period for publication. Or Professor Parsons may not have considered these omitted cases as deserving of perpetuation, In a work of such a character, we cannot expect to find every insignificant decision, the hundredth repetition of a truism, referred to. It would be a useless waste of type and space. Nor do we expect in a sedate author, that ecstatic triumph over the very last case from the Law Times by the steamer just in, or from some shiny volume hot with travel from the farthest West, which counsel sometimes exhibit in a nicely-balanced cause. Still there is a mean which should be observed. Many of the minor cases cited in the old text-books may be suffered to drop into oblivion; but it is better to give all or most of the recent decisions, even where they seem of little value in themselves. It facilitates independent study by counsel, for the best of authors may sometimes in a hasty glance underrate the novelty or importance of an opinion. Besides, it sheds an air of freshness even over a commonplace, to find it verified by some new citations, rather than the old standbys from T. R., B. & C., Mass., Johns., S. & R., and all the other abbreviations which have grown stale on the pages of Story and Byles.

To be just, however, to Mr. Parsons, he has employed a great deal of industry and research in the preparation of these volumes, which will be found most useful to student and practitioner. We have only to repeat our regret that he has not directed that research and industry into more untrodden paths. H. W.

REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME JUDICIAL Court of MASSACHUSETTS. By CHARLES ALLEN. Volumes I., II., III. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1861, 1862.

We are here presented with a pretty liberal instalment of the labors of a new reporter within some eighteen months, in one of the oldest and most commercial states of the Union. We have nothing to object to the frequent appearance of new volumes of reports, since it is but an expression of the increasing business, wealth, and prosperity of the country, provided always that the cases reported are such as fairly tend to aid the profession in understanding and maintaining the old landmarks and fundamental principles of the profession. In the multiplication of causes, and of counsel, there is some temptation to publish too many cases which add nothing to the common stock of legal learning already possessed. And it is so much the nature of increasing numbers in the profession to depreciate what has gone before, in order to find fitting place for their

own mediocrity, that it will be an evil day for any one who presumes to discriminate between the labors of the past and the present generation of lawyers, unless such discrimination is in favor of the present.

In many of the states, and especially in the old Bay State, the legislature have undertaken to define the duty of the reporter. He is required to report and publish "the decisions upon all questions of law argued and determined before the first day of September in each year, within ninety days thereafter." The only discretion allowed the reporter is, that he is to report the cases more or less at large according to their relative importance, so as not unnecessarily to increase the size or number of the volumes." This is a very happy illustration of what may justly be called the bathos of legislation, where a convention of men of all trades and pursuits attempt to set themselves forth as wiseacres in other men's matters, and because it is their duty to become wise and experienced, to assume that such is already their condition and to act accordingly.

Under such circumstances the reporter has in fact no discretion, but to publish just what comes to hand; and the judges have no discretion, but to give formal opinions in every case, and thus practically make all cases, as nearly as possible, of precisely the same importance. This process of equalization has been going forward in this country, at a most hurried pace, for the last half century, until almost all the departments of office and trust have fallen into the hands of the unprofessional and the halfeducated, and it now remains to be seen how the experiment will finally succeed.

Mr. Allen, with very commendable zeal, and, we conjecture, with no inconsiderable labor and watchfulness, has certainly contrived, to compensate the embarrassments of faulty legislation, and in spite of the folly of his masters, to maintain the established character of the Massachusetts Reports, in a degree quite beyond what one could have expected, under the circumstances. These volumes compare not unfavorably with the best specimens of Massachusetts Reports, and that is saying a good deal, when we reflect that the former reporters reckon among their number some of the ablest jurists and most careful writers of this ancient commonwealth. Every law library in the country, of sufficient extent to prepare a brief, cannot afford to be without these volumes. The mechanical execution is excellent, and Mr. Allen will soon become, we venture to predict, one of the very best reporters in this broad empire.

I. F. R.

THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.

FEBRUARY, 1863.

COVENANTS FOR TITLE RUNNING WITH THE LAND.

COVENANTS which ran with the land were of early origin, and many of them were in common use, in leases and other contracts respecting lands, long before the introduction of the modern "Covenants for Title." See Spencer's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. 16 a. When, therefore, covenants were contrived as securities for the title to land, having all the requisites for running with the land, they naturally became subject to existing rules for the regulation of other covenants so far as these were applicable to them. This fact serves to explain the frequent reference, in the following discussion, to adjudications on such other covenants for illustrations and authority; but this will be avoided beyond what is strictly auxiliary to our purpose.

Much confusion prevails in the branch of law under consideration, and indeed throughout the whole subject of "Covenants for Title." There appear to be three principal causes for this confu

sion.

First. The Covenants for Title" are an artificial system, of a flexible nature, which has been left to judicial skill to shape by legal principles and needful rules, to the purpose for which they

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are designed. Many rules, which have been adopted because recommended by the exigencies of particular cases, have afterwards been found to lead to unforeseen and most undesirable results, thus giving occasion for numerous retractions and qualifications.

Secondly. Narrow views contained in certain early cases have too much escaped deserved criticism, and have unduly influenced subsequent decisions.

Thirdly. There has been, in many instances, a strange misconception of the effect of previous decisions, and a confounding of cases, which, however they may superficially resemble each other, are, in fact, radically different.

Much progress has recently been made towards removing these evils. Both the English and American Courts have not scrupled to reject old authorities in favor of more liberal views when necessary; and a considerable approach has been made towards establishing this branch of the law on a proper basis. It will be our aim to give an intelligible and accurate statement of the existing law, in a manner that shall also present the changes and progress in it, adding such observations and criticisms as seem to be appropriate.

The following plan, though to some extent arbitrary, will assist the execution of the work:

I. OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH REGULATE COVENANTS FOR TITLE IN RUNNING WITH THE LAND.

1. Of what is meant by "running with the land."

2. With what covenants for title may run.

3. To what extent the doctrine of running with the land contravenes the common law rule against the assignment of choses in action.

4. How far running with the land renders covenants for title "real covenants."

5. From what the ability of covenants for title to run with the land is derived.

(a) Of the words of the covenants.

(b) of the nature of the covenants.

First. The subject-matter of the covenants.

Second. The relation of the covenanting parties to each other, and to that which the covenants concern.

II. OF THE PRACTICAL RULES WHICH REGULATE COVENANTS FOR TITLE IN RUNNING WITH THE LAND.

1. What estate is requisite to enable covenants for title to run with the land.

(a) The transmission of antecedent covenants.

(b) The creation of new covenants.

(e) Of trust estates and mortgages.

2. Of the rights and remedies of the respective parties upon breach of covenants for title running with the land.

3. Of the division of the remedy on covenants for title which run with the land.

4. Of the release of the covenants for title which run with the land, and the effects thereof.

5. Of equities existing between the original covenanting parties, and the effects thereof.

III. WHICH OF THE COVENANTS FOR TITLE RUN WITH THE LAND.

I. Of the principles which regulate covenants for title in running with the land.

Under this head are included some topics which might, with propriety, be classed in the subsequent divisions, but which seem essential to a complete view of the fundamental principles of the subject.

1. What is meant by "running with the land." The phrase "running with the land," as descriptive of covenants in general, is ambiguous, denoting either that the covenantor confers a benefit upon the estate of the covenantee, or imposes a burden upon that of the covenantor. Note to Spencer's Case, Smith's Lead. Cas. Only the former meaning applies to covenants for title; and when Chancellor KENT, speaking of these, 4 Kent 470, says, "they do not run with the land, but affect only the covenants, &c.," the context makes it obvious that he has in mind only the latter signification.

This phrase conveniently and forcibly indicates the intimate