slavery and the slave trade is embraced within these implied limitations of legislative power? Is it not within the competency of ordinary legislation? Have not slavery and the slave trade been abolished by many States of this Union; and that not upon the ground, as has been suggested in debate, of interest merely, but because, when thoroughly examined, the pretended right to hold and transfer men as property has been found to rest on no substantial foundation? Indeed, the opposers of these petitions themselves, by laboring as they do to derive a prohibition to legislate on this subject from the constitution, and from the reservations in the cessions of this territory, manifestly betray an unwillingness to trust the claim to exemption from congressional legislation to the natural limi'ation of legislative power. [H. OF R. understand his argument, that the provision of the constitution, that "the citizens of each State shall be enti tled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States," necessarily extends to the District of Columbia, and that Congress must be understood to be prohibited from disfranchising here the citizens of the several States; that is, that it cannot deprive them of the privileges of citizens of the District whenever they come into it. It is true it cannot, because there would be a gross and glaring absurdity in securing, as the constitution does, the rights of citizenship in each State, to citizens of every other State, and, at the same time, denying the rights of citizenship in this District--the common property of all the States--to the citizens of those States. And, besides, the very act of constituting this ten miles square a District of the United States necessarily gives to the citizens of each and all the States common rights in it; not the rights which they each enjoy in their respective States--as the terms in which the gentleman states his argument would seem to imply-because that would constitute twenty-four different rules of action; but the right of each resident and sojourner here, of being protected by the laws made for the Dis. trict, and the whole District. It is said, indeed, by the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. WISE,] that the States which have abolished slavery have not violated the great principle of vested rights, by taking slave property against the consent of the owners and without compensation;" but that they have merely "adopted the post nati principle, and declared that rights which did not exist at the time should never exist;" that is, that the issue of slaves, born after a certain future time, should be free. Without stopping to inquire into the correctness of this, in point of fact, but, for the purposes of this argument, admitting it, let me ask what is the difference in principle between depriving an individual of his slave by act of legislation, and of the right to the issue of that slave by the same act? Upon common principles, an absolute right to the one, as property, necessarily carries with it a right to the other; and a farmer would resist, as equal infringe-ed up to the party to whom such service or labor may ments of his rights, an attempt to take away his cattle, and a claim to deprive him of their future progeny. It would be appropriate here to go into an examination of the right which is claimed to hold men as property, and of the rightful extent of legislation on this subject. But it opens too broad a field for the present discussion, and I will not enter it. The exception, then, of a right to disfranchise a citizen of Virginia who may come here, rests upon a principle having no possible relation to the case in question. But further: The gentleman from Virginia says that no person held to service or labor in a State, under the laws thereof, escaping into this District, can be discharged from such service or labor, but must be deliver be due; and that this constitutes an exception from the general power to legislate "in all cases whatsoever" for this District. I admit it does; and why? Plainly because the constitution having expressly secured the right to the slave-owner to reclaim his slave in any and every State of this Union, it would be a clear evasion of it, as well as a manifest absurdity, to deny him that right in a It thus appears that the right to legislate on the sub- District which is the common property of the very States jects of these petitions, which is manifestly included within which his right of reclamation is secured by the within the terms of the grant of power to Congress, is constitution. The exception in this case rests, therefore, not excluded by operation of the principles which form substantially upon an express provision of the constitu the basis of ordinary exceptions to the power of legislation, which by no possibility of construction can sustain tion. What is there, then, to exclude from the sweeping grant of power to legislate "in all cases whatsoever," the power in question? An honorable gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WISE] finds various grounds of implied exclusion in the constitution. He says there are certain admitted exceptions to the legislative power of Congress in regard to this District, which he enumerates; and thereupon proceeds to infer from the fact of these exceptions, that the power in question is also excepted. Thus, he says that Congress is prohibited by the constitution from suspending the writ of habeas corpus, from passing a law respecting the establishment of religion, and from abridging the freedom of speech and of the press, or the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, &c.; and asks if these prohibitions do not extend to the power of Congress to legislate for this District. Most certainly they do; but it is for the obvious reasons that they are unlimited in their terms, and of course necessarily extend to the whole legislation of Congress. Is there any such limitation of the power in question? Why, when the convention was in the act of providing limitations to the powers which had been granted to Congress, in the 8th section of the first article of the constitution, did they omit to limit specifically the power of legislation "in all cases whatsoever," which had been granted to Congress in reference to this District? Again: The gentleman from Virginia says, if I rightly VOL. XII.-129 the exception in question. Again: The constitution provides that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another." And the gentleman from Virginia contends that this prohibition must be regarded as extending to the commerce and the ports of the District of Columbia; and if so, his inference is, that an implied prohibition of the abolition by Congress of slavery and the slave trade in the States must also be taken to extend to this District. The first clause of the provision of the constitution just referred to was designed to exempt the exports of the country from taxation, and must, of necessity, be taken to extend to all the ports within it; otherwise, the entire object of the clause might be directly defeated. The remaining clauses of the provision, it will be observed, have exclusive reference to the equality of privileges of the several States, which they aim to preserve, by prohibiting Congress from favoring the commerce, or the ports, or navigation of one, at the expense of an. other. This it might do, in effect, if the ports, and commerce, and navigation of this District might be exempted from the operation of the clauses in question. Thus a preference of the port of Alexandria over that of Baltimore would disturb the equality of privilege which the constitution intended to preserve between Virginia and Maryland. But what has all this to do with the subject under discussion? The provisions with regard to commerce, &c., do not specifically reach it; and it is only, therefore, from the supposed analogy between the implied limitation of the power of Congress in the cases cited, and the limitation sought to be established in the present case, that an argument can be drawn in favor of the latter. But where is the analogy between an implied prohibition to abolish slavery in the States, and an express prohibition of a preference of the ports of one State over those of another State? There is, indeed, a prohibition in both cases; but here the analogy ceases. If this is sufficient to establish the position of gentlemen, let us see what other positions it may establish. Upon the same ground that Congress is prohibited from abolishing slavery in the State of Virginia, for example, is it also prohibited from forbidding in that State the sale of lottery tickets, and the practice of gambling, and the crime of kidnapping? But could it not have enacted a prohibition of these practices in the city of Alexandria the moment it was ceded to the United States? Could it not, in fact, have rendered valueless establishments for gaming, and receptacles for the kidnapped, which had been erected under the sanction of the laws of Virginia, if those laws had permitted such practices? Would the gentleman from Virginia have exclaimed against the invasion of vested rights, the taking of private property for public use, without compensation? Again: The gentleman from Virginia says the "local Legislature of this District cannot enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money," &c.; and infers, if I understand him, that because this disability results, as he supposes, by implication, from the inhibition to the States of the exercise of these powers, therefore the assumed disabili ty of Congress to abolish slavery and the slave trade in this District may, in like manner, result from its want of power to put an end to these evils in the States. The whole of this argument rests on a false supposition with regard to the source of the inability of Congress, as a Legislature for this District, to make treaties, grant letters of marque, and coin money; and falls to the ground when it is perceived that that inability results, not from the inhibition to the States of the exercise of such powers, but from their utter inconsistency with both the purposes for which the power to legislate over this District was granted, and the relation which the District evidently bears to the Union. The gentleman from Virginia next proceeds to lay down the following general rules to restrain legislation over this District: 1. "That nothing which Congress is expressly prohibited by the constitution from doing as a national Legislature, can it do as a local Legislature for the District of Columbia." 2. "That all the duties and obligations which the States are bound by the constitution to discharge and observe, from one to the other, the District of Columbia, or its Legislature, is bound to discharge and observe towards the States, respectively." 3. "That the local Legislature of the District of Columbia can do no act, or pass no law, which the States are prohibited from doing or passing, by the constitution." And how, let it be asked, do these rules affect the present question? No express prohibition to legislate on the subject of State slavery is found in the constitution, unless it be in the amendment which provides that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." But if Congress cannot legislate on the subject of slavery in this District, because the right to legislate upon it in the States is "reserved to the States," how is it to le. [DEC. 23, 1835. gislate for the District at all? The subjects of every-day legislation for the District are subjects upon which Congress has no power to legislate for the States, and are, therefore, according to the gentleman's argument, subjects on which it has no right to legislate here. And how does the gentleman's second rule touch this subject? Are the States bound, by their "duties and obligations" towards each other, to refrain from abolish ing slavery and the slave trade within their respective limits? Nobody pretends this. Many States have done it, and many more may yet do it, for any thing that can be found to the contrary in the constitution. And can any greater evil result to any of the slave States from the exercise of a power by Congress to abolish slavery and the slave trade within the limits of this District, than would result from the exercise, by the States, of their admitted power of doing the same thing within their limits? May not Maryland, for example, if she chooses, put an end to these evils within her limits? And would not the exercise of the power be as dangerous to the peace of the South, as would be the exercise of the same power by Congress in regard to this District? And has the gentleman's third rule a more appropriate application to the present question than either of the others? To what purpose, in reference to this argument, is it to say that Congress can pass no law in reference to this District which the States are prohibited from pass ing? Are the States prohibited from passing laws abol ishing slavery and the slave trade within their respective limits? The gentleman from Virginia says the constitution declares that "private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation." Supposing this to have any application to the present case, it only involves the inquiry, whether slaves can be rightfully emancipated by legislative authority, without providing a just compensation for their masters. This touches a question which I will not now discuss, namely: what is the foundation of the right to the slave, which is said to be vested in the master? Congress, however, are not asked to take private property for public use; but to free the African from the unnatural condition of being the property of another, to the end, not that he may become the property of the public, but the proprietor of himself. But this is not all that we are called on to do. We are asked to prohibit men from making mer. chandise of their fellow-men; from buying and selling them "to get gain." Do gentlemen talk of a compen sation to the slave merchant for the loss of such a priv ilege? Do they even touch the subject of the slave trade within this District? Dare they do it? Are there any "vested rights" in the way of legislation on this subject? Is there any question about "compensation" involved?--any limitation growing out of "the nature of society, and of government," to which the gentleman from Virginia refers?-any express or implied infringement of the rights of the States?-any kind of obstacle, in short, but the want of a will in those who have the power to put down this abominable traffic? Having thus attempted to show that the power of Congress to legislate on the subjects of these petitions, obviously included in the power to "exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever," is not restrained by any natural limitations of legislative power, nor by any express or implied limitations to be found in the constitution, the question arises, Where is the limitation to be found, for which gentlemen so earnestly contend? I am answered, in the acts of cession, by which the States of Virginia and Maryland ceded the territory which forms this District to the United States. These acts, say gen tlemen, are conclusive upon the subject. Let us see, then, if these States did, in making the cessions, actually impose restrictions at variance with the plain language of the constitution; and whether Congress accepted grants thus restricted. The cession from Virginia was made by act of the Legislature of that State, on the 3d of December, 1789, in the following words:" "Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof, as Congress may by law direct, shall be, and the same is hereby, forever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution of the Government of the United States." This grant, it will be perceived, transfers to the United States "exclusive jurisdiction of soil and persons residing or to reside thereon;" and adds, "pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the constitution of the Government of the United States;" that is, pursuant to that part of the constitution which, as we have seen, expressly grants to Congress the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever." Here, then, instead of a restriction of the jurisdiction contemplated in the constitution, there is, both in direct terms and by reference to that instrument, an express and clear confirmation of it. But, say gentlemen, there is a proviso, which follows this grant, that contains the limitation contended for. Let us see. The proviso is as follows: "Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States." Now, sir, is it not apparent, upon the slightest inspection of this proviso, that it limits the grant only so far as it extends to the soil, and was designed merely to protect the rights of individuals therein (that is, in the soil) from the operation of that part of the cession which grants "the tract of country" to the United States "in full and absolute right?" It seems to me, indeed, that, so far from limiting the grant in reference to the subject-matter now under consideration, this very proviso does, in effect, confirm it; since an express exception of one species of right from the operation of the grant, and one only, would seem to imply an exclusion of all other exceptions. It is, indeed, altogether incredible that the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland should have intended to restrict the United States in their power over the subject of slavery, without using language which would directly, or by clear implication, reach the case. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WISE] gives additional force to this argument by asking--"Why was the cession required? Why was their [the ceding States] consent to the purchase of places required by the constitution, if it was not to give the States the power of imposing condition and restraint upon your legislation over the ceded territory?" "The power of imposing condition and restraint!" Very well. If this was the purpose, the States of Virginia and Maryland of course understood it, and would take care to impose, in their grants, all the conditions and restraints upon the legislation of Congress which they thought proper; and to do it so plainly that even the wayfaring man need not err in regard to them. Now, where are the conditions and restraints on which The grant from Maryland was made on the 19th of December, 1791. It is in the same language as the grant from Virginia, and is limited by the same proviso. -Note by Mr. S. [H. OF R. gentlemen rely? I have recited the whole; and who will say that they embrace any restraint upon the power of Congress touching the subject under consideration? Is not the omission, upon the gentleman's own view of the subject, decisive of the question? But the gentleman, having looked into the grant, and seeing that no such "condition and restraint" was im posed there, seeks to find it in "the nature of society and government in Maryland and Virginia;" which he says is "of itself, independent of conditions expressed in the acts of cession, sufficient to restrain your power of legislation over this subject." Thus, at one moment, a cession was provided for in the constitution, to the end that the ceding States might impose condition and restraint upon the legislation of Congress; and, at the next, "the nature of society and government in Maryland and Virginia is of itself a sufficient restraint," without any thing expressed in the grant! But, Mr. Speaker, what is the condition of the people of this District in regard to this important subject, if the power contended for is not granted to Congress? Maryland and Virginia, possessing the power to abolish slavery and the slave trade within their respective limits, had the power of doing it within the territory which now composes this District. But they possess it no longer. Their jurisdiction here is extinguished. The inhabitants of the territory are transferred to the United States, entirely divested of all civil jurisdiction, with no power to legislate on this or any other subject, but subjected to the "exclusive legislation" of Congress in "all cases whatsoever." However much they may, at any time, desire to free the territory from the curse of slavery and the slave trade, they are powerless. For any thing that they can do, by the force of law, they and their children, and their children's children, to the latest time, must be doomed to see among them a traffic which makes merchandise of the bodies and the souls of their fellow-men; which marches through their streets, chained together, companies of human beings destined to the slave prison and the slave ship; and which agonizes their moral sensibilities by a severance of all the ties which bind man to his fellow-man, in the most valued and endeared relations of human life. I have thus shown that the power given to Congress over this subject, by the general grant in the constitution, is affected, neither by the natural limitations to the exercise of legislative power, nor by any limitation, express or implied, in the constitution itself, nor by any contained in the cessions of this territory by the States of Maryland and Virginia. But the petitioners are here met with another objection to granting the prayer of these petitions. It is made a question of public safety. To begin the work of abol ishing slavery, and to banish the detestable traffic in human flesh from this District, will, we are told, tend to excite a spirit of insurrection in the southern States; and gentlemen give full rein to their imaginations in depicting the horrors of rape, rapine, and murder, which will follow. I do not permit myself to doubt the perfect sincerity of gentlemen in these gloomy forebodings. I know they are in a position to see what I cannot see, and feel what I cannot feel. I will not allow myself to trifle with their views or feelings on this subject, though I must be permitted to doubt the correctness of the one, and the justness of the other. And may I not well doubt? It is true I do not profess a very familiar acquaintance with the disposition of the slave population, or the probable influence upon them of a discussion of, and action upon, this subject. And while I would hesitate to oppose my own individual opin. ion to the assertions of honorable gentlemen, so confi. dently made, they must permit me to confront them, not altogether with my own opinions, but with the authori ty of intelligent and respectable slaveholders themselves. I hold in my hand a petition presented to this House in the year 1828, signed by more than eleven hundred citizens of this District, praying for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade within its limits. It was referred to the Committee on the District of Columbia, and remained unacted on until the last session, when it was called up, on motion of an honorable member from New Hampshire, [Mr. HUBBARD, ] and ordered to be printed, with the names of the signers. I send it to the Chair, and ask that it may be read by the Clerk. Here Mr. GARLAND, of Virginia, interposed, and said he should object to the reading of that and all other petitions on the subject, unless the gentleman used it as a part of his argument. Mr. SLADE replied that he intended so to use it, and should read it himself, but, being exhausted, he wished it read by the Clerk. Mr. GARLAND withdrew his objection, and consented to the reading, as an act of courtesy to Mr. S. The petition was then read by the Clerk, as follows: "To the honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: We, the undersigned, citizens of the counties of Washington and Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, beg leave to call the attention of your honorable body to an evil of serious magnitude, which greatly impairs the prosperity and happiness of this District, and casts the reproach of inconsistency upon the free institutions established among us. "While the laws of the United States denounce the foreign slave trade as piracy, and punish with death those who are found engaged in its perpetration, there exists in this District, the seat of the National Government, a domestic slave trade scarcely less disgraceful in its character, and even more demoralizing in its influence. For this is not, like the former, carried on against a barbarous nation; its victims are reared up among the people of this country, educated in the precepts of the same religion, and imbued with similar domestic attachments. These people are, without their consent, torn from their homes; husband and wife are frequently separated and sold into distant parts; children are taken from their parents, without regard to the ties of nature; and the most endearing bonds of affection are broken forever. "Nor is this traffic confined to those who are legally slaves for life. Some who are entitled to freedom, and many who have a limited time to serve, are sold into unconditional slavery; and, owing to the defectiveness of our laws, they are generally carried out of the District before the necessary steps can be taken for their release. "We behold these scenes continually taking place among us, and lament our inability to prevent them. The people of this District have, within themselves, no means of legislative redress, and we therefore appeal to your honorable body, as the only one invested by the American constitution with the power to relieve us. "Nor is it only from the rapacity of slave traders that the colored race in this District are doomed to suffer. Even the laws which govern us sanction and direct, in certain cases, a procedure that we believe is unparalleled, in glaring injustice, by any thing at present known among the Governments of Christendom. An instance of the operation of these laws, which occurred during the last summer, we will briefly relate. "A colored man, who stated that he was entitled to freedom, was taken up as a runaway slave, and lodged in the jail of Washington city. He was advertised, but no one appearing to claim him, he was, according to law, put up at public auction for the payment of his jail fees, and sold as a slave for life! He was purchased by [DEC. 23, 1835. a slave trader, who was not required to give security for his remaining in the District, and he was, soon after, shipped at Alexandria for one of the southern States. An attempt was made by some benevolent individuals to have the sale postponed until his claim to freedom could be investigated; but their efforts were unavailing; and thus was a human being sold into perpetual bondage, at the capital of the freest Government on earth, without even a pretence of trial or an allegation of crime. "We blush for our country while we relate this disgraceful transaction, and we would fain conceal it from the world, did not its very enormity inspire us with the hope that it will rouse the philanthropist and the patriot to exertion. We have no hesitation in believing your honorable body never intended that this odious law should be enforced: it was adopted with the old code of Maryland, from which, we believe, it has been expunged since the District was ceded to the General Gov ernment. "The fact of its having been so recently executed, shows the necessity of this subject being investigated by a power which we confidently hope will be ready to correct it. "We are aware of the difficulties that would attend any attempt to relieve us from these grievances by a sudden emancipation of the slaves in this District, and we would, therefore, be far from recommending so rash a measure. But the course pursued by many of the States of this confederacy, that have happily succeeded in relieving themselves from a similar burden, together with the bright example which has been set us by the South American republics, proves, most conclusively, that a course of gradual emancipation, to commence at some fixed period, and to take effect only upon tho e who may thereafter be born or removed into the District, might be pursued without detriment to the present proprietors, and would greatly redound to the prosperity and honor of our country. "The existence among us of a distinct class of people, who, by their condition as slaves, are deprived of almost every incentive to virtue and industry, and shut out from many of the sources of light and knowledge, has an evident tendency to corrupt the morals of the people, and to damp the spirit of enterprise, by accustoming the rising generation to look with contempt upon honest labor, and to depend for support too much upon the labor of others. It prevents a useful and industrious class of people from settling among us, by rendering the means of subsistence more precarious to the laboring class of whites. "It diminishes the resources of the community, by throwing the earnings of the poor into the coffers of the rich; thus rendering the former dependant, servile, and improvident; while the latter are tempted to become, in the same proportion, luxurious and prodigal. "That these disastrous results flow from the existence of slavery among us, is sufficiently conspicuous, when we contrast the languishing condition of this District, and the surrounding country, with the prosperity of those parts of the Union which are less favored in point of climate and location, but blessed with a free and industrious population. "We would, therefore, respectfully pray that these grievances may claim the attention of your honorable body, that a law of Congress may be enacted, declaring that all children of slaves, born in the District of Columbia after the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and twenty-eight, shall be free at the age of twenty-five years; and that those laws, which authorize the selling of supposed runaways for their prison fees or maintenance, may be repealed. "And, also, that laws may be enacted to prevent slaves from being removed into this District, or brought Mr. SLADE replied, he could not inform the gentleman how many of the signers were slaveholders. He personally knew some of them, and knew them to be owners of slaves. The list of names, some of which he read, embraced men of all the professions and employments in the District-judges, lawyers, physicians, merchants, mechanics, and laborers. As to the question, (said Mr. S.,) whether all the signers were inhabitants of this District, I cannot, of course, answer it. I can only say that the petition was presented to this House seven years ago, and has remained on file in the Clerk's office ever since, open to inspection; and that it has been, during the past year, among the published documents of this House; and, moreover, that it purports on its face to be a petition of inhabitants of this District. Under these circumstances, I submit whether there is not a sufficient presumption that it is what it purports to be, to put gentlemen upon proof of the contrary. And now, Mr. Speaker, let me entreat gentlemen to look into this petition. I do this the more earnestly, because they will find the names of many there, whom, I am persuaded, they will not be inclined to charge either with ignorance or fanaticism; but on whose truth and intelligence and judgment they will place the most confident reliance. They state facts which they are in a condition to know, and advance opinions, the soundness of which is not liable to be affected by "northern prejudices" on this subject. They are in the midst of slavery, and understand what it is. They have witnessed the slave trade, and know something of its horrors: and without any of the doubts of gentlemen in regard to the power of Congress on this subject, and without any of the apprehensions with regard to the effect of its discussion upon the public peace and safety, which has been made the subject of such glowing descriptions and gloomy anticipations, here and elsewhere, they fearlessly announce the truth in regard both to slavery and the slave trade, and urgently appeal to Congress, "as the only body invested by the American constitution with power to relieve them." I submit, Mr. Speaker, whether it is not time that these petitioners, sustained as they are by the concur rent supplications of their northern brethren, should be heard and regarded; and whether the fact that eleven hundred citizens of this District have signed the petition which has just been read, is not a sufficient reply to the argument which has been drawn from considerations connected with a regard to the public safety. But further: The subject of the abolition of slavery, it is well known, was fully debated in the Legislature of Virginia in the year 1832, when the "injustice, tyranny, and oppression" of the slave system were openly and boldly maintained; and an effort was seriously made to The gentleman who opened the debate on the side of abolition, said: "It was a truth held sacred by every American and by every republican throughout the world, and he presumed it could not be denied in that hall, as a general principle, that it is an act of injustice, tyranny, and oppression, to hold any part of the human race in bondage against their consent. That circumstances may exist which may put it out of the power of the owners, [H. OF R. commence a system of abolition which should look to the final, and not distant, extinction of slavery in that State. And did that discussion produce any symptoms of insurrection among the slaves? No, sir. And why, indeed, should it? If you, sir, were the owner of one hundred slaves, and should seriously set about measures to give them the boon of freedom, do you think the first intimation of it would beget in them a spirit of rebellion, and that it would rise in proportion as you should advance your benevolent plans towards their consummation? To suppose this, is to suppose-what I want evidence to believe of the African race--that they are so lost to gratitude as to find no inducement to its exercise in such a manifestation of benevolent regard for them as this. Suffer me, sir, to dwell a few moments longer on the indications of opinion in Virginia on this subject, pending the agitation of the question in the Legislature of that State. While the subject was before a committee of the Legislature, the editor of the Richmond Enquirer, a well known leading public journal at the seat of Government of Virginia, said: "It is probable, from what we hear, that the committee on the colored population will report some plan for getting rid of the free people of color. But is this all that can be done? Are we forever to suffer the greatest evil which can scourge our land not only to remain, but to increase in its dimensions? We may shut our eyes and avert our faces, if we please,' (writes an eloquent South Carolinian, on his return from the North a few weeks ago,) but there it is, the dark and growing evil, at our doors; and meet the question we must at no distant day. God only knows what it is the part of wise men to do on that momentous and appalling subject. Of this I am very sure, that the difference-nothing short of frightful-between all that exists on one side of the Potomac, and all on the other, is owing to that cause alone. The disease is deep seated; it is at the heart's core; it is consuming, and has all along been consuming, our vitals; and I could laugh, if I could laugh on such a subject, at the ignorance and folly of the politician who ascribes that to an act of the Govern ment, which is the inevitable effect of the eternal laws of nature. What is to be done? Oh! my God! I don't know, but something must be done.' "Yes, something must be done; and it is the part of no honest man to deny it; of no free press to affect to conceal it. When this dark population is growing upon us; when every new census is but gathering its appalling number upon us; when within a period equal to that in which this federal constitution has been in existence, those numbers will increase to more than 2,000,000 within Virginia; when our sister States are closing their doors upon our blacks for sale; and when our whites are moving westwardly in greater numbers than we like to hear of; when this, the fairest land on all this continent, for soil and climate and situation combined, might be. come a sort of garden-spot if it were worked by the hands of white men alone, can we, ought we to sit quietly down, fold our arms, and say to each other, well, well, this thing will not come to the worst in our day? We will leave it to our children and our grandchildren and great grandchildren to take care of them. selves, and to brave the storm? Is this to act like wise men? Ileaven knows we are no fanatics. We detest the madness which actuated the Amis des Noirs. But some |