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An act providing for a proposed alteration of a public road, and requiring persons claiming compensation for land to be taken to present their claims within a certain time, or be deemed as waiving all right to damages, is valid. (Potter v. Ames, 43 Cal. 75.)

It is competent for the legislature to prescribe the several steps to be pursued in the assertion of the right to compensation for land appropriated for public use, but the prescribed procedure must not destroy or substantially impair the right itself. (Potter v. Ames, 43 Cal. 75.)

The fact to be ascertained is the value of the land at the time it is taken, and testimony to prove the annual net profits is not admissible. (Stockton etc.

Co. v. Galgiana, 49 Cal. 139.)

Compensation.-An ordinance fixing water rates must allow a just and reasonable compensation to the water company for the property used and the services furnished by it. (San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, 118 Cal. 556, 50 Pac. 633.)

In a condemnation proceeding the land owner is not liable for costs, but is entitled to recover his own costs from the plaintiff. (San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259, 33 Pac. 56.)

Where a railroad company, prior to the commencement of proceedings to condemn a right of way, but with the bona fide intent to commence such proceedings, erects structures thereon, it is not required to pay for the structures so erected in the condemnation proceeding. (Albion River R. R. Co. v. Hesser, 84 Cal. 435, 24 Pac. 288; San Francisco etc. R. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Cal. 246, 24 Pac. 1027.)

The provision of section 1249 of the Code of Civil Procedure that, for the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the summons, is not in conflict with this provision. (California Southern R. R. Co. v. Kimball, 61 Cal. 90; Tehama Co. v. Bryan, 68 Cal. 57, 8 Pac. 673.)

Under the former constitution, where the land taken is a part only of a tract, the difference be tween the value of the tract without the improvement and with it, is the compensation to be made.

(San Francisco etc. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367.)

Both the injury to the land and the benefit to it should be considered. (San Francisco etc. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367.)

The defendant is entitled to receive for a strip of land taken for an alley an amount equal to that for which it could have been sold in the open market, on the day of the summons, for cash, after reasonable time taken by the owner to make the sale. (Santa Ana v. Brunner, 132 Cal. 235.)

The provision of this section, providing for compensation, "irrespective of any benefit from any improvement proposed," is not limited to the land taken, but also to the land not taken, and the damages to the property not taken must be fixed, irrespective of any benefit which may result from the proposed improvement. (San Bernardino etc. Ry. Co. v. Haven, 94 Cal. 489, 29 Pac. 875.)

The provision of this section, prohibiting any deduction from the damages to land not taken of the amount of benefits accruing from the improvement to such land, only applies to "corporations other than municipal," and does not apply to individuals. (Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 549, 21 Pac. 958.)

In a proceeding by a railroad corporation to condemn land for its road, the compensation to be awarded the owner must be ascertained irrespective of any benefit that will accrue to the remainder of his land from the building of the road. (Pacific Coast Ry. Co. v. Porter, 74 Cal. 261, 15 Pac. 774.)

An act requiring commissioners, in assessing the value of lands sought to be taken by a railroad company, to make allowance for any benefit that will accrue to the person whose lands are taken, is valid. (San Francisco etc. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 31 Cal. 367.)

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The increased cost of irrigation which would be caused by the building of a railroad is a legítimate subject of inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the damage sustained by the owner. (San Bernardino etc. Ry. Co. v. Haven, 94 Cal. 489, 29 Pac. 875.)

A county is not a municipal corporation within the

meaning of this section. (San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 Pac. 78.)

Assessments.-An assessment upon a lot adjacent to a street to pay for improvements made on the street cannot be maintained when the lot has received only an injury by the work on the street; and therefore in no case can the owner be made personally liable for any deficiency after the lot has been exhausted. (Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal. 613; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; Gaffney v. Gough, 36 Cal. 104; Coniff v. Hastings, 36 Cal. 292. But see Walsh v. Mathews, 29 Cal. 124.)

Benefits for street improvements accrue to the land and not to the buildings. (Appeal of Piper, 32 Cal. 530.)

The so-called "front-foot" method of assessment for street improvements has been many times upheld in this state. (Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497; Hadley v. Dague, 130 Cal. 207, 62 Pac. 500; Cohen v. Alameda, 124 Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377; Emery v. San Francisco etc. Co., 28 Cal. 345; Emery v. Bradford, 29 Cal. 75; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; Whiting v. Quackenbush, 54 Cal. 306; Whitin v. Townsend, 57 Cal. 515; Lent v. Tillson, 72 Cal. 404, 14 Pac. 71: Jennings v. Le Breton, 80 Cal. 8, 21 Pac. 1127; San Francisco etc. Co. v. Bates, 22 Cal. Dec. 302; Banaz v. Smith, 21 Cal. Dec. 735.)

Considerable doubt was cast upon the correctness of these decisions by the decision of the United States supreme court in Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187, but the doctrine of these cases has been since sustained by the decision of that court in Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. 389, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609.

An assessment for a street improvement upon the front-foot system is an exercise of the power of taxation, and not of eminent domain. (Emery v. San Francisco etc. Co., 28 Cal. 345.)

Benefits may be assessed in the ratio of their value. (Appeal of Piper, 32 Cal. 530.)

An assessment upon an assessment district is valid. (Appeal of Piper, 32 Cal. 530.)

Jury. The right of trial by jury in cases of eminent domain did not exist prior to the new constitu

tion. (Koppikus v. State Capitol Commrs., 16 Cal. 248; People v. Blake, 19 Cal. 579.)

Police power.--The police power will not authorize the state to take private property for public use without compensation, when such property can be condemned and paid for. (People v. Elk etc. Co., 107 Cal. 221, 40 Pac. 531.)

This provision does not prevent the legislature from prohibiting the conducting of offensive trades within the limits of a city. (Ex parte Shrader, 33 Cal. 279.)

Sec. 15. No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud, nor in civil actions for torts, except in cases of willful injury to person or property; and no person shall be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace.

IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT.-An assault and battery is not a case of fraud within the meaning of this provision. (Ex parte Prader, 6 Cal. 239.)

In a suit to recover money received by a person as agent, such agent cannot be arrested without showing some fraudulent conduct on his part, or a demand on him by the principal and a refusal to pay. (In re Holdforth, 1 Cal. 438.)

The proceedings for the settlement of an estate are not a civil action within the meaning of this section. (Ex parte Smith, 53 Cal. 204.)

Nor is money in the hands of an executor a "debt" within the meaning of this section. (Ex parte Smith, 53 Cal. 204.)

Sec. 16. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.

IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS— Contract.-A liquor license is not a contract within the meaning of this section, and may be revoked at any time. (Hevren v. Reed, 126 Cal. 219, 58 Pac. 536.)

CALIFORNIA

No person has a vested right to an unenforced penalty; and if such a penalty is reduced to judgment, the judgment will be reversed upon appeal, if, pending the appeal, the statute imposing the penalty is repealed. (Anderson v. Byrnes, 122 Cal. 272, 54 Pac. S21.)

As to whether or not the charter of a corporation is a contract within the meaning of this provision, see Spring Valley W. W. v. San Francisco, 61 Cal. 3.

A legislative grant of property to a municipal corporation is an executed contract, and as such within this clause. (Grogan v. San Francisco, 18 Cal. 590.) The right to practice law is not a contract. (Cohen V. Wright, 22 Cal. 293.)

An act authorizing the contractor to sue for a street assessment is a contract. (Creighton v. Pragg, 21 Cal. 115.)

Judicial decisions.-The decisions of state courts in regard to general rules of law, although they may affect contract rights, are not subject to the rule laid down by the federal courts that a judicial construction of a statute, so far as contract rights acquired under it are concerned, becomes a part of the statute, and that a change in such construction has the same effect on contracts as a legislative amendment. (Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 58 Pac. 460.)

The decision holding that a chattel mortgage vests the title in the mortgagee was not a judicial construction of section 1888 of the Civil Code, which was overlooked by the court, and does not fall within the rule of the federal courts that contract rights acquired under a judicial construction of a statute by a state court will be governed thereby, and cannot be affected by a subsequent change in such construction. (Alferitz v. Borgwardt, 126 Cal. 201, 58 Pac. 460.)

Decisions declaring that a conveyance absolute in form, but intended as security, did not pass the legal title, cannot be considered as forming part of a conveyance executed after such decisions and before they were overruled. (Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 184, 30 Pac.

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