No. 126. IN CONVENTION September 20, 1867. COMMUNICATION FROM THE CITIZENS' ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN RELATION TO THE COMMISSIONS IN THE METROPOLITAN DISTRICT. HON. WILLIAM A. WHEELER, President of the N. Y. State Constitutional Convention DEAR SIR-The Citizens' Association respectfully begs leave to address you, and through you the Convention, on the subject of making suitable provisions in the revised Constitution for the continuance and efficient operation of the Commissions established within the Metropolitan District, of which New York city forms the largest part. The exercise of certain governmental functions, through their agency, is neither novel nor peculiar to our State or city. London has the following Commissions, viz: 1. The Board of Police. 2. The Board of Health. 3. The Commissioners of Excise. 4. The Commissioners of Sewers. [CON. No. 126.] 1 5. The Commissioners of Regent's Park. 6. The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury. 7. The Commissioners of Her Majesty's Woods and Forests. 8. The Commissioners of the Metropolis Turnpike Road. 9. The Commissioners of Baths and Wash-houses. 10. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue. 11. The Board of Improvement Commissioners. 12. The Public Works Loan Commissioners. 13. The Poor Law Board. And Baltimore the following, viz: 1. The Commissioners of Finance. 2. The Commissioners of the Water Department. 3. The Commissioners of Public Schools. 4. The City Commissioners. 5. The Commissioners of Druid Hill Park. 9. The Board of Police Commissioners. The idea of absolute local self-government in the city of New York, has no foundation in our past history, and is at war with the fundamental principles of State supremacy. The State of New York never allows any portion of its territory, be it town, county or city, a local independence, but subjects all parts of its domain to the supreme authority of the State itself. When a charter is given to a village for the convenience of its inhabitants, the better preservation of order, the protection of private right, and the suppression of local evils, the State confers upon such village certain special powers, which may be recalled by the Legislature at will, and differ widely from irrevocable grants of property. In the exercise of such powers, the village officials, in effect, are merely deputed to perform a portion of the functions of the State government at that particular place. So, on a larger scale, the city of New York, from time to time, has received authority from the State for the purposes of local government, but always subject to the superior power of the State. The great amount of property and the large population of the city render it expedient, and even necessary, that the provisions for the local government here should be ample and comprehensive; but the fundamental principle of the subordination of the local government of a district to the general government of the whole State, is the same here as in the case of any mere village. So far as New York is concerned, it will be found that it is entirely due to the existence of commissions that our city has not been despoiled and ruined. All that is purely local in the govern ment of our city bears no comparison in value to that which emanates from State authority; while the corruption of the Legislature is caused mainly by the money taken from this city by popular branches of the municipal government. To abolish the commissions would be to destroy all hope of our attaining good government. It is not the capitalist, the merchant, the banker, the honest laborer and largest tax payers in this city who are opposed to commissions, but the professed politician-the place and power seeker, the trader in contracts and jobs. Some few eminent, able, and honest men may question this form of government, but the great mass of our responsible citizens uphold it, and would be struck with terror were it abolished. Nothing in our form of government requires that all offices should be filled by election. It is maintained by the ablest writers on this subject, that, to insure the integrity of our institutions and the effic-. ient and economical management of public affairs the elections should be few and held to fill the highest offices only. The system of electing every officer, no matter how merely executive his duties, by spreading the elective franchise over so many subjects, cheapens and weakens it, and lowers the standard of character and capacity in our officials; because by multiplying the number of officers to be voted for we render it impossible for the elector to give the attention required to the character and qualifications of the individuals soliciting his vote. The elector may have the time and opportunity to inform himself on these matters in the case of one man or of a few men, but he shrinks from the task in the case of a large number of men. One |