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H. OF R.]

Fortification Bill of Last Session.

taken-debate should have been had-all the forms of parliamentary etiquette should have been observed! Why, sir, does not the honorable gentleman recollect that the hours, nay, that the very minutes, of that Congress were numbered, and were fast wasting away? In addition to its business of legislation, the Senate was pressed with business of an executive character, and every moment of its time was actively employed. Was that an occasion to stand upon questions of mere punctilio and matters of idle ceremony? No, sir; the Senate, entertaining objections of a character which can never be abandoned by men who respect themselves or deserve the respect of others, but which might have been obviated on the part of the House, lost none of the time, more valuable then than all the precedents of ceremony which the gentleman can find in his labored researches, in bringing the subject of disagreement to direct issue; and with all the "indecent baste" they are accused of, a conference, the usual parliamentary mode of reconciling disagreeing votes, was not obtained seasonably to have reported, as is now contended, during the life of that Congress. To my mind, these proceedings manifest an earnest solicitude to save the bill, rather than a willingness to defeat it. The Senate overlooked all minor considerations--disregarded all inferior and subordinate matters, in the great object of appropriating largely for works of defence and security. They exposed them selves to this very charge of precipitation and indecorum, or what under other circumstances might be so considered, in their zeal to get the bill so framed as to be acceptable to both Houses. What could they do? Compelled to vote for an amendment which they regarded as unconstitutional, and which they could not, therefore, under any circumstances agree to; or to see a measure they were anxious to adopt perish before their eyes, with no power to save it--how were they to act? The steps taken by them, standing in the emergency they did, were the only ones possible by which the bill could have been rescued from the destruction that awaited it; and if they had been met by the House in a corresponding temper, it would have become a law. How it failed, I shall consider presently. But, sir, "the message" to which the gentleman refers, and upon which he has expended his warmest indignation--what was it? A message from the Senate "respectfully to remind the House of the report of the committee of conference appointed on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses" in respect to the fortification bill. It may have been unusual and without precedent-I do not dispute it. But that it was insolent and contemptuous towards the House, or was so designed, or so regarded, I utterly deny. If it was unusual and without precedent, it was because the condition in which the business between the Houses stood was new and without precedent. Emergencies--extreme cases-make their own precedents, and furnish their own justification. What was the condition of the bill to which the message referred?

The two Houses had disagreed in relation to the three millions. A committee of conference had been appointed. A report had been agreed upon unanimously, as was then supposed, and which it was not doubted would be satisfactory to each House. The chairman of the committee of conference [Mr. CAMBRELENG] retained the papers, with a view of making the report to the House first; after which it was to be sent to the Senate, and, until thus sent, the Senate had no power over it. A considerable time elapsed, and no intelligence was received by the Senate from this branch. Few mo. ments only remained. The bill was every where deemed of great importance. The report of the conferees, if adopted by the Houses, would save it. Nothing had been done in this body, nor, as they feared, would be done, upon the report of the conference. To meet a

[JAN. 28, 1836.

state of things so new, so unusual, so extraordinary, demanded new and unprecedented proceedings. Deeply solicitous for the passage of the bill, the Senate, regardless of forms, not studious of precise rules of ceremony, made a last effort for its safety. Surprised they doubtless were, that the conferees on the part of the House, who had so lately agreed in a report, should fail to present it, and that no information should be afforded them of its final disposition. In this view of the matter, sir, I can perceive nothing in that message, against which the gentleman has directed his sharpest indignation, but a respectful though earnest intimation that the Senate was ready to pass the bill in the shape which the conferees appointed by the House had agreed to recommend. They could not do it until the papers should be sent to them. Where was the disrespect and the insolence of such an intimation? I confess, sir, I have not a perception keen enough to discern it. One sincerely searching for the truth, unheated by other considerations, would not be very apt, I think, to discover it.

The honorable member, sir, has furnished us with a history of the introduction of the three million appropriation into the fortification bill. He says it was founded upon a resolution of the House, unanimously adopted on the preceding day, in these words:

"Resolved, That, in the opinion of this House, the treaty with France of the 4th of July, 1831, should be maintained, and its execution insisted on."

I perceive nothing in this leading to hostilities, and requiring measures, and extraordinary measures, too, of defence. Yet it is said the appropriation was consequent upon this resolution-growing out of it-part and parcel of it, and absolutely necessary to give it efficiency.

[Mr. ADAMS interrupted. He hoped he should not be misrepresented. He had not said so. He said the appropriation was proposed in consequence of the resolu tion unanimously adopted the preceding day.]

I shall not, sir, designedly, misrepresent the gentleman. There is quite as much in the speech which I have before me, without misrepresentation, as can be maintained. The gentleman has said: "It was well known to every member of the House, and he believed to every person out of the House, that the appropriation of three millions was introduced in consequence of the vote on that resolution the night before. It was well known that the resolution, which finally passed by that vote, had been contested by a debate of several days immediately before its passage, upon grounds that such a resolution would occasion war. If you look, said he, to the journals of the House for the resolution which passed, and to the several resolutions proposed as substitutes for it, you will see that it was admitted with extreme reluctance by many members of the House, that it was ardently and perseveringly contested, and upon the grounds that it would occasion a war. Under these cir. cumstances, although the House were not of opinion that it would give just cause for war, still, how was it possible for a statesman, looking to the interests of our common country, not to see that these reasons so pressed upon the consideration of the House, and looking to the action of another Government, might have that tendency? The conduct of a foreign Government, to be predicated upon this act of our own, was matter of foresight and conjecture. There was misunderstanding and irritation between our Government and that of France. The members of the House who had resisted the pas sage of the resolution, intelligent and patriotic men, had urged the House against it; and all the tender sympa thies of our nature, and all the sentiments of humanity in our bosoms, had been appealed to as warnings against that resolution. The image of war, in all its terrors and with all its calamities, had been held up before us

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to deter the House from the assertion of the nation's rights and of the nation's honor contained in that resolution. Conscious that the resolution could not give any just cause of offence, the House did not believe that it would offend or endanger the peace of the country; yet in deference to the fears of the minority, and as an earnest of their sincerity in the determination to insist upon the execution of the treaty, it was deemed fitting that the country should put itself in an attitude of defence, to meet the worst possible contingency, and to sustain that resolution which they unanimously passed. These were the grounds upon which that item was introduced on the last day of the session. And why on the last day? Because it was only the night before that the unanimous vote had passed.

"In all the debate in the National Intelligencer to which he had referred, there was no more trace of such a resolution as having passed the House, than if it had never existed."

{H. of R.

which the gentleman challenges, does not bear him out. But this is a matter, sir, about which there need be no controversy. The journals show the facts. On the 27th day of February, the Committee on Foreign Affairs made a report, accompanied by these resolutions:

"1. Resolved, That it would be incompatible with the rights and honor of the United States further to negotiate in relation to the treaty entered into by France on the 4th of July, 1831; and that this House will insist on its execution as ratified by both Governments.

"2. Resolved, That contingent preparation ought to be made to meet any emergency growing out of our relations with France."

A minority of that committee made a separate report, offering no specific resolutions, but expressing the sentiment that the execution of the treaty should be insisted on "at all hazards."

The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ADAMS] then offered his resolutions, as substitutes for those proposed by the committee, in these words:

"2. Resolved, That if it be, in the opinion of the President of the United States, compatible with the honor and interest of the United States, during the interval until the next session of Congress, to resume the negotiations between the United States and France, he be requested to do so.

"3. Resolved, That no legislative measure of a hostile character or tendency towards the French nation is necessary or expedient at this time."

Now, sir, I am not sensible that I misunderstand or "1. Resolved, That the rights of the citizens of the misrepresent the gentleman. He certainly attributes United States to indemnity from the Government of the appropriation of three millions to an apprehension France, stipulated by the treaty concluded at Paris on somewhere existing that the adoption of the resolution the 4th of July, 1831, ought, in no event, to be sacrimight lead to measures requiring defence on our part--ficed, abandoned, or impaired, by any consent or acto a determination on the part of the House to sustain quiescence of the Government of the United States. that resolution. The resolution was the ground-work-the basis of the appropriation. Sir, I take issue upon these assertions. The appropriation would have been moved, I doubt not, and agreed to, whatever resolution had been passed. The particular resolution was passed unanimously, not because it looked to war, and involved contingent appropriation, but because it looked to peace, and was a rebuke upon hostile designs. Ifit was not so designed, and so to be regarded, ifit enfolded within itself any thing which might by possibility lead to war, and which demanded corresponding preparations, then I will say, with my honorable friend from Massachusetts, [Mr. REED,] that we were deceived and betrayed into its support. We agreed to it as a measure of peace. The abandonment of the treaty nobody dreamed of. Even France had not intimated it. Hostile movements, or movements tending in any degree to hostilities, were never intended by us. We would not have moved an inch in that direction; least of all would we have done any thing to place the question of peace or war in the sole hand of the President. The resolution, therefore, was not the foundation, I repeat, of the appropriation of three millions. It was not so understood, as the gentleman says it was, on all sides of the House. On the other hand, so far from being regarded as a consequence"-a "consummation of the resolution," it was looked upon as directly repugnant to it. A distinguished member from Virginia, [Mr. GORDON,] who I regret is not now here, and who represented the principles of the ancient Commonwealth with great ability, then said: "Yesterday, the House had voted unanimously that there was no occasion to make war; and now, just before the moment of adjournment, the extraordinary proposition is made, to remove all the guards from the Treasury, and to give up that and all the legislative power to the President, in order to carry on a war." The same sentiment prevailed among many members of that House. The appropriation was considered utterly inconsistent with the object and the spirit of that resolution, which is now represented as having been the basis of it. Nor, sir, is the gentleman any more correct in the remark that "the resolution which finally passed by that vote had been contested by a debate of several days immediately before its passage, upon grounds that such a resolution would occasion war.' The truth is, the resolution which passed was hardly debated at all. It was scarcely resisted. The reference to the journals,

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These various resolutions and the reports from the committee were debated on Saturday, 28th February, and also on Monday, the 2d day of March; and these were the resolutions which, upon the one side or the other, were "contested" and "resisted." The animated debate to which the gentleman refers, and the spirited resistance, were not upon his resolution which finally passed-for it had not then been proposed; but it was to some of these, and chiefly to that which looked to contingent preparations. Objections were made to the phraseology employed in the report and resolutions. The expression "at all hazards" was regarded as minatory, and so also the words "in no event," which occur in the first of the gentleman's proposed substitutes. Milder language was sought. Various unsatisfactory amendments and suggestions were offered, all going to soften down the asperities which were thought to exist in the language and spirit of the reports and resolutions. Finally, at a late hour in the evening, the House having been in continued session fourteen hours, a new resolution, or perhaps a modification of one which had been already offered, was proposed. Very little, if any, debate occurred upon it. None is reported. It was unanimously adopted, with but two slight efforts to substitute others in its stead. These are the facts. They cannot be controverted. The House will now judge whether that resolution, which is asserted to have been the foundation of the appropriation of three millions, was debated and resisted several days, upon the ground that it would or might involve the nation in war-whether it was agreed to under any expectation that it was to be followed up by measures for defence. As to the notice said to have been given by the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, [Mr. CAMBRELENG,] that he should submit a motion for large contingent appropriations, I lay it out of the case. Few heard it. But what of it? Was the House thereby pledged to vote any appropriation he might choose to propose? Above all,

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was the Senate bound also to take notice, to know that it was the consequence, the consummation of our resolution, and, despite their constitutional objections, to grant the money accordingly? Did the resolution which had been already adopted thereby change its character, and, from being pacific, become all at once belligerant, because the member from New York took upon him to give notice to the House of what he should propose? I repudiate all such conclusions, utterly, entirely.

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The honorable member, sir, [Mr. ADAMS,] has proceeded a step farther. He impugns the motive of the Senate in withholding the three millions. Their proceedings upon the subject of our difficulties with France at the last session were, he says, a "do-nothing policy"paralytic policy." The unanimous resolution of the House was considered "a pungent, though tacit, rebuke of that policy;" and if the appropriation had been agreed to, it would have made the Senate the unwilling accessary to implied censure upon its own quietism under foreign wrong." "The system of the Senate" was, "to do nothing." A resolution had passed that body, unanimously, in these words:

"Resolved, That it is inexpedient, at present, to adopt any legislative measure in regard to the state of affairs between the United States and France."

"This was," says the gentleman "a resolution not only declining to do that which the President had recommended to vindicate the rights and the honor of the nation, but positively determining to do nothing, not even to express a sense of the wrongs which the country was enduring from France. Such was the system of

the Senate."

Does the honorable member perceive, sir, upon whom his censures fall? Does he recollect his new-found friends and allies, the leaders and supporters of the administration in that body, must come in for their share of responsibility, if any justly attaches to the proceedings of the Senate? Does he not remember that "the system of the Senate" was unanimously adopted; that it was understood to have the concurrence and approbation of the Executive himself; that it was approved by the official organ of the administration, which has now become the chosen channel of communication of the gentleman's own opinions? Does he forget that the presses throughout the country--the party presses and othersheld the language of approbation upon that proceeding of the Senate? What responsibility, then, I pray to know-whose indignation had they any apprehension of incurring? A unanimous vote, for which each member was equally responsible; approved by all parties, complained of by none; what had they to fear? The load of reproach attempted to be thrown upon them falls upon broad shoulders.

At what period of time, sir, may I ask the honorable member, did he make the discovery that so weighty a load of responsibility lay upon the Senate? When did he find out "where the real sting of the three million appropriation lay?" Something was said about argu ments which had been used elsewhere being the fruit of "nine or ten months' meditation." What has "nine or ten months' meditation" done for him, in the way of memory or argument? Does he forget what his own sentiments were at the last session, as to "the do-nothing policy" of the Senate? Allow me, sir, to refresh his memory a little. On the 7th of February, certain papers touching our relations with France were transmitted to Congress by the President. A discussion of considerable interest ensued. The gentleman gave his opinions at some length. I was so unfortunate as to differ from him, and some words passed between us on that occasion. Among other things, the gentleman charged the Senate with "dodging the question"--doing nothing; at least he was so understood and so reported. The tenor

[JAN. 28, 1836.

of his remarks impressed every one with the belief that he was prepared to go far, very far, in the support of executive measures tending to hostilities. So it stood until the 14th of the same month, when the gentleman again favored the House with his views. I will not say he retracted or denied what he had said before; but at least he explained and modified. As to the policy of the Senate, the do-nothing policy," what did he say? Having requested permission to explain, and having stated the circumstances under which he had charged the Senate with dodging the question, he procceded-

"That explanation he now wished to make, publicly disclaiming all intention of any thing disrespectful to the Senate. He disclaimed it in the most explicit manner; and, had the debate proceeded, it had been his intention ultimately to recommend that the same course should be taken by the House. He should have recommended to the House to dodge the question' for the present, in the existing state of our information.

"He thought the Senate had acted as was their duty to do; and the conclusion to which they had unanimously arrived was the conclusion which he should have been desirous that the House should adopt. But the Senate had acted; they had not gone to sleep on the state of our relations with France."

So much, sir, for that part of the gentleman's remarks which goes to assign motives for the proceedings of the Senate, founded upon their reprehensible policy; and further I deem it unnecessary to reply.

The gentleman has spoken of "the imminent danger of war" which impended over the country at the close of the last session, and which he thinks justified and required contingent preparations for defence. "Imminent danger of war!" Was that, indeed, the condition of our affairs? Was it so understood? Did the gentleman himself consider it in that light? The only real danger of war which I perceived grew out of this very appropriation of three millions. If the power which this grant of money would have vested in the President had been conferred, I am by no means sure that we should not, at this very moment, have been in the midst of a war. But, sir, what did we think at that time upon this subject? Let me refer again to the remarks of the honorable gentleman, on the 14th of February:

"But, in conclusion, Mr. ADAMS wished to give notice (if such a notice could be necessary) to all merchants of the United States, that there was not the slightest danger; that any thing which might by possibility lead to war should proceed from that House, or from the other branch of the Legislature. He now said, upon his responsibility to the nation, that there was no danger of any thing being done by either House, which might by possibility lead to war with France."

Now, sir, in such a state of things, one would hardly suppose that the danger of war was very imminent. How was it at a still later period? The third resolution moved by the gentleman, on the 27th of February, doubtless expressed his own opinion at that time, which was, "that no legislative measure of a hostile character or tendency towards the French nation is necessary or expedient at this time."

I have already said that the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was made the same day. It became immediately a question what disposition should be made of the third resolution, which had in view "contingent preparations for defence?" The particular means of providing contingent preparations" which the committee had in contemplation, we shall discover by referring to their report. It is in these words:

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The bill now before the House authorizing the sale of our stock in the Bank of the United States, would, if adopted, afford all the revenue necessary. The committee is of opinion that the whole or a part of the fund

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to be derived from this source should be appropriated for the purpose of arming our fortifications, and for making other military and naval preparations for the defence of the country, in case such expenditures should become necessary before the next meeting of Congress."

[H. OF R.

[Mr. ADAMS. That was a sufficient reason, then, for the appropriation of three millions.]

Unfortunately, sir, no such reason was then assigned or thought of. But that is not what I am now considering. I am showing, sir, that the honorable member did not, from any cause, at the close of the last session, consider the danger so imminent as to require preparations for defence; for, immediately following the expression of his disapprobation of the recall of Mr. Livingston, he proceeds: "We should therefore be left defenceless all over the ocean for many months--at least until Confence of the country." Now, sir, although the gentleman spoke with much earnestness, and at some length, disapproving this step of the President, and expressing his opinion that, by possibility, it might lead to hostilities, he nowhere gave the slightest indication of a wish that Congress should provide for such an emergency; on the contrary, he distinctly avowed the opinion that nothing would be done "until Congress could be convened." Three days only before the termination of that session, when the whole subject of our French affairs was before us, was discussed, and was understood in all its aspects, did the honorable member anticipate any necessity for such an appropriation as was subsequently made? Did he recommend it, or advise it? No, sir. I submit, then, whether the danger was so imminent, the emergency so pressing, the necessity so overshadowing and irresistible, as to have required that appropriation in the objectionable form it was proposed? But, sir, it has been said that the constitutional objections of the Senate finally "melted down to a mere question of dollars and cents," whether the appropriation should be three millions or eight hundred thousand dollars. Is it possible that the honorable member does not perceive the true ground upon which these objections stood? Has the intellectual acumen for which he has been distinguished become so utterly blunted under the influence of feelings and passions which he seems to cherish? Nothing is plainer to the most obtuse understanding than the difference between the appropriation of three millions as it passed the House, and the proposition agreed upon by the conferees to reduce it to eight hundred thousand dollars, which, doubtless, would have received the sanction of the Senate. It is not in the amount, but in the form of the appropriation. In the one case, it was indefinite, loose, limited to no specific objects, undefined as to purpose. This was the objection. In the other case, it was a proposition for a precise, defined, limited appropriation, in the usual form, and for ordinary purposes--"three hundred thousand dollars for arming the fortifications of the country; five hundred thousand dollars for the repair and equipment of ships of war." The purpose is clearly expressed, the object declared. Now, sir, does not the gentleman perceive the wide difference between these forms of appropriation? Is he so blind as not to see that the constitutional objections which lay in the one case did not apply to the other? And will he then say that it all "melted down to a question of dollars and cents?" Sir, I put it to his candor, I put it to his sense of justice,

A strong solicitude was manifested, and an effort made, on the part of certain gentlemen, to adopt that third resolution forthwith; so that the bill for the sale of the bank stock might immediately be passed, it being the last day on which bills could be sent from one House to the other. The friends of "contingent prepara-gress could be convened, and take measures for the detions" and warlike measures urged speedy action. The effort on the other hand was, to discuss that resolution in a Committee of the Whole House, where we knew latitude of debate could be secured, and where the previous question could not be applied. The gentleman from Massachusetts was with us on that occasion. He advocated the motion made by a highly distinguished member from Virginia [Mr. ARCHER] to commit the resolution to the Committee of the Whole. He said "it was the only constitutional course." "The resolution proposed to spend the money of the nation; but its reference to the Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union was objected to, because, if it went there, the House could not be bound to pass it by the previous question. It was, in effect, a proposition to tax the people; to take seven millions of their money, and appropriate it to certain purposes." "He now discovered that war with France was to be connected with the war upon the bank. The two wars were to be united, each supporting the other." "Is this a proceeding touching an appropriation of money, or not? It was certainly a proceeding by which seven millions of the public money was to be taken and expended in a windmill war against France, in favor of which, he thanked God, there had yet been no expression of opinion on the part of this House." "It was now for the first time disclosed that these two wars were to be blended together-the war with France, and the war with the bank; one was to carry the other, if either was too heavy to sustain itself," Yes, sir, the war with the bank found favor in the House; it was popular. It was to carry the heavy load of the war with France. So thought the member at that time. Other gentlemen spoke also. The then chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means [Mr. POLK] said: "The third resolution of the committee should be acted on forthwith, to the end that the bill to sell the stock should be acted on to-day. He suggested the propriety of acting on the resolution forthwith. To commit this subject was to bury it." Certainly it was. That was precisely what we desired to do. The gentleman from Massachusetts was with us. He desired no preparations for "a windmill war;" a Quixotic expedition to be sure it was, in which at one time we had strong fears that the member from Massachusetts was to act the subordinate part. Well, sir, we succeeded. The resolution was buried. The war was defeated, as well that against the bank as that against France. In all the debate, the honorable gentleman made no allusion to any other means of defence or preparation. His objection was directed not to the particular mode of supplying the means then recommended, but it went to the whole matter of hostile measures, The war itself was held up to ridicule, and justly held up. And yet, sir, it is now said we were then in "imminent danger.' On the following day (28th of February) the gentleman again spoke to the questions growing out of our French relations. He expressed his regret that orders had been given Mr. Livingston to leave Paris, in the event of the rejection of the bill of indemnity by the French Chambers. Such a course, "according to the usage of nations, might be construed into an act of hostility."

to answer.

Much indignation has been expressed by the honorable member [Mr. ADAMS] at the charge he supposes to have been made by the "personified sentiment," in the columns of the National Intelligencer, against the last House of Representatives, of "man-worship" and subserviency to executive dictation. Whether such a charge be well or ill-founded, I shall not discuss. I wish only to produce some authority upon which it may be maintained: an authority having weight in certain quarters, and possibly which may be of some consideration with the gentleman himself-it is the authority of his own assertions and opinions. In the debate I have already referred to,

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(of the 27th of February,) the gentleman expressed himself in these terms: "In the first place, it was evident the question was to be managed on party grounds. The supporters of the administration were alone to be heard on the subject; and what they proposed was to be carried. The minority was to have no right to say any thing but 'yea' or 'nay' to the propositions of the leaders of the majority. The bugle-horn of the party will be sounded, and its friends will be told that they must pass the bill, in order to support the administration. When all the liege men of the administration have answered to their names, as they ought, according to the politics and morals of the party, the question will be put and the bill passed." Now, sir, these are not charges, in so many words, of "man-worship;" but they are so in substance and spirit. They are precisely that same subserviency which has been elsewhere denominated “man-worship;" and, for any thing I know, that same charge which he reprobates so severely was founded upon his own description of a portion of the last House. It may suit the purposes of the gentleman now to profess a high respect, as he has done, for those he then denominated "liege men"-rallying at the blast of the bugle-following submissively the dictation of party leaders, and doing as they were bid, "in order to support the administration." If "man-worship" can go farther than this description, I am at a loss to know how to define it.

Mr. Speaker, I have said I would not discuss the question whether the Senate ought or ought not to have concurred in the appropriation of three millions. A word or two only is all I design to say. I voted against it in the House, and I have no wish to retract the vote: not because I was unwilling then, or am unwilling now, to appropriate money largely, amply, to put the country in a state of entire defence; I desire it of all things; but because I perceived, as I thought, something beside the defence of the country lurking under that plausible pretext: means of aggression, opportunities of exciting collision, and of kindling up in the public mind warlike dispositions, were feared to be enveloped within it. Sir, I desire as much as any man to defend the country. Since I have filled a seat here, I have voted, I hazard little in saying, uniformly voted for the largest sums which have been proposed for the military and naval service. I well recollect the efforts of a distinguished member from South Carolina, [Mr. Drayton,] formerly at the head of the Committee on Military Affairs, to increase the annual expenditures for fortifications; I voted with him from year to year, in common with my friends who are now charged with having left the country defenceless. We thought it sound policy, in a time of peace, to prepare for those emergencies which every nation may at some day or other reasonably anticipate. Peace is a blessing which no country can assure to itself for a long period of years to come. By whom, sir, was that prudent forecast thwarted and defeated? By the party which now claims the exclusive merit of putting the country in a posture of defence, by a midnight vote of three millions, on the eve of hostilities! Sir, we did not believe in the potency of midnight appropriations for next day's security. The watchwords of the party were 66 'economy,' "retrenchment," "saving of the public money;" and we saw the extraordinary spectacle of a Government boasting, not how much it bad done, but how little, for the benefit of the country; not how much it had expended for the public good, but how much it had hoarded up in the coffers of the Treasury. It pointed to no impregnable muniments of defence; to no works of wide-spread and lasting improvement, as testimony of its watchfulness and protection of national interests and welfare, but to a miserable array of figures annually displayed for the gratification and laudation of all the faithful, showing only with what a miserly grasp it could hold ou to the

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[JAN. 28, 1836.

public treasure; and all the while, amid the loudest boast of retrenchment, the annual expenditures were largely increasing. Sir, I am glad to see, at last, something proposed in the way of defence-glad to see something doing, among others, for the State to which I belong. Some two or three years ago I moved in this matter, and endeavored to call the attention of the War Department to its exposed and defenceless condition. I received no encouragement or countenance, and I have never seen the time when I could have proposed, under favorable auspices, any measures of defence for that exposed frontier. Now, sir, as to the propriety of large and unusual appropriations at this time for naval and military service--appropriations which would not be thought expedient but for the aspect of our foreign relations--we are placed in an attitude by no means free from embarrassment. If there be really a danger of war, if hostilities are in any degree probable, and likely to ensue, I will go as far as the foremost in providing the means of defence and security. But if, as we are repeatedly assured, the prospect of a speedy and pacific adjustment of our difficulties grows brighter daily--for one, I am not disposed to nurse and feed a warlike passion; to encourage, what I greatly fear needs to be restrained, a desire elsewhere to terminate by an appeal to arms these needless differences. Sufficient, however, to meet these questions when the period for their consideration arrives.

I come now, Mr. Speaker, to the question presented in the resolution-"the cause and circumstances" of the failure, at the last session, of the bill making the ordinary appropriations for fortifications. How did it happen? By whose means? In what way? These are questions gravely put, and must be as gravely answered. The bill, we all know, passed the House, containing only the "ordinary appropriations," and, in the usual course of business, was sent to the Senate. It passed that body also, in due season, with a considerable increase of ordinary appropriations, made, it is understood, upon estimates furnished by the proper executive Departments, and was returned to the House a week before the close of the session. So far, surely, the Senate cannot be justly charged with a disposition to defeat the bill. All its control over it had ceased, as I have already said, in another connexion. Its fate was in the hands of the House. Did it pass this branch of the Congress? How did it pass? With the three million appropriation, already so often adverted to, suddenly, not to say rashly inserted--objectionable in point of form-uncalled for and unwanted, so far as we had any information, by the Executive. Does any body doubt that, but for this amendment, the bill would have passed, and become a law? This was the fatal blow, of which it lingered, and at last died. The bill was returned to the Senate, embracing this new and, till then, unheard-of provision. The Senate, under the views which it took of its constitutional power, could not agree to it, and the bill came back to the House without a concurrence in the amendment. It was in the power of the House to have waived its amendment, and to have passed the bill. It chose not to do so. The gentleman himself has given the true cause of its fail. He voted to recede, he says, because he was aware, if the House pertinaciously adhered, the bill would be lost. It did adhere, and the bill was lost. It is unquestionably true, if the Senate had voted the three millions, the bill would have passed; and it is no less true, if the House had waived it, it would have passed also. It failed, therefore, from a disagreement. Pausing at this stage of the history, I cannot but inquire, looking at the safety of the bill merely, what was the most reasonable course to be pursued? Which branch could most rationally be expected, for the suc

ure.

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