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respects are all equally accomplished, we may venture to affirm, that in regard to human beauty there will be no material difference of opinion.

Nor, indeed, in regard to any fort of beauty. Two perfons equally, and well fkilled in the nature of the horse, will not differ in their judgment of the beauty of that sort of animal. In every fpecies of visible things, that are liable to diforder, and capable of improvement, thofe forms will convey the most pleasing ideas, and confequently be accounted the most beautiful, which feem to be most perfect, or to come nearest perfection. But perfection, or the degrees of imperfection, in any individual, can be perceived by thofe only, who understand the nature of the fpecies to which it belongs; and of many a species the nature cannot be understood, except by thofe, whom inborn difcernment, and extenfive and accurate obfervation, have enabled to ftudy it fuccefsfully.

So much for the origin of our ideas of Beauty. In all cafes, it feems poffible to account for them upon the principles of affociation, except, perhaps, in that fingle one, of colours giving pleasure, and being called beautiful, merely because they are bright, or because they are delicate. For with bright and delicate colours, especially the former, children are delighted, long before they know any thing of elegance in fhape, motion, or attitude, or can form any judgment of the ufefulness, perfection, or imperfection, of things vifible. Yet fo far feems our taste, even for this fort of beauty, to depend upon affociation, that no degree of fplen

dour

dour, or of softness, will ever reconcile us to any colour, which we know to be the effect, or the neceffary concomitant, of difagreeable qualities.

If this inquiry fhall be thought too long, as an example, let it be confidered as a digreffion. It is now finished; and I return to my subject.

SECT.

SECT. V.

External Affociations.-Recapitulations.

SOM

OME people contract ftrange habits of, what may be called, External Affociation. 1 call it fo; because the body is more concerned in it than the mind, and external things than ideas. They connect a certain action with a certain object, fo, that without the one they cannot easily perform the other; although, independently on habit, there is no connection between them. I have heard of a clergyman, who could not compofe his fermon, except when he held a foot-rule in his hand; and of one, who, while he was employed in ftudy, would always be rolling between his fingers a parcel of peas, whereof he constantly kept a trencher full, within reach of his arm. I knew a gentleman who would talk a great deal in company, by the help of a large pin, which he held between his thumb and fore-finger; but, when he loft his pin, his tongue feemed at the fame inftant to lofe its volubility; and he never was at eafe, till he had provided himself with another implement of the fame kind. Locke speaks of a young man, who, in one particular room where an old trunk flood, could dance very well; but in any other room, if it wanted fuch a piece of furniture, could not dance at all. The Tatler mentions a more probable inftance, of a lawyer, who in his pleadings ufed always to be twifting about his

finger a piece of packthread, which the punfters of that time called, with fome reason, the thread of his difcourfe. One day, a client of his had a mind to fee, how he would acquit himself without it; and stole it from him. The confequence was, that the orator became filent in the middle of his harangue, and the client loft his caufe.

Such examples may be uncommon; but many perfons are to be met with, who have contracted fimilar habits. You may fee a boy, while repeating his catechism, button and unbutton his coat a dozen times; and, when learning to write, fcrew his features unknowingly into a variety of forms, as if he meant by the motion of those parts to imitate that of his pen. Some men there are, who no fooner bid you good morrow, than they thrust a fnuff-box into your hand; and fome can hardly either fpeak or think, without gnawing their nails, fcratching their head, or fumbling in their pockets.

It should be our care to guard against awkward habits, and fuch as make us neceffarily dependent on things and places: and we ought to be very thankful to thofe, who by friendly admonition would reform fuch improprieties in our behaviour. For peculiarities, which we cannot difcern in ourselves, may be very glaring, as well as ungraceful, in the eyes of others: and therefore, if we will not listen to advice on these points, we may in time, and without any bad meaning, make ourselves ridiculous. It has been recommended to musicians and others, who have occafion to act, or to fpeak, in publick, to practife frequently before a looking-glafs; that they may correct evil habits by their own judgment. The

rule

rule is not a bad one; but in all ordinary cafes, I would rather truft to the opinion of a judicious friend. For to our own infirmities it is to be feared that we are often partial, and fometimes blind and the frequent ufe of the mirror has been found, at least in the male fex, rather to encourage grimace, than to promote a tafte for ele-. gance.

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So much for that operation of the human mind, which by modern philofophers has been called THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS. It is commonly referred to the imagination; for which reafon I have spoken of it in this place; but, from the examples given, it will appear to be owing in part to habits affecting the memory, and the outward fenfes.

The doctrine is not peculiar to modern philofophy. Ariftotle, fpeaking of Recollection, or active remembrance, infinuates, with his usual brevity, that the relations, by which we are led from one thought to another, in tracing out, or bunting after (as he calls it) any particular thought which does not immediately occur, are chiefly three, Refemblance, Contrariety, and Contiguity* And this enumeration of the affociating principles does not differ, in any thing material, from what is here given. I reduced them to five, Refemblance, Contrariety, Nearness of Situation, the relation of Caufe and Effect, and Custom or Habit. Now the three laft may very well be referred to that one which Ariftotle calls Contiguity. Nearness of Situation is nothing elfe. In its influence, a

The paffage is quoted above. Effay on Memory. Chap. II.

Caufe

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