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horses, to carry it to market, would be so great,* that it would be better for him to take land near New York or Philadelphia, that would yield only half the quantity, of which one half would be claimed by the owner. Such is the case in the south and west of France. Capital is small; production is limited; the owners of capital have a large share; the labourer has a small one; wages are low; the whole amount received by the owners of capital is small: they and the labourers are miserable.

In those parts of India in which the permanent settlement exists, production is much greater than in southern and western India, yet the capitalist takes a larger proportion in the former than in the latter. The great landholder, the Company, fixes in southern and western India, what shall be the rate of wages, and the Zemindars, or landholders of Bengal, to whom it has assigned its claims upon the labourers, take nearly all that is produced above the amount of wages so fixed, and have consequently a large proportion. Were the permanent settlement established throughout India, production would be greatly increased, capital would accumulate with rapidity, and the proportion of the capitalist would fall, while the amount distributed as profits would be greatly increased-the proportion of the labourer would be increased, wages would rise, and the condition of the whole people would be greatly improved.

In comparing the densely peopled portions of the United States, France, and England, with those in which population is scattered, we find one general law, viz. that with the extension of cultivation over inferior soils there is a diminished proportion retained by the owner of capital, leaving an increased proportion in the

* Precisely such a case is referred to in Professor Tucker's recent work on Rents, Wages, and Profits, in which are given various returns, with a view to show that in the new States a larger proportion is obtained by the owner of the land than in the old States. It is obvious that the owner of land under enclosure, well provided with buildings, and worth $100 per acre, will demand a larger proportion for the use of it, than the owner of wild land worth only the governinent price, viz:" $1 25. In like manner, the owner of an unimproved lot in the neighbourhood of New York or London would demand a smaller rent than the owner of a house in Wall Street, or the Strand. Land that is worth only $1 25 per acre, wants roads, shops, &c., and the owner must give a large portion of its products to those capitalists who will enable him to exchange his wheat for clothing, groceries, &c. With every increase in the facilities for so doing, the value of the property and its rent will rise, until at length it may become worth $100 per acre, when it will yield to both labourer and capitalist larger returns than at any previous period. + Bengal, and Parts of the Presidency of Fort St. George.

VOL. II.-40.

hands of the labourer, and enabling him to command a larger quantity of the comforts of life; yet in comparing Massachusetts, with a population of 80 to a square mile, with India, having 300, and with France, which has 160, we do not find such to be the case. The cause of this is to be found in the slower growth of capital, consequent upon the greater expenditure by the government, to which we have already briefly referred, but which we shall now examine more at length, first, however, embodying in the form of propositions, the conclusions at which we have arrived, which are,

I. That with the increase of production there is a diminution in the proportion assigned to the capitalist.

II. That this diminution of proportion is accompanied by an increase in the facility with which both labourer and capitalist obtain the necessaries, conveniences, comforts, and luxuries of life, and by an improvement in the mode of living.

III. That increase of production being attended by a diminution in the proportion of the product obtained by their owners for the use of commodities or things, and an increase in the proportion retained by the employers of them, there is a tendency to a more rapid improvement in the condition of the latter than of the former.

IV. That this tendency can be counteracted only by the exertion of skill or talent on the part of the former, so that increase of production has a direct tendency to stimulate the owner of capital to the exertion of his powers in order that he may maintain his position in relation to other portions of society.

V. That, therefore, with the increase of production there is a tendency to reduction in the proportion which the unproductive bear to the productive classes.

VI. That with this diminution in proportion there is a constant increase in the facility of obtaining intellectual and material capital, and a constant increase in the amount of reward obtained for its use.

VII. That thus with improvement in the condition of the labourer there is a constant improvement in the condition of the landholder and capitalist, the man of science, the painter, and the teacher.

VIII. That this improvement of condition is in the exact ratio of the increase of production, and that every measure tending to augment the rapidity of its increase, tends equally to produce further and more rapid improvement of condition, while every one that tends to retard it tends equally to retard improvement.

IX. That increase of production results from improvement in the quality of labour, produced by the increased application of capital.

X. That every measure tending to prevent the increase of capital, or to interfere with its free application, tends to prevent increase of production-to produce an increase in the landlord's or capitalist's proportion-to produce an increase in the proportion which the unproductive bear to the productive classes-to produce a diminution in the labourer's proportion, with a diminution in the quantity of both labourer and capitalist—and thus to prevent improvement in the condition of all classes of society.

XI. That it is, therefore, contrary to the interest of both labourer and capitalist to adopt any measure tending to restrain the growth of capital, or its free circulation and application in aid of production.

CHAPTER IX.

DISTRIBUTION.-SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT.

MAN unites with his fellow men in the establishment of government, with a view to obtain security for his person and his property. The task of framing laws, and that of carrying them into effect, are assigned to certain individuals, who are to be paid for so doing by contributions from each of the members of society. In assessing those contributions, several different modes are pursued, each of which requires consideration.

The first, is by a specific tax upon each individual, payable in money, or in personal services.

The second, by a tax upon capital.

The third, by a tax upon the commodities consumed.
The fourth, by a tax upon income.

"The first is unequal and unjust. Government is instituted for the protection of person and of property, and property should contribute its proportion to maintaining security. When an individual possessing an estate yielding him a large income, and another whose family is depending upon his exertions for the means of subsistence, are required to contribute the same amount, there is manifest injustice. If such be the case when a payment in money is demanded, it is not less so when personal service is required, as in the case of the conseription of France, the impressment of Great Britain, and the militia system of the United States. Were the latter often engaged in war, it could not fail to be perceived that there is obvious injustice in requiring of the labourer to contribute the same number of days of training as are required of the capitalist, who compounds therefor by paying a trifling fine in lieu of personal service. When, however, a nation maintains a large army and is frequently engaged in war, the amount of injustice is such as to warrant almost any measures for its correction. The son, upon whose exertions depends a father, mother, or sisters, is taken for years, and is compelled to serve the community, receiving only the necessaries of life in exchange for his labour. The State thus demands of him, without remuneration, the most valuable years of his life; those years in which he is best qualified to provide for his future sup

'port; and then returns him to civil life, without a trade, and with the habits of the caserne.

Justice is the same between an individual and a community, as between two individuals. A community has no more right to take the services of an individual, without making him the same compensation therefor that he could obtain for the same quantity of exertion in the service of a member of that community, than that person has to enslave him, and compel him to work for half the usual rate of wages.

If it be thus opposed to justice that the labouring classes should be thus compelled to give their services to the State at low wages, for the purpose of relieving the owners of property from contributing as much as is necessary for their full and equitable payment, equally is it in opposition to the course that would be dictated by that enlightened self-interest which should govern the actions of the man who has had prudence, activity, and energy to enable him to accumulate capital.

We have abundant evidence that with the increase of capital— with the improvement in the quality of labour-and with the increased wages of the labourer-there has been an improvement in the habits of the people, accompanied by an increased security of person and of property, and by constantly increasing profits of capital, and requiring a constantly diminishing proportion of those profits to be contributed for the maintenance of that security. Every measure tending to throw upon the labouring classes an undue proportion of the cost of maintaining government tends to prevent improvement in their habits-to prevent increase of security-to prevent the profitable application of labour and capital—to prevent increase of production—and to prevent increase in the quantity of the conveniences and necessaries of life that may be obtained in return for the use of a given amount of capital, and is therefore directly injurious to the capitalist.

We come now to examine the effect of taxes on capital, and in doing so will consider it as owned by a single individual. Let us suppose two settlements, each consisting of 1000 persons, the land, houses, ploughs, horses, &c., in both of which belong to one person.

Let us suppose that in No. 1 the labourers impose upon him the necessity of paying the chief part of the expenses of government, while in No. 2, a more equitable system is pursued and the cost is fairly divided between the labourer and the capitalist. The latter finds immediately that his property in No. 1, yields him a smaller return than in No. 2, and of course ceases to make

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