they had, the means of placing the government in such difficulties for want of money, that if they had courage and resolution to face the immediate consequences, they could ultimately compel the government to accept it upon their own terms. The danger was beginning to be felt in Elizabeth's times, but it was kept under by the general sense of the perils by which England and Protestantism were still surrounded, and by a general feeling that the safety of the nation depended upon the action of her government. While a Spanish armada was possible, it was impossible for English patriots to join in any attempt to weaken and embarrass the executive. Throughout James's reign on the contrary, there was a general feeling of security at home: and though there were many who were eager to be at liberty to attack and plunder Spain, no one was afraid of anything that Spain could do in return against England. In the eyes of the patriots, the King's embarrassments were his own business, and were no hindrance to theirs, but rather a help; their business being to assert and enforce what they called their rights; but what were in fact pretensions to a position in the constitution which they had not as yet enjoyed. Bacon,-to whom, though he has been sometimes represented as quite blind to what was coming, this state of things had long been a matter of the gravest anxiety,-had come to the conclusion that the best, if not the only, chance of healing the growing breach was to engage the country in some popular quarrel abroad: and I have little doubt that if his advice had been asked he would have recommended a steady opposition to Spain in the interests of Protestantism, and if it led to a war would have thought it all the more fortunate. But when in March, 1617, the King's declaration of the past history and present state of the negotiations for the Spanish match satisfied him that this policy was for the time out of the question, he turned to consider in what ways an alliance between England and Spain (since alliance it was to be) might be employed for the benefit of the worid. For the differences between Catholics and Protestants, the best effect that could be hoped for was a greater disposition towards mutual toleration, so far as it depended upon the action of the two governments. But there were many things important to Christendom in which Protestants and Catholics had a common interest. The pirates of Algiers had no preference for Protestant prizes over Catholic, or Catholic over Protestant. And the Ottoman was the common enemy of both-an enemy bound by principle, religion, and tradition to propagate his faith by the sword: still professing arms as his principal occupation; and though declining, still thought dangerous. It might be, he thought, (among other things

1 "The Turks, a band of Sarmatian Scithes . . . . out of which after much

1622.] EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION ON POLICY OF SPAIN. 369

of more immediate concern) "a beginning and seed (for the like actions before had had less beginnings) of a holy war against the Turk, whereunto it seemed the events of time did invite Christian kings, in respect of the great corruption and relaxation of discipline of war in that empire; and much more in respect of the utter ruin and enervation of the Grand Signor's navy and forces by sea; which opened a way (without congregating vast armies by land) to suffocate and starve Constantinople, and thereby to put those provinces. into mutiny and insurrection." 1

This was a matter for the negotiators to talk about in the intervals of their business, -as a thing which might come under serious consideration if the alliance should prosper. For some years this did not seem very likely. The fresh demands, interruptions, and delays which the Spanish government was continually interposing, and the complications which grew out of the Bohemian revolution, had been raising the hopes of those who wished it to fail and the fears of those who wished it to succeed, till during full twelve months-from the autumn of 1620 till the autumn of 1621-everybody expected that the treaty would be broken off by a war. But the circumstances under which Parliament was dissolved in the beginning of 1622 altered the prospect. Gondomar thought that there was an end of Parliaments in England, that the King would be inevitably thrown. into the arms of Spain, and that though the people would be much enraged, they would not be able to help themselves. Digby regarded it as settling the question as to the expediency of the match. The Palatinate could not now be rescued except by the co-operation of Spain; and in order to secure that co-operation the marriage must be concluded. The Spaniards, ready to do whatever was necessary to keep James on their side and detach him from the Protestant cause in the European quarrel, professed the strongest wish for the alliance, promised everything that was likely to encourage him to proceed with it, and made Digby believe that they intended performance. It was only by the absolute authority of the two Kings he said, that the business could be brought to any good conclusion;2 the Spanish Council of State had decided, after a full discussion of the question of the Palatinate, that complete satisfaction should be given to the King of England: and he "made no doubt but that

variety of fortune, sprung the Othoman family, now the terror of the world." Speech on General Naturalisation, February 1606-7. Vol. III. p. 324. "The Turks have it" [the profession of arms, etc.] "at this day, though in great declination." Essay on the Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates. Works, vol. VI. p. 4.49.

1625.

1 Remembrance additional to the instructions of Sir John Digby. March 23, 2 13 July, 1622. Gardiner ii., p. 221.

1616-7. Vol. VI. p. 158.

VOL. VII.

2 B

the Prince should entirely be restored both to his territories and his electorate and the King of Spain, merely to gratify his Majesty, would make it his work.1

Whether wisely or unwisely, therefore, the relations between England and Spain had been brought back to much the same condition in which they were in the spring of 1617, when Bacon suggested the additional instructions to Digby: and if any use could be made of the conjunction of the two Kings in making Christendom safe against Ottoman aggression, it seemed to be a fit time for taking the subject into consideration. To prepare the way, Bacon proposed to enter into a thorough discussion of the question in all its bearings, by means of an imaginary debate in which all opinions were to be represented. The speakers were to be a moderate divine, a Protestant zealot, a Roman Catholic zealot, a soldier, a statesman, and a courtier. The first point,-"whether a war for the propagation of the Christian faith, without other cause of hostility, be lawful or no, and in what cases "-was assigned to the Roman Catholic zealot. The second-whether, supposing it to be lawful, it was not also "obligatory to Christian princes and states to design it" was to be argued by the Protestant zealot. The thirdwhether allowing it to be in the absence of other engagements binding as well as lawful, "there were not other things to be preferred before it "-was to be handled by the moderate divine. The courtier was to contend that the idea was altogether vain and visionary, and the thing not to be seriously thought of. The statesman was to answer him, and show the general grounds for believing the enterprise practicable. And the soldier was to explain the particular means and preparations.

If it had been finished according to the design, and in a style and spirit answerable to the beginning, it would have been a very interesting record of the state of opinion then prevailing as to the duty of fighting for the faith, and a fine specimen of the discussion of a state-question by statesmen of different views. But it was carried no further than the opening speech, representing the opinion of the Roman Catholic zealot, which cannot be taken as representing Bacon's own, and remained as an unfinished piece in manuscript till after his death; when it was printed by Rawley among the 'Miscellany. Works.' He had thought well enough however of what was done, to have it not only preserved but translated into Latin; and therefore its proper place in this edition is among the Literary works, where it will be found in the beginning of volume vii., with a preface

19 Aug. 1622. Letter to the Prince. S. P. Spain.

1622.]

LETTER TO BISHOP ANDREWES.

371

containing what else I had to say about it. But the "epistle dedicatory" which was printed along with it contains so much information about his personal position at this time, and about the progress and purpose of the writings which were now his business and his life, that I have thought it better to reproduce it entire in this place, to which by right of date it belongs. Certain trifling variations between the later copy and the earlier seem to imply that it was written in the summer of 1622.

TO THE RIGHT REVEREND FATHER IN GOD, LANCELOT ANDREWES, LORD BISHOP OF WINCHESTER, AND COUNSELLOR OF ESTATE TO HIS MAJESTY.1

My Lord,

Amongst consolations, it is not the least to represent to a man's self like examples of calamity in others. For examples give a quicker impression than arguments; and besides they certify us that which the Scripture also tendereth for satisfaction, that no new thing is happened unto us. This they do the better, by how much the examples are liker in circumstances to our own case; and more especially if they fall upon persons that are greater and worthier than ourselves. For as it savoureth of vanity to match ourselves highly in our own conceit; so on the other side it is a good sound conclusion, that if our betters have sustained the like events, we have the less cause to be grieved.

In this kind of consolation I have not been wanting to myself. though as a Christian I have tasted (through God's great goodness) of higher remedies. Having therefore, through the variety of my reading, set before me many examples both of ancient and later times, my thoughts (I confess) have chiefly stayed upon three particulars, as the most eminent and the most resembling. All three, persons that had held chief place of authority in their countries; all three ruined, not by war, or by any other disaster, but by justice and sentence, as delinquents and criminals; all three famous writers, insomuch as the remembrance of their calamity is now as to posterity but as a little picture of night-work, remaining amongst the fair and excellent tables of their acts and works: and all three (if that were any thing to the matter) fit examples to quench any man's ambition of rising again; for that they were every one of them restored 1 'Miscellany Works,' 1629, p. 79.

with great glory, but to their further ruin and destruction, ending in a violent death. The men were Demosthenes, Cicero, and Seneca; persons that I durst not claim affinity with, except the similitude of our fortunes had contracted it. When I had cast mine eyes upon these examples, I was carried on further to observe, how they did bear their fortunes, and principally how they did employ their times, being banished and disabled for public business: to the end that I might learn by them; and that they might be as well my counsellors as my comforters. Whereupon I happened to note, how diversly their fortunes wrought upon them; especially in that point at which I did most aim, which was the employing of their times and pens. In Cicero, I saw that during his banishment (which was almost two years) he was so softened and dejected, as he wrote nothing but a few womanish epistles. And yet, in mine opinion, he had least reason of the three to be discouraged: for that although it was judged, and judged by the highest kind of judgment, in form of a statute or law, that he should be banished, and his whole estate confiscated and seized, and his houses pulled down, and that it should be highly penal for any man to propound his repeal; yet his case even then had no great blot of ignominy; but it was thought but a tempest of popularity which overthrew him. Demosthenes contrariwise, though his case was foul, being condemned for bribery, and not simple bribery, but bribery in the nature of treason and disloyalty; yet nevertheless took so little knowledge of his fortune, as during his banishment he did much busy himself, and intermeddle with matters of state; and took upon him to counsel the state (as if he had been still at the helm) by letters; as appears by some epistles of his which are extant. Seneca indeed, who was condemned for many corruptions and crimes, and banished into a solitary island, kept a mean; and though his pen did not freeze, yet he abstained from intruding into matters of business; but spent his time in writing books of excellent argument and use for all ages; though he might have made better choice (sometimes) of his dedications.

These examples confirmed me much in a resolution (whereunto I was otherwise inclined) to spend my time wholly in writing; and to put forth that poor talent, or half talent, or what it is, that God hath given me, not as heretofore to particular exchanges, but to banks or mounts of perpetuity, which will