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who dispensed blessings by his life, and planned them for posterity."

The Doctrines inculcated throughout this work are the foundation principles of all good government. The author by reasonings and language the most forcible and convincing-illustrates the doctrines of The Sovereignty of the People-Their absolute right to form a government, and in case of necessity, to reform, alter, and new model that government.-The Right of the people and parliament of Britain to resist and depose their Kings for evil govern ment. His proofs and illustrations are drawn from reason, and from history, sacred and profane. The whole work is replete with sound instruction, and written in a plain but energetic style, the best suited to the subject.

Our limits will only allow us to make one or two extracts from this admirable work.

On the subject of government in general, the author expresses himself as follows:

"Government in general, as ordained and instituted by God, is circumscribed and limited by him to be exercised according to the laws of nature in subserviency to his own glory, and the benefit of mankind. All rulers are confined by the Almighty and supreme sovereign, to exert their governing power, for the promoting his service and honour, and to exercise their authority for the safety, welfare, and prosperity of those over whom they are established. Though there were no previous compacts and agreements between princes and people as to these, yet princes would be obliged to observe them, for as much as they are settled and determined by the law and appointment of the divine legistator, and of the universal sovereign. Whosoever therefore refuseth to govern, in subordination unto, and for God, and in order to the protection and benefit of the community, ceaseth to answer the ends unto which magistracy was instituted, and for which rectoral authority is established over, and among men. Nor is it in the choice or power

of any society, at their erecting the forms of government under which they are contented to live, and at their nominating the persons to whom they commit the right of administering justice toward, and over themselves, and of withstanding and avenging injuries offered them by others, to enlarge and extend the power of those whom they constitute their rulers, beyond the limits and boundaries by which God hath stated and confined magistrates in the charter of nature and revelation. Though people both may then, and afterwards abridge themselves as they think meet, in things under their own disposal, and either contract or enlarge the ruler's power, in reference to what they have a right to retain or depart from, for the real or imagined benefit of the community, yet they can no ways interpose in the disposal of the rights which belong unto God, and which he hath incommunicably reserved to himself; nor can they confer those measures and degrees of authority upon those whom they elect and advance to magistracy, which God bath antecedently precluded the one from bestowing, and the other from receiving. For example, no body, or society of men, can transfer a power unto those whom they select and set a part from among themselves to be rulers over the community; by virtue whereof those vested with magistratical authority, can withdraw their subjects from their allegiance to God, or act arbitrarily in prescribing and imposing what religion they please, or destroy the meanest person, saving upon a previous crime, and a just demerit."

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"Magna Charta being only an abridg. ment of our ancient laws and customs, the king that swears to it, swears to them all, and is not admitted to be the interpreter of it, or to determine what is good or evil, fit to be observed or annulled in it, and he can have no more power over the rest. This having been confirmed by more parliaments than we have had kings since that time, the same obligation must still lie upon them all, as upon John and Henry, in whose time that claim of right was compiled. We know the value our ancestors set upon their liberties, and the courage with which they defended them, and we can have no better example to encourage us, never to suffer them to be violated or diminished."

Ou the Power and Duties of Juries, and on the Criminal Laws of England. By Sir R. Phillips. [Continued from p. 261.]

The second chapter of this work relates to the striking and summoning of juries. The following remarks on this important part of the subject are well worthy of attention.

"Although honourable and publicspirited men will gladly avail themselves of every opportunity to render themselves useful, in quality of jurymen; yet the law, to prevent too frequent a recurrence of the same names in juries, and for the ease of the public, has provided, that no person shall be summoned on juries, who in the counties Palatine, or in Rutland, have served within one year; in all other counties, within two years; and in Yorkshire, within four years. In causes between party and party, in Middlesex, a juryman may serve within two terms, or vacations; but in defiance of the statute the same special jurymen serve for their guinea per trial, in almost every cause in the courts at Westminster and Guildhall; and sheriff's summon them, although liable to a fine of five pounds in every instance.

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"It was an admirable provision of the constitution of Alfred, that juries should be struck by the sheriffs, who were annual officers chosen in their counties by popular election. Except in London and Middlesex, this right was lost to the people in the reign of Edward the Second; and sheriffs, in consequence, are officers nominated and chosen by the crown, or its ministers ; so that in fact, juries also, are now, in a certain degree, in the nomination of the crown, through its sheriffs. As this check on the influence of the crown is in critical times of the utmost consequence to public liberty, and was a valuable popular right, not abrogated by the conquest, I conceive the question of its resumption may deserve the notice of a patriotic parliament. The crown, as heretofore, might nominate three persons for every county; and the sheriff for the following year might be chosen from among the three by a ballot in the grand and Petit juries assembled at the next following assizes; at which, also, the sheriff elect might take the oaths of office. Sheriffs would thus

consist, in every country, of the most public-spirited and approved, of three competent persons named by the crown; and they would consequently fill their office with more energy, and with more regard to public opinion, than they have usually done for several centuries past.

"Jurors must be persons of honour and fair reputation; free, in executing their office, from all kind of obligation, affection, consanguinity, or prejudice; the peers or equals of the parties interested; of mature age and sound understanding; and must never have been outlawed, attainted of treason, or convicted of felony or perjury."

Chapter the third treats of grand juries, whose functions are thus detailed.

"A Grand Jury is one of the most ancient and respectable tribunals known to the constitution, and its members are usually gentlemen of the first consequence and best fortune in their county.

"They stand in the situation of umpires between the accuser and the accused, and are thus able at all times to protect the weak against the strong, and the persecuted against persecution.

"Their precise estate is not defined by any statute; but they ought to have freeholds at least equal to petit jurymen; and in striking them, it is customary to summon none but such as have the joint additions to their names of esquire and freeholder.

"If I may indulge in an hypothesis on a subject involved in so much obscurity, I should presume that, in their institution, grand juries were subsequent to petit ones. A grand jury appears from its nature and object to be a refinement or addition to the trial by petit jury, and is probably coeval with the division of the kingdom into counties and hundreds. May we not suppose that petit juries in barbarous ages may have been so far over-ruled by judges as not to continue their intended barrier against oppression. We know, that in the time of Alfred a great number of judges were hanged; and the reason given by the author of the Mirrour for these severities, was their having over-ruled or rendered of no effect, the verdicts of petit juries: hence the necessity, and perhaps the origin, of grand juries. They secure innocent persons, in the first instance, from being

exposed to an ignominious trial, and preserve them from the caprice of judges. They now form an integral, essential, and indispensable part of the jury

system.

"Had the revolutionary tribunal of France proceeded by the previous arraignment of a grand jury, instead of the information of a public prosecutor, not one in fifty of those who suffered by the guillotine would even have been put on their trial.

"As grand juries are the lawful guardians of the liege subjects of this realm against vexatious prosecutions, it must be evident, that criminal proceedings by motion, suggestion, process, information, or in any mode except through the medium of a grand jury, are con trary to the spirit of our constitution. Grand juries are mockeries, if they do not serve as general and universal protections against arbitrary and capricious prosecutions. They have universal powers, or they are useless, and not what they profess to be. No statiite can, however, be found which dispenses with them; and language has lost its power, if the following statutes are not as imperative as laws can be made, to secure to the subject the unbounded protection of Grand Juries."

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Magna Charta, 9 Hen. 3, cap. 29. No freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, or of his liberties or free customs, or be outlawed, banished, or otherwise destroyed; nor shall the king pass, or execute upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land. The king shall sell to none, or deny, or delay to none, right or justice.

25 Edw. 1, cap. 2. If any judgment be given contrary to the great Charter, it shall be undone and holden for nought.

"5 Edw. 3, cap. 9. No man shall be attached by any accusation, nor forejudged of life or limb, nor shall his lands or goods be seized into the king's hand, against the great Charter and the law of the land.

"25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, cap. 4. None shall be taken by petition or suggestion to the king or his council, unless it be by indictment of lawful people of the neighbourhood, or by process made by writ original at the common law. And none shall be put out of his franchises, or freehold, unless he be duly brought to answer, and forejudged by course of

law; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be redressed, and holden for none.

"28 Edw. 3, cap. 3. No man shall be put out of land, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disherited, nor put to death, without being brought to answer by due process of law.

“ 42 Edo. 3, cap. 3. No man shall be put to answer, without presentment before justices, or matter of record of due process, or writ original, according to the ancient law of the land; and if any thing be done to the contrary, it shall be void in law, and held for error, ، See also 11 Hen. 4, at p. 80.

“ 16 Car. 1, cap. 10, § 5. Neither his Majesty, nor his privy council, have any jurisdiction, power, or authority, by English bill, petition, articles, libel, or any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine, or draw into question, determine, or dispose of, the lands, or goods, of any subjects of this kingdom; but the same ought to be tried and determined in the ordinary courts of justice, and by courts of law."

"It has given me great pain to observe, that the late bill for declaring, say rather for restoring, the rights of juries in matters of libel, speaks of indictments, and also of informations. It can scarcely, however, be contended, that such incidental recognition of a practice renders it legal, and does away the force of all our charters of liberty. As the practice was common, and allowed in the courts of that day, it was necessary, perhaps, in order to guard the subject on a point common to both modes of proceeding, to name both, without meaning to declare, or even to consider their legality.

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Long practice, which is one of the justifications set up for dispensing with grand juries, might lead us to consider informations as part of the common law, provided they were compatible with the constitution, and there were not so many declaratory statutes altogether at variance with the practice, and prohibitory of it. Lord Hale, in his pleas of the crown, observes, “ that in all criminal cases the most regular and safe way, and that the most consonant with Magna Charta and other statutes, is by presentment or indictment of twelve sworn men ;" and a higher authority need not be quoted. I have, indeed, been gratified to perceive, even in our own days, in which liberty

has been rendered decrepid under the iron sway of revenue laws, that Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough has repeatedly refused to grant rules against parties, on the ground that the matter charged was properly within the cognizance of a grand jury."

Chapter the fourth treats of the calling, challenging, and swearing of the Petit Jury, and of the forms of trials; and chapter the fifth, of the judges. Events which are continually incurring in our courts, more particularly on ex-officio informations, will enable our readers to judge of the propriety of the following remarks.

"Juries should listen with attention to the judge's exposition of the law, and they should hear with respect his observations on the evidence; although to decide on the evidence is not his busiuess, but theirs; yet his profession, rank, experience, and office, demand their attention, and a reasonable degree of deference.

"The jury are to decide on their own convictions, in regard to the facts adduced in evidence, combined with the information given them by the judge, relative to the bearings of the law on the case. It is not an essential part of the duty of a judge to sum up the evideuce; but his reasonings ought to be received respectfully, yet not without great reserve and jealousy (if wholly on one side), the jury being, by the constitution, the sole judges of the evidence. Nothing but gross ignorance in a jury, palpable inattention, or incapacity to take notes of the evidence, can render such interference necessary.

"Juries are bound by respect to themselves, and by their obligations to the rights and liberties of their country, to discountenance all partial observa tions of the judge on the evidence. With reference to the bearings of the law, judges cannot, however, be too explicit, or juries too attentive. They are unavoidably ignorant of law, and in this respect must receive instruction from the judge, and rely on his knowledge and perspicacity for so much of their verdict as involves a mixture of the law with the fact. The observations of the counsel on both sides cannot fail to assist them in acquiring legal views of the question before them; but the judge is an au

thority on which they are bound to rely; and if he does his duty ably and completely, there will be few occasions for subsequently disputing the verdict of an honest and sensible jury.

"As neighbours of the parties, juries are often more competent to decide than judges: they are also more in numticular oath in each cause. Again, the ber, and they are bound by their parascendancy of their influence excites no public jealousy; because the same set of jurymen are seldom on a jury; while the permanent ascendancy of a judge would be suspicious and dangerous. If a judge agree with the jury, the interposition of his opinion is useless; and if he differs from them, it is unnecessary to give his opinion; because the jury cannot help seeing with their own eyes, and they are bound by their oaths to decide on their own convictions. Further, if a jury were attainted for giving a false verdict, it would be no valid plea of innocence, or bar of the penalties of conviction, that they followed the direction of the judge, and from sentiments of courtesy and deference, yielded their own opinions to the more enlightened judgment of the court,

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If judges were religiously to refrain from giving a colour to the evidence, nothing could be more desirable to the jury than to have it fully recapitulated from the bench; but if a judge interpose his own opinion (and it is difficult for him to avoid doing so,) it is likely to make an improper impression on the jury, because it is most unpleasant to jurymen to give a verdict in apparent variance with the expressed opinion of the judge; and when a juryman feels doubtful, he is apt to quote the opinion of the judge, and excuse himself to his own conscience, by resting on that opinion rather than on his own conviction, or what is worse, rather than take any trouble to investigate the subject."

The too common practice of browbeating witnesses in a court of justice, is reprobated in the following

terms.

"Many persons who attend a court of law to give honest evidence before the public, are of retired habits of life, are unaccustomed to deliver themselves before an assemblage of people, are tender of their characters, are fearful of committing themselves in terms or in substance, are unused to answer to in

terrogatories, are deeply anxious lest they should from any indiscretion or inadvertency prejudice the truth, and are agitated even to terror at the solemnity and heavy responsibility of their situation. The license of speech assumed towards witnesses by counsel, the latitude taken in cross-examination, and the insulting, opprobrious, and flippant insinuations and assertions, of which they often find themselves the subject, render the task of witnesses as onerous and painful as though they were themselves plaintiff or defendant, or the objects of the trial, rather than the prisoner at the bar! A witness is sworn to declare the truth, and the whole truth, yet few witnesses are hardy enough to venture beyond monosyllabic answers to questions often very trifling and irrelevant.

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Nothing is more difficult than to sift out the whole truth from parole evidence in public trials, as they are now conducted. Either the witness is terrified, and says what he ought not to say, and omits to say what he ought; or if free and honest in his communications, he is entangled and entrapped by the opposing counsel, and his declarations perverted; or if he has the hardihood not to suffer this, he finds himself insulted, and the jury influenced against him.

"Let us suppose a modest but not unintelligent witness, who perhaps never before saw the inside of a court of law, just placed in the wiress-box, and abashed at being in the presence of so many persons, many of them of superior distinction. He trembles, as well at the novelty of his situation, as at the responsibility which appertains to every thing he may say at a time when adventitious circumstances tend to overpower his understanding and fetter his utterance, the consciousness of which doubles his embarrassment. Should it be his ill-fate to be cross examined by a snarling and illiberal counsel, it is twenty to one but he involves himself in contradictions which he cannot unravel, and leaves the box under surmises and imputations, which render his testimony of little avail in the cause, and which hang about him during the remainder of his days.

"Judges, from sentiments of professional delicacy, do not often interfere to protect a witness; and it may be presumed, that they often give counsel credit for knowing of some sinister motive

in the witness for withholding the truth. Counsel themselves, also, are frequently misled by their clients, in the misrepresentations given them of the characters of witnesses. Again, the timidity and embarrassment of witnesses frequently creates prejudices against them in courts of law, and is ascribed to the workings of a bad conscience, rather than to its

true cause..

"It is, therefore, the duty of candid and intelligent men in a jury to protect witnesses, and to obtain from them the evidence which is likely to secure a just verdict. When they see a witness

forced into contradictions by the arts and sophistry of counsel, they ought themselves, in a candid and manly way, to put two or three leading questions, so as to come at the substance of the evidence meant to be given; and they Gught not to suffer a witness to leave the box, if he has been entrapped into contradictions, and has, in a state of mental embarrassment, made admissions not consonant with his evidence in chief. Such conduct in jurymen would render the pernicious practices of the bar of no effect, would consequently secure the testimony of witnesses from perversion, and essentially serve the cause of justice.

"A method of ascertaining the truth by parole evidence, infinitely superior to that of badgering and insulting witnesses, would be for the jury, in all trials of importance, or when there is reason to suspect any collusion, to request that none of the witnesses may be allowed to be present in court, except the one under examination. The truth would thus be elicited in all cases; and it would be a great reform in our courts of judicature, if it were made a standing rule, that the witnesses who had been examined should be kept apart from those who were to be examined, by an officer of the court. It is, however, in the power of any jury to request this arrangement during a term or sessions, or in any trial in which they are engaged.

"The best evidence the nature of the case will admit must be produced, for if it appear that better evidence might have been brought forward, the circumstance of its being withheld atfords a strong suspicion that it would have prejudiced the party who withholds it."

On the chapter respecting the verdiet, there are many observations

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