taken by the owners, and by every one else, as the correct measure of their wealth. Precisely the same is the case with the millions of railroad stock issued during the last few years to represent" capitalized earnings," and "improvements paid for out of traffic receipts," and "losses or profits of the directors in stock speculation." Some leading lines of railways have, no doubt, actually improved in value through increased traffic and better management; but the bulk of the additions to railroad stocks and steamship stocks are unquestionably sheer fabrications, representing nothing tangible, and, while adding large amounts to the nominal wealth of individuals, yet do not increase the real wealth of the country by one single dollar. It is impossible to tell, even approximately, the amount of this fictitious wealth, but with the figures already given it will not seem exaggerated to estimate it at over six thousand millions of dollars, or not far from one half of the total property valuation of the whole country in 1860. The figures are not given for their own sake; they are too much the result of loose estimates to have any practical value; but it is only when we can put the result of such an investigation into figures of even remote correctness that it becomes readily intelligible. It is for this purpose only that the figures are offered.

The final result of our inquiry is, then, as follows: The nominal wealth of the country is largely increased, the real wealth of the country is diminished; the whole of the nominal wealth, and a larger share than formerly of the real wealth, is in the possession of the wealthy; the poor are poorer in everything.

The social changes growing out of this change in financial condition are already developing themselves. Immense concentration of capital produces great concentration of business, with corresponding economy of management, diminution of profits, and advantage to buyers, but with destruction to smaller competitors, and the forcing down of the lower classes to still lower depths. Concentration of capital makes possible great public works controlled by single individuals, and raises private men to positions of power and influence, in which they can corrupt courts and legislatures and overawe the public.

J. B. HODGSKIN.

ART. VI. THE SPANISH REVOLUTION.

WHEN the Spanish Revolution broke out, the world was taken by surprise. Yet, when Queen Isabella was transferred from the pleasant watering-place of San Sebastian to the other side of the Pyrenees, people thought it the most natural thing possible, and only wondered that the event had not happened before. The saying that "nothing succeeds so well as success" thus had another illustration.

There is a school of politicians - or shall we rather say of shallow talkers?-who, though utterly ignorant of the real springs of action, are never at a loss to understand the absolute necessity of certain successful achievements, whilst they are equally ready to dismiss, with a supercilious toss of the head and a deprecatory motion of the hand, the "sheer folly," as they call it, of other enterprises, which "had not the ghost of a chance," - albeit the fact may be that triumph was almost within grasp, and defeat only the result of some calamity impossible to foresee. These are the men who slavishly worship Victory, and mercilessly rail at the stoutest hearts and coolest heads, when an undertaking has failed. Politicians of the true stamp, warriors who have learned by dear-bought experience how often the best combinations are foiled by an accident or an unexpected defection, pass by such critics, not caring to reason with them. Those who know something of the negotiations which preceded the pronunciamiento at Cadiz are aware of the greatness of the difficulties which had to be vanquished before that "Party Compact" was brought about which insured success as against the reigning dynasty. They are aware of the closeness of the game which had to be played, even after that compact was formed, in order to neutralize the reactionary portion of the army. And they understand, moreover, from the peculiar condition of Spain, as well as from the character of revolutionary movements in general, that the question as to the establishment of a republic, or a return to the monarchical system under some new form, will not be solved simply in accordance with what is called "the ripeness of a nation" for this or that form of government, seeing that it is

generally possible, when once the popular forces are set adrift, to fashion out of them different political structures, according to the strength of the initiative displayed by various parties, or even individuals.

That the Spanish rising was carefully prepared, in the beginning of the year 1868, by men who knew how to make use of the peculiar state of political parties in the Peninsula, admits of no doubt. On repeated occasions within the last few years, the insurrectionary attempts of some "Progressist" section, or of some dashing general of advanced Liberal opinions, had failed. The same ill success had attended the movements of the Democratic party, though of late it had rapidly and largely increased in all the more important towns, the capital included. In this condition of affairs Government had always the best of it. Narvaez and Gonzales Bravo, not to speak of the fine trio, "Father Claret, Sor Patrocinio, and Señor Marfori," were powerful only because their antagonists were · split up by rivalries, partly also by differences of principle. The men of the so-called "Liberal Union" disagreed with the "Progresistas," the "Progresistas" with the "Democrats"; and to make confusion worse confounded, a new party had risen up, striving to obliterate the very boundaries of the country by the establishment of an "Iberian Realm," that is to say, the fusion of Portugal with Spain, under the House of Coburg-Braganza. So that, in fact, there were moderate Liberals, clinging to the Bourbon dynasty, advanced Liberals, some of them afraid of any dynastic change, whilst others looked to some foreign prince, say, the Duke of Montpensier, then "Democrats," that is, in Spanish party nomenclature, Republicans, and lastly, adherents to the idea of an "Iberian Union."

This state of things enabled the Crown and the Camarilla to hold their own against successive comers. As each party, or fragment of a party, rose on its own account, it was easily sent back into nothingness, the popular element at large refusing to support these disjointed movements, and thus placing them practically at the mercy of the despotic ruler.

It must be owned that a great deal of responsibility in this matter attached to the unbending rigidity with which some of the military leaders who acted apparently in the Liberal inter

est were wont to regard their own immediate circle as the whole political world of the country. I know, on positive testimony, that, as late as the beginning of the year 1868, several attempts at bringing about concert of action between those whose evident advantage it would have been not to fight the common adversary single-handed remained utterly without result. Neither Serrano nor Prim, nor others of that stamp, were then ready for a general union. The infatuation thus displayed was extraordinary, as any one not bereft of foresight must have seen that continued isolation could only produce an endless round of abortive attempts. But the infatuation existed, owing to the harsh pride of sectional leaders and the fierce narrowness of military cliques. The Spaniards, it ought to be remembered, had until then been accustomed to work by strict party and even clique machinery, and their spirit had always had a strong dash of jealous rivalry with the "next-door neighbor." This frequently gave them their impetus, but in course of time, with the increasing number of sections, it proved the main source of their weakness against the Crown.

Those who had in vain endeavored to break the strange spell under which the majority of the military lay at last resolved to work a cure by temporarily increasing the evil. Being informed of a new conspiracy, in what was supposed to be the Montpensier interest, they purposely created a void around it. They knew that it would thus necessarily fail, and they calculated on its failure. They hoped that the very magnitude of the evil would prove its own remedy: and so it did.

I

may be allowed here to refer to the communication made by a Spanish leader, who has been frequently heard of since, to a few trusty Republican friends in London, in the early part of 1868. "In a few months," he said, " a number of our generals will most probably be arrested, among them even Marshal Serrano, Duke de la Torre, whose former personal relations with the Queen are notorious. A new military movement, in the constitutional sense, is on foot. We have nothing to do with it; we bide our time. Prim is not our man. you will see that in a few months after that movement shall have been crushed there will be another movement, of greater importance, in the Democratic sense. Our great towns are prepared

But

for that." He then went on to give more details, developing the whole plan as to the agencies to be employed, and even the probable time of the outbreak, - all of which was subsequently verified in the most marvellous manner. I well remember the

doubts which prevailed at the time in the small circle of exiles above alluded to. But it all turned out correct. I may the more properly allude to this astounding prediction, as the words I have quoted were published in England two months before the successful revolution of September, of course unheeded by the reading public, who considered it a wild speculation or windy braggadocio. I do not recollect a similar instance of exact political prophecy, except in the case of a confidential communication referring to the Sicilian insurrection of 1860, which ended in the expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples.

It may at once be added here, that in July last, immediately after the suppression of the Montpensier movement, or what was believed to be his movement, it became known on good authority to a few proscribed leaders in London that a secret convention had been negotiated between the Courts of Paris and Madrid, according to which, in the emergency of a war on the Rhine, Queen Isabella was to send an army corps to Rome, so as to enable Louis Napoleon to withdraw his troops from there, and to strengthen his aggressive force in the direction of Germany. When first announced, this news was received with some incredulity; but soon the foreign correspondents of several English, German, and Italian papers, of high standing, made explicit statements to the same effect. It was believed, even, that the intended exchange of royal and imperial visits at Biarritz and San Sebastian had been arranged for the purpose of placing the final seal upon the convention. By a most dramatic coincidence, the report of the insurrection at Cadiz arrived at the Spanish watering-place the very moment when Queen Isabella had ordered her carriage for her intended drive beyond the Pyrenees. That the news should have thus come in the nick of time has, perhaps, saved the French ruler from great embarrassment; for it will be remembered, that, after Isabella had been compelled to fly, she spoke of Louis Napo leon as her "august ally," which was clearly a reminder, though a fruitless one, as to what he was expected to do in the - NO. 223.

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