such a peculiar substance that its action can be in the highest possible sense its own while caused by the Author of its being. If we are willing, we as completely exercise that willingness as though we had caused it by an independent power. In regard to its being our own, we go as far as our brethren possibly can. The only point of difference is about the cause: not whether it is entirely our own, but what caused it to be exercised. Our brethren, if they differ from us in any thing but words, must mean that the mind of man not only exercises its own affections in the fullest degree, but causes itself to exercise them. If they meant only that the faculties cause the exercises, there is a sense in which this is true; for the essential attributes of mind are necessary to the action of mind. But they seem to have a confused notion that the will, not only exercises such volitions, but chooses to exercise them; placing a volition before every volition, and one before the first; the very absurdity charged upon the old Arminians by Pres. Edwards. The question is not whether Peter does himself exercise the affections, and exercise them in the highest possible sense in which any being can; whether it is his own faculties that put them forth. The question is not whether he is willing in the highest sense in which any being can be willing; whether it is his own hearty willingness. In these points all are agreed. the sole question is, what causes him to exercise such a willingness? One says it is God, another says it is Peter. And those who adopt the latter opinion, talk about his doing it spontaneously,—his doing it because he chooses to do it, as if there needed any other consent than the wil But lingness itself. But they seem to dream of the necessity of a willingness to be willing; which again carries us back to that confusion which Pres. Edwards encountered and exposed; namely, the necessity of a volition before every free volition, and therefore one before the first; else the first is not free; and then, as slaves cannot beget a line of freemen, no part of the series is free. If you say, the mind must cause the volition, there is a sense in which this is true. If there was no mind there could be no volition. It is the mind itself that wills. But the question still returns, what causes the mind to will thus and thus rather than in a contrary way? If you say, the mind chooses to do it, there again is a volition before every free volition, and one before the first. If you say, the mind has power to act in view of motives, I know it well; and so has Judas power to love, but he does not exert that power. Why does Peter exert it? If you say, because he chooses to do it, there again is a volition before every free volition. If you say, the cause lies in the self-determining power, the question still returns, why does Peter exert that power and Judas not? If you trace it to a previous volition in Peter, you have need to find the cause of that, and to run back interminably through a chain which at last leaves an effect without a cause. If the cause of that exertion of the self-determining power is not a previous volition, what is it? A capacity to choose? But Judas has this capacity and does not use it: why does Peter use it if the reason is not a previous choice? His capacity cannot be the cause of his using his capacity in this way; for Judas has the same capacity and does not say so use it. What self-determining power can be controlled by capacity, or can exist in capacity, without a previous choice? The very word self-determination implies a decision from fixed purpose; and this cannot be made by mere power or capacity without an act of the will. No man, I think, can conceive of a self-determining power which proceeds without purpose or choice. A self-determining mind is a mind that purposely determines its own acts and there is a purpose before every purpose, and one before the first. It is in vain to ransack the mind for a self-determining power that does not consist in a capacity to control the volitions by previous volitions. If you mean by the self-determining process, that we choose to choose, it but if you mean any other thing, you must mean only that the mind itself wills; and this is as true on our plan as on yours. The willingness could not be more its own if it carried back an agency beyond its own action to cause its own activity. This language exposes the confusion of the whole system. The theory of self-determination assumes that the mind sends back an agency to cause its own activity,—that it acts to cause its own action,— that it acts before it acts,-that its action causes its first action. If the mind originates its own holy action, it either acts before it acts, or, without acting, it originates its action by a mere power to act. Certainly the action grows out of a power to act; but a power to originate, without acting, is quite a different thing. It is not the mind's power to act, but a power, without acting, to cause itself to act. I will not have such a self-determining power in my system, you say. I always have denied it, and it shall not be fastened upon me. Well then, who does determine the will on your plan? God does not except by motives. Motives have no absolute control. After they have exerted all their force, the will is to decide whether to fall in with them or reject them. In that decision it is not influenced by motives. For after the whole body of motives have done their best, the decision is to be made whether to allow their influence to have any effect. Call that influence ten degrees. It must be no more nor less. The whole body of motives are wrapt up in ten degrees, and the question is, shall ten degrees be rejected or be allowed to prevail? That precise question the mind must decide without the influence of motives. The ten degrees are not the pleading attorney, but the prisoner at the bar. He stands to be judged. If he is allowed to speak, the ten degrees are changed to eleven. is not working on the judge; that influence is the very thing to be judged. It has spent itself, and now the question is, shall that identical influence, without increase or change, be lifted up or cast down? In that decision the will is influenced by nothing out of itself. It is its own determiner. Even the temper and affections are not allowed to interfere. The very thing which the will has to do is to crush and destroy the temper and affections. Selfinterest is not allowed to speak. The whole plea which self-interest has put in is mute in the prisoner at the bar. Not a straggling motive from any corner of the universe is left out of the ten degrees. Not one can exert an influence on the decision. The very point at issue is, whether The influence of motives one of them all shall have the least influence or not. the decision of that question the mind by nothing but its own despotic will. self-determination, tell me what is. In can be determined And if this is not Besides, here is a mind claiming to be rational, and highly jealous of its liberty, that constantly acts, in the highest concerns, without motives, and therefore with no more reason than a block. Every attempt to find in a previous act of the mind the cause of holiness, leads to inconsistency. Some have placed it in a consent to fall in with the motives contained in divine truth; others, (with nearly the same meaning,) in a resolution to submit to God. Let us consider both. The mind consents to fall in with the motives presented in divine truth, before it does fall in with them and put forth holy affections. That consent cannot be holy, for it it is the cause of holiness. And being unholy, it cannot be put in motion by holy motives. Such motives may be addressed to reason and conscience; but none except motives adapted to a selfish temper can induce that unholy consent which produces all the holiness in the soul. Motives of a better character must indeed be in readiness to be fallen in with when the mind consents; but that consent, which has the most important bearing of all the operations of the mind, sets aside as useless, (in respect to itself,) all the holy motives of the universe, and yields only to those which are unholy. It will not itself submit to any but bad motives, and yet it compels the mind to yield to all those which are contained in the truths of God. Take the other view. The advocates of the new doctrine, in their division of the mental powers, comprehend |