President. The person, having the greatest number of votes as Vice President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Elect ors appointed. And if no person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President. A quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person, constitutionally ineligi ble to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States."

§264. The principal differences between the original plan, and this amendment to the Constitution, are the following: First, by the original plan, two persons were voted for as President; and after the President was chosen, the person, having the greatest number of votes of the Electors was to be Vice President; but if two or more had equal votes, the Senate were to choose the Vice President from them by ballot. By the present plan, the votes for President and Vice President are distinct. Secondly, by the original plan, in case of no choice of President by the Electors, the choice was to be made by the House of Representatives, from the five highest on the list. It is now reduced to three. Thirdly, by the original plan, the Vice President need not have a majority of all the electoral votes, but only a greater number than any other person. It is now necessary, that he should have a majority of all the votes. Fourthly, by the original plan, the choice of Vice President could not be made until after a choice of President. It can now be made by the Senate, as soon as it is ascertained, that there is no choice by the Electors. Fifthly, no provision was made for the case of no choice of President by the House of Representatives, before the fourth day of March next. It is now provided that the Vice President in such a case shall act as President.

§ 265. A few words, only, will be necessary, to explain the main provisions, respecting the choice of these high functionaries, since the adoption of this amendment, as an elaborate examination of the subject would occupy too

nuch space. In the first place, the Electors, as well as the House of Representatives, are to vote by ballot, and not vivâ voce, or by oral declaration. The object of this provision, is, to secure the Electors from all undue influence, and undre odium for their vote, as it was supposed, that perfect secrecy could be maintained. In the next place, both car didates cannot be an inhabitant of the same State, as the Electors. The object of this clause is to suppress local partialities and combinations. In the next place, the votes are to be certified by the Electors themselves, in order to insure the genuireness of the vouchers. In the next place, they are to be sealed, and opened and counted only in presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, in order to prevent any frauds or altera tions in their transmission. In the next place, a majority of all the electoral votes is, in the first instance, required for a choice, and not a mere plurality; thus enabling the people, in case there is no choice, to exercise through heir Representatives a sound discretion, in selecting from the three highest candidates. It might otherwise happen, if there were many candidates, that a person, having a very small number of votes over any one of the others, might succeed against the wishes of a great majority of the people. In the next place, the House of Representatives are to vote by States, each having one vote in the choice. The choice is, as we have seen, in the first instance to be by the people of each State, according to the number of their Senators and Representatives. But if no choice is thus made, then the choice devolves on the House of Representatives, and each State is to have an equal voice in the election, and to have but a single vote, whatever may be the number of its Representatives. Thus, the primary election is in effect surrendered to the large States; and if that fails, then it is surrendered to the small States. So that an important motive is thus suggested for union among the large States in the first instance; and for union among the small States in the last resort.

§ 266. There probably is no part of the plan of the framers of the Constitution, which, practically speaking,

has so little realized the expectations of its friends, as that which regards the choice of President. They undoubtedly intended, that the Electors should be left free to make the choice according to their own judgement of the relative merits and qualifications of the candidates for this high office; and that they should be under no pledge to any popular favorite, and should be guided by no sectional influences. In both respects, the event has disappointed all these expectations. The Electors are now almost universally pledged to support a particular candidate, before they receive their own appointment; and they do little more than register the previous decrees, made by public and private meetings of the citizens of their own State. The President is in no just sense the unbiassed choice of the people, or of the States. He is commonly the representative of a party, and not of the Union; and the danger, therefore, is, that the office may hereafter be filled by those, who will gratify the private resentments, or prejudices, or selfish objects of their particular partisans, rather than by those, who will study to fulfil the high destiny contemplated by the Constitution, and be the impartial patrons, supporters, and friends of the great interests of the whole country.

§ 267. It is observable, that the mode, in which the electoral vote of each State is to be given, is confided to the State Legislature. The mode of choice has never been uniform since the Constitution was adopted. In some States, the choice is by the people by a general ticket; in others, by the people in electoral districts; and in others, by the immediate choice of the State Legislature. This want of uniformity has been deemed a serious defect by many statesmen; but, hitherto, it has remained unredressed by any constitutional amendment.

§ 268. The next clause is, "The Congress may de termine the time of choosing the Electors, and the day, on which they shall give their otes; which day shall be the same throughout the United States." This measure is undoubtedly the result of sound policy. A fixed period, at which all the electoral votes shall be given on the same day, has a tendency to repress political intrigues and

speculations, by rendering a combination among all the electoral colleges, as to their votes, more difficult, if not unavailing. This object would be still more certainly obtained, by fixing the choice of the electors themselves on the same day, and at so short a period, before they gave their votes, as to render any general negotiations and arrangements among them nearly impracticable. Prac

tically speaking, however, this provision, as well as the preceding, has had far less influence than was expected; for the votes of the Electors are now, in consequence of their pledges, almost as well known before, as after, their votes are counted.

§ 269. The next clause respects the qualifications of the President; and the qualifications of the Vice President are (as we have seen) to be the same. "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President. Neither shall any person be eligible to the office, who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States."

§ 270. Considering the nature of the duties, the extent of the information, and the solid wisdom and experience, required in the Executive department, no one can reasonably doubt the propriety of some qualification of age of the President. That, which is selected, is the middle age of life, by which period, the character and talents of individuals are generally known, and fairly developed; the passions of youth have become moderated; and the faculties are fast advancing to their highest state of maturity. An earlier period could scarcely have afforded sufficient pledges of talents, wisdom, and virtue, adequate to the dignity and importance of the office.

§ 271. The other qualifications respect citizenship and inhabitancy. It is not too much to say, that no one, but a native citizen, ought ordinarily to be intrusted with an office so vital to the safety and liberties of the people But an exception was, from a deep sense of gratitude, made in favor of those distinguished men, who, though not atives, had, with such exalted patriotism, and such per

sonal sacrifices, united their lives and fortunes with ours during the Revolution. But even a native citizen might, from long absence, and voluntary residence abroad, become alienated from, or indifferent to his country; and, therefore, a residence for fourteen years within the United States is made indispensable, as a qualification to the office. This, of course, does not exclude persons, who are temporarily abroad in the public service, or on their private affairs, and who have not intentionally given up their domicile here.

§ 272. The next clause is, "In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President. And the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability of the President and Vice President; declaring what officer shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." The propriety of this power is manifest. It provides for cases, which may occur in the progress of the government; and it prevents in such cases a total suspension of the executive functions, which would be injurious, and might even be fatal to the interests of the country.

§ 273. What shall be the proper proof of the resignation of the President or Vice President, or of their refusal to accept the office, is left open by the Constitution. But Congress, with great wisdom and foresight, have provided, that the only evidence of a refusal to accept the office, or of a resignation of the office, shall be an instrument in writing, declaring the same, subscribed by the party and delivered into the office of the Secretary of State. No provision has as yet been made for the case of the inability of the President or Vice President to perform the duties of his office, nor has any mode of proof been prescribed, to ascertain the fact of inability, or what shall be deemed an inability.

$274. The next clause provides for the compensation of the President. "The President shall, at stated times,