as much to effect the salvation of the one as the other, how can it be said that Peter was elected in distinction from Judas? [Now he will speak out.] Did as much for Judas as for Peter in the whole work of his salvation? Is that the meaning? But we have never said that, or any thing which implies it. Did as much for Judas as he did for Peter at the time he repented? Is that the meaning? [Now surely he will speak out.] We have not asserted even that. We have said that what God did for the repentance of Peter was effectual and converting grace; [because Peter made it effectual and converting ;] and what he did for Judas was ineffectual and resisted grace; [because Judas made it ineffectual by resistance;] and that what he did for both, was all that he in wisdom could do toward the object of securing their repentance and interest in salvation. In purposing to do this, we say in intelligible language, that he elected Peter; and that the election was founded, not in mere will and volition, but in a wise regard to the highest good he could effect in his kingdom.— Whether he did as much for both or not, he resolved to do the best he could, and as a consequence elected Peter. But how, [Dr Tyler asks,] was Peter elected in distinction from Judas? Why, Peter was elected and Judas was not. What other distinction would you have? Perhaps however Dr Tyler refers to the will of God. what else could he refer?] The question would then read thus: Can God will to save Peter in any sense in which he does not will to save Judas, if he prefers that both should repent rather than perish, and does all that he can for the object? Very well: if that is the meaning we are glad to

[And pray, to

come up to the question,"* Well, what does he do? Instead of answering the question directly in a single sentence, he proceeds to erect a guide board, and to write on it the words in 2 Pet. 3. 9, and Rom. 9. 18; and then, for a full page and a half, is calling upon all passengers to examine the guide board. All that I can gather from his explanation is, that the distinction between Peter and Judas was not grounded "on simple will and wont in God;" "that God really preferred, with his whole heart, that Judas should" "repent rather than neglect repentance and perish;" that "he will go forward with the measures of his own choice among his creatures, rescuing with his mercy, [how, he does not say,] and leaving to hardness whom he will ;" and that "he will take this course because he cannot possibly take a better." And this is the explicit answer to Dr Tyler's question, "How was Peter elected in distinction from Judas?" The simple answer should have been, that God foresaw that if he created Peter and Judas and placed them under such circumstances, Peter, by the self-determining power, would accept the invitation and Judas would reject it; and the decision to place them in such circumstances, with such a foresight of the event, was itself the election of the one and the rejection of the other. And whether the Spirit did more for one than the other, he ought not to have been pressed to say; for really he did not know: he could not know and should have said so. If any thing less than an effectual control of the will was done for Peter, who can prove from the mere continuance of Judas in sin, that less was done for him?

And surely the Scriptures could not be expected to make a minute distinction between two invitations both of which were susceptible of rejection. But if the Scriptures do make a distinction between this part of the treatment of Peter and of Judas, it only proves that the work upon Peter was efficient, and that Dr F's explanation of regeneration and election is wrong. And yet in this very passage he himself makes the supposition of different degrees of influence. "If" God "places his creatures in those conditions and under that influence which, while they favour the salvation of all in different degrees, will on the whole secure the greatest number possible for him, &c."* I conclude however that the supposition is, of different degrees of providential influence. It is to this influence, I suppose, that Dr F must refer when he talks of its limitation by a regard to the public good. "If to secure the obedience of Satan and the repentance of Judas, would involve a departure from that use of influence which on the whole is best, &c." "There is full ground for the distinction between the preference of God as to what" creatures "do, and his choice as to what he shall do himself in order to secure their obedience." "Nor can we infer at all from this choice of his heart" respecting the salvation of Judas, "that God could go any further on his part than he did to favour the repentance of Judas, with any gain to the cause of redemption on the whole, or at least with any gain to obedience in his whole kingdom."|| Allowing it supposable that the influence of providence, to be the best for the whole, cannot be the best for every individual; yet * 656. † 652, Note. + 654. || 656.

if sin and its punishment and the redemption it has occasioned, have not led to as much good as holiness in its stead would have done, then the good of the universe cannot be impaired by the highest action of the Spirit upon a Judas that is consistent with his moral agency. If there is no advantage to be gained by his remaining a sinner rather than becoming a saint, what possible injury can be done to any or to all by the strongest efforts of the Spirit upon him that are consistent with his freedom? If the Spirit were not omnipresent, his attention to Judas might draw his attention from others, and so diminish their chance. But that is not to be thought of. If the Spirit foresaw that he could not succeed with Judas, and that stronger attempts would only make him worse, then he did the best he could for Judas. To say that the Spirit did the best for Judas that he could consistently with the interests of holiness at large, and yet not the best he could absolutely, is certainly to say nothing, so long as you assume that it is better for the universe for each individual to be holy than sinful, and so long as no conceivable injury to others could result from the highest efforts of the Spirit upon Judas. If God really desired the holiness of Judas, all things considered, what public interest then could possibly restrain him from using with him the utmost energies of the Spirit that the laws of moral agency would allow? Who could possibly be injured by the strongest effort, (I may say unlimitedly,) that God could make? for any destruction of his moral agency, as it would have prevented the possibility of his holiness, could not have been an effort to make him holy. Look at the thing on every

side. If the holiness of Judas was better for the universe than his sin, and God, all things considered, did most heartily desire it, then, whatever hindrances might lie in the way of his providential influences over him, no injury could arise from the Spirit's doing all he could to make him holy; and he would be sure to do all that.

Shall I now tell you why Dr F is so reluctant to say whether the Spirit did as much for Judas as for Peter? Upon his principles it may be fairly doubted whether he did. I have already said that if the Spirit foresaw that he could not succeed with Judas, and that stronger attempts would only make him worse, then he did the best he could for Judas. This will unriddle the whole mystery. If God foresaw that a greater effort upon Peter would, through the self-determining power, prevail, and that a greater effort upon Judas would only make him worse; then, though by his Spirit he did all he could to any purpose for both, yet it may be presumed that he was encouraged to do, and actually did, more for Peter than for Judas: though upon this principle it must be confessed that he should not have shed upon Judas a ray of light. But this goes upon the supposition that by no exertion of power could he regenerate Judas. And this is denying, not only efficiency, but the absolute control of motives. And then no one will pretend that any thing turned the heart of Peter but the self-determining power.

And if there is no divine efficiency and no control by motives, how comes Dr F to say of our first parents, "They had ability to obey, and the opportunity of confirming their own holiness through the trial, and of bless