State v. Guilbert. fourteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States.) Second-Because it authorizes proceedings instituted and judgments rendered therein, to establish alleged titles of petitioners under it, and to extinguish the titles and claims to such lands of all other persons, without due course or process of law; in that (1) it dispenses with personal service of process or notice of the proceedings upon par. ties who are residents within the territorial limits of other counties of this state than the county in which the proceedings are instituted, and who are amenable to such process or notice; (2) it provides for binding and concluding the titles and claims of persons in private property without designating them by name as parties, although their names are known to the petitioners; (3) although the proceedings are inter partes, being either in personam, or partly in personam and partly in rem, the act authorizes necessary parties thereto to be notified of the commencement thereof without designating their names, and merely by a notice addressed to "all whom it may concern," although their names are known to the petitioners, or they have the means of ascertaining them; (4) proceedings under it are extraordinary and without precedent in the legislative and judicial history of the state, and are not such as to afford the means of an investigation and proper determination of titles to land in this state, and will result in wrong and injustice to many citizens thereof. Third-Because it confers judicial power upon county recorders of deeds. Fourth-Because the "assurance fund" feature authorizes the taking of private property for private purposes, without the owner's consent. State v. Guilbert. Fifth-Because it impairs the obligation of contracts, contrary to a provision of the constitution of the state as well as a provision of the constitution of the United States. The states are inhibited from depriving any person of property without "due process of law," and from making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States as to property. Constitution, amendment XIV, section 1. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Improvement Co., 18 How., 276. To the same effect, Allen v. Armstrong, 16 Iowa, 598; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. St., 256. Whether a mode of procedure is due process depends not upon considerations of form, but upon the principles underlying the process. Administrative and remedial process may be changed from time to time, but only with due regard to the landmarks established for the protection of the citizen. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 356. The states, therefore, may prescribe their own modes of proceeding and trial, provided these landmarks are not overridden. Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. N. C., 15; Story Commentaries on the Constitution III, 661; 4 Hill (N. Y.,) 146; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S., 714; Constitution, Amendments, Art. V.; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S., 516. This constitutional guaranty is Section 7. Bill of Rights. This is the equivalent of the phrase "due process of law," or "the law of the land." Turnpike Company v. Parks et al., 50 Ohio St., 560; Alder v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St., 539. The object of the quaranty was, in part at least, to interpose the judicial department of the government as a barrier against aggressions by any other department. Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N. Y., State v. Guilbert. 378; Bouviers's Law Dic., 1; Bl. Com. 138; Webster's Dic.; Westervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y., 202; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 140. The truth is, the bills of rights in the American constitutions have not been drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old principles against abrogation or violation. They are conservatory instruments rather than reformatory. Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich., 213; Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U. S., 701. Jurisdiction of the res is obtained by seizure under process, whereby it is held to abide such orders as may be made by the court concerning the property seized. Cross v. Armstrong, 44 Ohio St., 623; Vandewater v. Mills, 19 How., 89. All these proceedings are civil in their character, and the res must be proceeded against where the party defendant is out of the jurisdiction of the court, and the proceeding against the thing is known in law as a proceeding in rem or a proceeding quasi in rem. There are certain conditions and means under and by which the res is brought under the control of the court: 1. The court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, and actual dominion over the thing. 2. A petition or information must be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction asking the seizure of the thing, setting forth a right of action against the thing or the owner of the thing attached, and praying for judgment of condemnation or sale for the debt. 3. Notice must be given to the owner of the thing of its seizure, and the nature of the proceedings against it, or notice to the world, where the action is PURELY against the thing. State v. Guilbert. 4. Opportunity for intervention and defense by the owner of the thing must be given. McVeigh v. The United States, 11 Wall., 267. 5. A judicial finding of the facts alleged in the information or petition and a judgment of condemnation or sequestration are necessary. 6. The conclusiveness of the decree rests upon the sufficiency of the notice and regularity of the proceedings. 7. Seizure of the property may be by process issued from the court or by its being placed in the custody of some officer of the court or by law under the control of the court. 8. Under the divisions named, where a title to a right in, or the determination of some right pertaining to, real property within the jurisdiction, the proceedings become lis pendens on the filing of the petition sometimes, and always on the filing of the petition and service of notice. It is said that this rule may sometimes operate with harshness, especially where the notice is constructive, as in many cases, but general convenience requires it. Murray v. Ballou, 1 Johns. Ch., 576. Proceedings purely in rem are where the court in its plenary power of the law, based on legislative will and the authority of the goverment lays hold of and acts directly on the property itself and transfers its ownership to the purchaser by a title paramount to that of the owner, and without regard to the persons who are interested in it. Sales by administrators may be purely in rem, or partly in rem and partly in personam. Vansycale v. Richardson, 13 Ill., 173; Shield v. Ashley, 16 Mo.," 471; Miller v. Greenham, 11 Ohio St., 486; Day v. Micon, 18 Wall., 156; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall., State v Guilbert. 316; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Brown v. Board of Levee Comrs. 50 Miss., 487. It is necessary, in order to determine what kind of notice will constitute due course or process of law in any judicial proceeding affecting an individual's title to land, to ascertain what notice has always been required and deemed essentially necessary in actions or proceedings of that kind. The general law of this state has always, in such cases, required actual notice by service of summons to all known persons who are directly interested residing within the State, and notice by publication to all who are unknown, or who conceal themselves to avoid service of summons, or who reside out of the state; and it has further provided that when notice is given in the latter mode a party against whom judgment or final order has been rendered, may at any time within five years. after the date of the judgment or order, have the same opened and be let in to defend. 2 Chase's St., 786; Swan's St. of 1841, p. 701; Revised Statute section 5048 to 5053, inclusive, and section 5355. Cooley Con. Lim. (5th Ed.), 499. It is submitted that the true rule, under the long established laws of this state as to the course of judicial process, is that laid down in Hamilton v. Brown, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, March 2, 1896, 161 U. S., 256. Proceedings under the act of 1831, to provide for the partition of real estate (Swan's Ohio Statutes of 1841, p. 612), were held to constitute proceedings . in rem, or to be analogous to those in rem. Glover v. Ruffin, 6 Ohio, 255; Pillsbury v. Doolan, 9 Ohio, 117. to So, a proceeding by an administrator to sell lands pay debts under the act of 1831, like the act of |