Inferior courts.-A freeholders' charter is not a law within the meaning of this section, and, therefore, an inferior court cannot be established by such charter. (People v. Toal, 85 Cal. 333, 24 Pac. 603; Miner v. Justice's Court, 121 Cal. 264, 53 Pac. 795; Ex parte Sparks, 120 Cal. 395, 52 Pac. 715.)

This section limits the power of the legislature to the establishment of municipal and inferior courts within the limits of an incorporated city or town. (Ex parte Stratman, 39 Cal. 517.)

The municipal criminal court of San Francisco is an inferior court within the meaning of this section. (Ex parte Stratman, 39 Cal. 517; People v. Nyland, 41 Cal. 129.)

The police court of San Francisco was not abolished by the constitutional amendments in 1862. (People v. Provines, 34 Cal. 520.)

The term "municipal courts" has a legal meaning and includes mayors' and recorders' courts. (Uridias v. Morrill, 22 Cal. 473.)

The legislature may vest in inferior courts jurisdiction of cases of which the courts established by the constitution have jurisdiction. (Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 292; Seale v. Mitchell, 5 Cal. 401; Vassault v. Austin, 36 Cal. 691; Curtis v. Richards, 9 Cal. 33.)

The legislature may authorize a municipal court to send its process beyond the territorial limits of the municipality. (Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 292. Meyer v. Kalkman, 6 Cal. 582, overruled.)

Judges of the police court of San Francisco are not affected by the provisions of the County Government Act, but derive their power from this section and the act of 1893. (Kahn v. Sutro, 114 Cal. 316, 46 Pac. 87; In re Mitchell, 120 Cal. 384, 52 Pac. 799. But see People v. Cobb, 21 Cal. Dec. 779.)

An act creating police courts in cities having fifteen thousand, and under eighteen thousand, inhabitants, not being in conformity with the general classification of municipal corporations, is void. (Ex parte Giambonini, 117 Cal. 573, 49 Pac. 732.)

An act creating a justice's court for one particular named town, and fixing its jurisdiction, is not authorized by this section. (Miner v. Justice's Court, 121 Cal. 264, 53 Pac. 795.)

The late superior court of San Francisco was an inferior court, but its process ran outside of the city. (Chipman v. Bowman, 14 Cal 157; McCauley v. Fulton, 44 Cal. 355.)

Sec. 2. The supreme court shall consist of a chief justice and six associate justices. The court may sit in departments and in bank, and shall always be open for the transaction of business. There shall be two departments, denominated, respectively, department one and department two. The chief justice shall assign three of the associate justices to each department, and such assignment may be changed by him from time to time. The associate justices shall be competent to sit in either department, and may interchange with each other by agreement among themselves or as ordered by the chief justice. Each of the departments shall have the power to hear and determine causes and all questions arising therein, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained in relation to the court in bank. The presence of three justices shall be necessary to transact any business in either of the departments, except such as may be done at chambers, and the concurrence of three justices shall be necessary to pronounce a judgment. The chief justice shall apportion the business to the departments, and may, in his discretion, order any cause pending before the court to be heard and decided by the court in bank. The order may be made before or after judgment pronounced by a department; but where

a cause has been allotted to one of the departments, and a judgment pronounced thereon, the order must be made within thirty days after such judgment, and concurred in by two associate justices, and if so made it shall have the effect to vacate and set aside the judgment. Any four justices may, either before or after judgment by a department, order a case to be heard in bank. If the order be not made within the time above limited the judgment shall be final. No judgment by a department shall become final until the expiration of the period of thirty days aforesaid, unless approved by the chief justice, in writing, with the concurrence of two associate justices. The chief justice may convene the court in bank at any time, and shall be the presiding justice of the court when so convened. The concurrence of four justices present at the argument shall be necessary to pronounce a judgment in bank; but if four justices, so present, do not concur in a judgment, then all the justices qualified to sit in the cause shall hear the argument; but to render a judgment a concurrence of four judges shall be necessary. In the determination of causes, all decisions of the court in bank or in departments shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be stated. The chief justice may sit in either department, and shall preside when so sitting, but the justices assigned to each department shall select one of

their number as presiding justice. In case of the absence of the chief justice from the place at which the court is held, or his inability to act, the associate justices shall select one of their own number to perform the duties and exercise the powers of the chief justice during such absence or inability to act.

SUPREME

COURT. This section by implication forbids the legislature to increase the number of justices of the supreme court. (People v. Wells, 2 Cal. 198, 610.)

In the absence of any provision on the subject, all the judges composing the court must sit. (People v. Ah Chung, 5 Cal. 103; People v. Barbour, 9 Cal. 230.)

The word "heard" means the consideration and determination of a cause by the court. (Niles v. Edwards, 95 Cal. 41, 30 Pac. 134.)

It is not necessary that four justices be physically present at an oral argument, nor that all of the justices qualified to "sit" shall literally "hear" an argument; but whenever there is an oral argument, only the justices who were present at such argument are authorized to take part in the decision of the court. (Niles v. Edwards, 95 Cal. 41, 30 Pac. 134.)

The fact that one of the judges who participated in a decision of the court did not hear the oral argument does not render the judgment absolutely void. It is an irregularity which may be waived by the parties. (Blanc v. Bowman, 22 Cal. 23.)

The constitution requires the concurrence of four judges to pronounce a judgment, and a mere failure to agree cannot have the effect, ipso facto, of an affirmance; and where the personnel of the court is soon to be changed, a motion to affirm the judgment on account of an equal division of opinion will be denied. (Luco v. De Toro, 88 Cal. 26, 25 Pac. 983.)

But where there is no probability of an immediate change in the personnel of the court, the judgment will be affirmed. (Frankel v. Deidesheimer, 93 Cal.

73, 28 Pac. 794; Santa Rosa City R. R. Co. v. Railway Co., 112 Cal. 436, 44 Pac. 733.)

Opinions.-The legislature cannot require the supreme court to give in writing reasons for its decisions. (Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24.)

Rehearings. In an original proceeding in the supreme court the proper practice is to move for a rehearing, and a motion for a new trial is not proper. (In re Philbrook, 108 Cal. 14, 40 Pac. 1061: Grangers' Bank v. San Francisco, 101 Cal. 198, 35 Pac. 642.)

There is only one supreme court, and the jurisdiction which is vested in it may be exercised either in bank or in department. The court in bank has power to correct an error in or modify a judgment rendered in a department, without application therefor, and without the case being argued in bank. (Niles v. Edwards, 95 Cal. 41, 30 Pac. 134.)

Although a petition for a rehearing by the court in bank is filed within thirty days after the judg. ment in department, if it does not reach the hands of the court until after the expiration of the period allowed by the constitution for ordering a rehearing, the petition must be denied, irrespective of its merits. (Durgin v. Neal, 82 Cal. 595, 23 Pac. 133.)

The provision of this section as to the granting of rehearings in bank after the decision by a department does not create an implication against the constitutional power of the court in bank to grant rehearings in cases determined by it in bank. Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pac. 976, 22 Pac. 742.)

(In re

The supreme court, in bank, has power to grant rehearings by orders of the court entered upon its minutes, without the written signatures of five justices, and the legislature cannot take that power away. (In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 21 Pac. 976, 22 Pac. 742.)

An order modifying a judgment is not rendered nugatory by reason of the failure of the clerk to enter it in the minutes until after the expiration of thirty days from the judgment in department. (Niles v. Edwards, 95 Cal. 41, 30 Pac. 134.)