with these our moral speculations. Practice too often creeps, where theory can foar. The philofopher proves as weak, as those whom he moft contemns. A mortifying thought to fuch as well attend it. Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your general idea of the fovereign good. This is eafy from your own account, however intricate the detail. THUS then, faid he, fince you are fo urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. The Sovereign Good is that, the poffeffion of which renders us happy. And how, faid 1, do we poffefs it? Is it fenfual, or intellectual? There you are entering, said he, upon the detail. This is beyond your queftion. Not a fmall advance, faid I, to indulge your curiofity? Will you raise me a thirst, and be fo cruel not to allay it? It is not, replied he, of my raising, but your own. Befides I am not certain, should 1 attempt to proceed, whether you will admit fuch authorities as it is poffible I may vouch. That, faid I, must be determined by their weight and character. Suppofe, faid he, it fhould be mankind; the whole human race. Would you not think it something ftrange, to seek of those concerning Good, who pursue it a thoufand ways, and many of them contradictory? I confess, faid I, it feems fo. And yet, continued he, were there a point, in which fuch diffentients ever agreed, this agree ment would be no mean argument in favour of its truth and juftness. But where, replied I, is this argument to be found? He answered me by asking, what if it should appear, that there were certain original characteristics and pre-conceptions of good, which were natural, uniform and common to all men? which all recognized in their various pursuits ; and that the difference lay only in the applying them to par ticulars ? ticulars? This requires, faid I, to be illuftrated. As if continued he, a company of travellers, in fome wide forest, were all intending for one city, but each by a rout peculiar to himself. The roads indeed would be various, and many perhaps false; but all who travelled, would have one end. in view. It is evident, faid I, they would. So fares it then, added he, with mankind in the pursuit of good. The ways indeed are many, but what they seek is one. FOR instance: Did you ever hear of any, who in pursuit of their good were for living the life of a bird, an infect, or a fish. None. And why not? It would be inconfiftent, answered I, with their nature. You fee then, said he, they all agree to this; that what they pursue, ought to be confiftent, and agreeable to their proper nature. So ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo, continued he,one pre-concep-tion is discovered, which is common to good in general. It is, that all good is fuppofed fomething agreeable to nature.. This indeed, replied I, feems to be agreed on all hands. BUT again, faid he, Is there a man fcarcely to be found of a temper fo truly mortified, as to acquiefce in the lowest, and fhorteft ncceffaries of life? Who aims not, if he be able, at fomething farther, something better? I replied, fcarcely one. Do not multitudes purfue, said he, infinite objects of defire, acknowledged, every one of them, to be in no respect neceffaries? Exquifite viands, delicious wines, fplendid apparel, curious gardens; magnificent apartments adorned with pictures and fculptures; music and poetry, and the whole tribe of elegant arts? It is evident, faid I. If it be,, continued he, it should feem that they all confidered the Chief or Sovereign Good, not to be that, which conduces to bare existence or mere being; for to this the neceffaries alone are adequate. I replied, they were. But if not this, it must be somewhat conducive to that, which is fuperior to mere AGAIN, continued he. What labour, what expence, to procure those rarities, which our own poor country is unable to afford us! How is the world ranfacked to its utmoft verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter ! Nay more: How do we baffle nature herself; invert her order; feek the vegetables of fpring in the rigours of winter, and winter's ice during the heats of summer! I replied, we did. And what disappointment, what remorfe, when endeavours fail? It is true.. If this then be evident, faid he, it would feem, that whatever we defire as our Chief and Sovereign Good, is fomething which, as far as poffible, we would accommodate to all places and times. I anfwered, so it appear.. See then, faid he, another of its characteristics another pre-conception. What BUT farther ftill; What contefts for wealth ! fcrambling for property? What perils in the purfuit! What folicitude in the maintenance ! And why all this? To what purpose, what end? Or is not the reason plain? Is it not that wealth may continually procure us whatever we fancy good; and make that perpetual, which would otherwise be tranfient? I replied, it feemed fo. Is it not farther dfired, as supplying us from ourselves; when without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of others, and depend: depend on their caprice for all that we enjoy? It is true, faid I, this feems a reason. AGAIN; Is not power of every degree as much contested for as wealth? Are not magiftracies, honours, principali-ties, and empire, the subjects of ftrife and everlasting contention? I replied, they were. And why, faid he, this? To obtain what end? Is it not to help us, like wealth, to Is it not farther to afcer the poffeffion of what we defire ? tain, to secure our enjoyments; that, when others would deprive us, we may be strong enough to refift them? I replied it was. OR, to invert the whole; Why are there, who feek receffes the moft diftant and retired; flee courts and power, and fubmit to parfimony and obfcurity? Why all this, but from the fame intention? From an opinion that small poffessions, used moderately, are permanent: that larger poffeffions raise envy, and are more frequently invaded : that the fafety of power and dignity is more precarious than that of retreat; and that therefore they have chofen, what is most eligible upon the whole? It is not, faid I, improbable, that they act by fome fuch motive. Do you not fee then, continued he, two or three more pre-conceptions of the Sovereign Good, which are fought for by all, as effential to constitute it? And what, faid I are these? That it fhould not be tranfient, nor derived from the will of others, nor in their power to take away ; but be durable, felf-derived, and (if I may use the expreffion) in-deprivable. I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. But we have already found it to be confidered, as fomething agreeable to our nature; conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being;; and what we aim to have accommodated to all places and times. We have.. THERE may be other characteristics, said he, but these I think fufficient. See then its idea; behold it, as collected from the original, natural and univerfal pre-conceptions of all mankind. The Sovereign Good, they have taught us, ought to be fomething agreeable to our nature; conducive to well-being; accommodated to all places and times; durable, felf-derived, and indeprivable. Your account, faid I, appears juft. HARRIS. СНА Р. II. THE SAME SUBJECT. BRUTUS perished untimely, and Cæfar did no more. These words I was repeating the next day to myself, when my friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me good-morrow. I could not return his compliment with an equal gaiety, being intent, fomewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this he propofed a walk into the fields. The face of nature, said he, will perhaps difpel these glooms. No affiftance, on my part, fhall be wanting, you may be affured. I accepted his propofal; the walk began; and our former converfation infenfibly renewed. BRUTUS, faid he, perished untimely, and Cæfar did no more. It was thus, as I remember, not long fince, you were expreffing yourself. And yet fuppofe their fortunes to have been exactly parallel-Which would you have preferred ? Would you have been Cæfar, or Brutus? Brutus, replied I, beyond all controverfy. He afked me, Why? Where was the difference, when their fortunes, as we now fuppofed them, were confidered as the fame? These feems faid I, abstract from their fortunes, fomething, I know not what, intrinfically preferable |