lend my aid to continue such a state of things. By depositing this money with the States, as is proposed by this bill, the public mind will be quieted; the banks will be freed from the suspicion, as well as the odium, which must attach to them under the state of things which I have attempted to describe; and, above all things, our pecuniary concerns will be separated from all political connexions or associations-a consummation devoutly to be wished. It Sir, there is no constitutional objection to this bill. The most refined sophistry cannot show any. Gentlemen may attempt to confound it with a distribution. But it is no more nor less than a simple deposite of the public money with the States. It avoids the objections which would exist to a general system of distribution. That implies that a surplus shall be created for the purpose of distribution. This does not even distribute a surplus, accidentally and unavoidably on hand. It deposites it with the States. It still remains the property of the Government, and the Government can use the money whenever it is required for the public service. It creates no dependance, on the part of the States, on the General Government, as a distribution system might do. It merely provides for the present emergency. disposes safely of a surplus, for which, at present, we have no use, and with which we know not what to do. If gentlemen would satisfy me of any other proper disposition of it, I would embrace any proposition that would seem to meet the exigency of the case. But I hear of none, except to spend it all by extravagant appropriations, or leave it to accumulate in the deposite banks. To both of these I have already indicated my objections. We are then brought back to the proposition contained in this bill; and I confess, after the maturest deliberation and reflection, I can not only see no objection to it, but I can conceive of no mode so proper. By this mode the States will receive their ratable proportions of the surplus, giving the security of the States themselves for the repayment, when it is needed by the General Government. This money is retained by the States, without interest, until the Secretary of the Treas ury, for want of other means, sells the certificates of deposites, when they are made to bear an interest of five per cent. These certificates are redeemable at the pleasure of the States, and would always bring par in the market, and probably a premium. No arrangement which has been suggested, or, as I believe, can be suggested, is, in my judgment, equal to this. It is the best for both parties. It is best for the United States. It is best for the individual States. If they invest the money in internal improvements, or as a fund for education, it will be vastly better employed for the whole country than if it were left for the use of speculators in the deposite banks; and whenever it is wanted by the General Government, the Secretary of the Treasury, as its agent, has only to sell the certificates in market to get the money on them; and the States, on such sale, have merely to provide for the payment of interest at the rate of five per cent. They are not bound to raise the principal on any such call, because the certificates are made redeemable at their pleasure; and when they are sold, they become to the States the same as any other five per cent. stock which they may have issued. One advantage, and one great advantage, of this proposition is, that it requires no action on the part of Congress, nor on the part of the States, to bring this money back to the Treasury, whenever it is required for the wants of the Government. Congress judges in the first instance of those wants, and makes appropriations to meet them. If, then, there is a lack of other means, the Secretary of the Treasury, without any further action on the part of Congress or the States, can avail himself of the fund thus deposited, by a sale and transfer of the certificates. [JUNE 17, 1836. As long as this money remains the property of the General Government, the States will exercise a proper caution as to the use and application of it. There will be no profligate expenditures, merely because they have come into the possession of such an amount of funds. Most of the States would probably apply it to internal improvements, already authorized by their respective Legislatures, and perhaps already commenced. If it should be thus applied, there can be no better evidence of its proper application, because such works have been authorized and commenced without reference to any such means. I might instance the State of New York as in this situation now. The last Legislature directed new works of internal improvement to be commenced, and loaned her credit to the Hudson and Erie Railroad Company, to the amount, in the aggregate of $6,000,000. For this amount she must issue stocks, and raise the money as it is wanted, and bearing such interest as is directed by the act authorizing it. If she should receive, under this bill, $5,000,000, more or less, it would to that extent take the place of the stocks which are by her past legislation already directed to be issued. This money she would apply to those works of internal improvement, and would pay no interest on it till it should be wanted for the use of the United States; and whenever it should be so wanted, she would then pay an interest, the same as she would have paid from the beginning, on her own stocks, and provide for the principal whenever it suits her convenience, because the certificates of deposite are redeemable at her pleasure. If the money should not be called for, then she will retain it, without interest, still resting under the obligation to return it when required, and whenever it suits her convenience to redeem her certificates which may have been put into the market. What objection is there to her thus using this money? Has she not, like every State in the Union, contributed, by the indirect taxation of the people, to raise it? It is true it has not been raised with the design to accumulate a surplus; but being unavoidably and without design on hand, what valid objection can be urged to such an application of it? What application can be made that will so much benefit the whole country? The States can carry on their works of internal improvement much better and much more economically than the United States can, even if there were no constitutional objection to such a system or. behalf of the General Government. By the proposition in this bill we also avoid another objection which is sometimes urged against a system of distribution, by which the money is given to the States, namely, that we have no right in this way to carry on a system of internal improvements, by means of the agency of the States, which we cannot carry on directly. In other words, if Congress cannot appropriate and apply the money for such purposes, it cannot give it to the States for the same purposes. Under the present bill, the money is not given to the States. It is merely deposited with them for safe keeping. It remains the property of the United States, and to be applied by their agent, the Secretary of the Treasury, whenever it shall become necessary to meet appropriations made by Congress. There is also this additional advantage of this proposition, namely: whenever these certificates are sold, like all our State stocks, they would probably find their way to Europe, and would, to the amount sold, be the means of introducing foreign capital into the country. This is what is wanted. I will not dwell on the importance of foreign capital to a country, and particularly to this country. Our astonishing growth and prosperity are greatly owing to the introduction and use of foreign capital. Amidst all the turmoil and disturbances of the European world, there is no safer investment for capital from abroad than the public securities of this country, JUNE 17, 1836.] Public Deposites. 1842 [SENATE. to these balances? Sir, what are the factsCongress makes appropriationscurrent year. A portion of the mo one half, remains unexpended at the emount for the Now, sir, when this money is wanted to meelly about propriations, the only inquiry is, whether the Secrar. of the Treasury has the means for the purpose. No mat ter whether those means are in the Treasury, from past receipts, before the appropriations were made, or whether they have come there from receipts subsequent to their being made; the only inquiry should be, has the Secretary the means to meet them? This is the common practice. Appropriations are often made beyond the money in the Treasury at the time, and are expected to be met by the subsequent receipts. But the sarcastic remark of the honorable Senator from Missouri would seem to imply that specific money was set apart for specific appropriations; as if, the moment an appropriation was made, an ear-mark was placed upon the money in the Treasury sufficient to meet them; and then, that those identical pieces were called in whenever they were needed, as a Dutchess county farmer would select particular sheep from his whole flock by the ear-marks he had previously placed on them. Sir, this idea is altogether fanciful. There are no such specific sums set apart for specific appropriations. If this were so, what would be the result of the appropriations, if they should be made by the present Congress to the amount of some fifty-five millions of dollars, according to the statement exhibited by my honor. able colleague? Why, sir, the unexpended balances alone of such appropriations, that would remain in the Treasury on the first of January next, would be thirty millions of dollars. Do gentlemen desire that any such amount, or any portion of it, should remain there, merely because it is an unexpended balance, and when the receipts of the current year will be more than sufficient to meet all the appropriations which will be made? It will be recollected that five millions of dollars are to be retained to meet any possible contingencies of the Treasury; and if, at any time, and from any unforeseen continany moment cash the certificates of deposite in his hands, and thus avail himself of any amount he may require. There is no necessity, therefore, that these unexpended balances should be excepted out of the amount to be deposited; but there is every reason in the world why they should be included in it. whether they be stocks of the United States or of the several States. Such, sir, are some of the advantages proposed by this bill; and in addition to all these, though last not least, its adoption will tend to quiet the public mind, to get rid of that feverish state of anxiety which has existed for some time past, which has kept our monetary system in constant agitation, which has disturbed the peace of the whole commercial community, and more or less deranged the affairs of the whole country. Mr. President, if such be some of the advantages of this bill, (and I confess I have glanced at them but hastily,) what, let me ask, is the objection to its adoption? Why, sir, it is objected, in the first place, that the two propositions, namely, to regulate by law the deposite banks, and to dispose of the surplus revenue, ought not to have been in the same bill. Viewing these propositions as I do, I have not, on my own account, any objection to their being embraced in the same bill; but knowing that a few of my political friends entertained different views from me in regard to the latter one, I felt it due to them that they should have the opportunity of acting and voting separately on them. My honorable colleague, although he originally put the propositions together, accordingly moved to recommit the bill to a committee, with instructions to report two separate bills. After repeated trials, it was decided not to recomm't. This I regret, because such a separation would have left each proposition to rest on its own merits, and every member of this body could, with perfect freedom, have voted for the one or the other, as he should deem best. But the two propositions have been kept together against my vote and against my wishes. The question now is, approving them both as I do, whether I shall vote against the whole bill because it contains a proposition which some other gentlemen do not approve. Sir, I cannot, under these circumstances, hesitate as to my course. I voted for the engrossment of the bill; I shall vote for it on its final passage. But my honorable colleague objects to the ratio introduced by the amendment of the Senator from Mississippi. Sir, I resisted that ratio to the utmost. I deemed the ratio in the bill as reported by the select committee, namely, in propor-gency, more should be wanted, the Secretary can at tion to federal population, more equitable and just; but I cannot vote against the whole bill merely because it takes the representatives of the States in the two Houses of Congress as the basis of deposite, instead of the representation in the popular branch. And, even though the ratio were restored, as my honorable colleague desires it, we know perfectly well that the bill would not receive his vote. Having done all in my power to retain the ratio required by the interests of my own State, and which seemed to me both just and equitable, and having failed in that, I cannot, consistently with my sense of duty, vote against a bill which contains two such important provisions, even if I have some objections to that part which relates to the surplus revenue. I should feel that they ought to be very weighty and very strong to induce me to vote against the other part of the bill regulating the public deposites by law-a measure so frequently recommended by the President, and so imperiously demanded by the public voice. Sir, the honorable Senator from Missouri objects to this bill that it does not except from this ratable deposite with the States the unexpended balances, as they are termed, of the appropriations made by Congress; that the bill recaptures them, to use his own emphatical language, and brings them back for the purpose of distribution, after they have been appropriated by Congress. Sir, a good argument is sometimes put down and a bad one built up by a sarcasm. This, I apprehend, must have been the object of the honorable Senator in thus speaking of the recapture of these unexpended bal ances. VOL. XII-116 Again, sir, it is urged that this surplus, thus depos ited with the States, will never be called for by the General Government, and that such calls would not be responded to by the States if they were made. Let us, for one moment, examine these objections. In the first place, the way in which the money would be called for would be through appropriations made by Congress; and in case there were not means in the Treas. ury to meet them, the Secretary would sell the certifi cates of deposite for the purpose of raising the means. The States would have nothing to do with the transac tion. The Secretary would require no response from them. This objection might have had some plausibility if the bill had required that the certificates should be paid by the States, instead of being made transferable, and thereby enabling the Secretary of the Treasury to cash them in the market. But, even if such had been its provision, does any one believe that there is a solitary State in this Union which would violate its pledged faith to this or any other Government? No, sir, no one can seriously entertain such an opinion. I would vouch for all of them. Corruption has not so far fastened on the vitals of any of them, that they should so soon exhibit such ev. idences of premature decay. It is, however, said that Congress would omit to make appropriations, in order to 1813 SENATE.] GALES & SEASON'S REGISTER prevent this money from . Public Deposites. ed for or required by What! Mr. President, m its duty to the country from the Secretary of thation of keeping so much trash as Congress relped thus in the treasuries of the States! the palpose this body that would thus withhold the mi for the common defence of the country? Let very member of either House put the question to himself, whether he would be governed by such motives. His answer will be, No, sir-no. For my own part I should despise myself, if such considerations could, for a single moment, influence me; and I believe that sentiment pervades the breast of every one who hears me. Where, then, is the danger of appropriations being with held? I have heard it said that our constituents, the people, would direct or instruct us to vote against them, in order to prevent their portion of this surplus being withdrawn from their respective States. Sir, there is no such sordid and debasing spirit amongst the people of this country. They will go all necessary lengths to sustain the Government in any emergency, whether it be peace or whether it be war. It is their pride and their ambition to rally round the standard of their country, and to provide the requisite means for sustaining its institutions and its honor. So far from withholding its means from it, they would always be ready to contribute their own. Sir, I have studied the character of the American people to little purpose, if I could suppose them capable of being guilty of such meanness. No, sir, they are a noble, a generous, a chivalrous people. Whilst I trust they will always guard against unnecessary and extravagant expenditures, at the same time I feel assured that nothing will be withheld which is right and necessary for the proper administration of the Government. Is our own patriotism of so much higher, order than theirs, that we are willing to say that we, their representatives, would not, of our own accord, withhold appropriations, but should be compelled to do it under their influence and instructions? Sir, I do not think so meanly of myself, nor of my constituents. I am unwilling to assume any such attitude in regard to them, and I trust they will not assume it in regard to me. I am unwilling, with a kind of Pharisaic, political righteousness, to say to my constituents I am holier than you. No, sir, rather than place myself in such a contrast with them, I would say, with the humble publican, God be merciful to me, a sinner. 1844 [JUNE 17, 1836. ed. But, sir, if you want to ensure an increase of duties, let your expenditures be made extravagant, for the purpose of absorbing this immense surplus, and the duties must be increased to furnish means to carry out the extravagance thus commenced. I beg gentlemen to reflect on this subject. They seem to have looked only on one side of the question. Whilst they are attempting to avoid an imaginary evil, they are rushing into absolute danger. To them might well be applied the Roman maxim, Incidit in Scyllam qui vult vitare Charyb dim. Put it to the plain, practical, common sense of every man in this nation, and he will respond to you that he is governed by no such motives as those attributed to him. He will tell you that this surplus is in a situation to be productive of immense mischief, as it now is; he will tell you it ought to be deposited with the States, because it will there be safely kept and carefully used, for the benefit of the people, who contributed towards it; and that it will be forthcoming whenever the wants of the Government require it. If such would be the convictions of every honest man, how can you charge upon the great mass of the people of this country such base and sordid motives as a contrary position would imply? Sir, it cannot be; I feel that the spirit of the people is above it; I feel that I know the motives which govern my fellowcitizens in such matters. I have been brought up with them; I have always lived in the midst of them; and I am yet to learn that such are their principles of action. I am persuaded I speak the sentiments of the people of the State of New York on this subject. They cannot be seduced from their integrity by such means. They may be willing to keep the public money, as a safe depository of it, till it is needed for the public service; but they will not be humble suppliants here for your bounty; and they will not instruct their representatives to do that which they would not do themselves. There is no danger, therefore, in this measure. It is the only one which avoids all danger. If this be not adopted, there are but two other modes of disposing of the surplus left. The one is by extravagant appropriations, without reference to the real wants of the country, and which will require an increased tariff to carry them through. The other is, to leave them in the deposite banks, to become the prey of speculators, and the foot-ball of party. Sir, I cannot hesitate between them. And I am utterly at a loss to conceive how gentlemen, who are so naturally jealous of all banks, are willing to leave this immense power in their hands. When the United States Bank was deprived of its power by the removal of the deposites, it had, at that time, but about seven millions of the public money; whereas, by the lowest estimates, these deposite banks will have, on the first of January next, not less than thirty millions. Do not gentlemen perceive that they are putting into their hands a power far greater than they were willing to intrust to the Bank of the United States? Do they not also perceive that, by re This idea of withholding appropriations, either by representative or constituent, is ideal. It exists in the imagination. Equally fanciful is that notion which has been advanced, that our tariff of duties on foreign imports will be increased, for the purpose of creating a surplus for distribution. No gentleman will admit that he would be governed in his action here by such a motive. Nay, he would repel with indignation such a charge. I would repel it for my constituents as readily as I would repel it for myself. Sir, the difference be tween the proposition contained in the bill and an abso-jecting that portion of the bill which relates to the delute system of distribution is as palpable as that between the night and the day. In the first case, we deposite with the States, for safe-keeping, an accidental and unavoidable surplus, to be used by the Government when required. In the other, we create a surplus for the purpose of being given to the States, and without any expectation or obligation on their part to return it. there is no danger of raising our duties on imports for such a purpose. The principle on which duties are levied, I believe, is well and universally understood at this day. Graduate your duties so as to raise no more revenue than is required for the economical wants of the Government, and, in thus graduating them, give incidental protection to such branches of industry as you think the interests of the country require to be protect Sir, posite banks, they are leaving this immense power in their hands without any regulation by law? Why is all this? Why, simply because they are apprehensive that, by depositing this surplus, ratably, among twenty-six States of this Union, it will tend to corrupt the people! They are willing to leave it in these banks, without legal restraints, subject to all the vicissitudes and dangers which the use and disposition of such an immense fond must always encounter; but they are unwilling to intrust it to the custody of the States, under the sanction of law, to be by them safely kept, and surely returned, whenever the wants of the Government require it. Sir, I think I speak the sentiments of the deposite banks when I say I do not believe they wish to keep it. They are not unaware of the tendency to speculation and over 1 can trading which the use of such immense means has on the whole community; and when thus embarked, any sudden demand for and withdrawal of these means must produce consequences of the most destructive character. readily foresee that, even if this bill becomes a law, there will be more or less difficulty in the banks' contracting their loans, so as to be prepared to meet the drafts of the Treasury when this surplus shall be deposited with the States. The projectile force which has already been given to the community, by means of these funds, will continue to operate after the cause has ceased. But the period fixed in the bill for withdrawing them is so re mote, that I apprehend no material difficulty in their being ready to carry out the arrangement. Mr. President, the vote I am called upon to give on this bill I deem the most important I have ever given in my life. I have maturely considered it-it is the result of anxious reflection and deep conviction; and were 1 not supported by the very large majority of my political friends in this Senate, I might be led to distrust my own judgment; but with their support, my convictions are the stronger; and I can never persuade myself we are wrong. I think I see this matter as clear as the sun at noonday. My mind has a perfect conception of the evils to be encountered by the rejection of this bill, and of the benefits to be conferred by its adoption. There is no film upon the mental eye-my judgment tells me it is right-my conscience approves it. I have no inclination to indulge in prophetic vision; but I think I can discern in the long vista of the future the sad train of evils which must follow the adverse action of this day. I fancy I can see our currency deranged, our credit system overturned, and our country precipitated from that height of prosperity which she has so long enjoyed; but I will not appal you with an exhibition of those evils, which, like Banquo's ghosts, are lengthening out before And dizzy 'tis, to cast one's eye so low!" Sir, in giving my vote for this bill, if it is the last vote I ever give, I shall feel that I have faithfully and conscientiously discharged an important and responsible duty to myself and to the country. When Mr. TALLMADGE had concluded Mr. WRIGHT made some remarks in explanation of several things that had fallen during the debate, and in opposition to the bill. Mr. SHEPLEY said he had wished to state the reasons of his vote, but would take some other occasion, and hoped the question would be taken at once. Mr. CLAY took the floor, and spoke at length in favor of the bill, and in general congratulation of the determination which seemed to pervade the Senate, without distinction of party, to check extravagant expenditures and provide for the safety of the public moneys. Mr. NILES made a few remarks. Mr. CALHOUN expressed a hope that the harmony of the debate would not be disturbed. He thought there was no mischief in the measure, and it was a mere measure of precaution. Mr. WEBSTER called for the yeas and nays; which were ordered. The question being taken on the passage of the bill, it was decided in the affirmative, as follows: YEAS-Messrs. Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing of Illinois, Ewing of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Mangum, Moore, Morris, Nicholas, Niles, Page, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, [SENATE. Mr. CLAY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom were referred the resolutions of the Legislature of Connecticut, and a number of memorials and petitions from various quarters, praying for the recognition of the independence of Texas, made the fol lowing report: The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom were referred resolutions of the Legislature of Connecticut, sundry memorials, and other proceedings of various meetings of the people, all recommending the recognition of the independence of Texas, has, according to order, had them under consideration, and now beg leave to submit to the Senate the following report and resolution: The right of one independent Power to recognise the fact of the existence of a new Power, about to assume a position among the nations of the earth, is incontestable. It is founded upon another right-that which appertains to every sovereignty to take care of its own interests, by establishing and cultivating such commercial or other relations with the new Power as may be deemed expedient. Its exercise gives no just ground of umbrage or cause of war. The policy which has hitherto guided the Government of the United States in respect to new Powers has been to act on the fact of their existence, without regard to their origin, whether that has been by the subversion of a pre-existing Government, or by the violent or voluntary separation of one from another part of a common nation. In cases where an old established nation has thought proper to change the form of its Government, the United States, conforming to the rule which has ever governed their conduct, of strictly abstaining from all interference in the domestic concerns of other States, have not stopped to inquire whether the new Government has been rightfully adopted or not. It has been sufficient for them that it is in fact the Government of the country in practical operation. There is, however, a marked difference in the instances of an old nation which has altered the form of its Government, and a newly-organized Power, which has just sprung into existence. In the former case, (such, for example, as was that of France,) the nation had existed for ages as a separate and independent community. It is matter of history; and the recognition of its new Governments was not necessary to denote the existence of the nation; but, with respect to new Powers, the recognition of their Governments comprehends, first, an acknowledgment of their ability to exist as independent States, and, secondly, the capacity of their particular Governments to perform the duties and fulfil the obligations towards foreign Powers incident to their new condition. Hence, more caution and deliberation are necessary in considering and determining the question of the acknowledgment of a new Power than that of the new Government of an old Power. The Government of the United States has taken no part in the contest which has unhappily existed between Texas and Mexico. It has avowed its intention, and taken measures to maintain a strict neutrality towards the belligerants. If individual citizens of the United States, impelled by sympathy for those who were believed to be struggling for liberty and independence against oppression and tyranny, have engaged in the contest, it has On been without the authority of their Government. the contrary, the laws which have been hitherto found necessary or expedient to prevent citizens of the United States from taking part in foreign wars have been directed to be enforced. Sentiments of sympathy and devotion to civil liberty, which have always animated the people of the United States, have prompted the adoption of the resolutions and other manifestations of popular feeling which have been referred to the committee, recommending an acknowledgment of the independence of Texas. The committee shares fully in all these sentiments; but a wise and prudent Government should not act solely on the impulse of feeling, however natural and laudable it may be. It ought to avoid all precipitation, and not adopt so grave a measure as that of recognising the independence of a new Power, until it has satisfactory information, and has fully deliberated. The committee has no information respecting the recent movements in Texas, except such as is derived from the public prints. According to that, the war broke out in Texas last autumn. Its professed object, like that of our revolutionary contest in the commencement, was not separation and independence, but a redress of grievances. In March last independence was proclaimed, and a constitution and form of Government were established. No means of ascertaining accurately the exact amount of the population of Texas are at the command of the committee. It has been estimated at some sixty or seventy thousand souls. Nor are the precise limits of the country which passes under the denomination of Texas known to the committee. They are probably not clearly defined, but they are supposed to be extensive, and sufficiently large, when peopled, to form a respectable Power. If the population is small; if, when compared with that of the United Mexican States, amounting, probably, to not less than eight millions of souls, the contest has been unequal, it has, nevertheless, been maintained by Texas with uncommon resolution, undaunted valor, and eminent success. And the recent signal and splendid victory, in which that portion of the Mexican army which was commanded by General Santa Anna, the President of the Mexican Government, in person, was entirely overthrown, with unexampled slaughter, compared with the inconsiderable loss on the other side, put to flight and captured, including among the prisoners the Presi dent himself and his staff, may be considered as decisive of the independence of Texas. That memorable event will probably be followed by negotiations which may lead to the acknowledgment by Mexico of the independence of Texas and the settlement of its boundaries. And, under all circumstances, it might, perhaps, be more conformable with the amicable relations subsisting between the United States and the United Mexican States, that the latter should precede the former in the acknowledgment of the independence of Texas. But if the war should be protracted, or if there should be unreasonable delay on the part of the Mexican Government, the Government of the United States ought not to await its action. The recognition of Texas as an independent Power may be made by the United States in various ways: 1st, by treaty: 2d, by the passage of a law regulating commercial intercourse between the two Powers; 3d, by sending a diplomatic agent to Texas, with the usual credentials; or, lastly, by the Executive receiving and accrediting a diplomatic representative from Texas, which would be a recognition as far as the Executive only is competent to make it. In the first and third modes the concurrence of the Senate, in its executive character, would be necessary; and in the second, in its legislative character. The Senate alone, without the co-operation [JUNE 20, 1836. of some other branch of the Government, is not competent to recognise the existence of any Power. The President of the United States, by the constitution, has the charge of their foreign intercourse. Regularly he ought to take the initiative in the acknowledgment of the independence of any new Power. But, in this case, he has not yet done it, for reasons which he, without doubt, deems sufficient. If, in any instance, the President should be tardy, he may be quickened in the exercise of his power by the expression of the opinion, or by other acts, of one or both branches of Congress, as was done in relation to the republics formed out of Spanish America. But the committee does not think that, on this occasion, any tardiness is justly imputable to the Executive. About three months only have elapsed since the establishment of an independent Government in Texas; and it is not unreasonable to wait a short time to see what its operation will be, and especially whether it will afford those guarantees which foreign Powers have a right to expect before they institute relations with it. Taking this view of the whole matter, the committee conclude by recommending to the Senate the adoption of the following resolution: Resolved, That the independence of Texas ought to be acknowledged by the United States whenever satisfactory information shall be received that it has in successful operation a civil Government, capable of performing the duties and fulfilling the obligations of an independent Power. Mr. CLAY stated that the committee, he was happy to inform the Senate, had been unanimous in their sanction of this report. He did not know that it was very important that the resolution should be acted on at this session. Yet, as there might be gentlemen who would desire to give their views on the subject, he would move that the report be printed, and made the special order for Thursday next. Mr. PRESTON, in a tone which did not reach the reporter, expressed his acquiescence in the motion, and his wish that a resolution offered by him some days since, calling on the President for a communication on the sub. ject of any correspondence between him and the Gov. ernment or agents of Texas, on the subject of the condition, administration, &c., of Texas, be taken up. The Senate would then be able to decide whether any further action was necessary. Mr. CLAY said he hoped the resolution would be taken up. It would be very desirable to have the information which it asked for, in order to determine if any stronger measure was necessary than that now reported. The motion of Mr. CLAY was agreed to. The Senate then took up for consideration several private bills; after which, On motion of Mr. BENTON, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business; and, after some time spent in secret session, The Senate adjourned. MONDAY, JUNE 20. The CHAIR presented the credentials of RICHARD BAYARD, elected United States Senator, by the Legisla ture of the State of Delaware, to fill the vacancy occa. sioned by the resignation of the honorable ARNOLD NAUDAIN. Mr. BAYARD then appeared, and took the requisite oath and his seat. BANKS IN FLORIDA. Mr. WEBSTER, from the Committee on Finance, to which was referred a resolution [Mr. HUBBARD'S] instructing the committee to inquire if the course pursued by the territorial Legislature of Florida, concerning the |