would make a man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply to the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another governinent, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison, yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that common-wealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that which I think concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.

123. If a man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, to have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property. To which in the state of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard

of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies hetween them for though the law of nature be plain and fintelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular

cases.

125. Secondly, In the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law: for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss in other men's.

126. Thirdly, In the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injustice; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it.

127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of nature, being but in an ill condition,while they remain in it,are quickly driven into society, Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressors of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punish ing, to be exercised by such alone, as shall be appointed to it amongst them; and by such rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that pur pose, shall agree on. And in this we have the origiual right and rise of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.

The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permission of the law of nature by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society, distinct from all other creatures. And

were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations.

The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular politic society, and incorporates into any commonwealth, separate from

the rest of mankind.

129. The first power, viz. of doing whatsoever he thought for the preservation of himself, and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit) to assist the executive power of the society, as the law thereof shall require; for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require; which is not only necessary, but just, since the other members of the society do the like.

131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition

VOL. IX.

with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend further than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invason. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

CHAPTER X.

Of the forms of a Commonwealth. 132. The majority having, as has been shewed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him ouly for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according

2 Q

as the power of making laws is placed: such is the form of the common-wealth.

133. By common-wealth, I must be understood all along to mean, not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community, which the Latins signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language, is common-wealth, and most properly expresses such a society of men, which community or city in English does not; for there may be. subordinate communities in a government; and city amongst us has a quite

different notion from common-wealth : and therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense, in which I find it used by King James the first; and I take it to be its genuine signification; which if any body dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better. [To be continued.]

selves into such employments, or stand in competition with men as well or better qualified for the business than themselves, this is generally looked upon as a just cause of suspicion of some sinister ends and designs in them.

This being so in private trusts, why is it not, or should it not be much more so in public, since they are of greater importance? And yet it is not always in these: The reason is this: Of public offices of trust, some are also offices of profit, and reason good they should be so, being

offices of great skill and pains, and requiring the expence of living proportionable to the dignity of the office: And such as providence hath left to get their livings by their labour, may reasonably desire such honest employments as they are duly

usually great faults committed, as 1. When men, who are in a competent, decent, and convenient way living, are not contented therewith,

of

Trusts are things, which all men agree, nemine contradicente, ought to be performed with all faithfulness, and for that purpose with all care and diligence, that the nature, importance or difficulty of the matter doth require. Hence it is that honest men, who make conscience of the due performance of their obligations, are not easily persuaded into such undertakings, unless where near relation, intimate friendship, great charity upon some special advantage and need of their assistance doth move, and in some sort oblige them to it; much less are they apt to intrude into such employments, or offer themselves, except where there is apparent need of their assistance, and upon due consideration of their own abilities to discharge what they undertake: And therefore when men are without any such special motives found to thurst them

ably gaping, after great and higher matters These are not, nor cannot be either compleat christians, or truly good men, and when the temptation comes, do usually shew themselves. 2. When they seek such places merely for the profit, and are not sufficiently qualified duly to discharge the office and trust. 3. When by their interest or friends, they interpose to keep out better or fitter men than themselves; in both which cases they do prejudice to the public, and are obstacles and impediments to its service.

Other offices and imployments are of great trust, honour and authority, but of little or no profit, but rather occasion of expence. These, I conceive, are neither to be sought for the honour or authority by any, nor to be refused for their trouble or expence, by such as are well qualified for them, when they are regularly called to that service. But of all public

trusts in this nation, there is none, taken singly, of greater weight and concern than that of enquiring, consulting and aeting, in parliament; of which I shall speak a little more particularly, as to persons to be chosen for representatives of the commons, and the duty of the electors. Each of these hath a double trust reposed in him, the one by the electors for the special good of the place for which he is chosen, the other by the constitution of our government for the good of the whole nation, wherein the religion, lives, liberties, properties, and whole concern of all that is valuable is comprehended, and many times great concerns of other nations also: And in this the representative of the meanest borough hath an equal share with a knight of the largest county.

The qualifications of a person to be chosen for such a service, ought to be proportionable and agreeable to the extent and weight of the trust, which is to be reposed in him. As 1. Integrity, and such integrity as is not to be moved by any prospect of profit, honour, or fear of the faces of men. 2. Knowledge and good understanding in that variety of matters, which may occur, and are there to be considered, whether ecclesiastical or civil, the principles of laws and government in general, and the laws and government of England in particular, and many other matters, with a good sagacity, prospect and foresight, into the remote consequences of things. 3. Diligence and industry, to attend and consider, and prepare and forward matters of importance to the public. These are necessary, if not indispensable qualifications; to which may be added two others of great use, that is, 4. Elocution, so as to speak pertinently and closely to business, and 5. Reputation of integrity and good judgment, which usually makes what is spoken by such a person to be the more regarded by the rest.

These five qualifications are as requisite to a complete parliament man, as are the five senses to a complete man.

Such indeed are to be desired, to be sought for, to be preferred and chosen, where they may be had. But where persons thus qualified in all particulars, and in the highest degree, are not to be had, in such case they that come nearest are to be chosen, especially at such times when matters of great moment and concern are to be ordered. This is plain and evident, because the end, which all men in such cases are by the laws of God and nature obliged to intend, is the public good, and by consequence are likewise obliged to make choice of the most just and proper means and instruments for the attaining of that end; and such only are those who have most of the principal qualifications aforesaid, and in the highest degree.

are

And by this rule may all such, both competitors and electors, who more concerned to discharge their duty and serve their country, than to gratify their ambition or serve a private interest, easily direct their actions, and judge the actions of others. And therefore 1. for compe titors, whoever, because of his quality, his estate and ability to spend most money, or his interest among his neighbours upon any other score than the qualifications aforesaid, shall oppose another better qualified in those respects for this purpose than himself, does certainly either act upon mistaken principles, or is transported with a vain ambition, or has not that affection for his country, and sense of his duty, as he ought to have. And this may be further demonstrated from a familiar instance, for there is no wise and ́ considerate man, but in his private matters of law, in matters relating to his health, in matters of dealings with other nien, and the like, will seek assistance from such as are of

more ability in those respects than himself; and therefore in matters of greatest moment to himself, to his posterity, and whole country, not to do the like, is inconsistent both with common prudence, and that sense of duty, and of the weight of his undertaking, which every honest man bath in the acceptance of but a private trust; and certainly mens so forward intruding into a trust of so great importance, deserves no other construction than it doth, and usually bath, in the case of a private trust, under the like circum

stances.

By the same rule also may the clectors as easily direct their choice, if they intend the just and honest discharge of their duty; that is, if they regard only or principally the true and proper qualifications of the person for the business for which he is to be chosen, and lay aside all by-respects and private concerns.— Some men pretend that a good estate is a necessary, or principal qualification, to oblige the person to be the more concerned for so considerable an interest, but that is but a mere fallacy; for a covetous or ambitious man will be apt to use that as a step to sacrifice the interest of his country, to the satisfaction of his humour, which soever it is, whereas an honest man contented with bis condition, will be no less careful to preserve the little he bath, than he that hath more. Others are carried up to the consideration of friendship, which is as unreasonable as if a man instead of an able lawyer or physician, should make choice of a person but incanly skilled in either of those sciences because he is his friend And as absurd and unreasonable it is for any man to take it all from his friend, who chooseth the assistance of a more proper man in a special case than himself. The first of these does plainly prefer his private friendship before the public

:

good of his country, and the latter his own interest or humour before either. A like mistake is very common in cities and boroughs, where they think themselves obliged to choose their actual or expected benefactors, and they again expect to be chosen. Of these we may judge by what is said of the last. In the country many are swayed by fear of the displeasure of their landlords or great neighbours, and they as unreasonably expect their compliance. The former do in a matter of greater importance, the choice of trustees for their country, what they would not do in a less, the choice of trustees for a small estate of their own: And the latter take from their neighbours that freedom, which they would not have taken from themselves; or ha ving basely given up their own, would injuriously usurp their neighbours right, as hath often been the case of late times. For that rabble of brutes who are ready to sacrifice all to their bellies, they are scarce capable of hearing reason, Venter non habet aures, but if any of them have so much humanity left as to listen to it, the rule before expressed may direct him.

HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONS OF CORSICA.

[By the late Mr. Boswell, 1768.]

Liberty is so natural, and so dear to mankind, whether as, individuals or as members of society, that it is indespensibly necessary to our hap piness. Every thing worthy ariseth from it. Liberty gives health to the mind, and enables us to enjoy the full exercise of our faculties. He who is in chains cannot move either easily or gracefully; nothing elegant or noble can be expected from those, whose spirits are subdued by tyranny, and whose powers are cramped by restraint.