H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH 14, 1826. from necessity and policy also. Take, for illustration, the power, although the People of Rhode Island have, with case of a State, one half of which, in time of war, is in the one or two exceptions, chosen the Presidential Electors possession of the enemy-this may be considered an ex-in another mode: yet, inasmuch as there is but a short retreme case, but it was the situation of Maine during the move between the People and their Representatives, one late war-an election by districts would be impracticable; branch of the Legislature being chosen annually, and the and, although the territory in the possession of the enemy other semi-annually, and but three months before the elecis, for some purposes, considered in the light of a foreign tors are chosen, the Legislature of Rhode Island would territory, I ask gentlemen if the electoral votes of a State seldom, in the choice of Electors, run counter to the will are to be curtailed by this temporary possession? If not, of the People. I will claim the indulgence of the Comthen, ex necessitate, the Legislature must appoint. We mittee, whilst I examine the proposed mode of choice by learn from the gentleman from North Carolina, who first districts. A cursory examination must answer, as I can addressed the Committee, (Mr. SAUNDERS) that the Le- say but little that has not been already said by gentlemen gislature of that State once exercised this appointing who have preceded me. It has been already shewn that, power, and, in doing so, nobly sustained Mr. Madison. by this mode, a minority may elect and the late vote in Sir, the case referred to by that honorable gentleman, is a Maryland has been referred to, where a minority of those case in point, to shew that it is sometimes expedient, and who voted, elected seven of the cleven Electors. In a may be good policy, for State Legislatures to exercise this late Congressional election of Representatives to Congress, power. The case referred to, was one during the late by districts, in the State of New York, of the members war; and combinations were then the order of the day; elected there were chosen, to use terms introduced in the the avowed objects of which were, a speedy peace, and a course of this debate, fourteen Clintonians to twenty Buckglorious termination of the war. There was too much tail members, when the aggregate votes given to the Clinreason for believing that these were not the real objects. tonians far outnumbered those given to the other party. The votes of Pennsylvania and North Carolina were ne- The election by districts might, in many cases, restrain cessary to secure the re-election of Mr. Madison, and, "to the power of large States, and lessen their force and inmake assurance doubly sure," the Legislature of North fluence, more especially those large States that had not a Carolina interposed. They were, in my opinion, justified candidate of their own; and if, coming as I do, from one in exercising a right, which, by the Constitution, it was of the smallest States in the Union, I could be actuated by lawful for them to exercise, and, under similar circumstan- motives which I hope have not influenced others, I should ces, would be again justified. If the choice of electors not object to this; but I am not influenced by such conhad been submitted to the People, the result might have siderations; willing to retain all the powers the Constitu been different, and still that result would not have been a tion conferred upon the smaller States; and willing, at the fair expression of the voice of the People of the State, but same time, the large States should derive from the Constian expression of the opinions of those who were at home, tution all the advantages their numbers can give them. when ten thousand of the independent freemen of that In districts there is a better field presented for intrigue and State might have been abroad, fighting the battles of their corruption; as you lessen the sphere of operation of some country. men, you enable them to concentrate their forces, and to In further illustration of this policy and expediency, act with more success and efficiency. Ten unprincipled suffer me to advert to another case, of which I am remind men, when scattered over the surface of a whole State, ed by seeing near me my worthy friend from Massachu- with all their force and power to corrupt, as well as mislead, setts, (Mr. EVERETT.) In reference to the political or might not be able to make, among the People at large, party distinctions, as they have existed, the town of Mar- any unfavorable impressions, or effect any improper reblehead, distinguished as the birth-place of one Vice Pre-sults; but give to each of these political jugglers a dissident, and other illustrious men, and more distinguished trict, and they might be able to control the votes of at for the enterprise, laudable zeal, and uniform patriotism least ten districts. Ten votes in each, of seven out of ten of its citizens, stood, at the commencement of the late districts, might control the election; and the majority in war, in the proportion of six hundred and fifty voters on one of the other districts for another candidate, might be one side, to about sixty or seventy on the other. During more than the united majorities in the whole of the seven the war, the citizens of that place were fighting the bat- districts. There is one view which I shall take of the tles of their country, in the army, in the navy, on board of election by districts, which is different from the views of private armed vessels-on the land, on the lakes, and on any of those who have preceded me. It is contended that the Ocean. The town was literally drained of its popula- the district system is necessary to preserve the rights, the tion; and, during the war, at one period, the minor party power, and influence of the small States. I hold directly succeeded in electing their candidate to the Legislature of the reverse to be the case: district the small States, and, the State. Sir, the political sentiments of a State may be in the primary elections, they will lose what little political changed in the same way as were changed the political force and influence they now have. And why? Because sentiments of the town referred to. I ask, then, sir, if it the large States hereafter will have the President and Vice would be a stretch of power, on the part of any State Le- President; they will be men who reside in those States, gislature, whose members are chosen by a full expression are born there, or are a favorite of those States. From of the opinions of all the People of a State, when at home, State pride, and the esprit-du-corps, which will always and quietly pursuing their wonted occupation, which have an influence, they will hereafter present an undividshould exercise this appointing power, although the ma-ed vote, let the mode of election be what it may, by gejority of the People at home, and the majority brought neral ticket, by Legislature, or by districts. The small about in the way referred to, entertain opinions different States, and the States of secondary grade, having no canfrom those of the members of the State Legislature? didates, faction may tear them, and division destroy their These are my reasons, Mr. Chairman, against taking force. New York and Pennsylvania have nearly as many from the State Legislatures the right to exercise this of the votes as five of the Eastern States, six of the States power. I do not presume it will be often exercised: sel-lying in the valley of the Mississippi, and New Jersey and dom when it is known that the People are averse to the Delaware; the proportion is as sixty-four to seventy-one. exercise of it; and there may be cases in which it ought Select from New York the candidate for the Presidency, to be exercised. Let the Constitution, in relation to this and from Pennsylvania the candidate for the Vice Presipower, remain as we found it. So far as relates to the dency, and those States will hereafter give an undivided State I represent, the exercise of it by the Legislature vote, whether the choice be by districts, Legislature, or would not, under any circumstances, be a great stretch of general ticket; but divide the thirteen States to which I MARCH 14, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. left the remedy in the power of the several States, to be applied as they may think most judicious. have referred, into districts, perhaps the time will never arrive when one-half of their votes will be given to any one candidate. We cannot judge of the future by the past; I come now, Mr. Chairman, to the other proposition, the local, the political distinctions, which have existed, and certainly the most important one, if the rights and inwill not last forever; and we ought to recollect, that, interests of the small States are to be either guarded or promaking this amendment, or the other amendment, to tected-the proposition which contemplates the removal the Constitution, if we now have in view one political in- of the election of President from the House of Representerest, or another interest, the course that will best pro-tatives, and the loss which the small States will consemote the interest of this or that man, the Constitution, with the amendments that may be made, may outlive all those interests, and all the individuals, that can be affected by the immediate operation of the amendments that may be agreed to. Leave it optional with the States to elect by district, or otherwise, as may best subserve their own purposes, and as the People of the several States may think best-for they will govern, they will be heard, and will have that mode which they prefer-gentlemen need not give themselves any apprehensions on this subject. I am unwilling so to amend the Constitution as to esta-bear the weight and influence of the wealth and aristocrablish an uniform mode of voting for the President and Vice President in districts. I am satisfied with the Constitution as it now is, and that the mode is well left to the Legislatures of the several States. But, sir, if uniformity is so great a desideratum, why confine this uniformity to the choice of Electors of President and Vice President? Let the qualifications of Electors be uniform; let the election of Representatives to Congress, both as to mode and time, be uniform; but no, this would not do; some gentlemen would have to quit their country. The odds being so great against Virginia, she must go to other States: it would not be reasonable to expect that other States would fall in with the views of Virginia, when that State, and my native State, are the only two States in the Union whose electoral qualifications are placed exclusively upon real estate. quently sustain; judging from the tenor of the remarks and arguments of the honorable mover, they are to have no compensation, and are to be in no way indemnified. This contingent power is all-important to the small States, and, without it, some of thern would have never become members of the Confederacy, nor come into the Union. Rhode Island did not become a member until late in the year 1790, and then by a majority of only two votes, in the second Convention that was called to adopt the Constitution; and this result was produced by bringing to cy of the State. Such were the jealousies and apprehensions of the People of that State; so tenacious were they of their rights; they reluctantly yielded their assent, and joined the Confederacy. But, sir, if the members of that Convention had been told, that within thirty-six years of the time the People of that State became members of the Union, propositions would be made, seriously discussed, and strongly, ably enforced, calculated to deprive that State of the benefits one of the features in the Constitution gave to it, and the one that was best calculated to preserve the political power of small States, Rhode Island would never have become a member of the National Union, nor come into it other than a conquered province. We need but look into the Constitution to shew that it was formed in the spirit of compromise, and in reference to State rights; and any alterations which affect those rights, As to the mode of electing Members of Congress, in all is such an infringement upon the compact itself as to debut the Eastern States, a plurality alone is all that is re-stroy the compromise upon which it was formed. The quired to make a choice; in the New England States, the compromise is seen in the equal representation in the Secandidate that is elected must have a majority of all the nate, in the treaty-making power, in the apportionment of votes polled. Here, then, is an essential difference as to Representatives and direct taxes, and in the choice of Prethe mode of choice a difference I have been made sensi-sident and Vice President, on the final vote, in the House bly to feel. Much has been said about a minority Presi- of Representatives; and no part of the compromise is more dent; non constat one half of the Representatives on this important to the small States than the latter. To shew the floor are minority Representatives. The honorable mo- light in which the Convention viewed the great work ver of these resolutions may come here as a Representa- they had completed, I will read one or two extracts from tive, when a large majority of his constituents may be op- the letter of Washington, written after the Constitution posed to his election. I do not think that will soon take was framed : place: for I learn that gentleman is deservedly popular in "It is at all times difficult to draw, with precision, the his district; and if zeal, fidelity, and a display of shining line between those rights which must be surrendered, and talents, in advocating their interests, and guarding their those which may be reserved; and, on the present occarights, can secure popularity, he will with them long con- sion, this difficulty was increased by a difference among tinue to be popular. Yet, in that gentleman's district, if the several States as to their situation, extent, habits, and A has two thousand and fifty votes, B two thousand and particular interest. The Constitution which we now preforty-nine, and C two thousand and forty-nine, A is elect- sent is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual ed, although there is almost a majority of two to one against deference and concession which the peculiarity of our pohim; and A, elected under such circumstances, is, un-litical situation rendered indispensable.' doubtedly, the People's candidate, and is elected by the If the Constitution was formed in the true spirit of comPeople. There is, at present, among the States, no uni-promise, it may not be improper to inquire into the relaformity as to the time of electing members, although Con- tive loss and gain between the large and small States; gress, under the Constitution of the United States, have and if, upon investigation, it shall be found that the comthe power of fixing the time; yet, they never have inter-mon and practical operation of the Constitution has been fered, and a committee raised upon that subject, at this session, have reported almost unanimously against any interference on the part of Congress. Some members are now elected at the expiration of their term, and others are elected, if the People think proper to return them again, soon after the first session of Congress: if they are not returned, they come again, bringing with them from their constituents, manifestations of their want of confidence, calculated to render the incumbent an unprofitable servant to them and to the Nation. Yet, if there be evils growing out of this state of things, Congress has wisely such, and will continue to be such, as to lessen the weight of the small States, with all their contingent advantages, they will be fully justified in claiming and exercising all the rights which were fully guarantied to them. When the Constitution was framed, presented to the People, and adopted by the small States, it was expected the number of States would be increased; but no one anticipated the rapid increase, and no one anticipated the incorporation of States out of Territories not within the old dominion of the United States; and every addition of States which has been made to the Union, has decreased the H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH 14, 1826. would be the most likely to succeed? Sir, I doubt, if Washington had been a citizen and resident of one of the smallest States, whether he would have been elected a second time. power of the old States, in the Senate of the United States; and has, by making necessary an increase of the representative ratio, decreased also the power of the old States in the other branch of the National Legislature. When the Constitution was adopted, the Federative voice bore Small States are liable to be overlooked, by the apa proportion to the Popular voice, of twenty-six to sixty pointing power, by the People; and in every case, except five: there were then thirteen States, with twenty-six Sena where their blood or their treasure is required; then the tors, and sixty-five Representatives; of which, New Hamp- Representative ratio is not always the rule or standard. If shire had three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island one, a neighboring district, in a large State, is invaded—a disConnecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Penn- trict contiguous to a small State-imaginary lines do not sylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, prevent the small States, thus situated, from making comNorth and South Carolina each five, and Georgia three. mon cause with the large one that is invaded. Take from Now, the Federative voice bears a proportion to the Po- the small States heir final vote on this floor, and what pular voice, of forty-eight to two hundred and thirteen. can they effect by unity of action, in the primary election When the Constitution was adopted, Rhode Island, with of the President? There never would, and from the local one Representative, had one sixty-fifth of the whole repre- situation of the small States, there never could be, in the sentation, and Delaware the same; but now, Rhode first election, any concert between them. Suppose, in any Island, with two Representatives, has not one hundred one election, there was an union between the six New and sixth part of the whole representation, and Delaware England States, New Jersey, and Delaware, and the six has now a two hundred and thirteenth part of the whole. small States in the valley of the Mississippi; these fourEach had one thirteenth of the representation in the Se- teen States can give but eighty-six electoral votes. New nate; now, but one twenty-fourth. Each had one thir- York and Pennsylvania, contiguous States, with Virginia tieth of the Electoral votes; now, Rhode Island has about in the vicinity of the latter, have eighty-seven electoral one sixty-fifth, and Delaware one eighty-seventh. Each votes. These three States, so situated that they can act had, on the final vote, in the House of Representatives, in concert, always liable to unite-from one, the candione thirteenth-and now, one twenty-fourth. Small States, date for the Presidency may be taken, from another the in apportionments, suffer more than large ones, by their candidate for the Vice Presidency, and the claims of the fractions. Take from Rhode Island one Representative, third may be satisfied with assurances of a place in the and you take one half of her whole representation: take Cabinet-have more power in the primary election, than from New York one, that State will have thirty-three re- the other fourteen, although the populous State of Masmaining and if Rhode Island should lose one Represent-sachusetts is one of the fourteen. If such be the compaative, that State must have a large fraction for years. rative strength and force of the large States, how can the Delaware has now a fraction of thirty-two thousand; and, Federative system be preserved, and the political importif the late apportionment bill, as reported by the commit-ance of the small States sustained, except by this final tee of the whole, when under discussion, had become a law, Rhode Island would have been left with a fraction of thirty-eight thousand. Small States are continually liable to suffer in this mode. Once, in every ten years, Rhode Island must struggle for one half of her representation. What, Sir, is the effect of this fraction, considering the usages, as well as many of the established rules of the Government? In the distribution among the several States of many of the Government favors, I do not speak of Executive patronage, the Representative ratio is resorted to as a rule. This is the standard by which the appointment of cadets for the Military School is governed. I have now, Mr. Chairman, on my desk, a bill which has While the smaller States have not had, by the common been reported, creating a school fund, which contem- operation of the Constitution, all the benefits and advanplates a distribution of the same, according to the number tages which they had a right to expect, I will proceed to of Representatives in each State; and, upon the princi- show, that the influence and political power of some of ples of this bill, your State has a fraction of thirty-two the larger States have increased, beyond the calculations thousand, whieh can derive no benefit whatever from it. of the framers of the Constitution; and, perhaps, the inSmall States must always suffer, in the distribution of crease has been much greater than the States to which I public moneys. When standing alone, their expectations shall refer anticipated. I approach, Mr. Chairman, this must be small, or they will certainly be disappointed. subject with reluctance, cum manibus certe tremulisThe most successful argument that was urged, and, pro- knowing how sensitive many gentlemen on this floor are, bably, the most judicious one, that was made in favor of whenever the subject I propose, but for a moment, to the fortifications now erecting in Rhode Island, was bot- examine, is brought into discussion, and believing it tomed upon the importance of the fortifications to other right that their sensations should be excited, whenever States. The waters of the Narragansett Bay were the key any discussion should remind them of their unpleasant and to Long Island Sound, and the Chesapeake Bay. Sup-unfortunate circumstances: but, Sir, gentlemen will do pose, Sir, a question should arise, in the location of the contemplated Naval School, between Delaware and the State of New York-and Delaware, for the sake of the argument, we will say, was the most suitable place, would the small State of Delaware, with one Representative, able and distinguished as he is, stand an equal chance, here or elsewhere, with the great State of New York, with her thirty-four Representatives? These are inconveniences which the smaller States must calculate upon. Suppose two men were equally qualified for the Presidency, and had equal claims, one living in Delaware, and the other in New York, Pennsylvania, or Virginia--which vote, this contingent advantage, whenever the election comes to this House? Sir, it is the old States, long settled, whose population has been drained to supply new States, that will be most sensible to this loss of power. Their representation on this floor, I will not say never, but may not, for one hundred years, increase. Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Delaware, have not the prospects before them of Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, and Mississippi. Let the small States retain all the `advantages it was intended they should realize, under the Constitution; their influence, at best, will be small, and less than was originally contemplated. me the justice to believe me, when I tell them I speak the undissembled sentiments of my heart, when, in my opinion, I declare, that the proposed amendment aims a deadly blow at the political power of the State to which I am indebted for a seat in this House. Shall I not then, be justified by the occasion, in drawing an argument from any legal source, that will have a tendency to show the fallacy of the arguments in favor of the resolutions, and the injustice of the proposed amendments? The Constitution was framed and adopted by the States, in a spirit of compromise: and shall one portion of the States enjoy all the benefits, while another shall be deprived of MARCH 14, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. {H. of R. population does exist, in the late war some of the States withheld their militia, when called for by the General Government and this refusal by some States, is to shut out of sight, in this discussion of State rights, the part of the Constitution referred to, and the political power given to some States by the means of it! Sir, all the old thirteen States, and particularly the smaller States, who have relied upon their relative importance in the Senate, which is in the inverse ratio of the number of that body, have witnessed a diminution of their strength, in the admission of States into this Union, out of Territories not included within the limits of the old domain, at the adoption of the Constitution. It is, perhaps, too late to controvert the constitutionality of such admission; and if it could be questioned, and I think it well might be, necessity, which knows no law, would be resorted to for a justification : the territory must be purchased, to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi, and the deposite at New Orexpress stipulation in the treaty of cession, binding the United States to admit "the inhabitants of the ceded territory into the Union, as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the United States." what it was intended they should enjoy? Sir, one portion of the States have enjoyed all that they could ever have expected, or hoped for-nay, more. I speak in reference to States with "a population of a certain kind." I will not, on this occasion, nor on any other, if I can possibly avoid it, in this Hall, use a term not used in the Constitution of the United States. Who can read the third paragraph, in the second section, and first article, of the Constitution of the United States, and not see the concession made by many of the small States, to the States to which I shall call the attention of the Committee. "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." That this feature of the Federative system was consi-leans; and the purchase could not be elected, without an dered, at the time the Constitution was framed, an advantage to those States having the kind of population to which I have referred, no rational man can doubt. So important was it considered, that it is a well known fact, that two of the States refused to recommend the Constitution, when formed, or to be bound by it, until the first Two States have already been carved out of this terriclause, in the ninth section, of the first art cle of the Con- į tory; and, in the course of time, perhaps, some eight or stitution, was inserted. At the time the Constitution was ten more may be. When the Constitution is examined, framed, as well as at the period it was adopted, but a few and it is found to have been "ordained and established among us thought this population would increase it was for the United States of America," and for the territory the unceasing prayer of every philanthropist in the which belonged to the United States, the same being an country, that it would not; and it was consequently sup- appendage to the United States: when we view the reposed that those States which had this population, would stricted power, relative to the admission of new States; derive no additional advantages from it, in the ratio of [here Mr. PEARCE read the third section of article fourth, representation, or otherwise. But, Sir, how stand the of the Constitution,] it may well be questioned, whether facts, at this period? In 1800, this population furnished the Convention that framed, or the State Conventions eighteen Representatives in this House; and, in 1820, but which adopted, the Constitution, supposed it capable of a fraction short of twenty-five Representatives. The in- a construction that has been put upon it, and which, in crease of black population is found, on examination, to be this respect, it has received. If they did not, then, here much greater than that of the white population. In five has been an unexpected operation of the Constitution, of the Atlantic States, from 1789 to 1810, the relative in- diminishing the power, if not impairing the rights, of the crease of the white and black population, has been as small States, and, in fact, of the whole of the Old Thirteen. follows: In Maryland, the white has been thirteen per In whatever light the practical operation of the Constitucent., and the black thirty-one. In Virginia, the white tion is viewed, it will be seen that the smaller States have population has been twenty-four, and the black thirty-gained nothing by it, but have been made to feel, and will eight. North Carolina, the white population thirty per cent., the black seventy. In South Carolina, the increase of the white population has been sixty-four, and that of the black population, eighty-three per cent. In one of these States, South Carolina, the increase from 1810 to 1820, has been, whites 23,000, and blacks 64,000. In this State, the whole number of whites is 237,000, and the whole number of blacks is 265,000. The black population of that State, upon the existing representative ratio, furnishes four Representatives, and a fraction over-nearly one half of the whole representation of that State; and the increase of that population, from 1810 to 1820, has been sixty-four thousand-an increase which has given to that State an additional Representative, while Vermont, Connecticut, and Delaware, have each lost one. At this moment, this species of population amounts, perhaps, to more than one million seven hundred thou sand, and, at the next census, will furnish one third of the representation from those States where it exists. Those States, with this compound of population and property, have had the full benefit of this feature in the Constitution-introduced for their benefit. They have, in fact, had the benefit, without paying, except in a few cases, the quid pro quo agreed upon our revenue, except in a very few cases, has been derived from commerce; and but a small part of our war debt has, or will be, paid off by direct taxation. I will not pursue this subject further. The gentleman from Tennessee has intimated it ought never To be referred to, and has told the committee, that, if this VOL. II-106 continue to witness, their weakness, and diminutive power: and hence the necessity of thus retaining, if the Fede rative system is not to be at once destroyed, all the contingent powers which, under any circumstances, they can exercise. From the tenor of the argument of some gentlemen, one would be led to suppose, that they are desir ous of those amendments that will subserve the interests of the States they represent, regardless of the rights and interests of other States, and regardless of the Federative powers of the Government. When the gentleman from Virginia, who first addressed the committee, (Mr. ARCHER) was contending for the removal of the election from this House, but was, at the same time, contending for an elec. tion by General Ticket, I was induced to believe that high minded and generous Virginia had become influ enced by those sordid, contracted, and niggardly notions, which, in former times, did not characterize the citizens of that State. But, when I listened to the other gentleman from that State, who addressed the committee, (Mr. STEVENSON) whose candor and patriotic views were only equalled by the impressive eloquence with which he spoke, I was satisfied that Virginia is now, in the language of one of her most distinguished citizens, "too proud to surrender her own rights, and too just to invade the rights of others." I regret, Mr. Chairman, that I cannot agree to the substitute proposed by that honorable gentleman, because, believing in the correctness of the greater part of his able argument, I should have been pleased to have subscribed to the whole of it. If the election is H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH 14, 1826. it, inasmuch as the present Executive was chosen in a Constitutional mode taken from this House, in the event of there being no choice by the People, and transferred to the State Legislatures, would not all the evils there exist, which some But a word on this subject-if gentlemen would tell have alleged have existed, and declared will exist, here? us their candidate was not chosen, no one would argue The votes of one State may settle the question of Presi- that point with them. Let gentlemen make an estimate dent, and will elect A or B, as they may be given for the of the number of Electors, or voters, in those States one or the other; and the votes of five men, or a lesser which gave their electoral votes to the incumbent, and number, may carry the vote of the State, for A or B. Un- proportion those, in those States whose electoral votes der this state of things, if corruption, intrigue, and cabal, were divided according to the division, and they will find would exist in either body-this House or the State Legis- that the incumbent had a plurality, if not a majority, of lature-would they not operate as efficiently in the State all the Electors in the Union; and, are they prepared to Legislature as in this Hall? Compare the conduct of the say, that, if, in the late election, the vote had been a dimembers of this House, when lately electing a President, rect one, in every State, for the several candidates, the with the cabal, intrigue, and riot, on the part of the New incumbent would not have had a plurality, if not a majoYork Legislature, when electing Electors, whose votes rity, of all the votes? In elections by the House, a field were supposed to be necessary to choose a candidate. It is opened for Executive influence and Executive patronis not alleged that corruption did there exist, although age. This argument has been so ably combated, and one of the incorruptible Seventeen has lately vacated his so completely overthrown, by the gentleman from Masseat, and, like the retreating Scythian, has fled the capital. sachusetts, (Mr EVERETT) that any remarks of mine If suspicion be evidence of corruption, (and I do not con- would be a waste of time. The Executive has no influtend that in any case it is, or ought to be so considered,) ence he can exercise, and no patronage he can, of himthere was as much of it in that Legislature, as in any self, bestow; and I know of but one officer of the Gobody of men which ever existed. The members not vernment who has any-the Postmaster General; he had, only suspected one another, but themselves, and the on the first of January, 1825, five thousand one hundred People suspected the whole. An Editor of one of the and eighty-two deputies, and has, probably, at this moJournals of this city did not extend his journey beyond ment, some hundred in addition to that number; some of the city of New York, for fear, perhaps, of incurring some the offices of Deputy Postmaster are lucrative and desirunpleasant imputations; and the Postmaster General able. The President appoints the Postmaster General, could not visit the Springs, for the benefit of his health, but, in no case, has any Executive interfered with the without being suspected of bringing with him a disposi- rights or prerogatives of that office. Mr. Madison refustion to influence the rascally Postmasters," in the Le-ed to do it, when importuned by the citizens of Philadelgislature of that State. phia; and Mr. Monroe, notwithstanding the influence of Sir, if public confidence, and a desire to retain it, can names, and the presence of distinguished men, would do give any assurance of a faithful discharge of duties, a Re- no act to defeat the hopes, or disappoint the just expecpresentative of the Nation ought to be considered as safe tations of the friends of the gallant and heroic Van Rensan agent, as a Member of a State Legislature. Every selaer. But, man is too frail to resist temptations. He member of this House has a good share of the confidence must be frail, indeed, not to resist them, when there are of forty thousand People; a town, a borough, or a dis- none which exist. Civil war will grow out of an election trict, with comparatively few inhabitants, may return a by this House. It will grow out of any election, if the member of a State Legislature. Again, we are told, by People are to be led away by restless spirits, and disapthe honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Mc-pointed men; but, referring to the late election, I beDUFFIE) that, hereafter, no man can aspire to the Presi- lieve there were no indications of war of any kind; there dential Chair, who has not distinguished himself on this was a whisper in the gallery, but that was soon stopped. floor, or who has not shown himself eminently qualified An honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. CAMto discharge the duties of President, by the discharge of BRELENG) cannot give to the Administration his support. the duties of some of the Departments of Government. Hinc Lacrymæ. That gentleman is also opposed to an Be it so. Who are the best qualified to judge? And election by the House of Representatives. If the distinwho can best judge of the qualifications of such men? guished citizen who now fills the Executive Chair, had The members of this House, who associate with them, been elected by the People, would my friend from New know them well, and see them every day, or the mem-York have been satisfied? If not, his objection may not bers of a State Legislature, who can know them only by be so much to the mode of election, as to the man electreputation? If, Sir, the election is to be sent back to the ed. But, my friend from New York cannot give to this States, to be by them settled by a vote, in districts, each Administration his support. This declaration created, at State to have one vote, my objections will be found ap-first, in my mind, some disagreeable sensations, and gave plicable to a vote in that mode-perhaps they will apply rise to some melancholy reflections. I did not know that with more force; the votes in one district will settle the the wheels of Government could move, if Hercules withvote of a State, and twenty men, or less, can control the held his strength. One hundred and eighty clerks, in vote of the district, and those men foreigners, mere birds the different departments, I had been told, had been anxof passage for, we are told, by the honorable gentle-iously watching the progress of the appropriation bill, and man from Massachusetts, (Mr. EVERETT) that, in some anxiously waiting its final passage. They were sensibly States, the elective franchise is extended to aliens, and alive to the subject-matter of this bill. I felt for them : persons not naturalized. But, the Constitution must be but, since I have ascertained this bill has, or is, in a fair amended: for, the late election has not given satisfaction way to become a law, and that the sun, more benign to to the People. Individuals are dissatisfied, and always us than he has been to many of our friends further North, will be; but where is evidence of dissatisfaction on the for the last two or three weeks, has, as usual, rose, and, part of the People? It makes but a little difference to some part of the time, shone, and set, my mind has been the great body of the People, whether A or B is Presi-greatly relieved. But the gentleman from New York dent, if he be honest, virtuous, and intelligent; and they will not try the present Administration by its measures have, thank God, too much virtue and intelligence to this he cannot submit to, although his distinguished and condemn without cause, and before trial. The People's magnanimous leader is perfectly willing so to do. Percandidate has not been chosen. Where is the evidence haps the gentleman from New York is apprehensive, if to support this declaration? Is it necessary to controvert he adopts this course, he may find nothing to condemn ; |