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fore in all the regulations we make, with respect to our conftitution, we are to guard against running too much into that form of government which is properly called democratical: this was, in my opinion, the effect of the triennial law, and will again be the effect, if ever it should be restored.

THAT triennial elections would make our government too tedious in all their refolves, is evident; because, in fuch cafe, no prudent administration would ever refolve upon any measure of confequence, till they had felt not only the pulfe of the parliament, but the pulfe of the people; and the minifters of state would always labour under this disadvantage, that as fecrets of ftate muft not be immediately divulged, their enemies (and enemies they will always have) would have a handle for expofing their measures, and rendering them difagreeable to the people, and thereby carrying perhaps a new election against them, before they could have an opportunity of justifying their meafures, by divulging those facts and circumftances, from whence the juftice and the wisdom of their meafures would clearly appear.

THEN, Sir, it is by experience well known, that what is called the populace of every country, are apt to be too much elated with fuccefs, and too much dejected with every misfortune; this makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of state, and never long of the fame mind; and as this houfe is chofen by the free and unbiaffed voice of the people in general, if this choice were so often renewed, we might expect, that this house would be as wavering and as unfteady as the peoplé ufually are; and it being impoffible to carry on the public affairs of the nation, without the concurrence of this houfe, the minifters would always be obliged to comply, and confequently, would be obliged to change their measures, as often as the people changed their minds.

WITH feptennial Parliaments, Sir, we are not exposed to either of these misfortunes, because, if the minister, after having felt the pulfe of the parliament, which they can always foon do, refolve upon any measures, they have gene. rally time enough before the new elections come on, to give the people proper information, in order to fhew them the juftice and the wisdom of the measures they have purfued; and if the people should at any time be too much elated, or too much dejected, or should without a caufe change their minds, thofe at the helm of affairs have time to fet them right before a new election comes on.

As to faction and fedition, Sir, I will grant, that in monarchical and ariftocratical governments, it generally arises from violence and oppreffion; but in democratical governments, it always arifes from the people's having too great a fhare in the government; for in all countries, and in all governments, there always will be many factious and unquiet fpirits, who can never be at reft either in power or out of power; when in power, they are never eafy, unless every man submits intirely to their direction; and when out of power, they are always working and intriguing against those that are in, without any regard to justice, or to the interest of their country: in popular governments such men have too much game, they have too many opportunities for working upon and corrupting the minds of the people, in order to give them a bad impreffion of, and to raise discontents against thofe that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and thefe difcontents often break out into feditions, and infurrections. This, Sir, would in my opinion be our misfortune, if our Parliaments were either annual or triennial: by fuch frequent elections, there would be fo much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would deftroy

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that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our conftitution : in short, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical. Therefore, in order to preferve our conftitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to preferve that law, which I really think has brought our conftitution to a more equal mixture, and confequently to greater perfection than it was ever in, before that law took place.

As to bribery and corruption, Sir, if it were poffible to influence, by fuchi bafe means, the majority of the electors of Great-Britain, to chufe fuch men as would probably give up their liberties; if it were poffible to influence, by such means, a majority of the members of this houfe, to confent to the establishment of arbitrary power, I would readily allow, that the calculations made by the gentlemen of the other fide were juft, and their inference true; but I am perfuaded that neither of these is poffible. As the members of this house generally are, and muft always be gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country; is it poffible to suppose, that any of them could, by a penfion, or a poft, be influenced to confent to the overthrow of our conftitution; by which the enjoyment, not only of what he got, but of what he before had, would be rendered altogether precarious? I will allow, Sir, that with respect to bribery, the price must be higher or lower, generally in proportion to the virtue of the man who is to be bribed; but it must likewife be granted, that the humour he happens to be in at the time, the fpirit he happens to be endowed with, adds a great deal to his virtue. When no encroachments are made upon the rights of the people, when the people do not think themfelves in any danger, there may be many of the electors, who by a bribe

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of ten guineas, might be induced to vote for one candidate rather than another; but if the court were making any encroachments upon the rights of the people, a proper fpirit would, without doubt, arife in the nation; and in fuch a cafe, I am perfuaded, that none, or very few, even of such electors could be induced to vote for a court candidate; no, not for ten times the fum.

THERE may, Sir, be fome bribery and corruption in the nation; I am afraid there will always be fome; but it is no proof of it, that ftrangers are fometimes chofen; for a gentleman may have fo much natural influence over a borough in his neighbourhood as to be able to prevail with them to chufe any perfon he pleases to recommend ; and if upon fuch recommendation they chufe one or two of his friends, who are perhaps ftrangers to them, it is not from thence to be inferred, that the two ftrangers were chofen their reprefentatives by the means of bribery and corruption..

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To infinuate, Sir, that money may be issued from the public treasury for bribing elections, is really fomething very extraordinary, especially in those gentlemen who know how many checks are upon every fhilling that can be issued from thence; and how regularly the money granted in one year for the public fervice of the nation, muft always be accounted for, the very next feffion, in this house, and likewife in the other, if they have a mind to call for any fuch account. And as to the gentlemen in offices, if they have any advantage over country gentlemen, in have fomething elfe to depend on befides their own private fortunes, they have likewise many disadvantages: they are obliged to live at London with their families, by which they are put to a much greater expence, than gentlemen of equal fortunes, who live in the country: this lays them under a very great difadvantage,

difadvantage, with refpect to the fupporting their intereft in the country. The country gentleman, by living among the electors, and purchafing the neceffaries for his family from them, keeps up an acquaintance and correfpondence with them, without putting himself to any extraordinary charge; whereas a gentleman who lives in London, has no other way of keeping up an acquaintance or correfpondence among his friends in the country, but by going down once or twice a year at a very extraordinary charge and often without any other bufinefs; fo that we may conclude, a gentleman in office cannot, even in seven years, fave much for diftributing in ready money, at the time of an election; and I really believe, if the fact were narrowly inquired into, it would appear, that the gentlemen in office are as little guilty of bribing their electors with ready money, as any other fet of gentlemen in the kingdom.

THAT there are ferments often raifing among the people without any just cause, is what I am surprised to hear controverted, fince very late experience may convince us of the contrary. Do not we know what a ferment was raised in the nation, towards the latter end of the late Queen's reign? And it is well known, what a fatal change in the affairs of this nation was introduced, or at least confirmed, by an clection's coming on while the nation was in that ferment. Do not we know what a ferment was raised in the nation, foon after his late Majefty's acceffion? And if an election had then been allowed to come on, while the nation was in that ferment, it might perhaps have had as fatal effects as the former; but, thank God, this was wifely provided against by the very law which is now wanted to be repealed.

As fuch ferments may hereafter often happen, I must think that frequent elections will always be dangerous; for

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