would substantially relieve the pressure upon the community. Mr. BENTON rose and said that, about this time two years ago, the Senate was engaged in proclaiming the danger of a bankrupt Treasury, and in proving to the people that utter ruin must ensue from the removal of the deposites from the Bank of the United States. The same Senate, nothing abated in confidence from the failure of former predictions, is now engaged in celebrating the prosperity of the country, and proclaiming a surplus of forty, and fifty, and sixty millions of dollars in that same Treasury, which so short a time since they thought was going to be bankrupt. Both occupations are equally unfortunate. Our Treasury is in no more danger of bursting from distension now, than it was of collapsing [SENATE. The from depletion then. The ghost of the panic was driven from this chamber in May, 1834, by the report of Mr. Taney, showing that all the sources of the national revenue were in their usual rich and bountiful condition, and that there was no danger of bankruptcy. speech and statement, so brief and perspicuous, just delivered by the Senator from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT,] will perform the same office upon the distribution spirit, by showing that the appropriations of the session will require nearly as much money as the public Treasury will be found to contain. The present exaggerations about the surplus will have their day, as the panic about an empty Treasury had its day; and time, which corrects all things, will show the enormity of these errors which excite the public mind, and stimulate the public appetite, for a division of forty, fifty, and sixty millions of surplus treasure. I have several objections, said Mr. B., to this measure; and the first is, that two distinct subjects are conjoined in the same bill. One part of the bill is to regulate the keeping of the public money in the local banks; the other part, under the disguise of a deposite, is to make a distribution of the public money among the several States. The law of Parliament (and that law is founded in equity and wisdom) forbids the junction of different subjects in the same bill; it requires them to be disjoined, and each subject put into a bill by itself, whenever the diversity and incongruity is detected. The incongruity in this bill is easily detected, and was early objected to. It was objected to on the second reading, a vote taken, and a decision had, according to what was right and proper. That vote was in favor of disjunction. The two subjects were disjoined, and a committee was directed to put them into separate bills. This was in the afternoon, too late for the accomplishment of the order that evening; a night intervened; new lights broke upon the minds of Senators; the vote of disjunction was reversed; and the divorced subjects were solemnly reunited. What was done by a majority of three in the evening, was reversed by a majority of one in the morning. That these subjects are of different natures, admit of different decisions, and may be acted upon at different times, is perfectly clear from a view of their provisions. One is a general and permanent law-the other a special and temporary arrangement. One requires immediate action-the other ought not to be acted upon until all the appropriations are made. One is to take effect in. stanter-the other not till next year. One is what it professes to be, a regulation of the deposites—the other is what it does not profess to be, a distribution of the revenue. Either may pass, and have a perfect operation, without the aid of the other. Either may be rejected, and no detriment ensue to the other. One may be postponed to the next session without inconvenience to any interest, and with positive advantage to the action of Congress upon it-the other cannot be postponed without offence to the public mind, injury to the public service, and dereliction of our legislative duty. Against the conjunction of subjects so dissimilar conscience revolts, correct feeling rebels, and parliamentary law has planted its cannon. It is in vain to call it a deposite with the States. The abuse, perversion, misapplication, and violation of language, in calling that which is a distribution to the States a deposite with the States, can neither alter the thing nor conceal its design; and the attempt to coerce support, deter opposition, or involve in odium, by joining a measure of questionable propriety with one of acknowledged expediency, might be lost upon some, if not on all." I have some objections to the deposi'e bill proper, as it now stands; but they are objections of detail, and such as would admit of remedy, and might have been easily SENATE.] Public Deposites. obviated, had it not been for the impatience of the [JUNE 17, 1836. To this I object; because, without reference to the opinions of any Secretary, I hold it to be a case in which the inflexible rule of law, and not the variable dictate of individual discretion, should prevail. It concerns the currency of the country, and law should govern the currency. It is a case in which discretion is subordinate to systems, as well as to personal temperament. A hardmoney Secretary would require a heavy proportion of specie; a paper-system Secretary would be content with a very light proportion. Besides, some of the deposite banks need regulation upon this point at present. Some of them are far in arrear of what would be deemed a safe proportion of specie, and threatening the Treasury with another edition of "unavailable funds." As a whole, they are far behind the point of specie responsibility at which the Bank of the United States stood at the time of the removal of the deposites, though some are up to that mark, or above it; but, as a whole, (and it is in that point of view that the public is concerned,) they are far behind it. On the first day of October, 1833, when the deposites were removed, the immediate liabilities of the United States Bank, in public and private deposites, and' in its circulation, were $37,105,465, and the specie on hand was $10,663,441; being at the rate of more than one to four. At the close of the last month, which is the date of the latest returns of the deposite banks, their immediate liabilities in the same items-public and private depos ites, and circulation-was $84,401,880, and the gold and silver on hand was $10,202,245; being at the rate of less than one to eight. This, certainly, is a progress in the wrong direction for us, who have undertaken to strengthen the gold and silver foundations of the currency. It is travelling on the wrong end of the road, and that rather fast. The rejection from the bill of the clause which was intended to hold the deposite banks up to the possession of a certain fixed proportion of specie, looks like an abandonment of our hard-moncy professions, and a relapsing tendency into the wide and bottomless ocean of paper. It is certainly a great decline from the doctrines of President Jackson's message of December last-those doctrines which were then hailed with approbation by an immense majority of the American people, and received as landmarks in the whole democratic camp, and in which the President expressly treated the regulation of the deposites as the regulation of the currency, and looked to the increased circulation of gold and silver, and the suppression of all bank notes under twenty dollars, as two of the great results which were to flow from the connexion of the federal Treas ury with the local banks, and the consequent influence of the Government over the currency. Hear his words: The consent of the State is not required to the adinission of this agency, although at the very last session of her Legislature, as at preceding sessions, she refused to charter a bank for herself. Finally, this provision goes to legalize the establishment of an agency of an Ohio bank in the town of St. Louis, now in operation there as a bank of discount and deposite and of circulation; when the utmost argument in favor of the federal nccessities would not extend beyond a bank of deposite only. That agency was established in St. Louis without my knowledge or consent, and without the consent of the State Legislature. The right of the Legislature to expel it would be complete if this law was not passed: if it passes, then the statute of the State will be liable to the same revision and reversal which took place on the Virginia statute in the case of Cohen and the lottery tick-ting the value of the gold coinage. These advantages ets. Having mentioned the agency at St. Louis, I deem it right to add that the officers who have charge of it have shown every disposition to deserve the good will of the inhabitants, and to promote the policy of the Government in the diffusion of gold. "Connected with the condition of the finances, and the flourishing state of the country in all its branches of industry, it is pleasing to witness the advantages which have already been derived from the recent laws regula will be more apparent in the course of the next year when the branch mints authorized to be established in North Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana, shall have gone into operation. Aided, as it is hoped they will be, by further reforms in the banking systems of the States, and The other part of the deposite bill proper to which by judicious regulations on the part of Congress, in I object, is the want of a clause requiring the deposite relation to the custody of the public moneys, it may be banks to keep on hand a certain amount of specie, bear- confidently anticipated that the use of gold and silver as ing some reasonable, average, fixed proportion to their a circulating medium will become general in the ordiimmediate liabilities. The bill was drawn with such a nary transactions connected with the labor of the country. clause; but it was the will of the majority to strike it out, The great desideratum in modern times is an efficient and to substitute the discretion of the Secretary of the check upon the power of banks, preventing that excesTreasury for the time being for the proposed legal sive issue of paper whence arise those fluctuations in the enactment. The proportion of specie on hand, in the standard of value which render uncertain the rewards of several deposite banks, is now to be whatever may be labor." * * "It has been seen that, without satisfactory to the officer at the head of the Treasury. I the agency of a great moneyed monoply, the revenue • * |