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.nat secret jealousy, which disposes all states to aggranlize themselves, at the expense of their neighbors."

$ 17. On the other hand, if the States should separate nto distinct confederacies, there could scarcely be less than three, and most probably, there would be four ; an Eastern, a Middle, a Southern, and a Western Confederacy. The lines of division would be traced out by geographical boundaries between the slave-holding and the non-slave-holding States, a division, in itself, fraught with constant causes of irritation and alarm. There would also be marked distinctions between the commercial, the manufacturing, and the agricultural States, which would perpetually give rise to real or supposed grievan ces and inequalities. But the most important consideration is, that, in order to maintain such confederacies, it would be necessary to clothe the government of each of them with summary and extensive powers, almost incompatible with liberty, and to keep up large and expensive establishments, as well for defence as for offence, in order to guard against the sudden inroads, or deliberate aggressions of their neighbors and rivals. The evils of faction, the tendencies to corrupt influence, the pressure of taxation, the necessary delegation of arbitrary powers, and the Auctuations of legislation, would thus be immeasurably increased. Foreign nations, too, would not fail to avail themselves, in pursuit of their own interests, of every opportunity to foster our intestine divisions, since they might thus more easily command our trade, or monopolize our products, or crush our manufactures, or keep us in a state of dependence upon their good will for our security.

§ 43. The Union of the States, “the more perfect union" of them, under a National Government, is, then, and for ever must be, invaluable to the whole country, in respect to foreign and domestic concerns. It will diminish the causes of war, that scourge of the human race; it will enable the National Government to protect and secure the rights of the whole people ; it will diminish public ex.. penditures ; it will insure respect abroad, and confidence at home ; and it will unite in one common bond the in: terests of agriculture, of commerce, and of manufactures

§ 49. The next object is, “to establish justice." This, indeed, is the first object of all good and rational forms of government. Without justice being fully, free ly, and impartially administered, neither our persons, nor our rights, nor our property, can be protected. Call the form of government whatever you may, if justice cannot be equally obtained by all the citizens, high and low, rich and poor, it is a mere despotism. Of what use is it to have wise laws to protect our rights or property, if there are no adequate means of enforcing them ? Of what use are constitutional provisions or prohibitions, if they may be violated with impunity? If there are no tribunals of justice established to administer the laws withi firmness and independence, and placed above the reach of the influence of rulers, or the denunciations of mobs, what security can any citizen have for his personal safety or for his public or private rights ? It may, therefore, be laid down as a fundamental maxim of all governments, that justice ought to be administered freely and Cully between private persons; and it is rarely departed from, even in the most absolute despotisms, unless under circumstances of extraordinary policy or excitement Doubtless, the attainment of justice is the foundation, on which all our State governments rest ; and, therefore, the inquiry may naturally present itself, in what respects the formation of a National Government would better tend to establish justice.

$ 50. The answer may be given in a few words. In the administration of justice, citizens of the particular State are not alone interested. Foreign nations, and their subjects, as well as citizens of other States, may be deeply interested. They may have rights to be protected; wrongs to be redressed ; contracts to be enforced ; and equities to be acknowledged. It may be presumed, that the States will provide adequate means to redress the grievances, and secure the rights of their own citizens. But, it is far from being certain, that they will at all times, or even ordinarily, take the like measures to redress the grievances, and secure the rights of foreigners, and citizens of other States. On the contrary, one of the rarest occurrences in human legislation is, to find foreigners, and citizens of other States, put upon a footing of equality with the citizens of the legislating State. The natural tendency of every government is, to favor its own citizens; and unjust preferences, not only in the administration, but in the very structure of the laws, have often arisen, and may reasonably be presumed hereafter to arise. It could not be expected, that all the American States, left at full liberty, would legislate upon the subject of rights and remedies, preferences and contracts, exactly in the same manner. And every diversity would soon bring on some retaliatory legislation elsewhere. Popular prejudices and passions, real or supposed injuries, or inequalities, the common attachment to persons, whom we know, as well as to domestic pursuits and interests, and the common indifference to strangers and remote objects, are often found to interfere with a liberal policy in legis lation. Now, precisely, what this reasoning would lead us to'presume as probable, actually occurred, not only while we were colonies of Great Britain, but also under the Confederation. The legislation of several of the States gave a most unjust preference to the debts of their own citizens in cases of insolvency, over those due to the citizens of other States and to foreigners.

§ 51. But there were other evils of a much greater magnitude, which required a National Government, clothed with powers adequate to the more effectual establishment of justice. There were territorial disputes between the States, as to their respective boundaries and jurisdiction, constantly exciting mutual irritations, and introducing border warfare. Laws were perpetually made in the States, interfering with the sacred rights of private contracts, suspending the remedies in regard to them, or discharging them by a payment or tender in worthless paper money, or in some depreciated or valueless property. The debts due to foreigners were, notoriously, refused rayment ; and many obstructions were put in the way of the recovery of them. The public debt was left wholly unprovided for ; and a disregard of the public faith had become 30 common a reproach among us, that it almost ceaser

even a resort to arms

to attiаct observation. Indeed, in some of the States, the operation of private and public distresses was felt so severely, that the administration, even of domestic justice, was constantly icterfered with ; the necessity of suspending it was boldly vindicated ; and in some cases,

was encouraged to prevent it. Nothing bui a National Government, capable, from its powers and resources, of overawing the spirit of rebellion, and of aiding in the establishment of a sound currency, just laws, alid solid public credit, could remedy the existing evils.

§ 52. The next object is, “to insure domestic tran quillity.” From what has been already stated, it is apparent, how essential an efficient National Government is, to the security of the States against foreign influence, domestic dissensions, commercial rivalries, legislative retaliations, territoral disputes, and the perpetual irritations of a border warfare, for privileges, or exemptions, or smuggling. In addition to these considerations, it is well known, that factions are far more violent in small than in large communities ; and that they are even more dangerous and enfeebling; because success and defeat more rapidly succeed each other in the changes of their loca! affairs, and foreign influences can be more easily brought into play to corrupt and divide them. A National Gov ernment naturally tends to disarm the violence of domestic factions in small states, by its superior influence. It diminishes the exciting causes, and it leaves fewer chances of success to their operations.

$ 53. The next object is, " to provide for the common defence.” One of the surest means of preserving peace is always to be prepared for war. One of the safest reliances against foreign aggression is the possession of numbers and resources, capable of repelling any attack. A nation of narrow territory, and small population, and moderate resources, can never be formidable ; and must content itself with being feeble and unenviable in its condition On the contrary, a nation or a confederacy, which possesses large territory, abundant resources, and a dense population, can always command respect, and is almost acanable, if true to itself, of being conquered. In proportion to the size and population of a nation, its general resources will be ; and the same expenditures, which may be easily borne by a numerous and industrious people, would soon exhaust the means of a scanty population What, for instance, would be more burdensome to a State like New Jersey, than the necessity of keep ing up a large body of troops, to protect itself against the encroachments of the neighboring States of Pennsylvania and New York? The same military force, which would hardly be felt in either of the latter States, would press heavily upon the resources of a small State, as a perma; nent establishment. The ordinary expenditures, necessary for the protection of the whole Union with its present limits, are probably less than would be required for a single State, surrounded by jealous and hostile neighbors.

$ 54. But, in regard to foreign powers, the States separately would sink at once into the insignificance of the small Euiopean principalities. In the present situation of the world, a few great powers possess the command of commerce, both on land and at sea. No effectual resistance could be offered by any of the States singly, against any monopoly, which the great European Powers might choose to establish, or any pretensions, which they might choose to assert. Each State would be compelled to submit its own commerce to all the burdens and inequalities, which they might impose; or purchase protection, by yielding up its dearest rights, and, perhaps, its own independence. A National Government, „containing, as it does, the strength of all the States, affords to all of them a competent protection. Any navy, or army, which could be maintained by a single State, would be scarcely formidable to any second-rate power in Europe; and yet it would be an intolerable public burden upon the resources of that State. A navy, or army, competent for all the purposes of our home defence, and even for the protection of our commerce on the ocean, is within the compass of the actual means of the General Government, without any severe exaction upon its finances.

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