nication, not to that House, but to the people of this country, justifying himself against what he was pleased to call an attack made upon him by the committee. A proposition was now made by the gentleman from Maine, that this communication, which had been already printed in nearly all the public journals of the United States, should be printed by order of that House, and that the House should become the organ through which an attack was to be made upon a committee constituted by itself, and appointed by its Speaker. When the gentleman first offered this proposition, amounting to no more nor less than that the House should subscribe to the doctrines therein contained, and thus tear up the bones of the dead, Mr. H. felt it his duty, as an individual member of the House, implicated in the charges, and instrumental in making the report, to ask that gentleman to withdraw it. Mr. H. did so, as the late Postmaster General slept in his grave, and it was not the part of a friend to wish to arraign his bones again before the people of his coun try. What the gentleman expected to gain by this, and what he expected to gain by an elaborate letter addressed by himself Mr. SMITH] to the people of the United States, Mr. H. would not pretend to say. If he wished to be considered the defender of the dead, Mr. H. would tell him he would fail of his object. Nothing of that kind could happen, and the gentleman would find, before he got through, that he had subjected not only himself, but his asseverations, to an ordeal in which they would be proclaimed as false.

The CHAIR called the gentleman to order. Mr. HAWES. I obey, sir; I beg pardon; I was led away by my feelings.

By the requirement of the CHAIR, Mr. H. took his

seat.

Mr. PATTON moved that the gentleman from Kentucky be permitted to proceed. Agreed to.

Mr. HAWES assured the House that he was unwilling, upon any debate, to trespass upon the feelings of House generally, or upon those of any individual memher of it. But, God knows, every member of the Fost Office committee of investigation could lay their hands upon their hearts and say that, in the report they made, they did justice to the Post Office Department, to the individual head of it, and to the great body of the peo. ple of the United States. When every individual member of the committee knew they had done this justice, then to be charged by an individual member of the House with partiality, misunderstanding, with ignorance, and with every thing almost within the human language of a denunciatory character, was more than he could bear. Let him ask, where did the gentleman from Maine obtain the vast body of information he professed to be in possession of in relation to this subject? Was he engaged in the Post Office Department day after day, week after week, and month after month, rummaging for, and wading through, a vast mass of documents from the commencement of the Government to the present time? Had he done all this, that he was to be permitted to put the brand of falsehood upon the report of the committee? He pronounced the gentleman's own report to be false, grossly false.

The CHAIR called the gentleman to order for being personal to a member of the House.

Mr. HAWES explained that he was not then speaking of the gentleman as a member of the House, the pamphlet to which he referred having been published before the present Congress was in esse.

Mr. SMITH hoped the gentleman would be allowed to proceed.

The CHAIR said the rule was imperative, which he read. The gentleman had indulged in a personality towards a member of the House, and the gentleman could not proceed.

[FEB. 16, 1836.

Mr. THOMPSON, of South Carolina, appealed from the decision of the Chair, on the ground of its encroaching upon the freedom of debate, as precluding allusion to statements made in publications issued, as the one alluded to had been, during the recess of Congress.

Mr. HAWES briefly explained. After the Commiton the Post Office Department had made their report, the gentleman from Maine had published a paper purporting to be, if Mr. H. recollected correctly, a comment upon that report, as a private individual, and not as a member of that House, attempting to prove that the Department was right and the committee wrong. It was in that way Mr. H. had thrown back the imputation cast upon the report.

The decision of the Chair was briefly opposed by Messrs. EVANS, WISE, MERCER, and PEYTON, and sustained by

Mr. SMITH, who, for himself, he said, had no objection that the gentleman from Kentucky should be allowed the utmost latitude, &c.

Mr. BYNUM said he did not come there to settle political quarrels. If the course was to be continued which had been commenced, they should in a short time have to come to the House prepared to protect themselves and their characters, as it would be out of the power of the Chair to protect them. If the position assumed by the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PEYTON] and the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WISE] be correct, they would have scenes of confusion and violence on that floor, before long, which would be a disgrace to the country and to the American Congress. For his own part, he must say that, feeble as his health was, whenever he found that the Chair could not protect him in the House, he must come prepared to protect himself. He conceived that, whenever a remark was made personal to any member of the House, that remark was out of order. Gentlemen did not come there to settle questions of veracity, but to do the business of the nation. He thought the House had seen enough to be convinced that this state of things must be put an end to; and he conceived it to be the duty of the House to sustain the Chair in his effort to preserve order.

Mr. BELL expressed a wish that the words of the gentleman from Kentucky be taken down, so that the House might know what he was called to order for.

The CHAIR said he was not bound take down the words of the gentleman from Kentucky, but he would state that he understood him in substance to say that he pronounced a certain paper false, and attributed that paper to a member of the House, and stated that that member had been guilty of a falsehood in publishing that paper.

Mr. HAWES said he was as much in favor of supporting the exertions of the Chair to preserve order as any member, and must say that he concurred in every remark made by the gentleman from North Carolina, [Mr. BYNUM.] In alluding to the paper published by the gentleman from Maine, he had said it was "grossly false;" but that paper was neither published at the expense of the Government, nor, by any member of that House, as such; and, on that account only, he conceived the Chair took it to be a personal insult to a member of the House. Mr. H. spoke in allusion to that paper, and pronounced it false. Perhaps the gentleman did not know it to be false; and he might not have written the paper, although his name was signed to it, and Mr. H. had an idea that that paper was not written by the gentleman, but was written in the Post Office Depart ment, by an officer of that Department.

Mr. WISE moved that the House give the gentleman from Maine [Mr. SMITH] leave to explain.

Mr. SMITH said he did write the pamphlet alluded to, every word of it, and was responsible for it, and every

the usual relation between creditor and debtor, inasmuch as it results not from an ordinary and voluntary contract, as between buyer and seller, but from a legislative exaction, which creates the debt without furnishing to the debtor an immediate, but only a contingent, equivalent. Let me endeavor to illustrate my meaning upon this point, confining the illustration to the case of duties secured by bonds. Immediately upon the arrival of a ship in port, before the cargo can be landed, the importer is required to execute his bona, with sureties, for the amount of duties on the goods consigned to him; and, from that moment, except that he is entitled to an allowance for damage ascertained to have been incurred during the voyage of importation, he is responsible to the Government for the amount of his bond, whatever losses he may incur in landing and storing the goods, or while they remain in store, before he has had an opportunity of disposing of them for consumption or export. Should the goods be exported, he is entitled to a drawback of the duty; if they are sold for consumption, the duty becomes an increment of value, and is received back by the importer in the price which the consumer pays; but while they remain in the warehouse of the importer, even, as in many cases, under the lock and key of the custom-house, the Government holds him responsible for the duties, against all risks; and, should the goods be destroyed or lost, will still exact the payment of his bond. Now, it is obviously of no advantage to the importer that a duty is thus levied upon his goods, and it is as obviously not the design of the revenue laws that he shall be a loser, by reason of his being held subject to the payment of the duty; but the design is, that the payment of the duty shall devolve ultimately upon the consumer, and the Government employs the importer as its agent for collecting the duty from the consumer. When the importer has sold the goods to the consumer, (though he is obliged to take upon himself the risk of bad debts, without any guarantee from the Government,) he has realized a consideration for his bond, and acquired the means of paying it; but, until that contingency has occurred, he remains in the situation of an agent who, upon the receipt of goods on consignment, has made an advance in cash, or given an acceptance to his principal, without being able to avail himself of the legal privilege of the agent in such cases, of recovering from the principal the amount of the advance or acceptance, if the goods should be lost or destroyed, in landing or in store, before they can be

sold.

The disadvantage and injury to which the importer is thus exposed may be attributed to a prominent defect in our revenue laws-the want of a warehousing system. In England, where that system, after many gradual efforts to establish it, has been in full operation since 1826, the evil does not exist. It is there provided that the importer, upon landing his goods, may deposite them, under the inspection of officers of the custorns, in a "warehouse of special security," as it is termed, which may be a private store or quay, duly licensed for the purpose, under prescribed regulations; and the goods are allowed to remain in such warehouse for a term of three years, subject only to the standing bond of the proprietor or occupier of the warehouse, or the special bond of the importer, "for the payment of the full duties of importation, or for the due exportation of the goods. If within three years the goods are exported, the bond is discharged; if they are taken "for home use," the duties are payable in cash upon delivery from the warehouse. While the goods are warehoused, the duty does not accrue; if they are lost or destroyed by unavoidable accident in the warehouse, the duty is not held to be payable; or if they are lost or destroyed in landing or shipping," or "in the receiv

66

[FEB. 16, 1836.

ing into or delivery from the warehouse," the duty, payable or paid," is remitted or returned. While the goods remain in the warehouse, sales may be made by one party to another, (the law prescribing a mode of transfer,) and the purchaser succeeds to all the privileges of the importer; or, rather, the privilege attaches to the goods, so long as they remain in the warehouse, whatever may be the changes of ownership in the meanwhile. It is not until they are about to pass into immediate consumption that the duty is payable; and thus the importer has the opportunity of collecting the duty from the consumer before he is required to pay it to the Govern ment; and it is only after the goods have passed into the consumer's hands that the Government is released from the risk of losing the duty, in consequence of any unavoidable accident (by fire or otherwise) that may befall the goods.

Such, Mr. Chairman, is the design of the English warehousing system; and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. PICKENS] will perceive that, in a case like the present, it would save harmless (in respect to liability for duties) most of the importers for whose partial and temporary relief this bill makes provision. Had the English system been in operation at New York, a large proportion of the imported goods destroyed by the fire would have been warehoused; the duty would not have accrued, and would not have been payable; and the Government could not have been a gainer by the calamity, as it now may be, since it has secured the duty upon all goods which, if not burned, would have been exported, and will derive an increase of revenue from the importation of goods required to supply the place of those (also burned) which were intended for consumption.

I regret, sir, that the warehousing system could not, long since, have been introduced here. As perfected in England, it affords innumerable advantages to the commerce of the country, and has not proved liable to abuse. I perceive no sufficient obstable to its introduction here. The principle was partially recognised in the sixtieth section of the act of Congress of the 2d of March, 1799, providing for the landing, storing, and relading, of the cargoes of ships ariving from foreign ports in distress, without requiring the consignee, in such cases, to enter the goods and secure the duty. The allowance of drawback upon goods imported is also a partial recognition of the principle; but it is only by adopting the system in its entire extent that we can secure to our citizens the same advantages of foreign trade that are now enjoyed in England, as well also as at most of the principal ports of the continent of Europe. The fire at New York furnishes striking proofs of the injury and injustice to which merchants are exposed, from the want of the system; and I shall consider it as the strongest indication of friendly regard for the mercantile interest, whenever Congress shall see fit to entertain a suitable proposition in reference to this object. I shall cheerfully vote for this bill, because I consider it founded in the most equitable principles, and because it provides for a case of suffering of appalling magnitude; and yet I am not unaware that it furnishes some foundation for the charge of partial legislation, inasmuch as there have been other cases, similar in all important respects to this, in which importers, from unavoidable accident, have been subjected to the loss of goods upon which they had secured the duties, and have received no relief from the Government. It is impossible to refer to any single case which exhibits an amount of loss at all approaching to what has been sustained at New York; but I am safe in saying that the aggregate of losses in such cases as the Government has failed to provide for, if it could be ascertained, would prove that importers have been hitherto great sufferers from the unjust

operation of laws which are still in force, and from the want of a system which might easily be established.

The gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. PICKENS,] misapprehending, as I conceive, the relation between the Government and the importer, upon which the provisions of this bill are founded, has illustrated his view by the assertion that the claim upon the Government is the same, or that there is equally no ground for a claim, whether the sufferer by fire is an importer at New York, or a purchaser of imported goods at Cincinnati. The Government is clearly under no obligations to the dealer at Cincinnati. It has subjected him to no legislative exactions; it holds him under no peculiar responsibilities; it sustains towards him no other than the ordinary relation of Government to a citizen. It is, more especially, in no sense his creditor; it has no demand against him as a debtor; and, most of all, it cannot regard him as a debtor of whom it is requiring the payment of a debt for which it has given him no equivalent, and in regard to whom the contingency, upon which alone depended the opportunity of his realizing an equivalent, through unavoidable accident, cannot occur. This, then, is the distinction between the two cases, resulting from the widely different relations which the supposed sufferers sustain towards the Government. When the foreign goods pass from the importer to the consumer, (or to the consumer's agent, the purchaser for consumption,) I agree that the duty becomes an increment of value; that the importer then realizes the equivalent for what he has paid or owes the Government; that from that time the importer can have no claim upon the Government, growing out of the peculiar relation which he had assumed; and that, of course, he cannot transfer to the consumer, or his agent, an equitable right which was peculiar to himself as an importer, and has ceased to exist. The purchaser for consumption buys the foreign goods of the importer, as he would buy any other goods, for a fair consideration, and afterwards holds them, as he would hold any other goods, at his own risk. His contract with the importer does not involve any assumption of responsibility to the Government; he cannot therefore prefer a claim against the Government, as resulting from that contract; and there is no other ground upon which he can rest a claim. Whenever the Government shall return to a system of which its experience has been too unfortunate again to recommend the adoption, and shall levy an excise upon whiskey before it has been removed from the vats, or, at least, from the warehouse of the distiller at Cincinnati; and when that distiller can state the fact to Congress, that, as one of the sufferers by an awful conflagration which has reduced to ashes an extensive section of the thriving emporium of the West, he has been deprived, by the destruction of his property, of the means of recovering from the consumer the amount of the excise which he has paid or owes the Government, there may be a case at Cincinnati resembling, in some of its features, and in its equitable claims to the consideration of Congress, the present case at New York.

I have thus far confined myself to a statement of some of the reasons which induce me to regard it as an act of justice, to make provision for those debtors of the Government who have been immediate sufferers by the fire--the first class designated in this bill. My convic. tions lead me to the conclusion that the most reasonable objection to the first section of the bill is, that it falls short of its proper object; and that it should have provided, not simply for an extension of the time of payment, but, under suitable regulations, to prevent fraud, for the absolute remission of the duties upon all goods subject to duty which were destroyed by the fire. And, sir, if any argument applicable to this case is to be

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drawn from that clause of the constitution which requires duties to be "uniform," I submit to the gentle. man who has quoted it, [Mr. PICKENS,] whether it is not virtually a palpable disregard of uniformity to require of the importer, whose goods perished in the fire on the day of their landing, or on the day preceding that on! which (the outward entry, perhaps, having been lodged at the custom-house) they were to have been exported, or on any intermediate day, so long as they remained in his hands undisposed of for consumption or export, the same duty which has been paid by another importer, who has received the duty from the consumer, and has thereby been enabled to act, as the law intended he should act, merely as the agent of the Government in collecting the duty which is thus actually paid by the consumer? Upon a proper construction of the clause, however, I do not consider it as furnishing any argument applicable to this case; and I suppose it only designed to prescribe that the general revenue laws shall operate equally and alike throughout the country, without restraining the power of Congress to make suitable provisions for extraordinary cases arising under those laws, as necessity, justice, or the public interest, may require. I will barely submit, in this connexion, that, to ensure the most salutary effect to this and every part of the constitution relating to the collection of revenue from imports, and to the regulation of commerce incident thereto, there is no legal provision so practicable, so simple, and certain in its operation, and so well adapted to exclude cases of special legislation, as a warehousing system.

It is my deliberate opinion, for the reasons which I have stated, that the importers of "dutiable" goods destroyed by the fire, and upon which the bonds are in the course of collection, may justly claim a remission of duties. If the bonds have been collected, or if the duties were paid in cash, I hold, for the same reasons, that the amount of duty in such cases should be refunded. But, at this point, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. CHAMBERS] encounters a difficulty which, it appears to me, may be easily removed. Confining himself to the case of bonds which have been paid, he says, that as soon as they are paid, the relation of creditor and debtor ceases; and that thereupon the claim of the importer upon the Government expires. Allow me to suggest to him, that though the bond has been paid, if good cause shall subsequently appear why it should not have been paid; or if it can be shown that the consideration for which the bond was given has not been and could not be realized; or if, where the duty was paid in cash at the time of entry, the exportation of the goods has entitled the importer to drawback; that, in all these cases, the fact of payment has not settled the account; and that, it may be, the relation of creditor and debtor, instead of having ceased, has in effect been reversed-the Government having become the debtor for the amount paid, and the importer, as a creditor, being entitled to reclaim it. The English law, in the cases to which I have referred, authorizes the commissioners of customs to "remit or return" the duties "payable or paid;" and the gentleman, in justice, must acknowledge that, when he can agree that the duty cannot equitably be claimed by the Government, he should be equally ready to refund the money if it has been paid, or to give up the bond if it has been secured. He surely will not attempt to screen the Government from the obligation to do equal justice to two claimants, similarly situated in respect to the merit of their claims, merely because one claimant had been obliged or had chosen to advance the amount which he claims in cash, and the other had been suffered to substitute his bond; or between two claimants similarly situated in all respects, except that both having given their bonds, the bond of one should happen to fall due the