MARCH 22, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. sent. But, if a Representative is to act according to his own will, in opposition to that of his constituents, whom does he represent, sir? He can only be the representative of himself. If the latter is the true meaning of the word Representative, I call upon the fathers and professors of literature to expunge the term from our vocabulary. Give the People the exercise of their legitimate right in the election of their Chief Magistrate, and all these evils will be avoided. Mr. Chairman, I will now turn my attention for a moment to the election of electors, by the Legislatures of the States; as it is said, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. MITCHELL) and others, that the Legisla tures do possess the right to elect electors, if they choose to exercise that right. Let us, sir, look to the Constitution itself, for its true explication. In the first section of the second article, it is thus written: "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, the number of electors," &c. This language, sir, must be perverted, and a meaning cruelly extorted, before any such power can be derived by inference from this clause. If this power is to be exercised by the State Legislatures, whom, sir, are they to direct? Themselves? No, sir; that would be a strange and unnatural construction. There must be some third person, some acting power, to whom this direction shall be given. Can you, Mr. Chairman, give a command, or a direction, to yourself? No, sir, you cannot. but you can will to do or not to doa mere sic volo is only necessary. If it had been intended by the Convention that the appointment of electors should be lodged in the Legislatures, instead of a power to direct how they should be elected, they would have used quite different language-such as the appointment of electors in the respective States shall be by the Legislatures thereof-instead of saying that the Legislatures should have the power of directing the mode. The power of appointing electors was never intended by the Constitution to be conferred upon the Legislatures of the respective States. To give such construction to this clause would be a clear perversion of the principles of our language. You, sir, this Committee, or a State Legislature, cannot direct your selves what to do; but, sir, you can direct another. This committee can direct you, sir, and so can a Legislature direct. And, if the Legislatures are to direct in what manner electors shall be chosen, it is plain they do not possess the power to choose themselves. State may be independent, and the People thereof slaves to power. There is a marked difference between the independence of the States and the liberties of the People. Spain, sir, is independent as a nation, and yet her People are in the most desperate state of vassalage; and so may the respective States of this Union, as to their municipal regulations, be entirely independent of one another, possessing all the sovereign rights of independent States, one not having the power to direct the political will of the other, and yet the People not be free. It was the intention of the Convention to unite the freedom of the People with the independence of the States, and that could only be done by giving the People a proper exereise of their will, and this exercise of will cannot exist without its concomitant, the popular principle. But, says the gentleman, that does not exist even in this or the other House. A moment's examination will show the unsoundness of this argument in relation to this House, as I have already shown, so far as it was possible to make the principle conform to the existing constitutions of the States. Uniformity in the election of the Senators by the Legislatures of the respective States to be equal in numbers and reciprocal in powers, was intended by the Convention to constitute the federal election of the Union. But, sir, those who contend that the election of President is the act of the States, and not of the People, will have to admit another principle: that is, that the State can only act in her aggregate or political capacity, by her constituted organ, the Legislature. And, in the event of the election of President devolving upon this House, the members on this floor would, and ought to be, controlled by the resolutions of their own State Legislatures; and, sir, the voice of the Legislature ought to be, to those who would disobey their will, or that of the State, (because, according to this doctrine, their voice must be that of the State, as a State cannot, as a body corporate and politic, be heard in any other manner,) as terrible to them as the thunders of Sinai. They should think no more of disobeying it than a Christian would of disobeying the positive commands of the Gospel; and I hope that gentlemen have, and always will, act up to this principle, and not say that a Representative has a right to exercise his own opinion against the sovereign voice of his State: for that voice can be heard in no other way than through the Legislature. But, sir, the Constitution never intended that this House should supersede the electors. That would have been to lessen the representative character and dignity, The gentleman from New York says, the little States and to reduce us beneath our intended level. But gen- will never agree to any such amendment; that it would tlemen say, that, when the election comes before this be taking from them their sovereign equality, without House, they do not act in their representative capacity, giving an equivalent; and, in the next breath, he says, but are made electors under the Constitution. This, sir, that the district system would fritter away the large was not the intention of the Convention. Upon this re- States, and take from them the power of preserving their mote, this possible contingency, it was thought wise, by weight and importance in the Union, and thereby deprive that same compromising spirit by which electors were cre- them from presenting an undivided phalanx, in a Presiated, to place the election in the hands of the Representa- dential election. The resolutions, sir, on your table, are, tives of the People on this floor, still not removing the in general terms, pointing out the broad features of an election farther from the People than it was when in the amendment, containing only the principle, without being hands of the electors-never doubting but that the Repre- entangled in the minutia. But the arguments are used as sentatives would act upon this, as upon all other subjects, if they were to assume no other shape, which is quite dein accordance with the will of the People, in their repre- ceptive. How, I would ask, can the small States lose any sentative capacity, and with representative responsibility. thing by the proposed amendments? What do the small Sir, such an independence of the servant over his master States now possess that they would lose by the proposed was never intended by those who framed this Government. change? Nothing, sir, but what was thought by the The Representative could become no more independent Convention that framed this Constitution, a mere possí upon this than in the discharge of any other duty devolving | bility—that is, of being placed upon a footing of equality upon him. What is the meaning of the word Representa- with the large States, in the election of the last resort in tive? Does it not, ex vi termini, imply a power to create this House: for, in the first instance, they can only be that Representative, and to govern and direct his actionhe having no will but a political will, and that derived alone from those who invested him with the power of action? And, in view of our Government, the Representative is presumed, yea, intended, to do for the People that thing that the People would do were they personally preVOL. II-110 felt according to the gravity of their population, and therefore possess no more power at present than is proposed by the amendment. That they can lose any thing, is a mere phantom, hatched only in the ingenious imagination of gentlemen, and presented here with a view of alarming and deterring the small States from the performance of a H. of R.] Amendment of the Constitution. [MARCH 22, 1826. senting this undivided front, and marching in a solid phalanx, unbroken and undivided, to an election, as stated by the gentleman from New York, and also by both the gentlemen from Virginia, who have addressed the committee, under the operations of the general ticket system, is tyrannical and oppressive in the extreme. I ask this committee if it is just, if it is right, that the large States should possess this power? Is it not a power left to the Legislatures, which may be made to work both ways? At the eve of a Presidential election, the Legislatures meet, and they discover that, if the general ticket system is established, they may give the undivided vote of the State to A, the favorite of whom, sir? Not of the People, but of the members of the Legislature, and, therefore, the general ticket system is established. It may so turn out that very near an equality of the whole People of the State are deprived of their rights and privileges because their votes count as nothing; their feelings are excited; they are opposed to the general ticket system, but yet they are determined to punish them with their own weapons. They fortify themselves against the next election, determined to vanquish their adversary by running candidates enough of their own. This is discovered by the Legislative party, and their increased strength is also discovered; therefore, the general ticket system is repealed, and districts are established, with the sole view of a division of the votes of the State. Thence, the great necessity of uniformity and fixidity in the principles and plan of electing the President. And, by the district system, the small States must gain; the nerves of those States will be strengthened in proportion as those of the greater States are relaxed. This is the real truth; I do not disguise it. Whatever else may be laid to my charge, it shall never be said that I dissemble. No, sir, I will never dissemble or hide my true sentiments. If I stay here with you, sir, until we become old, and are bowed down, by the weight of time, toward the grave of our fathers, I shall never deserve the charge of dissimulation. But 1 contend that the great States will be losing nothing which they ought not to be willing to part with. Spurious, unnatural, and usurped powers, are such as ought not to be retained. A generous, free, and high-minded People ought to disdain their exercise. duty which they so strongly owe to themselves. But to give their arguments any weight, you must suppose that the election of the President will inevitably devolve upon this House, in every instance. Without this view of the subject, it would be fruitless to contend that the small States would not be greatly the gainer by the proposed amendment. No one can, under any circumstance, successfully contend that they will not be greatly the gainer by the district system. I will give but one illustration to prove this position: Suppose the district system to prevail, sir, and New York shall be nearly equally divided, in a Presidential election, say as 17 to 19, and the majority of the State of Rhode Island shall be given to the same man for whom the minority in the State of New York vote-as, for instance, the majority of New York vote for A, and the majority of Rhode Island vote for B. By this process it is obvious that Rhode Island would become as important, in the election, as the great State of New York, by her majority being placed with the minority of New York; and thereby the extraordinary power of New York would be completely neutralized; and this would be more than an equivalent for the mere possibility of her members voting for a President on this floor. One moment's reflection, will prove to the small States the truth of this declaration. It is obvious that, if the election should devolve upon this House, and the principle of voting, by the members, is claimed and exercised as mere electors, and not as Representatives, it will but too frequently be the case, that the Representative, thus transformed into an elector, may entertain an opinion different from the majority of the People, and give his vote in favor of a man who is not their choice. Thus, a conflict will be created between the People and their Representatives. And to which, sir, will you give the preference With me, sir, the answer would be easy. I would always give it in favor of the People. Give the election to the People, and the conflict between this strangely metamorphosed elector of mere territory, (who has stepped down from the exalted dignity of Representative to that of a puny elector) and the People, will be entirely avoided. From this view of the subject it is clear that the small States in this can lose nothing, except that they prevent a work of supererogation in their Representatives, if that can be viewed as a loss. I will now notice the second branch of the gentleman's But gentlemen talk of preserving the independence and argument, wherein he says, "the large States will be the power of the States. Sir, the States, considered as frittered away." Both branches of this argument cannot territory merely, are inanimate, are insensible things, and stand for, sir, it must be a ruinous contract by which no power or independence can belong to them abstractboth parties are to lose. Only a minute before, the gen- edly. It is the People, sir; those who possess intelligent tleman was pouring forth his lamentations like Rachel of animal existence, where power is placed, and where indeRamah, for the great injury about to be inflicted upon the pendence ought to be preserved. The arguments of the small States. Those writhing agonies were not on ac- gentlemen give to mere boundary, to mere ideal lines, a count of the pretended disfranchisement of the small vast and extraordinary power, which land, air, and water, States, but for the sole purpose of retaining to the Le- cannot possess. But, while boundaries are thus contendgislatures of the large States a power they should noted for, and the power of mere geographical limits is thus possess: that is to say, a power to muzzle a certain por-defended, the People, who possess all power, are entirely tion of the citizens of this Government at their pleasure. forgotten. 'What inducements, sir, can men have in If this would lessen the power of the great States, it is coming to the polls at a Presidential election, when the impossible that it will also lessen the power of the small electors to be voted for may be entirely unknown to them; States. If the great States lose, the small States must and, if known, pledged to vote for a man not of their gain; because that power must lodge somewhere. But choice? And, if the People have gotten up other candithe gentleman says, that, if the general ticket does de- dates for electors, they can have but faint hopes of their stroy the minorities, it is nothing more than the general success. No wonder, sir, that they should evidence design of the framers of this Government that the majority great indifference, and fall into a state of stupor, when should rule, and that the minority should submit. As a they know their voice is not to be heard, that they are not general principle that position is true; and it is equally to be brought into action, and that their votes are to be true that it was never designed to destroy the intrinsic counted as nothing. weight of the minority. It never was intended that the Legislatures should resort to tricks and devices with a view of creating majorities or destroying minorities, at their will and pleasure. The district system proposes power and freedom to the People es rational members of a great community; it gives them their relative strength, and fastidiously guards against the tyranny of the State Legislatures over their citizens: for this power of pre But, sir, if the United States were divided into districts, according to the proposition of the gentleman from South Carolina, the People would then awake to a proper sense of their duty; they would feel themselves elevated, and their sentiments and their powers would be ennobled. They would then act on the principle of rational men; all would be put into a scale of equality; and each man would have a voice in determining who should be their MARCH 22, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. Premier. But, mind you, sir, I make these observations whether with or without intention. All the States of this on the supposition that the People are to vote, not for Union are independent, and yet the People are deprived electors, who are to vote for a President, (as some gentle- of the exercise of an important right of sovereign action, men have contended would be the effect of the second and a right acknowledging a power of self government. resolution of the gentleman from South Carolina) but di- This privation does not wound the inanimate, but the anirectly for the President, and without the intervention of mate and sensible States. If, sir, the President should enelectors. ter into entangling alliances with foreign States, by which But it is said that the district system will tend to a con- the most ruinous consequences might result to the United solidation of the States. A declaration of this kind, to States, who, sir, will feel its effects? On whom will the me, is peurile and idle in the extreme. Will not the wound be inflicted? Sir, it will not be on the soil, the State Legislatures exist as they have heretofore done, and forests, the rivers, the rocks-it will be the living, moving as they now do? Will they not possess the same legisla- States, constituted by the People thereof; and, of such tive powers in the enactment of laws? Will not each States as these, the President is the chief Governor. He State have its own Executive and its own Judiciary? Will is the officer of the whole nation. The gentleman from they not possess the same plenary powers in their muni- South Carolina, who last addressed the committee, (Mr. cipal regulations? Is any right they ought to possess ta- MITCHELL) and several others who preceded him, have ken from the States? Do they lose, as gentlemen sup-doubted the capacity of the People to make a proper sepose, all power, when their Legislatures are permitted no lection of a President for themselves; and, particularly, longer to direct themselves to appoint Electors? I answer, the gentleman from South Carolina has said, that the Peo no. It would seem that gentlemen imagined that all the ple could not, by possibility, become acquainted with the intrinsic power of State rights were involved in the mere great and the good of the nation; their means of informa act of appointing Electors. There is nothing in these ar- tion were too limited, and the result would be, that every guments, sir; they are mere vanity and vexation of spirit: State would have a great man of their own, for whom the more they are probed, the more will their fallacy be they would vote. I do not know, Mr. Chairman, exactly, exposed. The States will be what they now are—their in what part of the State of South Carolina that gentleman fundamental law the same; they will possess the same resides, but I believe it is at or near Georgetown. I have, sovereignty, and the People more freedom: their Legis- sir, the good fortune to be acquainted with the history of latures will still be their proper sovereign organs, possess- those People, and of a personal acquaintance with many. ing all their legitimate functions. But I will admit, sir, I know that they are intelligent, and capable of becoming that they will no longer possess the power to wield a mass acquainted with all such men as would dare aspire to the of party machinery, to prostrate the wishes of the People, office of President. I do not know what may be the feelfor the purpose of promoting or defeating a particular ings and sentiments and situation of other gentlemen. Presidential candidate. The contemplated amendments For my own part, I am proud to confess to you, sir, that I can have not the least tendency toward consolidation. It can safely draw on the intelligence of my district. There only makes the election of the President of the United are very many of my constituents who are capable of inStates the act of the whole People over whose destinies structing me in my duty. They can point out the course he presides. They raise rational man to his true standard, I ought to pursue, and direct my course upon this floor. and put him in the exercise of that power which is his And, I can look back to the intelligent community by right, and which was never intended by the principles of whom I have been elected, with that enthusiasm which this Government to be withheld. They will prevent the animated the ancient Grecians, when they looked to the large States from lording it over the small. Therefore, sir, oracle of Delphi, and drew upon the Pythia for favorable I as firmly believe as I do in a future state of rewards and omens; and I have no doubt but that each and every punishments, that the small States will be the gainers by member upon this floor is placed in the same happy situathe amendments: to be losers they cannot. It is the great tion. It never was intended, sir, to prevent the People States that will lose; but all they lose will be a usurped from interfering in elections. It never could have been power, and that they ought not to desire to retain. It is an designed that a majority of the House of Representatives excrescence, a political cancer, which is eating into the should have the power to determine who shall have the bowels of their peace, and excoriating them from head to vote. Gentlemen are widely off the mark when they foot, and which, if not removed, will destroy their most maintain that there is any federal feature involved in the vital interests. Sir, I have no doubt that the States of this election of President, even, sir, as the Constitution now Union, when this amendment shall be submitted to their stands, after the election has devolved upon this House. consideration, will act rationally, and not superficially. It is there ordered in the most popular manner, and made Sure I am that all magnanimous and generous States will to conform as near to the will of the People as it was posconsider it in its proper light-as a proposition calculated sible to make it, so as to adjust the equality of the States. to place the People in proper action; to give vitality to The vote of each State is to be determined, as I have althe springs of our Government; and that it deprives them ready said, by a kind of sub-election, between the Repreof nothing which they ought to have, or which is truly sentatives from the States. theirs. Suppose, Mr. Chairman, I had stolen your horse, and, on the road home, some person should take him from me-should I be, in reality, the loser? Should I, by this act, be rendered any the poorer? No, sir; I should only have lost what never belonged to me. If gentlemen insist such was the intention of the framers of the Constitution, and if they are even able to prove it, I reply, in answer, that that intention was wrong; and, of consequence, all the fruits of that intention must be wrong also. And, therefore, an amendment is the more imperatively neces sary. I would think, Mr. Chairman, that it can be of but little moment what the intention of the Convention was, when we look to the Constitution and the operations under it, and discover there is a material defect, which calls aloud for amendment, no matter how that defect originated, Notwithstanding this caution, in devising a plan to represent the will of the People, even in this dernier resort, the intention of that plan may be defeated, and frequently must be defeated, in the following manner. Say, for instance, that there are seven Representatives from a State, four of whom vote for A and three for B; now it may happen that the three members may represent districts of a greater amount of population, than those which send the other four, and so the voice of the People is lost. Mr. Chairman, gentlemen seem to forget that we are now discussing the principle and not the details of the amendment proposed by my friend from South Carolina. They should recollect, that, after we shall have settled the principle, that the resolutions are to be sent to a committee, to prepare and draw out the details in conformity to the principle settled by us, and after those details shall have been drawn out and submitted to this Committee and concurred in by it, the amendments are then to be submitted to the People for their approbation or rejection; and the People of the respective States will instruct their Representatives to the State Legislatures, to act in accordance with their will upon the subject. Gentlemen have argued this question, sir, as though they were discussing the principles of an electoral law under the existing Constitution, instead of an amendment, which has for its object, the alteration of the fundamental law, which now regulates the Presidential election; which has for its only object, the true exercise of the power and liberties of the People; and, sir, as the amendment will have to be submitted to the People, we are only pursuing a Constitutional course, in giving to the People an exercise of a right which belonged to them, and which we ought not to withhold from them, of saying whether they are satisfied or dissatisfied with the present mode of electing the President of the United States, and whether it shall, in any event, devolve upon this House. On that question, I have no hesitancy in saying that the People will give an overwhelming vote in favor of the amendment. Sir, if it can be supposed for a moment, that the small States would be by that means deprived of what they may prize as a privilege, we say that they will receive more than an equivalent in the district system, if no other means shall be thought preferable: that the election be sent back to the People of the different States. Let the population of the State vote en masse, and the majority count as one vote or by districts, and let the majority of the districts vote, and let the majority of that electoral vote be counted as one vote for the State. This would completely restore to the small States their supposed and ideal federal equality again. But, sir, my object has been to avoid entering upon the investigation of the details of this subject, until they shall have been presented to us in a tangible shape. (MARCH 22, 1826. say to gentlemen from the North, do not excite their hopes; you only rivet on them a more galling chain; as their expectations become excited, they will be less dutiful and more obstreperous, which of necessity will require the master to hold over them a tighter rein. The more you meddle with them, the worse you render their condition. We have amongst us in the South, very many good and religious men, who are slave-holders, who treat their servants with the utmost humanity; they teach them to labor not as slaves, but as working for themselves; they extend to them every means of rational intelligence, and render their hard lot as tolerable as kindness and humanity can make it; they have comfortable dwellingssleep, and eat, and are clothed, as their masters. But, sir, I do not go the length of the gentleman from Massachusetts, and hold that the existence of slavery in this country is almost a blessing; on the contrary, I am firmly settled in the opinion, that it is a great curse; one of the greatest evils that could have been interwoven into our system and entailed upon us-but for which we are in no wise responsible. 1, Mr. Chairman, am one of those whom some of these poor wretches call master; I do not lash them, I do not task them; I feed and clothe them well; but yet, alas! they are slaves-and slavery is a curse in any shape-whether under a task-master, a faction, or a government. It is, no doubt, true, that there are, in Europe, persons who claim no particular individual as a master, far more degraded than our blacks, worse fed, worse clothed, worse supplied with every necessary of life, and, still more lamentable to tell, far more ignorant : but, sir, this is far from proving that negroes ought to be slaves; yet, since they are slaves, let them and their masters alone; do not, by an injudicious interference, add cruelty to slavery. The gentleman complains that our black population should increase our political power. But I would ask that gentleman to reflect a moment, that when the storm of war is heard to howl in our land; when I will now, Mr. Chairman, turn my attention to another clouds of difficulty and danger lower around our horizon; argument of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. STORRS.) when your vessels are shut up in their ports; when your That gentleman said, that if the mover of the amendment sails are not seen to whiten the seas, except under the was sincere in his wishes for an equal district system, he broad pennant of war; when the avenues and portals of must give up his argument or go one step farther, and your commerce are shut up; when your Treasury is put the free voters in all the States, on a footing of equal-drained of its last dollar, and no resource is left you but ity, and abolish the provision in the Constitution, which a direct taxation for the necessary supplies to keep the puts the three fifths of the black population into the Southern scale. Sir, is it not strange, passing strange, indeed, that no topic of debate can arise in this House, let it come from where it may, or relate to what it will, but our negroes must be hauled into the question, and made a black hook for gentlemen to hang upon Why, sir, I would ask, is this argument used-is it by way of reflection? We of the Southern States are not to blame in this matter; the evil was in the country before we were born; it was co-extensive with the Colonial system that peopled this country; the evil was entailed upon us by our fathers-by the cruel and relentless acts of the mother country. We are not, we cannot be, responsi-that they are represented here, and I rejoice that they ble for its existence. But I will tell you, sir, who is responsible for its continuance from the date of the convention, to the year 1808. The framers of this transcendent, this immaculate Constitution, which gentlemen have found so faultless in all its parts, are the persons who are to be blamed; yes, sir, greatly blamed, because they might have brought the importation of these unhappy beings to an end at the time the Constitution was adopted; but instead thereof, they inserted a provision which authorized its continuance to the year 1808. wheels of Government in motion-at such a portentous period as this, gentlemen are in no wise backward in demanding of us the increased ratio of direct taxes to which we are liable on account of our slaves. Property is represented as well as persons; it is all important at such a moment that it should be so; nor have we ever complained at paying our full quota to meet the exigencies of the nation. A gentleman from Rhode Island, (Mr. PEARCE) has gone into a calculation, to show that those poor slaves have twenty-five Representatives upon this floor. I will not say that I am opposed to all arithmeticial politicians; but I will say that I vibrate to the fact are; their unhappy situation entitles them to our person al sympathies and our legislative protection; and if that gentleman does not feel this sentiment toward them as his fellow beings of the same great family, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. I need not, sir, dwell upon the argument of the gentleman from New York (Mr. STORRs) when he says, if we disturb the present arrangement of things, we are bound to give a better in its place. I answer, of course we are. We say, and we believe that we have proved, that the What now can be the opinion of the gentleman in re- course proposed by the amendment is far better in every lation to the transcendent intelligence of that Conven- respect and we say further, that, as it is the best, it tion? Sir, we do not contend for any extension of this pe- ought to be certain and uniform throughout the whole riod, or any change in the constitutional provision in re- Government. One of his arguments looks like an argulation to it-we wish it to remain upon the principles of ment ad captandum ignobile vulgus, when he says, we had the compact entered into by our fathers. All we ask of better have the general ticket system with its concomithe gentleman is, to let us and our poor slaves alone. Wel tant, a caucus, at the seat of government of the respect MARCH 22, 1826.] Amendment of the Constitution. [H. of R. of which the gentleman has spoken. I know nothing of those dark and mysterious midnight conclaves, that dread the light of Heaven. I have never been in one of them in my life, nor do I think they are needed, nor can they naturally follow the adoption of a district system. ive States, than the district system: for, in the State of New York, there would be thirty-six districts, and there would be a petty caucus in each. The gentleman has already acknowledged that a caucus is the creation of a faction. Sir, I am one of those who believe that the People can never be governed by a faction-a People like The gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. MITCHELL) that of these States, spread over so many millions of says, that a caucus at this place is indispensably necessasquare miles-a People, so intelligent, from the universal ry for collecting and uniting the public will; and he prevalence of common schools, academies, seminaries, makes this House a vast luminary, and we, as its divergcolleges, and universities; and, moreover, so well in- ing rays, are to dispense its sublime light to the peripheformed on public affairs by the agency of so great a mul-ry of this extended Government. I have said already, sir, titude of printing presses-to talk of their becoming fac- that the great body of the People cannot be corrupted. tious, or being drawn into the Maelstrom of faction, is They therefore need not gather themselves together into little less than downright nonsense. Sir, it is all a hoax; secret meetings, to form secret plans and secret designs. the printing presses must become corrupted-they must They have no designs but those of self preservation, and be bought; and to purchase all, is utterly impossible, if the general good of all. They possess the proper intelthe millions of your Treasury were at the disposal of ligence, and are endowed with a proper temper, to choose those hungry factionists; some few may be bought, and a President for themselves. A President thus elected methinks some have been bought and paid for. Sir, I will be armed with the great sword of their will. He will will believe these People can become factious only when go forth at the head of the People, as the man of their I hear the great tocsin of ruin and desolation sounding confidence-as the Captain General of their forces, to Rain this country, as it sounded in Greece immediately pre-moth Gilead, to battle; prostrating cupidity by the spear eeding the downfal of its happy Republics-and not be of his knowledge and the sword of his justice. Such a man fore. Happily for this Government, we have too great an will not present such a cadaverous countenance as desagricultural population; too much of the simplicity, and cribed by the gentleman from South Carolina, or stand in comparative equality, in the conditions and estates of our need, for his success, of any of your bank directors-your citizens, to belong to, or be governed by, a faction-they money shavers-your trained band captains, and patent have no inducements to faction. Sir, when the French electioneering squads. Sir, none of your bloated sons of army under Bonaparte invaded Italy, and were poured in pride, none of your intriguers and political conjurors will upon them like a flood in the bosom of that empire, they then be in requisition. No, sir. Nothing but the majori found a little spot near the Mediterranean, which had re-ty of the People's mighty voice will then be heard. Sir, mained for near fourteen hundred years in a state of perfect freedom and independence-I mean St. Marino. It was so poor that it had never excited the cupidity of a conqueror. There was nothing to tempt ambition to achieve its conquest, except its badly built city, and the barrenness of its mountains and hills. Bonaparte, that conqueror, who could give away kingdoms at his will, sent to those primitive People the offer of an addition of territory, more fertile and more valuable than their own, but their Senators disdained the proffer, and preferred to remain in their native simplicity and humble liberty. I instance this, sir, not to show that we ought to remain in a state of poverty, but to remind you, sir, that comparative poverty, primitive simplicity, and virtue, are twin sisters, and inseparable companions; and also to remind you that the experience of past ages ought to teach us, that the moment nations become very wealthy, that luxury and ambition will follow close in the wake; that when they begin their schemes of national grandeur, splendor, and aggrandizement, the sun of their glory is about to set, and their last grasp will be at best but a glittering chain or golden fetter. We ought to learn a lesson from the experience of other nations: if we cannot look into futurity, we can at least pursue the course of the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, "that by things that have been, and are, we can guess of things to come." But to the general ticket, sir. Wherever this system prevails, there are always a select few at the seats of Government-a set of well trained and well drilled political jugglers, who take upon themselves to dictate to the residue of the voters. Thus it happens the People are called upon to vote for electors of whom they have no knowledge for persons selected by this central caucus and imposed upon the People as candidates, for whom they must vote or not vote at all. But the gentleman says, if you will do away this central caucus and establish the district system, the only effect will be to substitute many caucuses for one. I have already attempted to show that a caucus is the creature of a faction, and that it cannot exist among the People generally. Sir, I live in a State where the district system prevails. I know nothing of those local caucuses it must and will be heard; by you, sir-by me-and by all-by some of us it may be to our cost. If I am one of those that has defied the majesty of their will-if the course I have pursued is wrong, and I have endeavored to thwart and resist the will of the People—if I have attempted to raise my puny arm against their political omnipotency, the fire of their indignation will destroy me-it will burn me as grass and as stubble, and so it ought, sir. Whoever attempts to interrupt the majestic course of their high determination, may rely upon it with certainty that they will take him by the poll of his head and dash him, politically, lifeless to the ground. I fear the People, and I am proud to own that I fear them, and we ought all to fear them--not with a slavish fear, but with that mingled awe and respect that a Christian entertains towards his God The People are our masters, and we are their servants. Sir, they will call us all before their tribunal, where we must give a strict account for the discharge of our various trusts while on this post. But, wherever the general ticket system prevails, they must meet in conclave, in secluded corners, hid from the People's discerning eye-when "Night, sable goddess, from her ebon throne, In rayless majesty, now stretches forth Her leaden sceptre o'er a slumbering world. Silence how dread! and darkness how profound! Nor eye nor listening ear an object finds; Creation sleeps. "Tis as the general pulse Of life stood still, and Nature made a pause." That is the time you will find always selected. I hope I shall be pardoned for troubling the Committee with an effusion of poetry, and I should not have done so had not the example been set me by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. STORRS) who called to his aid the poetic fancy of a Milton, and his conclave of demons, to paint the scene; and also, by my worthy friend from Massachusetts, who tossed the poesy high indeed. I am of lawful age, sir, and for my life I never have been enabled to see the mighty difference between a caucus at this place, and elsewhere. I am myself opposed to a caucus here, t one at Albany, or any where else. But |