tion of the rights of creditors therein. Reid, 111 Cal. 484, 44 Pac. 167.)

(Beaton v.

The constitution is based upon the idea that the homestead is to be carved out of the property of the husband, or at least out of the common property. (Gee v. More, 14 Cal. 472.)

If in the country, the homestead may include a garden or farm; if in a town or city, it may includę one or more lots or blocks. It need not be compact in form, and is not measured by fences merely. The only tests are use and value. (Gregg v. Bostwick, 33 Cal. 220.)

Statutes for the purpose of carrying out the constitutional command as to the preservation of the homestead for the family are remedial, and should be liberally, or at least fairly and reasonably, and not strictly, construed. (Southwick y. Davis, 78 Cal. 504, 21 Pac. 121.)

Sec. 2. The holding of large tracts of land, uncultivated and unimproved, by individuals or corporations, is against the public interest, and should be discouraged by all means not inconsistent with the rights of private property.

TRACTS OF LAND.-This section declares a policy against the holding of large tracts of land uncultivated, and this policy should not be limited by a narrow construction of the constitution. (Fulton v. Brannan, 88 Cal. 454, 26 Pac. 506.)

Sec. 3. Lands belonging to this state, which are suitable for cultivation, shall be granted only to actual settlers, and in quantities not exceeding three hundred and twenty acres to each settler, under such conditions as shall be prescribed by law.

PUBLIC LANDS.-The provision of this section that "lands belonging to the state which are suita

ble for cultivation, shall be granted only to actual settlers," operates on applications made before as well as those made after the constitution took effect. (Johnson v. Squires, 55 Cal. 103; Mosely v. Torrence, 71 Cal. 318, 12 Pac. 430.)

An application to purchase state lands made by one not an actual settler, before the adoption of the new constitution, and who had made no payments thereon, conferred no right to purchase such lands after the adoption of the constitution. (Urton v. Wilson, 65 Cal. 11, 2 Pac. 411.)

A certificate of purchase, obtained before the adoption of the new constitution, is not impaired by this section. (Miller v. Byrd, 90 Cal. 150, 27 Pac. 51.)

What are public lands.-The phrase, "lands belong. ing to the state which are suitable for cultivation," includes all of its lands which are ready for occupation, and which, by ordinary farming processes, are fit for agricultural purposes. Thus swamp-lands may be suitable for cultivation. (Fulton v. Brannan, 88 Cal. 454, 26 Pac. 506; Goldberg v. Thompson, 96 Cal. 117, 30 Pac. 1019; McNee v. Lynch, 88 Cal. 519, 26 Pac. 508; McDonald v. Taylor, 89 Cal. 42, 26 Pac. 595; Belcher v. Farren, 89 Cal. 73, 26 Pac. 791; Dewar v. Ruiz, 89 Cal. 385, 26 Pac. 832; Manley v. Cunningham, 72 Cal. 236, 13 Pac. 622.)

The fact that the land is in most places heavily covered with redwood timber and brush, that it would not, when cleared, produce ordinary agricultural crops in average quantities, and that it is more valuable for timber than for agriculture, does not render it unsuitable for cultivation. (Jacobs v. Walker, 90 Cal. 43, 27 Pac. 48.)

Actual settlers.-An actual settler is one who establishes himself upon the land, or fixes his residence upon it, to take possession for his exclusive occupancy and use, with a view of acquiring title to it by purchase from the state. (Gavitt v. Mohr, 68 Cal. 506, 10 Pac. 337.)

Under this section a claimant to purchase state lands which are suitable for cultivation must be at the time of his application an actual settler thereon. (Gavitt v. Mohr, 68 Cal. 506, 10 Pac. 337.)

The fact that an applicant living upon swampland suitable for cultivation removed his family therefrom temporarily, because of the ill-health of a member of his family, does not show nor tend to show that he was not an actual settler. (Maddux v. Brown, 91 Cal. 523, 27 Pac. 771.)

der adequate penalties, all undue influence thereon from power, bribery, tumult, or other improper practice.

BRIBERY.-Where a candidate for office publicly pledges himself before the election to perform the duties of the office for less than the compensation established by law, and by reason thereof a sufficient number of voters were induced to vote for him to secure him the election, his election is void. (State v. Collier, 3 Pac. C. L. J. 394; State v. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213.)

A vote given for a public officer, in consideration of his promise, in case he should be elected, to donate a sum of money or other valuable thing to a third party, is void. (Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 140; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 428.)

See, further, State v. Church, 5 Or. 375; Commonwealth v. Shaver, 3 Watts & S. 338.

SUFFRAGE. This section does not authorize the passage of a law curtailing the privilege of free suffrage. (Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659.)

Sec. 12. Absence from this state, on business of the state or of the United States, shall not affect the question of residence of any person.

Sec. 13. A plurality of the votes given at any election shall constitute a choice, where not otherwise directed in this constitution.

Sec. 14. The legislature shall provide, by law, for the maintenance and efficiency of a state board of health.

Sec. 15. Mechanics, materialmen, artisans, and laborers of every class, shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have bestowed labor or

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furnished material for the value of such labor done and material furnished; and the legislature shall provide, by law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens.

MECHANICS' LIENS.-This section is not selfexecuting and is inoperative, except as supplemented by legislation. (Spinney v. Griffith, 98 Cal. 149, 32 Pac. 974.)

The constitution by this section has left to the legislature the duty of providing for the enforcement of these liens. (Morse v. De Ardo, 107 Cal. 622, 40 Pac. 1018.)

The legislature has power to provide that the owner shall be liable to materialmen and laborers, unless he executes his contract in a certain form, and files it in the recorder's office. (Kellogg v. Howes, 81 Cal. 170, 22 Pac. 509.)

This section does not give a lien upon public buildings or property. (Mayrhofer v. Board of Education,

89 Cal. 110, 26 Pac. 646.)

Sections 1183 to 1199 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not being inconsistent with this section, remained in force after its adoption. (Germania Bldg. etc. Assn. v. Wagner, 61 Cal. 349.)

Sec. 16. When the term of any officer or commissioner is not provided for in this constitution, the term of such officer or commissioner may be declared by law; and, if not so declared, such officer or commissioner shall hold his position as such officer or commissioner during the pleasure of the authority making the appointment; but in no case shall such term exceed four years.

TERM OF OFFICE.-This section being a re-enactment of section 7, article 11, of the former constitution, must be construed in the same manner. (People v. Edwards, 93 Cal. 153.)

The word "duration" signifies extent, limit, or time. (People v. Hill, 7 Cal. 97.)