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their hearts on God."* Now, in a fair use of language, does such an influence exerted on Peter render Peter's action certain, when he is the cause of his own action, and has a sufficiency in himself to refuse to act let his Maker do what he will? Can God's illuminating influence which many resist, but which he merely foresees that Peter will allow to prevail, be said to ensure Peter's compliance? Suppose Esther had been a prophetess, and had foreseen that her intercession with Ahasuerus would convert him to the cause of the Jews; would it be proper to adopt the high Calvinistic language in the case, and say that she decreed the conversion of Ahasuerus, and ensured it, and elected him to be the saviour of the Jews? And yet such language might be applied to that case as correctly as to this. God's determination to urge motives which he foresees will owe their success to a power in the creature independent of his control, is God decreeing the event! Now with this understanding of the interposition, is it fair to apply to it the highest language that the advocates of efficiency have ever employed? It may serve to hide the alien form of the theory and cover it with an orthodox guise; but I appeal to the universe if it is fair.

It is not necessary to make quotations to prove that Dr Fitch holds strongly to the doctrine of perseverance. This will not be denied.

Dr Fisk, in his Reply to this Review,† holds the following language. "If I understand the reviewer-he is -in principle an Arminian.—The reviewer's whole ground of defence is solely this Arminian explanation of the + Christian Advocate, May 11, 1832.

* 632.

doctrine of predestination. He acknowledges, nay boldly asserts, in a strain of rugged controversy with his brethren who may differ from this view of the subject, that there is no other explanation by which the arguments of the sermon can be avoided; that is, as I understand it, the only way to avoid the arguments against the doctrine of Calvinian predestination, is to give it up and assume the Arminian sentiment.—I cannot approve of the reviewer's use of terms. Though to my understanding he has evidently given the doctrine of predestination, not merely a new dress, but a new character, yet he more than intimates that it is the old doctrine with only a new method of explanation. And so confident is the reviewer that he still believes in the fact of predestination in the old Calvinistic sense, that in stating his sentiments on this subject, he uses the same forms of expression which Calvinists have used, when their meaning was as distant from his as the two poles from each other.-I feel safer in understanding the reviewer in an Arminian sense, because he and some others take it very ill of me that I have represented them as Calvinists.—By God's foreordaining whatever comes to pass, he only means that God foresaw that sin would certainly take place, and predetermined that he would not hinder it, either by refraining from creating moral agents, or by throwing a restraint upon them that would destroy their free agency; in short, that he would submit to it as an evil unavoidably incident to the best possible system, after doing all that he wisely could to prevent it. This is foreordaining sin! This is predetermining that it should be! I cannot but express my deepest regret that a gentle

man of the reviewer's standing and learning, should lend his aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language,—to such a confusion of tongues.-Do the words predestinate, foreordain,-decree, mean in common language, or even in their radical and critical definition, nothing more than to permit,—not absolutely to hinder,— to submit to as an unavoidable but offensive evil? The reviewer certainly will not pretend to this.-The use of these terms by those who believe as I understand the reviewer to believe, is the more unjustifiable, because they are used by most Calvinistic authors in a different sense. Why then should the reviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in the symbols of his faith? Different persons might give different answers to such a question. For one I would prefer he should answer it himself.—His mode of explanation-turns the doctrine into Arminianism. -But the sermon was never written to oppose those who hold to the decrees of God in an Arminian sense. Why then does the reviewer complain of the sermon ?—It seems that Calvinism, in its proper character, is as obnoxious to the reviewer as to the author of the sermon.-If it is safer to attack Calvinism in this indirect way, I will not object. -But I cannot see that it would be safer. An open bold front always ends best.-As I understand the reviewer, from the days of John Calvin down to the present hour, there is on this point, between the great body of Calvinists and himself, almost no likeness except in the use of words. Theirs is one doctrine, his another. Why then-does he hail from that party and hoist their signals; and then, after seeming to get the victory by espousing the very

cause of the assailed, encourage the Calvinists to triumph as if their cause had been successful?"

These remarks of the President of the Wesleyan University of Connecticut, appear to me candid and judicious, and go far towards exposing the unhappy incongruity between the language and the sentiments of this Review.

Since writing the above I have seen, in the Christian Spectator for December 1832, an article from the same pen on the Divine Permission of Sin; referring to several publications by which the Review and the system had been assailed. I shall make a few extracts in confirmation of some of the foregoing remarks and in illustration of others. In the supralapsarian scheme, which Dr F condemns," it is assumed," he says, that God's "direct efficiency—is such that he can rely on that alone to secure any conceivable result whatever.-Now to affirm that God, in this manner, selects a part for holiness and blessedness, and leaves the rest to sin and misery, is placing the subject on the ground of mere arbitrary will."* "We have begun with very obvious facts, that moral agents have the power of choice, and that their voluntary conduct is not the result of immediate propulsion or direct creation."+ God 'purposes to conduct his own works, [of creation as well as grace,] in the particular manner he does, in view of the results which will certainly ensue,-and for the sake alone of the good which lies in these results, as being the highest good he can secure." The infralapsarian scheme, which he approves, is this. "God, foreseeing the conduct which + 619, Note.

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* 617.

618.

to ensue.

will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to take with a moral kingdom, purposes to pursue those measures which will secure the best possible result.— It supposes that there may be obstacles in the nature of a moral kingdom which render it impossible for him to give universal efficacy to any original scheme of moral government or subsequent scheme of redemption. It supposes therefore that, as the first thing, he decides upon that course of means and measures which he foresees will on the whole most overcome hindrances and carry holiness to the farthest extent possible, considering a whole universe in all ages. Such a purpose is, by consequence, the purpose of all that conduct in his creatures which is certainly That is, the general purpose to use the power of moral government and redemption in the manner first seen to be the best possible, is, by consequence, the specific election of Gabriel rather than Lucifer, and of Paul rather than Judas."* Now take from the universe divine efficiency and the absolute dominion of motives, and what did God foresee, but merely how creatures, by the selfdetermining power, would treat the motives presented in his government, providence, and grace? He foresaw that Peter would yield to them and that Judas would reject them. And seeing this, his very decision to create these beings and to bring forward this system of motives, was itself the election of Peter and the rejection of Judas. As the submission of Peter and the obstinacy of Judas were acts equally independent of him, one was decreed as much as the other, except that no measures were taken to induce

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