of said act so entitled and that said section so to be amended is a section bearing a given number in the Revised Statutes in this case "being section 5317 of the Revised Statutes of 1881"-there can be no valid objection to the title of the amendatory act and where the body of the act, after such a statement in the title, refers to the section to be amended as "section 5317 of the Revised Statutes of 1881" without any reference to the section of the original act, there can be no doubt that it was the legislative intent to amend such section and the amendment is properly made. So, if the title and the body of the act be considered together, if it distinctly and unequivocally appears what particular section of a statute is to be amended, it is not necessary to refer in the body of the amendatory act to the title of the act amended; Bush v. Indianapolis, 120-477

No law can be changed or repealed by a subsequent act which is void because unconstitutional. If an act repealing a prior act be invalid, an appropriation made by such prior act is not affected by the latter invalid enactment - it remains in force; Carr v. State, ex rel., 127-214.

This section was borrowed from article 119, of the constitution of Louisiana, of 1846, the words "set forth being substituted for the word "re-enacted" in the latter. The section was reported to the convention and passed in the language of said article 119, of Louisiana, and the substitution was made, by the committee on revision, as a mere verbal alteration and the change was sanctioned, by the convention. The construction given to said article 119, by the legislature (with few exceptions) and by the judiciary, of that state, has been that the act revised, or the section amended, should be set forth and published, at full length, in the act amending or revising it; Langdon v. Applegate, 5-327, 2. No section of an act can be amended without setting forth and publishing, at full length, the whole of such section, into however many clauses it may be divided; but, the old act, or section, need not be set forth in full; Town Martinsville v. Frieze, 33-507; Town etc. v. Hackney, 54-83; Town etc. . Kroes, 55-14; Niblack v. Goodman, 67-174; Draper v. Falley, 33-465; Greencastle etc. Co. v. State, 28-382, over'g Wilkins v. Miller, 9-100; Langdon v. Applegate, 5-327; Littler v. Smiley, 9-116; Rogers v. State, 6-31; Armstrong v. Berreman, 13-422.

3. An amendatory statute must state, in its title, what act or section of act it proposes to amend and the section as amended must be set forth and published at full length; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50-194.

4. This section requires that, in the amendment of a statute, (1) the title of the act to be amended, shall be referred to, and, (2) the act, as revised, or the section, as amended shall be set forth and published, at full length; Feibleman v. State, 98-521.

5. When a section in an existing statute is amended it ceases to exist. The section as amended supersedes such original section and constitutes a part of the original act; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50-194. 6. Act of March 14, 1867, in reference to the incorporation of a city, repeals the act of December 20, 1865, although the former act refers to the latter as of date 1863, by mistake, the act correctly reciting the title; M Nulty v. Connew, 50-569; Shoemaker v. Smith, 37-122.

7. The substitution in a repealing act of the word "while," instead of the words "as long as," in attempting to recite a section of the statute to be repealed, does not affect the validity of the act; Draper v. Falley, 33-465.

8. Identification, of any kind, of the statute to be repealed, in repealing it, is sufficient; Leard v. Leard, 30-171.

9. The intention to amend several prior statutes upon the same subject will be defeated, if such intention has not been expressed in the manner prescribed by the fundamental law; Dodd v. State, 18-56. Such an amendatory act can not have effect, simply because it is inconsistent with the statates it is intended to change; Dodd v. State, 18-56.

10. The repeal of a statute, on a given subject, is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute as to the same subject; although the repeal of the former statute be not mentioned in the title of the new enactment; Gabbert v. Jeff. R. R. Co., 11-365.

II. A statute may be repealed by implication. Such repeal is not within this sec. tion; Branham v. Lange, 16-497.

12. Act, of March 2, 1855, amendatory of section 22 of act, of June 11, 1852, providing for the incorporation of towns, is unconstitutional; the full section as amended not being set forth; Cowley v. Town Rushville, 60-327.

13. Where a statute is amended it ceases to exist and is superseded by the section as amended. An act of the legislature which attempts to amend a section of a statute which has already been amended is void; Draper v. Falley, 33-465; Blakemore v. Dolan, 50-194; Ford v. Booker, 53-395; Cowley v. Town, 60-327; Niblack v. Goodman, 67-174; Clave v. State, 68-17; Brocaw Board, 73-543; Lawson v. De Bolt, 78-563; M'Intyre v. Marine, 93-193; Feibleman v. State, 98-518.

J

118. Local laws forbidden. A special law, within this section, is such an act as, at common law, courts would not notice unless specially pleaded and proved; T. L. B. R. R. Co. v. Nordyke, 27-95; Hinkle v. State, 24-28.

2. This section does not prohibit the legislature from passing special laws creating courts of inferior jurisdiction; Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; Clem v. State, 33-418.

3. The legislature is the exclusive judge whether a statute on any subject, not enumerated in this section, can be made general and applicable to the whole state (Thomas v. Board etc., 5–4 over'd); Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; Gentile v. State, 29–409; Longworth v. Com. Council, 32-322; Johnson v. Board etc., 107-24.

4. The salary act, of March 10, 1873, section 3, fixing the salaries of judges of criminal courts, at $2000, but, containing a proviso, "that in all counties having cities with a population of 40,000, the salary of said criminal court judges shall be $2500, to be paid quarterly out of said county treasury as aforesaid ", is constitutional and valid in all its provisions; not being local within the meaning of the constitution; State v. Reitz, 62-159.

5. A provision, of a city charter, that every sale, to satisfy an assessment for street improvements, shall be by public auction and upon, or near the premises, or in the city court room of said city is not unconstitutional, as special legislation; Brookbank v. City Jeff'ville, 41-406.

6. "An act to provide compensation to the owners of animals killed or injured by the cars, locomotives or other carriages of any rail road company in this state " is not invalid, as being special legislation; M. & I. R. R. Co. v. Whiteneck, 8-217.

7. An act (1871) providing for fees and salaries of sheriffs etc. is unconstitutional as it makes the salaries of sheriffs non uniform, in violation of this section. The sheriff is not a salaried officer; Fulk v. Board etc., 46-150.

8. Act of March 12, 1875, giving an increased compensation to county auditors, in counties of which the population exceeds 15,000 is not unconstitutional, as being local or special legislation; Hanlon v. Board etc., 53-123.

118-9. Local laws. Laws must be general. These sections were designed to remedy the evil of local and special legislation, which had grown up under the old system; Maize v. State, 4-342.

2. These sections are to be construed as operating prospectively. Local statutes which were in existence, at the time the coastitution took effect, and not inconsistent, were expressly continued in force (sect. 235, cl. 1); State v. Barbee, 3-258; Davidson v. Koehler, 76–412.

3. The legislature has no authority to enact a local, or special, statute when a general law can be made applicable; Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4.

4. Courts can inquire whether a general law can be made applicable to the subject matter of a local or special law; Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4, overruled in Gentile v. State, 29-409.

5. Except where the case falls within the cases enumerated, in section 118, the legislature is the sole judge as to whether, or not, a general law can be made applicable; and, when, in such case, the legislative judgment is expressed that special legislation is required and a special curative or retrospective statute is, under such circumstances, enacted it will be upheld; Johnson v. Board etc., 107–24.

6. It is for the legislature, alone, to judge whether a law, on any given subject, not enumerated in section 118, can be made applicable to the whole state; Kelly v. State etc., 92-239; Gentile v. State, 29-409, app'd and foll'd, State v. Boone, 30-225; Longworth v. Com. Council, 32–322; Clem v. State, 33-418; State etc. v. Tucker, 46-355, and over'g Thomas v. Board etc., 5-4.

7. It is not unconstitutional to provide for a criminal court in all counties of 10,000, voters or more (stat. Dec. 20, 1865); Combs v. State, 26-98; Anderson v. State, 28-22; Guetig v. State, 66-94.

:

8. Act (March 6, 1873) to divide the state into circuits, for judicial purposes etc., so far as it authorizes the election of prosecuting attorneys in October, 1873, is constitutional (provision obsolete, see sect. 5861); State v. Tucker, 46-355.

9. The fish law, by making an exception of the Ohio and St. Joseph rivers, is not thereby made local and unconstitutional; Gentile v. State, 29-409.

10. Act authorizing the donation by a county, which donation is to be raised by a county_tax, is not prohibited, by sections 97, 118-9; Marks v. Trustees, 37-155.

11. Taxes may be assessed, in a county, to liquidate a debt contracted, by the county, in securing the location of a state institution in the county, and not contravene sections 97, 418-9; Marks v. Trustees, 37-155.

12. These section do not prohibit local taxation for objects in themselves local. They require a general uniform levy, for state purposes, but do not forbid local taxation under a general statute; Anderson v. Kerns Drain. Co., 14-199; Goodrich v. W. &D. Turnp.. Co., 26-119;

thus, taxes (March 6, 1865) for turnpike purposes are permitted; Goodrich v. W. & D. Turnp. Co., 26-119;'.

and, assessments on lands for benefits thereto (June 12, 1852), for purposes of drainage, to promote the public health; Anderson v. Kerns D. Co., 14-199;

and, assessments for street improvements, under a statute for the incorporation of cities; Palmer v. Stumph, 29-329.

119. Laws must be general. It was not intended that the operation of laws throughout the state shall be uniform in any other sense than that their operation shall be the same in all parts of the state, under the same circumstances and conditions; Groesch v. State, 42-547.

2. The provisions of a statute having a uniform operation throughout the state and applying to all alike, under similar circumstances, the statute can not be, rightfully, classified as special legislation; Elder v. State, 96-164; Heanley v. State, 74-99.

3. This section implies that, in many cases, local statutes are necessary, for the reason that general laws can not be made applicable; Gentile v. State, 29-409.

The section does not inhibit a local, or special, statute when the subject of the act is local; Marks v. Trustees, 37-155; Cash v. Auditor, 7-227.

5. A statute conferring power on the common council of a city to pass an ordinance requiring the procurement of a license to retail liquors within the city is not void, for want of uniformity, because some cities do not require a license to be taken out; Wiley v. Owens, 39-429.

6. It is for the legislature, alone, to judge whether a law on any given subject, not enumerated in section 22 of article 4, (§ 118), can be made applicable "and of uniform operation throughout the state," as required by this section; Evansville v. State, 118-433; Wiley v. Bluffton, 111-157; Johnson #. Board etc., 107-15; Kelly v. State, 92-236; Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; State v. Tucker, 46-355; Long worth v. Com. Council etc., 32-322. 121. Passage of bills. A joint resolution is, here, recognized as a means by which some acts may be authoritatively performed, by the legislature; State v. Bailey, 16-46.

2. The legislature has power, by joint resolution, to direct the secretary of state, as to the proper discharge of his duty; State v. Bailey, 16-46.

3. A joint resolution is not a bill. Laws for the appropriation of money, for public purposes or the payment of private claims, can not be enacted by joint resolution; nor can the auditor of state issue a warrant for money so appropriated; May v. Rice, 91-551.

4. Issues of fact can not be formed to investigate the mode of procedure of the executive and legislative branches of government. Judicial investigation stops with an examination of the title and contents of a statute and the evidence of its due attestation, by the signatures of the speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate, and its acceptance and filing, as an act of the legislature, by the secretary of state. Courts can not look beyond the statute, to the legislative proceedings; Board etc. v. Burford, 93-384, foll'g Evans v. Browne, 30-514, followed in Bender v. State, 53-245 and approved in Eager v. Board etc., 70-331.

124. Publication of statutes. In this section the words "published" and "circulated" are used synonymously; Jones v. Cavins, 4-305.

2. A distribution of such acts, in a bound volume, by the secretary of state, through his proper agents, is a publication and circulation of the statutes by authority; State Bailey, 16-46.

3. A statute, without an emergency declared therein, does not take effect until published and the legislature has no power to make it of effect sooner by another act; Cain v. Goda, 84-211.

4. An emergency clause in an act (June 14, 1852) declared the statute to be in force from and after its being filed with the clerks of the circuit courts, in the respective counties. The legislative intention was that the act should be in force so soon as it could be distributed to the several counties and although there be no express direction to the secretary of state to distribute, the emergency clause implies such a direction; State v. Dunning, 9–20.

5. The execution law of 1843, amendatory of the statute of 1842, was approved Feb. ruary 11 and published, at Indianapolis, on the 14th day of the same month. By statute, it was made the duty of the secretary of state to forward, immediately after its publication, a copy to the clerk's office of each county in the state and, upon its being filed in any one of those offices, the act became the law of the county, in which such office was. In such case, it must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the law, of 1843, became effective February 28; Doe v. Collins, I-23.

6. Provisions of a statute as to the form of binding, character and color of materials, divisions into volumes and the like matters are merely directory; State v. Bailey, 16-46.

7. When a statute became effective and in force is a judicial question, for the courts; State v. Bailey, 16–46.

8 The declaration of emergency, contemplated by this section, can not be taken by implication; but, must be expressly declared, in substantial conformity to the requirement of the section. A declaration, by the legislature that a statute shall be in force, or take effect, on a future day specified is not, per se, a declaration of an emergency; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7-13.

9 The publication and circulation of a statute, unless done by authority, can not affect the period of its taking effect; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7-13.

127. Governor. The executive power is vested, solely, in the governor. Any power or authority vested, by the legislature, in the governor and others, in which

such others are to have an equal voice and authority with the governor, can not be executive. Duty imposed can not be executive and mandamus will not lie to compel such others to perform; Gray v. State, 72-567.

130. Manner of voting. Courts have no jurisdiction of an action to enjoin the secretary of state from delivering to the speaker of the house of representatives the sealed returns, alleged to be wrongful and illegal, of an election for lieutenant governor, which are directed to the speaker, as required by law, in care of the secretary of state and which are to be delivered by the latter; Smith v. Myers, 109-5.

2. Courts take judicial cognizance of the accession to office of the chief executive of the nation and the state; Hizer v. State, 12-330.

131. Plurality elects. One who claims the office of lieutenant governor can not maintain an information, in the nature of quo warranto, to settle the title to that office. This section vests exclusive jurisdiction of such controversy in the general assembly; Robertson v. State, etc., 109-85.

133. Qualifications. A declaration to become a citizen of the United States, with the requisite residence in the state, not only confers, upon male persons of foreign birth, the elective franchise, but renders them eligible to any office, in the state, except governor, lieutenant governor, senator and representative in the legislature; M'Donel v. State, 90-323; see M'Carthy v. Froelke, 63-507.

ARTICLE 5 - EXECUTIVE.

140. Bills signed or vetoed. Where an act has passed both houses of the general assembly, has been duly signed by the presiding officers of both houses and presented to the governor who has returned it to the house in which it originated, without his signature, but with objections stated, and these objections have been spread out on the journal of such house, and the vote upon the bill has been reconsidered, and the bill has passed by a majority of all the members elected to that house, and it has been sent to the other house of assembly, with the governor's objections and approved by a majority of all the members elected to that house, eo instanti its passage in this latter house it becomes a law the objections of the governor to the contrary notwithstanding. It is not required by the constitution that it again be signed by the presiding officers of the two houses, transmitted to the governor and by him filed in the office of the secretary of state. The evidence as to the passage of the bill is to be found in the journals of the two houses; Evansville v. State, 118-433; State v. Denny, 118-453.

2. An act, permitting parties to be competent witnesses, was filed, in the office of the secretary of state, March 11, 1861, at 5 o'clock, p. m., without the approval of the governor and without objections thereto being filed. The adjournment of the legislature, sine die, was on the same day, at an earlier hour. As the act contained an emergency clause, it became law from the time of such filing; Tarlton v. Peggs, 18-24. Pardon is the exercise of executive clemency.

143. Pardons and reprieves.

As an accused person is entitled to an impartial trial such trial can not be denied him on the ground that the governor may pardon him, in case such governor becomes satisfied that the conviction was not just; Sanders v. State, 85-322.

2. This section confers on the governor the exclusive power to remit fines and forfeitures and to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons; Butler v. State, 97-375.

3. This section, investing in the governor power to remit fines and forfeitures," has reference to fines and forfeitures which have been adjudged. Section 1718 relates to the discharge of liability before judgment; State v. Rowe, 103-120.

4. Power to set aside a forfeiture of recognizance for appearance, of defendant, to answer to an indictment, is, by this section, in the proper court as well as in the governor; State v. Shideler, 5164; the statute, however, authorizes the courts to remit judgments, on forfeited recognizances, only upon cause shown; State v. Speck, 20-211.

5. Under this section, the governor's power, to remit fines and penalties, can be exercised, only, pursuant to legislative direction; State v. Dunning, 9-20.

6. Pardon, by the governor, of one convicted of a crime does not discharge the party from the costs of the prosecution. The governor is without authority to remit costs in such a case; State v. Farley, 8 B., 229.

7. When it may be reasonably inferred, from the language of a pardon or remission of sentence, that the executive was deceived or imposed on by one who procures it, by false statements, or an omission to state relevant facts, the pardon or remission is void; State v. Leak, 5-359.

144. Governor may fill vacancies. This section empowers the governor to fill vacancies in office under certain conditions. The legislature thereunder, has, however, no power to fill a vacancy occurring in an office, whether of its own creation or otherwise, unless express provision therefor can be found in the constitution. By force of this section and of section 223 (Art. 15, $), the power of appointment as to certain officers of the state is reserved to the legislature, among which, however, is not included local officers, whether county, township, city or town; y erefore an act of March 7, 1889, providing for a board of metropolitan police and fire department in cities of 29,000 inhabitants, assuming to confer on the general assembly authority to appoint police and fire commissioners for cities, is void; Evansville v. State, 118-445.

2. It is the duty of the governor, on receiving a resignation, creating a vacancy in a judicial office, to appoint a successor. This is the only notice he is required to give of the existence of the vacancy. Should the governor communicate knowledge of such resignation to the public, his communication will not be such lawful notice of the fact as to make it the duty of clerks of the several counties, to give notice of an election; Biddle v. Willard, 10-62.

152. Terms of county officers. The phrase "eligible to office," in this section, has reference to the qualification to hold the office; not to the election; Smith v. Moore, 90-304; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15-327;

2. The disabling provision, in this section, which ordains that "no person shall be eligible to the office of clerk, recorder or auditor more than eight years in any period of twelve years," literally applies to periods of time, under the constitution, and not to terms of office. Time served under the present constitution, pursuant to an election under the old constitution, must be regarded as part of the eight years, to which a clerk is limited under the new constitution; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15-327.

3. The limitation, of eight years, in this section does not embrace time served in either of the offices named, under a pro tem. appointment or the simple holding over to fill a vacancy; Carson v. M'Phetridge, 15-327.

4. Where one has held, by election, the office of clerk of the circuit court for eight years consecutively, he can not, under this section, hold over, on the death without qualifying of the person elected to succeed him. Upon the expiration of such period a vacancy arises, which the board of county commissioners may fill by appointment; Gosman v. State etc., 106–205.

5. A county surveyor is recognized, by section 152, as an administrative officer. His duties, however, are ministerial as well as administrative; State etc. v. Johnson, 105-467.

6. County surveyors in office at the adoption of this constitution did not continue in office after it took effect; Starry v. Winning, 7-311.

153. County and township officers. Judges of circuit courts and prosecuting attorneys are not state, county or township officers; State v. Tucker, 46-355.

2. If a county officer vacate and abandon his office, by removing to a foreign state, he can not, lawfully, resume the office. Leaving his family in the county, paying his poll tax and voting therein, however, it is no abandonment that he leaves his office in charge of a deputy and is temporarily absent, at Washington city, acting as a door keeper to senate or house of representatives; Yonkey v. State, 27-236.

154. Qualifications of county officers. An inhabitant of a county during one year preceding his appointment to the office of county superintendent is not ineligible thereto because not a citizen thereof during that length of time. A citizen is a native or naturalized person. An inhabitant is one having a fixed and permanent residence in a county; State etc. v. Kilroy, 86-120.

2. A declaration to become a citizen of the United States, with the requisite residence in the state, confers, upon male persons of foreign birth, eligibility to hold any office in the state, except governor, lieutenant governor, senator and representative in the legislature; M'Donel v. State, 90-323; see M'Carthy v. Froelke, 63–507.

156. Residence of officers. Semble; an act which allows civil officers, who enlist in the army, to retain their offices and occupy them by deputy (Stat., 1861, p. 40) so far as applicable to the county auditor is unconstitutional; State v. Allen, 21-516.

2. A county officer who leaves his family in the county, pays his poll tax and votes therein, does not abandon his office, by leaving it in charge of his deputy while he temporarily acts as a door keeper to one of the houses of congress; Yonkey v. State etc., 27-236.

160-1. County Boards. It is competent, for the general assembly, to provide by law that the board of commissioners, of each county, shall constitute a court of inferior jurisdiction and to clothe such court with original jurisdiction and judicial power over claims and accounts against the county, as a corporation, and other matters of local interest; providing for appeals, from its decisions, to courts of superior jurisdiction; State v. Board etc., 101-71.

161. Judicial powers. All judicial powers are vested in the courts of the state. The legislature has no authority to invest any other tribunals, than the courts, with judicial power. It is certain that the legislature can not exercise judicial power; Columbus etc. Co. v. Board etc., 65-427; Doe v. Douglass, 8 B., 10; Young v. State B'k, 4-301.

2. It is not within the power of the legislature, by a special act, directed to a particular case, then pending in court, to direct or change the course of decision in such case; C. C. & I. C. R. Co. v. Board etc., 65-427; see Waldo v. Wallace, 12-569; Trustees v. Ellis, 38-3.

It is well settled that the legislature can not confer judicial power on other than judicial officers; Elmore v. Overton, 104-548. The constitutional restraint, as to conferring judicial power upon other than judicial officers, does not, however, prohibit the legislature from entrusting large discretionary powers, in certain cases, to executive, administrative and ministerial officers in matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices; State etc. v. Johnson, 105-467.

4. The jurisdiction of the superior court of Vanderburgh county is less than that of the circuit court and is, therefore, inferior to the latter. The legislature has power to establish such courts; Smith v. Smith, 77-81; citing Guetig v. State, 66-94; Cropsey v. Henderson, 63-268; Vickery v. Chase, 50-461; Ex p. Wiley, 39-546; Clem v. State, 33-418; Anderson v. State, 28-22; Combs v. State, 26-98, 5. When the judge of a court, in vacation, is engaged in doing acts in vacation as the appointment of a receiver-he is exercising-quoad hoc-the judicial power of the state. His acts and proceedings, in the premises, although had in vacation, are the judicial proceedings of the court, whereof he is judge; Pressley v. Lamb, 105-185.

ARTICLE 7-JUDICIAL.

161. Judicial powers. The effect of this provision is to vest in the courts the whole element of sovereignty known as the judiciai, established by the constitution and the laws