Opinion of the Court. even a hint of a purely special application. We have no right to attempt to defeat that purpose by extraneous considerations which do not amount to an infraction of any constitutional limitation of the general power conferred upon the general assembly. No street railway company of the class claimed to be excluded by this statute, has yet appeared to complain about it; and it does not seem to us to lie in the mouth of a taxpayer, speaking for a municipal corporation, to make the claim for an imaginary corporation of such description. For the reasons stated we approve as the fair result of all the cases the statement of the law which is made in State ex rel. v. Parsons et al., 40 N. J. Law, 123, as follows: "A law framed in general terms, restricted to no locality, and operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purposes of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves, is not a special or local law, but a general law." If the law was imperfect in its operation, or if the classification should be broadened, the remedy, as suggested by Burket, J., in State v. Nelson, supra, should be sought through the general assembly. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S., 155, was a case which involved the question whether an act of the general assembly of Iowa was an act of a general nature having a uniform operation, and also whether the act was in conflict with the provision of the constitution of the state of Iowa that "the general assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not Opinion of the Court. equally belong to all citizens ;" and the following extract from the opinion, which was delivered by Chief Justice Waite, is pertinent here. "The statute divides the railroads of the state into classes, according to business, and establishes a maximum of rates for each of the classes. It operates uniformly on each class, and this is all that the constitution requires. This act does not grant to any railroad company privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, do not equally belong to every other railroad company. Whenever a company comes into any class, it has all the 'privileges and immunities' that have been granted by the statute to any other company in that class." "It is very clear that a uniform rate of charges for all the railroads in the state might operate unjustly upon some. It was proper, therefore, to provide in some way for an adaptation of the rates to the circumstances of the different roads; and the general assembly in the exercise of its legislative discretion, has seen fit to do this by a system of classification. Whether this was the best that could have been done is not for us to decide. Our province is only to determine whether it could be done at all, and under any circumstances. If it could, the legislature must decide for itself, subject to no control from us, whether the common good requires that it should be done." It is also argued that the operation of this act is limited to fifty years from the date of its passage, that it is therefore a temporary act, and that being such it is necessarily also a special act; and the court below has gone to the extent of asserting that this court has so decided State v. Hoffman, 35 Ohio St.,. Opinion of the Court. 435, 443, and in Platt v. Craig, 66 Ohio St., 75, 79. This point was not made, considered, or decided in either of the cases cited, and the language of the judges delivering the opinions in those cases is that where the subject-matter and operation of an act is local and temporary, it may be a special act, and valid if it does not confer corporate powers. Here the question is, pure and simple, whether the limitation as to the time of operation stamps this statute as special; for this act, so far as appears from the act itself, is not restricted to any locality nor to any individual corporation. This question was before the supreme court of Illinois in People ex rel. v. Wright, 70 Ill., 388, and the court said: "The distinction then, seems plain-a local or special statute is limited in the objects to which it applies; a temporary statute is limited merely in its duration, and, necessarily, a local or special law may be perpetual, or a general law may be temporary. This, therefore, is a temporary general law, and not within the prohibition of the section referred to." This is likewise our conclusion in this case. Having, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the act in question, which is commonly known as "the Rogers law," is constitutional, it is unnecessary to determine the other questions which have been so ably and interestingly presented. The judgment of the superior court in general term is Reversed and the petition is dismissed. SHAUCK, PRICE, CREW, SUMMERS and SPEAR, JJ., concur. Syllabus. STEVENS V. THE CINCINNATI TIMES-STAR COMPANY. STEVENS V. THE COMMERCIAL-TRIBUNE COMPANY. STEVENS V. THE ENQUIRER COMPANY. Guessing contest instituted by newspaper company-Persons to pay fifty cents to company, twenty-four for subscription and twenty-six for privilege of guessing-On total vote for state officer to be elected-Guesser nearest actual vote to receive prize money-Is within the condemnation of Ohio statutes against lotteries-Guesser has no standing in equity courtTo maintain action for injunction and receiver-One cannot sue for all, when-Jurisdiction of superior court-Games of chance-Equitable procedure. 1. A guessing contest, instituted by a newspaper company, by which persons are invited to deliver to the company fifty cents each, twenty-four cents of which being payment for a subscription to the newspaper and twenty-six cents for the privilege of making a guess upon the total vote for a state officer who is to be chosen at an approaching election, the guesser coming nearest to the actual total vote cast to receive a money prize from the fund equal to one-tenth thereof, and others next nearest to receive from the fund lesser money prizes, is within the condemnation of the statutes of Ohio against lotteries and schemes of chance, and is an unlawful enterprise. And a similar scheme, involving the same amount of payment by each person, but differing from the former in that there is to be no subscription to a paper, and the prizes promised are definite amounts from five thousand dollars, down to two dollars, is equally within the condemnation of the statute and unlawful. 2. One who delivers fifty cents to the company under and by virtue of the foregoing scheme has no standing in a court of equity to maintain an action for injunction and a receiver on the claim that the money paid by himself and other contributors, amounting to $200,000.00 or over, constitutes a fund which equitably belongs to all who have made guesses and paid money; that such persons are numerous; that their names are unknown to him, and that it is impracticable to bring them before the court. A petition setting forth these facts is insufficient to constitute a cause of action in equity, and, the superior court not having jurisdiction at law in ac Statement of the Case. tions to recover the sum of fifty cents, it was not error to sustain a general demurrer to such pleading, and dismiss the plaintiff's action. (Nos. 8578, 8577 and 8579-Decided March 21, 1905.) ERROR to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. Plaintiff's actions below against these several defendants were begun in the superior court of Cincinnati, October 20, 1902. The petition in the first case named is as follows: "The plaintiff, Samuel A. Stevens, brings this action on behalf and for the benefit of himself and all others similarly situated and interested. "Plaintiff says that the defendant is a corporation organized and transacting business under the laws of the state of Ohio. "Plaintiff alleges that he delivered to the defendant company the sum of fifty (50) cents, upon a gaming and lottery contract under and pursuant to the terms of which contract, sums of money, uncertain in amounts, are offered as prizes, conditional and wholly dependent upon the happening of the uncertain event that the persons making the first, second, third and other nearest correct guess or guesses of the exact total vote cast for secretary of state of Ohio, at the November election, 1902, shall be entitled to receive said. first, second, third and other prizes; that under the terms of said contract all persons making a guess were required to deposit with said defendant the sum of fifty (50) cents; that twenty-four (24) cents of said sum is retained by said defendant as the price of subscription to a newspaper belonging to said defendant; that the remaining twenty-six |