a step without assuming certain first principles, such as, that we should do as we would be done unto, or, that a man ought to regard the welfare of his children, or that we ought to respect the intentions of God as manifest in the constitution of our nature. A cultivated conscience is one which by practice has learnt to apply these principles to particular cases, but the principles themselves are granted at first by all human beings, in whom there is not a natural defect, so soon as they come to years of understanding. This appears so obvious as to need no demonstration. In vain would you attempt to educate a man morally who had no notion of duty. As well might you attempt to teach a man born blind the nature of color. The natural faculty which gives us the notion of duty, and enables us to form moral judgments, as the eye gives us the idea of color and enables us to identify and distinguish colors, we call Conscience or the Moral sense.

THE GROANING OF CREATION.

REPLICANT. In answer to QUERIST No. 2, p. 54. We know of no better interpretation than that which was given in our April number. Neither do we see any objection to include inferior animals, so far as their nature renders such reference possible. Beasts are affected by man, since man is their lord. Raise men and you benefit beasts, and vice versa. The 19th and 20th verses might include a reference to beasts, but, of course, in a vague and looser way. With regard to the Gentile world "waiting for the manifestation of the Sons of God," we see no difficulty. In the same way as the universal desires for redemption were an unconscious prophecy of the Sa

viour, so now there are a universal need and vague aspiration for the consummation of the blessing.

INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
OBJECTIONS.

REPLICANT. In answer to QUERIST No. 3, p. 54. As my name was associated with U. T.s query No. 48, vol. 8, page 531, which P. M. H. has reproduced at greater length, perhaps I may be permitted to offer the following in reply:

(1) "Has any individual a right to expect, or require, any act from another, which he would not perform himself?" On the assumption that that other is in the same position and circumstances as himself, certainly not. But I need not remind P. M. H. that there are relative duties, as well as individual; and that what is perfectly right in a parent, a master, or a ruler, might be perfectly wrong in a child, a servant, or a subject.

(2) "Should any consistent advocate of capital punishments object, or refuse, to carry out by his own hands the last penalty of the law ??' When circumstances point him out as the proper person to undertake such a duty, certainly not. But we must always distinguish between questions of conscience, and questions of physical nerve. We may instinctively shrink from doing many things which we know in our consciences to be indubitably right.

(3) "Assuming that capital punishments are in harmony with Christian ethics, is not the odium now attaching to the Sheriff's assistant most illogical?" Undoubtedly it is: and it would be scarcely less so, on the assumption that capital punishments were contrary to Christian ethics; for then the odium would pro

perly attach to those who advocate, and those who order, executions, rather than to the executioner exclusively. But there is something far more illogical than this alleged odium of the hangman. It is when writers on "Christian ethics" adopt popular sentiment (real, or supposed) as a test of truth, and insinuate that "odium" is an evidence of wrong. If we followed out such a deduction from popular feelings, whether on this side the Atlantic or the other, we should arrive at some surprising conclusions.

(4) "Can any consistently advocate war, who is not ready forthwith to take up arms, and shed blood?" Again, distinguishing between conscience and physical fitness, I reply No;-but on this condition, that by “forthwith” P. M. H. means, "so soon as the circumstances have arisen under which such an one advocated war." We may thank God that, at the worst times, a very small proportion of the population is required actually to engage in warfare; and in a nation of free, brave men, the duty of volunteering for such service can safely be left to individual judgment. As regards consistency, methinks it is no more inconsistent for one to maintain the lawfulness of war, while he sees it not his own duty to practise arms, than it is for one to advocate the spread of Christianity without himself becoming a missionary.

Our friend's remaining paragraphs do not take the form of questions, and are not very easy of analysis. If I read them aright they involve two, and only two, propositions. (1) That man in his corporate action is as much amenable to the laws of rectitude, as in his private conduct. (2) That man in a corporate capacity acquires no moral rights which he

cannot have in his individual capacity. To the former of these no exception can be taken; and it is, as P. M. H. intimates, a truth peculiarly important now, when combination for all kinds of purposes is so universal, and when we so often see how such divided responsibility tends to weaken individual conscience. With respect to the second proposition, I would respectfully urge our QUERIST to reconsider his position; for he will find, on consulting his New Testament, that society in its national form has most important rights and functions, which do not belong to individual citizens. Thus Christianity_prohibits private vengeance (Rom. xii. 19.), but it recognises public vengeance, as the divinely appointed mission of civil government (Rom. xiii. 4 -6). P. M. H. seems to view society as only an aggregate of independent units, instead of what it is, an organized whole. Perhaps by observing the language and conduct of inspired men we may obtain more satisfaction on these points than by vague generalities about "moral rights and immunities," "theory of society," &c. St. Paul did not court assassination-he guarded against it (Acts ix. 25–xxiii. 17.); yet when before Festus he used these words, (Acts xxv. 11.)-"If I have committed anything WORTHY DEATH, I refuse not to die." Now if St. Paul knew that in reality no crime was worthy of death, and that his execution as an actual malefactor would have been as much a murder as his being destroyed by the populace for preaching the Gospel, how could he, whose special glory it was to bear witness to the truth "before the Gentiles, and kings," allow himself to use such language as this? To his hearers it could convey but one meaning; and to

OF

THE NEMESIS OF CIVILISATION.*

No reflection is borne home with more melancholy impressiveness upon the student of history than that of the range and potency of the great law of mutation. Man sees this law acting in the universe around him, but he is slow to open his eyes to the extent of its sway over himself. If the forest has grown green and faded for hundreds of years, he yet knows it will some day fall. He has a terrible suspicion that the very soil of the world may be

come exhausted. He can believe that the stars will grow old'; but he is exquisitely ingenious in shielding his breast from thought of his own death, and still less does he realise that even the forces gained by the social union are unable to resist the approaches of decay, and that nations and politics sink into the grave as well as individuals. It is a melancholy thing to behold the system of civilisation which has illumined the world for a thousand years smouldering in grey ashes. Yet