is contained in two words: it is our CREDIT SYSTEM. But for this, our canals and our railroads, our great works of internal improvement of every kind, could never have been made. The Erie canal, the wonder of the age, must have remained a mere project in the imagination of its projectors. That stupendous work, which has added millions upon millions to the value of property within the extended sphere of its influence, must have remained unexecuted but for the credit system. But for this system, those great works throughout the Union, by which we have conquered time and space, could never have been accomplished. It is by this means that the giant arms of this young and growing republic have piled prosperity upon prosperity, mountains high, as the giants of old piled Ossa upon Pelion; not, like them, with a view to scale the heavens, but that she might place on its lofty summit the light of liberty, to shed its lustre and its benign influence throughout the world. Sir, that lustre has been shed, that influence has been felt, and is now being felt, in different portions of the globe. Under its magic touch thrones have trembled, dynasties have been overturned, and crowns have fallen. The credit system is the distinguishing feature between despotism and liberty; it is the offspring of free institutions; it is found to exist, and its influence is felt, in proportion to the freedom enjoyed by any people. By freedom 1 do not mean unregulated, unrestrained, natural liberty; but that freedom which is founded on just and equitable laws; where the rights of personal security, of private property, and religious toleration, are guarantied to every individual; where there is a general diffusion of knowledge, and the existence of public and private morality. These are the elements, and they together form the basis of public confidence on which the credit sys tem rests. This is the invention of modern times.

In the old Governments of Europe, where liberty never found a resting place, credit was unknown. To the United States has been left the honor of maturing and perfecting this system. To the United States, also, is the honor due of having first applied the system of steam navigation. The effects on the general prosperity of the nation have been as sensibly felt in the one case as in the other; and he who should at this day recommend an entire abandonment of our credit system for a sole and exclusive metallic currency, would be deemed no less visionary than he who should attempt to substi tute a Pennsylvania wagon for a locomotive or a canal packet, or should endeavor to stem the resistless current of the Mississippi in a flat boat, instead of those splendid palaces which now move majestically on its waters. Shall we, then, Mr. President, check this tide of prosperity, by the introduction of new and untried schemes? Shall we not be content with the necessaries, the comforts, the conveniences, and the luxuries of life, which are so widely diffused throughout this whole country? Shall we attempt to overthrow, subvert, and destroy, a system which has produced all these blessings; which has brought happiness and plenty to the door of every man; and that, too, for the purpose of adopting some of the exploded doctrines of the political economists of Europe? Sir, you might as well attempt to apply the common law of England, which was born and nurtured on the Thames, to the father of waters in this western world, and to our mighty inland seas, compared with which the boasted streams and lakes of Europe dwindle into rills and ponds beside them; yes, these vast inland seas, into which, in the language of a distinguished Senator of my own State, you might cast the whole land of the common law, without producing a ripple. Sir, I believe I speak the almost unanimous sentiment of my political friends in this Senate, when I say they intend no such thing. I believe I speak the sentiment

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of the democratic party throughout the Union, when I say, I believe they neither expect nor desire any such thing. What, then, do they expect and desire? I answer, no more nor less than what every real friend to his country is willing to adopt, namely, a preservation, and, at the same time, a regulation of the credit system. In all such measures of reform I will go as far as he who goes farthest. Preserve and regulate, but not destroy, is my motto. Enlarge your specie basis; introduce, as far as practicable, a gold currency, by the prohibition of small notes; provide means for coining at the mint; take all proper measures to prevent excessive issues of bank paper, and the unnecessary increase of bank incorporations; repeal your restraining laws, so as to permit the free employment and investment of foreign capital. Whatever danger there may be, is to be found in the abuse of the system, and not in its existence. Guard against these abuses, and correct them when discovered. An entire abandonment of the credit system, and a return to a sole and exclusive metallic currency, if it were practicable, would produce desolation and destruction from one extremity of the Union to the other. Such notions ought not, cannot, must not, prevail.

My

Mr. President, I hope I shall be pardoned for this digression from the main subject of discussion. apology will be found in the course and character of this debate. The question again recurs, what disposi tion shall be made of the surplus revenue? That there will be a surplus, seems to have been conceded or taken for granted on all hands, except by the Senator from Missouri. It was anticipated by the Secretary of the Treasury, and he recommended a mode of disposing of it. What was that proposition? Why, sir, in substance, that the Secretary should go into the market, by himself or agent, and invest it in the State stocks. This proposition was introduced by my honorable colleague; and if a surplus was not anticipated, why introduce a proposition to dispose of that which it was supposed would have no existence? The proposition received but little favor in the Senate. I will not attempt to recapitulate the objections which were made to it. Some of them struck me as more imaginary than real. I did not appreciate them as other gentlemen did. In the vote which was taken upon my honorable colleague's proposition, we found ourselves in a lean minority of four. Being satisfied that something ought to be done, I determined to unite in a proposition which should be more generally satisfactory to my political friends. The one reported by the select committee was

"That the money which shall be in the Treasury of the United States on the first day of January, eighteen hundred and thirty-seven, reserving the sum of five millions of dollars, shall be deposited with the several States, in proportion to their respective amounts of population, as ascertained by the last census, according to the provision of the second section of the first article of the constitution; and the Secretary of the Treasury shall deliver the same to such persons as the several States may authorize to receive it, on receiving certificates of depos ite, signed by the competent authorities of such State, each for such amount, and in such form, as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, which shall set forth and express the obligation of the State to pay the amount thereof to the United States, or their assigns; and which said certificates it shall be competent for the Secretary of the Treasury, in the name and behalf of the United States, to sell and assign, whenever so directed by any act of Congress; all sales and assignments, however, to be ratable, and in just and equal proportions among all the States, according to the amounts received by them, respectively; and all such certificates of deposite shall be subject to, and shall bear an interest of five per centum per annum, payable half yearly, from the time of such

sale and assignment, and shall be redeemable at the pleasure of the States issuing the same."

That part of it which required an act of Congress before the Secretary could sell and assign the certificates was deemed objectionable. The object was to keep the money so far under the control of the Secretary as to enable him to use the means when necessary. I accordingly offered an amendment, which was adopted, by which the Secretary was authorized, on behalf of the United States, to sell and transfer the certificates whenever it should be necessary, for want of other money in the Treasury to meet appropriations made by Congress. This amendment removed the principal objections to the bill. It placed the avails of the money in the power of the Secretary, whenever it should be required to meet such appropriations. If there should be means sufficient in the Treasury to meet them, then of course the money would not be wanted. It would never be called for until there was a deficiency of means.

Let us now inquire, Mr. President, whether this proposition, so amended, is one which ought to be adopted. The idea of returning to the States any surplus revenue which has been collected from the people, by indirect taxation, is neither unheard of nor novel. We have high authority as to the expediency of the measure; and if the proposition under consideration, which is a mere deposite, and not a distribution, involves no constitutional dif. ficulty, then we have the same authority in favor of its adoption. This authority is one which no friend of the administration will lightly disregard. President Jackson, in his message of December, 1829, has the following Janguage:

"After the extinction of the public debt, it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff, upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union, will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the Government without a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what may be required for its current service. As, then, the period approaches when the application of the revenue to the payment of debt will cease, the disposition of the surplus will present a subject for the serious deliberation of Congress, and it may be fortunate for the country that it is yet to be decided. Considered in connexion with the difficulties which have heretofore attended appropriations for purposes of internal improvement, and with those which this experience tells us will certainly arise whenever power over such subjects may be exercised by the General Government, it is hoped that it may lead to the adoption of some plan which will reconcile the diversified interests of the States, and strengthen the bonds which unite them. Every member of the Union, in peace and in war, will be benefited by the improvement of inland navigation and the construction of highways in the several States. Let us, then, endeavor to attain this benefit in a mode which will be satisfactory to all. That hitherto adopted has, by many of our fellow. citizens, been deprecated as an infraction of the constitution, while by others it has been viewed as inexpedient. All feel that it has been employed at the expense of harmony in the legislative councils.

"To avoid these evils, it appears to me that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the several States according to their ratio of representation; and should this measure not be found warranted by the constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the States an amendment authorizing it. I regard an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of all our ob. ligations."

From this it would seem that a surplus was anticipated after the extinction of the public debt, and that it

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would continue to a remote period, beyond the current expenses of the Government. The importance of internal improvements was duly appreciated; but, inasmuch as the appropriation of money for that purpose by Congress was necessarily unequal, and inasmuch as some entertained doubts as to the constitutional power of Congress thus to appropriate it, the President very properly expressed the opinion that the most safe, just, and federal disposition which could be made of the surplus revenue would be its apportionment among the several States according to their ratio of representation; and should this measure not be found warranted by the constitution, that it would be expedient to propose to the States an amendment authorizing it." The Presi dent seemed fully to appreciate the expediency of the measure of apportionment of the surplus revenue among the States, but cautiously and properly reserved the constitutional question. After the delivery of this message, public attention was turned to the subject. Coming from so high a source, it received due consideration, and those who doubted its expediency, suggested their objections. Here the matter rested till the next session of Congress, when the President, in his annual message of December, 1830, again recurs to the subject. He adverts to the opinion expressed in his previous message, that there would be "a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond what may be required for its current service," and adds, "I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it." He again repeats the recommendation of "the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds which may, at any time, remain in the Treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the States in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal improvement.' The Presi dent then proceeds to answer the objections which have been made to the recommendation contained in his former message, and repeated in this. Those objections are the same which have been urged against this bill, and he refutes them satisfactorily and triumphantly.

It is due to him that I should give his views in his own language. They are as follows:

"I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds which may at any time remain in the Treasury, after the national debt shall have been paid, among the States, in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal im

provement.

"Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it has also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A brief notice of these objections here, will not, therefore, I trust, be regard d as out of place.

They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following grounds: 1st, an objection to the ratio of distribution; 2d, an apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution; 3d, that the mode proposed would lead to the construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of such as are general, and as would, consequently, be of a more useful character; and, last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious dependance on the part of the State Governments upon the Federal power. Of those who object to the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the importations of the respective States would constitute one that would be more equitable; and others, again, that the extent of their respective territories would furnish a standard which would be more expedient, and sufficiently equitable. The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one of obvious equity, because of its

should be adopted, in depositing it with the States, that shall give to them equal benefits, so far as incidental benefits are to be derived from becoming the deposito"ries of it.

If we should adopt the same ratio that we would in an absolute distribution, provided we had the constitutional power to distribute it, it would be no argument against the constitutional power of Congress thus to deposite it. As to the constitutional power of Congress over this subject, I cannot for one moment doubt; I will not suffer myself to doubt. No one I have heard has suggested any constitutional doubt, and no one, in my judgment, can place such an objection before the people in a way that they can comprehend it, or feel the force of it. From this view of the matter, I feel justified in saying that I am sustained in my support of the proposition contained in this bill, by the principles laid down in the several messages of the President to which I have referred; and backed by such authority, and from a deep settled conviction of the importance of the measure, I cannot hesitate as to the vote I shall give. If this plan be not adopted, I ask gentlemen by what mode will they dispose of this surplus? If there be any who do not believe there will be a surplus, (and this number must be very small,) to them I say, the plan proposed can do no harm in that event, because there will be nothing on which it can operate. If the sentiment were unanimous, or any thing like it, that there will be no surplus, I would not then adopt any measure in relation to it, when there was no probability of its being required. But this is a very different case. No rational man can doubt but that there will be a large surplus, unless our appropriations are made for the express purpose of getting rid of it; and, of course, in a very extravagant | manner. I again ask, what shall we do with it? It is in vain to make objections to this proposition, unless gentlemen will condescend to point out some other mode of disposing of the public money. If none is suggested, and the present bill be not adopted, the money must remain in the deposite banks, without legal regulation, and subject to all the clamor which has been, and which will hereafter be, made against them. I here repeat, as I have before said, I have entire confidence in the deposite banks. But no one can hesitate to say, and it is no disparagement to any banks to say, that this vast and accumulating treasure is more secure in the treasuries of the several States. With the confidence which I place in the security of the deposite banks, it would not be surprising if I should be in favor of leaving it there; but that gentlemen who profess to look upon all banks with more or less distrust should be willing to leave it there, in stead of depositing it with the States, is to me a matter of astonishment.

Some gentlemen, when pressed upon this point, and asked, what will you do? are ready to say, leave it till the next session of Congress. Why leave it till the next session of Congress? I emphatically ask. If there is to be a large surplus in the Treasury on the 1st of January next, it is our duty to the banks themselves, as well as our duty to our country, to make early arrangements for its disposition. If it is to be deposited with the States, the banks ought to know it, that they may be prepared for it at the time fixed for that purpose. If it is to be left with them, and no change is hereafter to be made, they ought equally to know it; for their arrangements in relation to the management of their own means would depend more or less on the fact, whether they were to retain the means of the Government. So that, in any point of view, it is all-important that the question be now settled. Every important interest of the country requires it. If it be not now arranged, it will be productive of the most alarming consequences. If this mo ney is thus suffered to accumulate in these banks, the

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people will never rest satisfied that it shall behoarded up there; and it would in that case be of no use to the banks to have it. I take it for granted, then, it must be used. How far such a use of money, which has been collected from the people, would be deemed a just and equitable use of it in regard to the great body of them, I leave to the American people to judge. In the use of such means there is more or less favoritism; and the desire of the banks to make the most of it, especially if an interest is to be charged on it in their hands, would tend strongly towards those extravagant and wild speculations, about which gentlemen have so feelingly declaimed. If this money should be loaned out to the communities where these deposite banks are located, will it not be seen at once that the business of those places will be more or less extended, according to the means employed? Suppose, then, when these funds to such an enormous amount are thus loaned out, and the Government should want the money, can these banks respond, on notice given, to the call? If they can, it will be by reason of a sudden call on their debtors. What will be the consequence of such a call? We can readily foresee it. The whole money market will be disturbed. Like the sudden expansion and contraction of bank issues and bank discounts at all times, they would convulse the whole commercial community. Those convulsions arenot confined to the communities in which they happen; their effects are felt every where. You cannot strike a blow at the city of New York, which will not be felt, not only through the whole State, but throughout the whole Union.

Unless some

But it may be said, and I believe has been said, in the course of this debate, that this money will not be needed by the Government, and will not be called for from the banks. So much the worse. The longer such an immense sum is left to accumulate and to be used by them, the worse it is. But, Mr. President, public sentiment, which is generally right, demands that some other disposition be made of this surplus revenue. The people are jealous enough of banks at all times, but are peculiarly so of those, at this time, which hold such vast treasures which belong to them. other disposition be made of this surplus, suspicions will go abroad that the money is kept there for improper purposes, and from improper motives. We know there is no ground for such suspicion. But if it exist, whether true or false, the effect is the same. Its tendency is to agitate the public mind, and a consequent derangement of the moneyed concerns of the country. I can readily foresee that, if Congress adjourns without regulating the deposite banks by law, and without disposing of this surplus revenue, the whole country will be agitated by this all-important question, and we shall have to encounter another scene of panic and distress, and thereby derange the currency, and more or less affect every interest in the country. No matter whether there be any just ground for such agitation or not, such is the state of parties and of party feeling that we cannot hope to be rid of it, however much we may deprecate its existence. Sir, I live in a commercial community. I feel that I know something of its interests, and I am unwilling, for any consideration whatever, that this all-engrossing topic should any longer be made the sport of party, to the great detriment of the paramount interests of society. I am unwilling that such considerations shall, by designing politicians, be mingled in the approaching presidential contest, and that the commencement of the next session of Congress shall be the singal for increased and increasing excitement till it is closed. Sir, public confidence in our banks, as well as in our political institutions, becomes impaired by such constant assaults; and when that is impaired, every interest must suffer. I cannot, therefore,