It appears in evidence that this tax was voted, properly certified by the district board and levied by the board of supervisors, and that a portion, at least, has been collected. It is not competent for the board todefeat a vote of this kind by districting the subdistrict out of existence. The money must be expended in accordance with the vote, and the house must be built. Whether or not any of the tax has been collected is not material. It must be collected and expended by the board as directed by the people.

The case of Benjamin v. District Township of Malaka et al., 50 Iowa, 648, is applicable here. The only point of difference being that in the case cited the tax had been collected before action was had by the board.

In this case a part only of the tax has been collected, but as stated above, this is not material. The equities of this case may be with the board, but the action of the electors in voting to build a house in subdistrict number four, and in providing the means, will bar the board, and any act calculated to avoid their mandatory duty is a violation of law.

September 16, 1886.

AFFIRMED. J. W. AKERS,

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

J. B. B. BAKER V. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF WAUKON.

Appeal from Allamakee County.

RULES AND REGULATIONS. In establishing and enforcing regulations for the government of scholars, the board have a large discretion.

On the 7th day of June, 1886, Maud Baker, the daughter of the plaintiff, was suspended from the public school for repeated violation of a rule of the board, known as rule five, which reads as follows: "Any scholar who shall be absent five half-days in four consecutive weeks, without any excuse from parent or guardian satisfactory to the teacher that the absence was caused by said pupil's sickness, or by sickness in the family, or, in the primary grades, by severity of the weather, shall forthwith be suspended. No pupil so suspended shall be reinstated without a permit from the principal."

Rule twelve provides that the principal of the school may suspend pupils temporarily, and that he shall immediately notify the parent or guardian of a suspended child of such suspension, the notice to be in writing, and furthermore, that he shall immediately inform the board of his action.

Maud Baker was absent without excuse, and when called to account for her absence stated that she had gone on a fishing excursion, and expected to go the week following. Having failed to render a satisfactory excuse, she was suspended, as above stated. Notice in writing was sent to the parent, as required by rule five, and the board informed of the suspension. The board approved the action of the principal. J. B. B. Baker appealed to the county superintendent, who reversed the action of the board. D. W. Reed appeals.

The facts in the case are not controverted. It appears in evidence that the suspension of Maud Baker was reported to the board, and that a special meeting of the board was held for the consideration of the act of the principal. Maud Baker was present at this meeting of the board, and the president testifies that he read to her the rule under which she had been suspended, and asked her to give the board some promise of amendment in the future, as a condition of reinstatement, and she replied that she would not make any promise for the future, and expected to go fishing the following week.

The county superintendent finds that the suspension was made in compliance with the rules of the board for the government and regulation of their schools, and that the act of the principal in suspending, and of the board in approving his action, was without prejudice or malice. The board was reversed on the ground that the law does not confer upon the principal, or the board, power to suspend for the cause for which Maud Baker was suspended.

The case turns, therefore, upon the power of the board to establish and enforce a rule providing for the suspension of pupils, who are absent a given number of days, or half-days, without a satisfactory excuse. This point has been fully discussed and settled by our supreme court in the case of Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa, 562, and need not be considered here. Murphy v. Independent District of Marengo has been cited, but does not apply, as in that case it is stated that the offense for which the pupil was dismissed was not in violation of any rule or regulation.

We are compelled to overrule the decision of the county superintendent, and to sustain the action of the board.

October 23, 1886.

REVERSED.

J. W. AKERS,

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

JAMES TOMPKINS V. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT OF KEYSTONE.

Appeal from Page County.

1. SCHOOL-HOUSE SITE. It is manifestly unwise for the electors to express any preference for a site, by a vote. The remedy of any one aggrieved by the action of the board is appeal.

2.

The board are bound to take into account any special reasons existing which favor a particular location, and a vote of the electors to expend school-house funds in a certain specified manner, may not with safety be disregarded.

On the 24th of May, 1886, the board located the new school-house in said independent district upon the site of the old house. At the meeting of the electors on the 12th of March, 1884, the sum of one thousand dollars was voted to build a school-house in Page Center, The board regarded the designation of the site as advisory only, and located the house one-half mile from Page Center. James Tompkins appealed to the county superintendent who found that the board had violated law, and for this reason reversed their action. G. W. Stanage appeals.

Section 1724 confers upon boards the power to locate school-house sites. If, however, the location of the school-house is coupled with and designated in the vote to build, the house must be built in accordance with the vote. The transcript of the record filed by the secretary contains the following statement: "Voted a tax of one thousand dollars for the purpose of building a school-house in Page Center."

While any attempt on the part of the electors to designate the precise. location of a school-house site would be an unwarranted assumption of power, nevertheless a vote to build a house in a certain village or town. plat, in connection with the vote to appropriate money for that purpose, we think so far concludes the board as to location as to require the selection of a site within such specified limits. Any other holding would open the way to fraud and deception. We are compelled to hold that the board should have selected a site in Page Center. The decision of the county superintendent is

November 1, 1886.

AFFIRMED.

J. W. AKERS,

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

E. G. LEWIS v. DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF WOOLSTOCK.

Appeal from Wright County.

SCHOOL-HOUSE SITE. Location of. A village in a subdistrict has special claims favoring the selection of a site within its limits. The element of distance to be traveled by some is largely overcome by the advantages of a location in the

town.

The board were petitioned to remove the school-house in subdistrict number three to a site at, or near, the village of Woolstock, which is situated on the western half of the said subdistrict. The petition was denied. E. G. Lewis, et al., appealed to the county superintendent. The decision of the board was reversed. B. Watkins appeals.

The school-house in subdistrict number three is now centrally located, and nearly one mile from the village by traveled highway. There are about fifty-three children of school age in the district, and it appears from the evidence that forty-five of these live within one-half mile of the proposed new site. The removal of the house may increase the distance now traveled by the children of a few families, but it appears that in such cases accommodations may be had within about one and one-half mile at other schools.

If the nature of the case is such as to require some changes in the boundary lines, we think such changes should be made, and the schoolhouse located in the village, and for the following reasons: The children from the rural portions of the district can travel to and from the village much more conveniently than those from the village can attend in the country. The course of trade brings the parent to the market in the morning, and the movement of conveyances will therefore afford many conveniences toward reaching the school from the country, and of returning in the evening. But, on the other hand, there is no regularity of travel to the country in the forenoon, so that when walking is bad, or impossible, conveyances would be required for the sole purpose of taking children to the school. Besides, the great majority of those who live in the village have no means of carrying their children a distance to school, while the farmer is seldom, if ever, without them.

There is a reason why the school should be convenient for children in the village, which does not exist as to children of the country. The village has many evil resorts, where children are led into vice, which are not incident to the country. All children should be kept regularly in school, but the reasons for this, as applied to village and town children, are much stronger than as applied to those of the country.

The village must be supplied with a school, and in the case before us, if the house is not located at the village, the result in the near future will be two schools for this subdistrict. We are compelled to hold that the board erred in refusing to grant the petition. The decision of the county superintendent is

September 14, 1887.

AFFIRMED. J. W. AKERS,

Superintendent of Public Instruction.

J. A. COUSINS V. INDEPENDENT DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF SPIRIT LAKE.

Appeal from Dickinson County.

SCHOOL-HOUSE: Removal of. The removal of an old house away from the geographical center and away from the center of population, without special and strong reasons therefor, is an abuse of the discretionary power of the board.

On the 6th day of April, 1887, the board passed an order to move the school-house known as the Swailes school-house, to a point one-half mile west of its present location. From this order J. A. Cousins appealed to the county superintendent. The action of the board was sustained. J. . A. Cousins appeals.

The district borders on Spirit and adjacent smaller lakes, and is very irregular in its boundaries. There are about fifty children of school age. living in the district, most of whom are favorably or adversely affected by the change. But, considering both locations, there is no material change in the distance traveled by all.

The present site is at the junction of an east and west road, known as the Diamond Lake road, with a north and south road known as the Emmet County road. The school-house is old and has recently been repaired at a cost of $60. As now located there are seven children two miles from the school-house. Twelve children will be two miles from the new site. We are unable to find in this case any good and substantial reason for this change of location.

The present site is central and nearer the center of population, so far as we can determine from the map submitted as a part of the transcript. It is at a cross roads, which is very desirable. The lease to the present site expires in about five years. By that time the old house will in all probability be worthless and a new one will be needed to take its place. The electors at their last March meeting voted to build a new house on section nineteen, the site of which is one-half mile west and one and threefourth miles north of the present site.