subject. I have referred gentlemen to this part of our history to show, that if, in that case, the contest was rendered doubtful for a season, where the individual had not, in contemplation of the People, received a single vote for the Presidency; that it may occur, under the present provisions of the Constitution, where an individual may have received a very small number of Electoral votes, as in the cases I have supposed. It may happen, sir, that a minority may thus elect the President, when the election devolves upon this House, from personal partialities to the individual elected, and thus palm upon the Nation a President evidently not the choice of a majority of the People of the United States; not the choice of the immediate constituents of those gentlemen, upon this floor, who may elect him; and not the choice of a majority of the Representatives in Congress. It may happen, sir, that the first choice of the Representative here, holding in his hands the power of controlling the vote of his State, may not be returned to the House as one of the three highest upon the list. The second choice of the Representative may be essentially different from the second choice of his constituents, if the election were again referred back to them. The Representative may be ignorant of the will of his constituents, or if he know their will, he may affect ignorance of it. But the doctrine is maintained by some politicians in this country, and I appeal to your experience to know, sir, whether it has not been openly avowed upon this floor, that there is no connexion between the Representative here, and his constituents at home; that the Representative here is not bound to regard or obey the instructions of those who send him here; that, in the election of a President, when it shall devolve upon this House, he is, by the Constitution, made the umpire to decide it; and though his constituents might be in a body, knocking at the door of this Hall, and proclaiming to their Representative, upon this floor, from the galleries, "our will is thus and thus; you are our agent, delegated by us to execute our will, and it is our will that the vote of the State which you hold in your hand, should be given to the individual of our choice;" yet the Representative, entertaining the opinion that his constituents have no right to interfere or instruct him upon this subject, disregards their voice, and exercises his own arbitrary will in disposing of the vote of his State. I must confess, sir, that, for myself, I have never entertained such opinions, but believe, upon all questions of expediency, that the Representative is bound to regard and obey the known will of his constituent. Other gentlemen, however, entertain different opinions; and when such opinions are entertained and openly avowed, what security have the People that their rights will be preserved, when the preservation of them depends upon the accidental, interested, or capricious will of their public servants? Thus the President may be elected by a minority of the Representatives in Congress, who may be of opinion that they have conscientiously discharged their public duty. [MARCH 13, 1826. as it was to carry into effect that part of the Constitution in relation to the election of a President, you provide that the electors in each State shall be elected within the thirtyfour days immediately preceding the first Wednesday in December, in every fourth year, the day upon which the electors, throughout the Union, are required to give their votes Why this short intervening period between the choice of the electors, and the day upon which they shall give their votes? It was a wise provision, made to prevent the possibility of tampering with them; to prevent intrigue, corruption, bargaining, and sale; to prevent the interference of political jugglers; and to keep pure the stream as was the fountain, the People, from which it flowed. So particular have you been upon this subject, and so cautious to preserve the purity of the electors, that you have given them but a short and transitory existence; and if any one of them should be elected more than thirtyfour days before the day upon which he is required to vote, the presumption of your law is against him, and his vote will not be received. But is not the House of Representatives likewise a pre-existing body of men? Are they not collected together at one point for weeks together, between the period when it is ascertained that the primary electors have failed to make a choice, and the day upon which they are called upon to vote? Is it not as probable, to say the least of it, that they may be tampered with to prostitute their votes, and that they may be corrupted, as that twenty-four separate electoral colleges, dispersed over the twenty-four States of the Union, might be? In the one case you have been distrustful, and have provided against the possibility of undue influence of any kind, so as to thwart the public will. In relation to the electoral colleges, you have adopted, by your laws, the salutary maxim, "lead us not into temptation." Would it not be quite as safe to adopt it in relation to ourselves? Is there any thing inauspicious to corruption, intrigue, and management, in your locality? Where are you situated? Within the limits of the same city where the President, in office, is, and who may be a candidate for reelection-where all the other candidates may be, and where their respective friends and partisans will be. Is your situation here less exposed than that of the electoral colleges? But we are told by the honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. STORRs) that, for the honor of this House, a suspicion should not be indulged that its members could be corrupted. Let it not be told, says he, at the court of St. James, or upon the continent of Europe, that even suspicion had been openly entertained upon the floor of the American Congress, that any of its members were corruptible. And the gentleman from Massachusetts, too, (Mr. EVERETT) denies in broad terms the corruptibility of this House. Sir, it is a humiliating idea, a painful thought I admit, that the Representatives of freemen could, under any circumstances, barter away or disregard the rights of the People for their own individual aggrandizement. But human nature is the same in all ages of the But is there no danger, sir, when the election of the world. All past history has shown that it is unsafe to rely first officer of the first Nation in the World is to be made by a upon virtue alone when strong temptations are presented. select and pre-existing body of men, that even the Repre- And what stronger temptation to corruption and the aban sentatives of freemen may, in an evil hour, be tempted to donment of principle than the Presidency, can be held depart from the path of duty, receive the wages of iniqui- out to an ambitious man aspiring to that high office? The ty, and prostrate at the shrine of some ambitious aspirant President of the United States, when elected, has an imto the Presidency, the public will, and with it the best in- mense patronage to bestow; has many honorable and luterests of the Country? Shall we assume to ourselves the crative offices in his gift. And what stronger temptation high prerogative of being uncontaminated and incorrupti- than to receive the patronage in his power, can be held ble, when the same attributes are denied to all the rest of out to the few assembled here who have it in their power mankind? Is immaculate purity to be found within these to elect him? I apprehend, sir, if this election shall frewalls, and in no other corner of the earth? Have you quently devolve upon Congress, that a door will be opennot yourselves, sir, in your legislation in relation to this ed to corruption, intrigue, and to office hunters; and I apvery subject-the election of a President-given incon-prehend, further, that through that door the evil doer may testible evidence that you are distrustful of human nature? one day enter, and sap the foundations of this happy ReWhy is it, that, by the act of Congress of 1792, designed public. Other countries have been revolutionized and in MARCH 13, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. volved in anarchy and confusion, upon whose ruins despo- Sir, we should not be so sensitive upon this subject as to tism has erected her throne. I hope, sir, my apprehen- shut out from our eyes all past experience" The pusions may be unfounded; but surely it is prudent in us to rest gold has some alloy; the great Sun of day has his take warning from their example, and close the door spots; and among the chosen disciples of our Lord there through which unprincipled men may enter, and obtain was a Judas." And in pronouncing this judgment, coldan advantage. Surely there is as much virtue in the Peo-blooded as it may seem to the gentleman, we are only reple-surely it is as safe to permit them to be the electors cording the history of human nature as it is, and ever has of their Chief Magistrate as to arrogate it to ourselves. been, from that fatal hour when man came under the curse But, sir, as to the corruptibility of this House, which is de- of a violated law. Another argument, Mr. Chairman, of nied by the honorable member from Massachusetts, (Mr. the gentleman from N. York, struck me with peculiar force. EVERETT.) That honorable gentleman not only denies If, says he, this Government is ever destroyed, it will not be the existence of corruption in this House, but he goes by men in power, but by men out of power. And the genfurther, and denies the corruptibility of its members. Will tleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. EVERETT) who succeeded that honorable gentleman tell me what charter of exemp- | him, used a similar argument, and told us that, if the Govtion we have from the frailties of human nature? Will he ernment was ever destroyed, it would not be by a President tell me through what purifying crucible we have passed elected by a minority of the People, but by a President when we take our seats upon this floor? Until he shall elected by an overwhelming majority of the People: by do so, I shall believe that human nature is the same some "military chieftain," that should arise in the land. here that it is elsewhere. And from my earliest infancy I Yes, sir, by some "military chieftain," whose only crime have been taught to believe, that, from the fall of our first it was to have served his country faithfully at a period great parent until the present hour, man has been depra- when that country needed and realized the value of his ved, frail, and impure. I do not contend that he is natu- services. I know, sir, there are some politicians in this rally more so here than he is in other situations; but I con- country who are continually in alarm, or affect to be so, tend he is as much so, and that he is more exposed to lest the People should destroy the Government. And I temptation here than in ordinary situations. But, says the know, sir, there are others, and I am bold to say I am of gentleman from New York, (Mr. STORRS) if men in pow- the number, who are of opinion that, if this happy Governer may, by wielding their patronage, by favoring and flat-ment is ever destroyed, (which God forbid!) it will be by tering, bribe or corrupt us, may we not by the same means the encroachments and abuse of power, and by the allur bribe and corrupt the People? How sophistical! Corrupt ing and corrupting influence of Executive patronage. the People! No, sir; the great body of the People are of ne- Rely upon it, sir, that if you should ever see an Adminiscessity virtuous, because it is their interest to be so; you tration of this country, whose elevation, whose measures, cannot extend patronage to all; you cannot corrupt all; a and whose policy, are not supported by the good feelings select body of men you may. But, says the gentleman from and opinions of the People, there will be more danger, New York, if the members of this House are corrupt, is infinitely more danger to be apprehended from them, than not the corrective at hand? Do they not return to the all the ideal dangers which the gentlemen seem to apprebody of the People, in less than thirty days after a Presi-hend are covertly lurking among the great body of the dential election takes place in this House? And if they People of this Union. have acted incorrectly, or disobeyed the will of their con- To what inevitable conclusion does the argument of stituents, will not the People signify their disapprobation the gentleman from Massachusetts lead? If the Presiat the polls at the next election, and turn them out of dent, according to his argument, is elected by a majority their service? Sir, the evil deed may be committed, and of the People, he is a dangerous President; if elected by the perpetrator of it may receive the reward for his perfidy a minority of the People, the irresistible inference is, and his crime, in being elevated to some high station, be- that he will not be a dangerous President. And, accordyond the reach of an indignant, insulted, and an injured ing to his argument, I suppose it would be dangerous for community. Yes, sir, he may be elevated, too, by the indi- a majority of the People to elect the President. Sir, this ⚫vidual whom he has assisted to place in the Presidential is a doctrine which may be congenial to the feelings and chair, and may never again return, or put himself in the opinions of some gentlemen; but I must confess, that I am power of his constituents, so as to receive the sovereign far, very far, from being prepared to adopt it as one of the remedy of the gentleman from New York at the polls of rules of my political faith. hold the converse of the the next election. His constituents may frown upon his con- gentleman's propositions. We are at issue on these duct and reprobate his course : he is elevated above them; points, and the committee will decide between us. Anohe looks down upon them with contempt, and sneers at ther reason why the election of President should not detheir discontent; and yet this is the sovereign corrective volve upon this House, is, that members of Congress of the gentleman, and will, as he conceives, ensure puri- should not only be virtuous and pure, but, like Cæsar's ty in this Hall. That gentleman should remember, too, wife, above suspicion. Next to doing right, is to inspire that, in many of the States of the Union, the Congression public confidence, and give public satisfaction. Whenal elections, for the next Congress, have transpired some ever this election shall come here, are not the most virtutwelve or eighteen months before the Presidential elec-ous and correct, subject to dark suspicions and unkind retion; the member is either defeated by a more favored citizen of his district, who is to supply the place here, and his direct and immediate responsibility to the People is destroyed; or he has been previously elected, and is assured that he will at least hold his seat here, if he desire it, for another term. If he has been defcated at home, he seeks elevation and promotion elsewhere; if he has been I shall not, said Mr. P. dwell upon another argument, successful at home, he hopes his good constituents may which has been very properly used by some gentlemen forget his political sin before the next election; if he in the course of this debate-that when the election should still desire to hold the seat, he hopes, by the assist-comes to this House, it is calculated to interfere with, and ance of Executive influence, he may effect some local impede the ordinary business of legislation. It has not measure that may reconcile his constituents, or balance in been my fortune to witness the effects of an election here; their estimation the evil deed he has committed. That this is the first time I have had the honor to be a humble gentleman, too, pronounces it a cold-blooded judgment Representative of a portion of this People upon this floor. to entertain a suspicion that corruption can enter here. I could wish, upon this great occasion upon which we de flections? If some act incorrectly, or corruptly, is it not calculated to affect the reputation of all who may necessarily be associated with them, however correct their course may be and is not the inevitable tendency to impair public confidence, and to destroy the harmonious operation of the Government? liberate, that they were more ably represented. But though, sir, I have not witnessed the scene, I have read of its effects upon two occasions, in the history of my country, and can well conceive that Members of Congress will be too apt to neglect all the important subjects of legislation, in devising plans, intriguing, and manag. ing, to promote the success of their favorite candidate. If there should be no corruption, still it is calculated to distract their deliberations. It will produce excitement; arouse all the angry feelings of our nature; create heartburnings, party feelings, and sectional jealousies, detrimental to the public welfare, and dangerous to the duration and stability of the Government. The effects produced will not, probably, terminate with the election itself, but will mingle and be felt in your deliberations for years afterwards. [MARCH 13, 1826. sistently with important rights reserved to the States, which are not proposed to be disturbed, their equal rela tive weight in the election. To do this, the public sentiment should be fairly ascertained-and in order to obtain a fair expression of the popular will, it is a self-evident proposition to my mind, that some uniform mode of collecting the public sentiment should be established throughout the Union. Under the present provisions of the Constitution, and the practice under them, according to the various and diversified modes of election, prescribed by the respective State Legislatures, do the People, in every section of the Union, in fact, possess and exercise their equal relative weight in the election? Is the public sentiment of the whole People of the Union correctly ascertained? No, sir! It is demonstrable, if an election be made at all by the Electoral Colleges without involving the national calamity (for such I view it) of a recurrence to the House of Representatives, a little more than a fourth of the People of the United States may choose the President. If I succeed in establishing this fact, the necessity for uniformity and amendment will, as I conceive, be apparent, if we hold to the principle that a majority should rule. What are the various modes of election at present established in the States? In some, the district system prevails; in others, the Legislatures have assumed to themselves the power of appointing electors; and in one State of the Union (Kentucky) a compound of the district and general ticket system is the mode prescribed by the Legislature. The State being entitled to fourteen electors, is divided into three districts, in one of which four electors are chosen, and five in each of the other two districts. I shall not here stop to inquire why this artificial arrangement of dis But, sir, after all that can be sail upon this subject, it resolves itself into this at last; and I wish gentlemen distinctly to answer me the question. Are we prepared to hold out to the People, the ignus fatuus of popular elections; to tell them they are sovereign, and shall elect the President; and, at the same time, by the operations of your present Constitution, put it virtually out of their power to do so; unless, indeed, by a combination of the large States, as I shall presently attempt to show, by literally immolating large masses of their citizens, and destroying their weight in the election, and thereby enabling an inconsiderable portion of the People of the Union, by presenting a solid front, and impressing into their service their respective minorities, to elect the President in the primary colleges? and in this event, as I shall attempt to show, the remedy is almost as bad as the disease. Shall we any longer hold out the delusion to the People, that they are the electors of the President, when, in prac-tricts in that State was made. Whether it was made upon tice, they have ordinarily only, the power of nomination an emergency, and designed to throw majorities in each They may, indeed, nominate three individuals to the district in favor of a particular party, or of particular men, House of Representatives, but they do not choose the is wholly immaterial to the present inquiry. In this state President. That important power devolves upon their Re- of things, a bare majority of the People of the six larger presentatives in Congress a power which they are com- States in the Union may, by adopting the general ticket petent to exercise themselves. Judging from our past ex- system, the Gerrymandering system, or by assuming the perience upon this subject, what will probably be the re-election to the Legislatures, elect the President, though sult of future elections of this distinguished officer? Much of the larger portion of that long list of worthies who personated the drama of the American Revolution, have past from the stage of action, and are numbered with "the years beyond the flood." We can no longer, as our fathers did, contemplate the immortal Father of his Country, upon whom all united in elevating to this high station; nor can we call into our service the immortal author of the Declaration of Independence. A new generation are about to assume the places of their fathers; many are the aspirants to this high station; public opinion is divided, and cannot, in future, be often concentrated on any one individual. Under these circumstances, it is idle to suppose that this election can be prevented from terminating ultimately in the House of Representatives. That it will often devolve here, cannot be doubted; that it should not do so, I have attempted, and, I hope, satisfactorily, shown. These are some of the objections to the Constitution in its present form, and some of the reasons which have presented themselves most forcibly to my mind, why the election of President and Vice President should in no event devolve upon Congress. I come now, said Mr. POLK, briefly to consider the second resolution, submitted to the consideration of the Committee, by the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. MCDUFFIE) which proposes that each State in the Union shall be divided into as many districts as there are Senators and Representatives in Congress from such State. The object of this proposition is to give to the People of every section of the Union, as near as may be, con a respectable minority, and very nearly half of the People New York has Electors. 36, a majority is 19 28 15 Thus, sir, in these six States, there are 133 electoral votes, a majority of the whole number in the Union, and sufficient, if united, to elect the President in the primary colleges. But the People in those six States are divided in opinion, and very nearly equipoised as to numbers, between two contending candidates, A and B, for the Presidency. But A has small majorities over B, in each of those States. If the district system were established, the friends of A could give him 72 electoral votes, and the friends of B could give him 61 electoral votes. B, too, in the case supposed, might be supported by the remaining eighteen States, or by such majorities of them as, when added to his 61 votes, would be sufficient to elect him. But by compressing the friends of B in those six States, into the support of A by the effect of the general ticket system, or MARCH 13, 1826. Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. by elections made by the Legislatures; by literally sup-States choose the electors, the larger States would still pressing the voice of the minorities, in each of those six retain their present power And, by either of these States favorable to the election of B; by denying to al- modes, the predominant party or faction in power, in each most half the population of those States the right of suf- State, by suppressing the voice of the minority, may move frage, or of being heard in the election-you, in truth, in a solid front, and elect the President. If it be conenable a minority of the People of this Union, amounting tended that this is an advantage which all the States would to but little more than the fourth of the whole population, equally possess, the idea is a mistaken one. Such is the to elect the President against the will of all the rest of the difference in the size, and quantum of population, in the People of the Union, amounting to almost three-fourths several States, that a majority, whose voice is totally supof our whole population. But will it be said, that this pressed in the election in one of the larger States, may likewise is an extreme case, and will probably never oc- be as great-nay, more than five times as great-as the cur? I answer it is possible it may occur, and cases ap- whole population of one of the smaller States. To illusproximating to it, and the same in principle, if the elec- trate this, take, for example, the States of New York and tion is kept from the House of Representatives, in all pro- Delaware, one of the largest and one of the smallest States bability will occur. in the Union. Suppose New York to be divided in opinThis, then, is our dilemma. Under the present pro-ion between two candidates, in an impending Presidential visions of the Constitution, either a minority of the whole election, in the proportion of 19 to 17 of her 36 electors. people of the Union, by a combination of the large States, If the district system prevailed, one of the candidates must elect the President, or we must submit to the nation- would receive 19 electoral votes, and the other the real calamity of an election in the House of Representa-maining 17 electoral votes. But, by establishing the getives. Which shall we choose? Neither is compatible neral ticket system in New York, a large minority, and with the genius of our free institutions, or the sovereignty very nearly half of her citizens, who would be entitled by of the People. And here will the larger States object to the district system to give 17 electoral votes, are literally the district system, and say, we cannot part with the ad- destroyed, and impressed into the service of the majority. vantage which we now have, of moving in a solid, un- In Delaware, the whole population can give only three broken phalanx, and giving to our favorite candidate an electoral votes. Thus, the minority in New York, whose undivided electoral vote, by suppressing the voice of the voice is totally suppressed in the election, would be more minority in the State, by means of the general ticket sys- than five times as great as the whole population of Delatem, or elections by the Legislatures? I answer that the ware. But suppose Delaware likewise to be divided in larger States will receive an ample equivalent for this sur- opinion in the proportion of one to two of her three elecrender, in the certainty that the election can never devolve tors. By the district system, Delaware would give two upon the House of Representatives, where, voting by votes to one candidate for the Presidency, and one to the States, a minority, as I have attempted to show, and I other. Establish the general ticket system in Delaware, hope successfully, may elect. and her three votes will be given to one candidate, thereby suppressing the voice of a minority of that State, who, by the district system, would be entitled to give one vote. One vote of the minority, then, by the general ticket system, is suppressed in Delaware. But in New York, by the same system, seventeen votes are suppressed. Thus the minority in New York, whose voice is suppressed by the general ticket system, is seventeen times as great as the minority in Delaware, whose voice is suppressed by the same system. Thus, sir, it is seen what great inequali ty would be produced in the election of a President by establishing the general ticket system as the uniform mode in all the States. The same result would happen by establishing the mode of clecting by the Legislatures as the uniform mode in all the States. The great excellence of the district system is, that each district throughout the Union would contain very nearly the same quantum of population, would be composed of contiguous territory, and would be very nearly of the same size; and each district would be entitled to give one vote. And if, sir, minorities should be found to exist, in a Presidential election, in each district, as they may, is it probable that there will be such a disparity, such a disproportion between the respective minorities of adjoining or different districts, where all are of the same size, as would exist between the minorities of different States, differing as they do in size, some containing more than thirty times as great a population as others; and, when, by the general system, each State would compose one district? I was amused, sir, but not convinced, by the argument of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. STEVENSON) the object of which was to show the superiority of the general ticket system over all others, and that minorities in the district system would prevail. That honorable gentleman adduced, as an apt example, in illustration of his argument, an occurrence, which he says took place in one of the districts of Maryland, in the late Presidential election. In one of the districts in that State, he says there were a majority of the People in favor of the election of Mr. Adams; that there were two candidates for elector favorable to that gentle Will the smaller States object to that part of the resolutions now under consideration, which proposes so to amend the Constitution as that the election shall in no event devolve upon Congress, and say, we cannot part with the advantage which we have of voting by States, when the election shall devolve upon the House of Representatives, and whereby we, though a minority, may have it in our power to elect a President? I answer, that the smaller States will receive an ample equivalent for this surrender, in the certainty that the larger States cannot combine and move in an unbroken body in the electoral colleges, and thereby enable a minority of the People of the Union, by suppressing the voice of their respective minorities in the large States, to elect the President, as I have attempted to show, and I hope successfully, they might do. The resolutions, then, viewed together, and not as substantive and distinct propositions, in relation to their effects and operations, propose a compromise to the larger and smaller States, that they should meet upon middle ground, and surrender the advantages which the one or the other might possess in certain contingencies, each receiving a mutual consideration from the other for the surrender thus made. It is a surrender of advantages, too, which neither should wish to retain; a surrender made not to each other, but to principle, upon the altar of their common country. But, will the larger States object, and say, though uniformity in the mode of election be important and desirable, in order to obtain a fair expression of the public will, yet we cannot agree that that mode shall be the district system? We prefer that the general ticket system should be the mode established in all the States, or we prefer that the choice of electors should be made by the Legislatures in all the States, and that the one or the other of these modes should be uniform throughout the Union. I answer, by neither of these modes can the evil complained of be remedied. If the general ticket system be the uniform mode established, the larger States would still retain their present power. If the Legislatures in all the H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH 13, 1826. man, and one in favor of General Jackson; that, in conse- tives in Congress from that State. The People of each quence of a division of the friends of the former, between district shall vote directly for the President and Vice Prethe two candidates for elector, neither of whom would sident, without the intervention of Electors. The person, decline in favor of the other, the elector, friendly to the in each district, who may have received the highest numlatter, received a plurality of votes of the district, and ber of votes for President, shall be holden to have rewas elected. Now, sir, what the facts were, in relation ceived one vote; and the person who may have received to that particular district, adduced as an example, I am the highest number of votes for Vice President, shall be not particularly informed; but, I understand it became holden to have received one vote. And if it shall be asmore a contest between distinguished individuals, who certained that no person has received a majority of the were opposing candidates for elector, and who had, re- whole number of districts in the Union, let the election spectively, many personal friends, than a contest between be referred back to the People, who, upon the second the candidates for the Presidency themselves, and is, balloting, shall, in like manner, vote for one of the two therefore, no test of the real sentiments of the People of highest upon the list of the former balloting for Presi that district, and no conclusive illustration of the gentle-dent, and so of the Vice President. The details of this man's argument. But, sir, if it were, I have it in my general outline of a system, to embrace the objects conpower to furnish that honorable gentleman with a fair re-templated by the resolutions, can be easily drawn, so as butter, which occurred in that election, by the operations to render it practicable, and easy to effect the choice in of his favorite-the general ticket system. The State of this way. But, if other gentlemen can suggest a more Ohio voted by general ticket. Did the gentleman who acceptable plan, in its details, not varying the general received the undivided electoral vote of that State, in fact principles, I am not wedded to this, and have merely sugreceive the support, even of the majority of the People gested it, lest it might be said, by some, that, however of Ohio? No sir; supported as he was, by a very small great the objections may be, to the present provision of number of votes over one of his competitors, and if all the the Constitution, it would be impracticable to adopt any returns had been correctly received, it is very doubtful mode by which the evil could be remedied. Neither shall whether he obtained even a plurality over him. Yet, sir, I, Mr. Chairman, detain the Committee by enumerating, he received, in the electoral colleges, the whole vote of in addition to those I have mentioned, many other objec the State of Ohio, against the sentiments of a considerable tions to the general ticket system, or to the appointment majority of the People of that State; and yet, sir, this, I of electors by the Legislatures. It would be unnecessa suppose, constitutes the excellence of the general ticket ry for me to do so, after the able exposition of the honorsystem, in the estimation of the gentleman from Virginia. able mover of these resolutions, (Mr. McDUFFIE) in the The individual, too, whom the gentleman conceives was, opening of this debate, upon this part of the subject. by the operation of the district system, deprived of an Some other objections, however, have been made to the electoral vote in one of the districts of Maryland-yes, sir, plan of amendment proposed, in the course of the discusthe same individual who had received the smallest num- sion, which demand to be noticed. ber of the votes of the People of Ohio, when the election ultimately devolved upon this House, received the vote of that State. But, sir, I concur in opinion with the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr. LIVINGSTON) who, a few days ago, submitted a resolution, proposing to dispense with the electors altogether. The People require no such agency. I believe them to be wholly unnecessary. Dispense with them altogether: let the People vote directly for the President, without their intervention, and the objection to the district system, as in the case in Maryland, which has presented itself so forcibly to the mind of the gentleman from Virginia, will be removed. When the People vote directly for the President, there can be no division between contending candidates for elector, in favor of the same candidate, and the majority of the People of each district can control and give the vote of that district. Another advantage of the district system is, that the sentiment of each mass of the community throughout the Union, composing a district, is fairly elicited, and made to have its due and proportional weight in the general collected sentiment of all the districts in the Union. The sentiment of no portion of the Union is suppressed. All are heard, and have their proper weight in determining the election. I do not design, Mr. Chairman, (said Mr. P.) to embarrass this discussion, by entering into details. If the great principles contemplated by the resolutions on the table, are retained, details are comparatively unimportant, and a spirit of compromise and accommodation of opinion should prevail, in relation to them. I shall, therefore, merely suggest to the consideration of the Committee, the plan which has presented itself to my mind, as preferable to any other, and leave it to them to determine how far it will afford a remedy for existing evils. It is in substance this: Each State shall be divided, by the Legislature thereof, into as many districts, composed of contiguous territory, and containing, as near as may be, an equal quantum of population, as shall be equal to the whole number of Senators and Representa The honorable gentleman from New York (Mr. STORRS) has been more abundant in objections to the proposed plan of amendment than any other gentleman who has addressed the Committee; and though I am aware, sir, when I approach an argument of that gentleman, I encounter an old and experienced politician, hackneyed in debate, yet, differing with him in opinion, as it is my misfortune to do, in almost every view he has taken of this subject, I will boldly meet him, and avow the reasons of that difference. That gentleman tells us, with a warning voice, that when we approach this Constitution, we stand upon holy ground; that when we attempt to amend it, we lay violent hands upon this mmortal work of our ancestors. He tells us he entertains great reverence for that instrument; that he would not disturb one principle which it contains; and, in the same strain in which he thus addresses us, he informs us that there is an insuperable objection to the plan of amendment proposed, because a portion of a certain description of population, negro slaves, in the Southern and Western States, will be represented in this election. Now, sir, by the present Constitution, for which the gentleman professes such great reverence, and would not alter or amend it in any particular, three-fifths of this population are represented in the election. By the proposed amendment, they are only represented. The amendment does not propose to disturb this principle, but leaves it precisely upon the ground where it is placed by the present Constitution. So that it was wholly unavailable, and I must say, unnecessary, to bring up this question in order to ascertain the comparative merits of the present Constitution, and the proposed amendment. I have regretted exceedingly, sir, that scarcely any subject of general concern can be agitated here, without having this unfortunate subject of slavery, either collaterally, or incidentally, brought into view, and made to mingle in our deliberations. It is a subject of peculiar delicacy; but, as it has been noticed upon this occasion, not only by the gentleman from New York, but likewise by the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. EVERETT) |